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Abstract of a thesis offered for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy of the Open University, in Augut, 1993, entitled
The Cultural Context of the Theories of Heinrich Schenker, by
Barbara WIiittle.
The thesis presents Schenker t
 s theory of musical
structure as grounded in the (mainly pedagogic) music theory
and practice of the eighteenth century, like the music of
the period of German classicism to which it relates. It
argues that Scheriker was right to see his theory as having a
wider significance than the strictly music-theoretical, and
that the music-structural concept which he elaborated and
codified is inseparable fran the work as a whole. Set apart
fran the aesthetic and cultural outlook fran which it
emerged, the historical and critical studies of the
repertory and of the theoretical literature, it may still be
usable, but it is profoundly impoverished and loses the very
particular meaning it had for Schenker.
The thesis proposes that while Schenker' s formulation of
his structural concept is unique,. the concept itself is not,
but was a cultural property which Schenker re-discovered and
that it is in this re-discovery as much as in the thing
itself that the significance of his work resides.
The view of Schenker as an eccentric is counterbalanced
by a picture of a thinker moulded by experiences anything but
unique to him, but, nevertheless unique to a particular
historical phase. It is suggested that in the absence of a
minimal degree of understanding of this phase and these
experiences no judgement of Schenker as thinker,' writer, even
musician, can properly be made.
- 3.1:1. -
Chapter One gives a brief account of Schenker' s career.
Chapter Two attempts to define a context for his exploration
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pedagogic theory.
Chapter Three attempts to dispose of sane mid-century
shibboleths inhibiting understanding of Schenker. Chapter
Four explores the radical changes in the character of musical
scholarship taking place in Schenker' s lifetime, relating
these to developnents in other fields, especially in
philology, and considers their effect on him. Chapter Five
considers Schenker' s attitude towards aesthetic and
scientific theories in circulation in his day and their
contribution to the formulation of his music-structural
concept and its developnent. The main focus of this chapter
is the metaphysics of music of Schopenhauer. Chapter Six
examines sane of the problems arising fran Schenker' S
historical-cultural situation and considers the enabling role
played for him by the sork of Nietzsche.
- iv -
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Introduction
Of the acres of print devoted to 'Schenkerian analysis'
only a small proportion has been focused on Scheriker' s own
work. Most of the secondary literature consists of accounts
of systems extrapolated fran his late writings with various
degrees of faithfulness to his theoretical principles, and
often little or none to his philosophical ones, and records
of analyses of works employing these systems. Other
approaches - attets to trace theoretical antecedents, to
consider the early work, to explore the cultural context in
which the work was done, to consider his thought as a whole
- remain peripheral and often tentative.'
?s for the theorist himself, he remains rather
sketchily delineated, represented by a few gestures:
querulous, vehement, , hurrourless, a Besserwisser.
The only substantial biographical study seems at first
glance unlikely to humanise this shadow, written as it is
in a drily documentary style avoiding anything that cannot
be referred to a letter or a diary entry, or sane other.
written record.2
But Schenker was a constitutional recorder. He hoarded,1
notes, newspaper cuttings, letters, drafts of letters, and,1
fran his late twenties onwards, the minutiae of his
day-to-day experience on the thousands of pages of his
diaries. Eien the rrost ascetically scholarly biographer,
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merely by quoting from this material, as Federhofer does
extensively, delivers, in spite of himself, a picture laden
with detail, in a huge, rich, even fantastic perspective.
Schenker is no longer a few lines pencilled on a blank
sheet, but a figure in a landscape.
The following pages attempt to explore sane aspects of
this landscape in relation to this figure with the hope of
contributing a little to the understanding of both. It seems
premature to approach the sDrk critically until the
underlying assumptions and their origins are more fully
considered. To be fruitful, such an approach ould have to
be very different from the rather arbitrarily judgemental
treathent to which Schenker' s output has been too often
subjected on the one hand, and the assumption, on the other,
that its supposed irica1 purity automatically guarantees
its validity. An essential precondition is the reduction of
the nrystification which has flourished because of the lack
of an intelligible context. This context must include the
theoretical history to which Schenker devoted so much time,
the rise of ncdern musicology, against which phenomenon he
had to srk out his career, and the philosophical influences
upon that developnent and upon alternative modes of thought
such as Schenker t s. It must also take cognisance of the
historical circumstances impinging on the lives of musicians
and musical scholars in his time, and of what he brought to
his studies fran his personal background.
Part of the mystification, however, has nothing to do
with Schenker, but with the peculiar insularity of at
least certain branches of mid-twentieth-century musical
scholarship, which sean sometimes to have been better
informed about the remote pas than about their own recent
history and more au fait with fashionable theories in other
-2-
fields than with some rather basic aspects of their own.
These conditions have made Schenker more obscure than he
need have been.
It is not self-evident that theories of music analysis
are necessary. Nor is it obvious what they achieve, in
particular, whether they benefit art. Of course analysis
is not necessarily meant to benefit art. It is done
perhaps for the benefit of the analyst, because it amuses
him, or for its educative value, or for some other purpose
quite external to the purposes of the art itself. Scie
analytic studies have been undertaken in order to make
possible the formulation of rules of composition. Others
have been more purely scientific in character, attipts to
discover not so much the patterns the composers consciously
weave into their work, as underlying patterns of which they
may not be conscious, or which are not, at least in the
first instance, the product of conscious contriving. Some
analysts have seen themselves as working in a different way
from the composer but in the same direction and towards the
same end, namely the manifestation of universal laws of
organisation. The composer, to use Schenker' s word,
'divines', the analyst discovers. The work of art in this
view is a means to an end, which is the refining and
ultimate perfection of the art whose purpose is essentially
revelatory.	 C:
It is this notion of the purpose of art, among other
things, which has led some critics of Schenker to see him as
attaching himself to out-of-date philosophical - ideas .
Attempts to salvage the usable parts of a theory thus
tainted have tried to re-focus the analytic purpose, and
Schenker' s theory has lent itself to various
re-interpretations which seek to accamodate it to a more
-3-
modern notion of science, ironically in view of Schenker's
hostility to the scientising of music. But, in reality,
the analysis of music is, by definition, scientific and has
always considered itself so, not necessarily with less
justification in 1618 or 1860 than in 1959 or 1977.
In its physical-mathematical aspect, music theory
goes as far back as the history of rational thought, but
fran time irmemorial, this same aspect of it has also been
felt to have religious significance, and the to kinds of
thought are often, indeed, until the eighteenth century,
almost always, associated. Even the Enlightenment did not
seriously disrupt this connection. An atpirical approach to
the discovery of laws of musical organisation, as Descartes
had shown, was not incanpatible with belief in God as the
originator of those laws . Even the pest-Newtonian search
for a physical origin for them did little to reduce the
mysteriousness of music. 4 Indeed, it might have helped to
keep the sense of mystery alive by its blatant lack of
relation to artistic experience, a lack which snetimes made
the theorists a laughing-stock among canposers. Metaphysical
accounts of the art continued to be influential well into
the early years of the present century, making it possible
to propose a quasi-religious interpretation of the origins
of musical law, as Schenker did, without thereby necessarily
losing intellectual credibility, except in certain quarters.
Unfortunately for Schenker these quarters soon caine to
include the dcmain of musicology. Schenker' S frequent
reference to the Divinity became one of the many causes for
embarrassment he gave to his followers. It is also one of
the things that makes the story interesting. How does it
coma about that a writer regarded as superstitious,
irrational, out of touch with modernity, can have influenced
-4-
theorists reared in a systn of thought so hostile to
anything metaphysical that they cannot read him?
Schenker' s real fame began only after his death. He
died almost five years before the war, and his name began to
be widely known outside the German speaking world - where it
was already virtually forgotten - only a decade after it.,
The gap which separated him fran his new public was
difficult to bridge. He wrote in one language and the
hoped-for public read another. The translation of the work
has been slow. As independent reading of Scheriker was
thought to be positively harmful to the developnent of an
orthodox Schenkerism, it was not a high priority.
In these circumstances, the myth of Schenker as a kind
of scientific equivalent of the holy fool was easy to
prcinulgate. Even those who could read German and lay hands
on the rare copies of his works still extant were bewildered
by his style of thinking and his personal and parochial
theoretical jargons, which made carparison of his theory
with the versions offered by his followers anything but
straightforward.
Perhaps the most rnarkable feature of the mid-century
reaction to the reappearance of Schenker 's theory is the
inability of the critics to place Schenker t s philosophical,
historical, scientific, even his music-theoretical -
assumptions. 5 The belief that these ideas, none of which'
was in the least extraordinary in its time and place,
ware idiosyncratic to the point of calling into
question Schenker!s mental stability, or were part of
some pseudo-philosophy, deservedly defunct and buried
beyond the reach of research, was all too obviously
genuine.
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while this ignorance facilitated the substitution for
his philosophical rationale of alternatives more congenial
to mid-century America, it also led to some serious
misreadings of his strictly music-theoretical and
music-pedagogic notions, notions which were crucial to his
theory and at the heart of his motivation as a teacher and
as a scholar.
It is surely only misunderstanding that can have led to
the belief that a good preparation for the study of Schenker
is a conventional training in 'harnony and counterpoint'
This would suggest that Schenker' s theory, far from offering
any challenge to conventional pedagogic prograims, is
entirely compatible with them, even dependent upon them.
Schenker would have found this acquiescence in the
institutional status quo profoundly depressing. All those
years of poring over the pedagogic literature, arguing with
the authors, comparing their rules with the practice of the
cariposers, testing, reasoning, tracing the sources of their
assumptions, the outpouring of effort which the text-Iok
hacks of his day avoided by simply repeating what they had
read in works of other hacks and adding a few refinements of
their own. . .ssould sean to have been futile if at the end of
it the student is still sent back to such sources for
instruction in harrtony and counterpoint before he is
considered ready to be initiated into 'Schenkerian
analysis'.
A non-musician could be forgiven for thinking that
'harmony and counterpoint' are the names of disciplines as
clearly defined as - say - 'calculus' or 'meteorology'. This
is not so. There is not, and never has been, any universally
-6-
agreed definition of 'harrrony' either as an academic
discipline or as a metaphysical entity. There are as many
definitions as there are authors of text-books and the
text-books are legion.
The case of counterpoint is, if possible, still
rrore confused. For sane people counterpoint means
essentially 'species counterpoint'. For others it means
exactly those parts of the curriculum which are not
included in the species: rrotivic or imitative counterpoint,
double, invertible, mirror counterpoints and other such
techniques, and above all fugue. Schenker' s hostility to
this latter interpretation of the role of counterpoint
in classical canposition is rooted in the particularity
of his experience as a part-time music student in
late-nineteenth-century-Vienna. Very soon after his time
at the Conservatory the counterpoint course he had
attended no longer ran. Species counterpoint became an
antiquarian-musicological property relinquished by the
Conservatory pedagogues to the University theorists.
Theorists for whan counterpoint means primarily species
counterpoint are further divided into those who feel that
the species are inseparable fran the ecclesiastical modes
and those who favour a major-minor adaptation of the systen.
Fux belonged to the former group, Schenker very vociferously
to the latter. ' It is therefore mis1eading to say without
further qualification that 'in the Schenkerian tradition r
the reference point is Fux. Yet 'another line of division
is one between those who, like Schenker (and, irideed,
Bruckner, still in Schenker' s time), distinguish th&
pedagogic fran the analytic motivation of the species, and
the style-analysts, who conflate them.
-7-
These discrepancies reflect the difficulty of defining
counterpoint itself, the art in its various guises, as we
find it in the works of those who were masters of it. There
is no rrore agreement about the nature of this art than
about counterpoint as an academic discipline, and authors of
'pedagogical works' who pretend that there is should be
treated with the same caution as authors of harrtony books
who give us to understand that four-part barrrony exercises
written according to schemes worked out in terms of
invertible triads, constructed upon scale steps identified
by Roman numerals, and connected according to 'the two
well-known guide-lines: . . .1) preserve canton tones or 2)
trove to the nearest note by step. . . subject to the
prohibition of parallel perfect intervals', reflect the
compositional procedure used by Bach in writing chorales.8
Schenker' s study of counterpoint is anything but a
survey of the literature, merely. To begin with he ignores
large areas of it entirely, focusing overwhelmingly, and
minutely, on the species. This is, noreover, a particular
version of the species, considered fran a particular point
of view. This kind of contrapuntal theory for Schenker is a
Cartesian basket of apples 'sane of which are bad'. What he
does is 'to ty [the] basket completely and take out and
test the apples one by one, in order to put the good ones
back in [the] basket and throw away those that are not
[good 1' . Whatever may ultimately be thought of his
criteria, this was a nonumental labour, too important to
the deve1oprent of his thought to be ignored, as it has
tended to be by the systematisers, who could not extricate
themselves fran the musicological conventions, so hated by
Schenker, to which they were anxious to make hin appear to
conform.
-8-
The patent lack of understanding between Schenker and
some of his most widely read interpreters, their concern,
indeed, to distance themselves from him, calls into question
the authenticity of any theory extrapolated fran his work
which takes no account of his own guiding principles. Anyone
who reads Free Composition must be struck by the striving
for systematic consistency, the desire to leave no
loopholes. it is inevitable that this should prompt caution
in the reader, but it cannot justify the arbitrary
selection of the most appealing features without reference
to any comprehensive rationale. It is the principles to
which the phenomena are required to conform that should be
considered critically. This is a topic the present study
attempts to prise a little wider open.
-9-.-
Notes
1.	 i.	 For a listing of the secondary
literature see Beach, 1985.
ii. Literature addressing theoretical
antecedents and of particular relevance to
the present study includes Morgan 1978;
Grave, 1980; Wason, 1983; Krebs, 1988.
iii. For a list of the philosophical
literature see Pastille, 1985.
For further listings see Siegel, 1990, p. 2.
2.	 See Federhofer, 1985
3.	 See Descartes, ed. Anscnbe and Geach, 1970.
See Christensen, 1989.
5.	 See e.g., Narnur, 1980, especially Ch. 3.
6. See Forte and Gilbert, 1982, p.1.
7. Johann Joseph Fux, (1660-1741) published his
Gradus ad Parnassum in 1725.
8. See op. cit., n. 6. p. 50.
9. See op. cit., n. 3, p. xxi.
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chapter 1
Heinrich Schenker
Heinrich Schenker was born on 19th June 1868 in
Wisniowczyk, near Podhajce (Podgacy) in Galicia (now
Ukrainia), where his father was a doctor. 1 He attended a
Gymnasium in Lernberg (Lvv) but took his Matura in Brzeany
(Berehany) before going as a law student to Vienna in 1884.
In 1887 he enrolled at the Conservatory, attending the
harrrony and counterpoint classes of Bruckner and studying
piano with Ernst Ludwig. He received his doctorate in law in
1889 and nbarked on a free-lance musical and journalistic
career. Apart fran holidays in the 'Iyro1 he made only rare
excursions out of Vienna, on one of which he re-visited
Lemberg as accompanist to the Dutch bass singer Messchaert.
From about 1900 he devoted his time a1rrst exclusively to
private teaching and writing, never holding any
institutional appointment. After a long friendship, he
married Jeanette Kornfeld (ne Schiff) on her divorce in
1919. His health had been sufficiently precarious to exanpt
him from military service in 1914 when symptoms of diabetes
began to appear. He became acutely ill on 4th January,
1935, and died ten days later. Jaenette Schenker died
in Theresienstadt in 1945. There were no children.
- 11 -
*	 *	 *
The major problem in approaching Schenker' s writings
has been a cultural one. His wildly incorrect political
views were an embarrassment to his anigr pupils and
followers, and indeed remain so. His reactionary attitude
appears everywhere in his writings - He prefaced his
works with diatribes of extraordinary ferocity against
progress in all its forms, against the dilettantism
of an ignorant public and the irresponsibility of
the cctmercialisers of art, the performers, publishers,
entrepreneurs, teachers, institutions, who pander to its
philistinism. He interspersed his texts with similar
outhursts, sanetimes astonishingly personaUed, and
never tired of making connections between his
aesthetic interpretations and his giitist social and
2
cultural ideas.
It was by no means only Modernism - a late
manifestation of the cultural catastrophe he talked
about in his preface to Counterpoint - which provoked
him. The whole culture, he believed, bad long been corrupt.
But it is not at all easy to pinpoint the time at which he
believed this corruption had set in, and it begins to seem
that the culture he envisaged is not so much an historical
reality as an ideal capable of realisation only through art,
a fleeting glimpse of which was afforded by the brief
flowering of the German classical revival, and whose
fulfilment must await a future chastened by catastrophe.
His work also presented problems of style arid of a more
- 12 -
specifically musicological-ideological nature. But it is
hardly necessary to look much further than his hostility to
the whole secularist, pluralist and materially oriented
ethos of which musicology is so much a part, in order
to understand the neglect of his writings and the reluctance
to translate them, and to find a motive for the apologies
and disclaimers that are their standard editorial
accompaniment. This is the background against which the
effort to carve out one portion of his work fran the rest
and to claim that this is both justifiable and beneficial
should be considered. There may have been a certain truth in
the latter claim, since the presentation of the works in
their entirety to an intellectual coninunity fastidious in
the extreme about political correctness would have made the
professional position of Schenkerians difficult and the
continuation of interest in his thought doubtful. Even the
survival of a body of work of enormous historical interest
might have been at risk.
This embarrassment, however, reflects the difficulties
of the emigrs and the political pressures on intellectuals
in the Anglo-Saxon world since the war as clearly as
Schenker t s attitudes reflect his situation. Schenker' s
reactionariness was only part of the problem.
He is categorised by the New Grove as 'an Austrian
theorist of Polish birth'. Another fact of his biography
crucial to his career, as well as a potent influence on his
outlook and even directly on his theorising, was either
thought too insignificant to be worth mentioning, or felt to
be sane kind of embarrassment: the fact that, rather more
than he was a Pole and at least as much as he was an
Austrian, he was a Jew.
- 13 -
Of course, this can be regarded as insignificant if, in
accordance with the superstition that an individual can be
separated from his thought, we regard Scheriker' s experience
in its entirety as insignificant, and if we are sufficiently
ingenious about separating his abstract, 'scientific'
activity fran other aspects of his thought, so that the
latter can be assigned to the irrelevant domain of the
personal. But Schenker's affection for Judaism and his
position as a Jew are indispensable keys to an understanding
of his political-cultural attitudes. Contextiess, as he and
his work have so often been presented, these curious
attitudes look like evidence of a character flaw, which -
according to the received wisdom - mercifully did not
impinge upon his analytic work, since this was purely
eirical. The reality is irore interesting.
*	 *	 *
-
Schenker was a particular kind of Jewish intellectual.
It is not merely that he was a devout believer. A Jew who is
assimilated in every other respect and carries his religion
as lightly as a mriber of any other denomination, lightly
enough for it to have no significant effect on his
professional activity, is unexceptionable. But Schenker was
patently not, in this sense, fully assimilated, even if, in
point of menners and social behaviour, he was
indistinguishable from the converts. It is not so much the
fact that he allows specifically Jewish thought to interfere
with his work, but that he entertains religious ideas at all
on a plane generally considered entirely secular, which is,
in a sense, a peculiarity of his kind of Jewishness. Worse,
there is a streak of something suspiciously like
- 14 -
fundamentalism in his religious outlook, and this also shows
through in his work in a way that is even more difficult for
twentieth century scholarship to deal with. If his religion
had not been de-mythologised it is not surprising that his
resistance to the metaphysical was not as implacable as a
well brought up positivist might wish.
The significance of his Jewishness would not have been
so clear, except perhaps to fellow Jews, until relatively
recently. 'Iwo develornents have made it inescapably so. In
the last decade there has been a spectacular growth of
interest in pre-Holocaust Vienna and much study has been
devoted to the Jewish contribution to the life of a city
which is seen, in so many ways, as the cradle of
twentieth century culture, artistic, philosophical and
scientific. The focus has begun to broaden to take in the
significance not only of the Viennese experience of an
artistic-intellectual conirtunity which was largely irrrnigrant,
but also the provincial world fran which the ininigrants
came. Schenker' s cultural ambience, once a darkened stage on
which ghostly figures shuffled meaninglessly atout, is
beginning to be illuminated.3
In 1985 Helimut Federhofer published an account of
Schenker' s life which does more than merely correct factual
errors in older accounts. 4 It is supplemented by quantities
• of material abstracted fran Schenker' s correspondence and
his inmensely detailed diaries. This study has transformed
the picture of Schenker as a man and as a thinker.
Fran Federhofer' s work it becanes obvious at once that
Schenker was a typical example of a refugee fran rural
Judentum to the Habsburg metropolis, that his career is
intelligible only in terms of the circumstances
- 15 -
characteristic of that situation, and that, to a
considerable extent, his intellectual behaviour is the
product of the tensions in the assimilee who cannot make the
crucial move to canpiete his assimilation: who cannot
convert. The problem is not a simple hostility to
Christianity. Schenker' s reflections on Christianity reveal
a level of sympathy and understanding, even of information,
far higher than is to be found among many naninal
Christians. The problem is the impossibility of repudiating
either Judaism or Judentum. Schenker the elitist
demonstrates more loyalty towards and irore fellow feeling
for the Jewish masses than is to be found among many of the
converts, as he bitterly reflected when, in the twenties, he
was accused by sane of them of being a Nazi sympathiser. It
was they, not he, he pointed out, who had ostentatiously
dissociated themselves fran the stereotype, not only fran
the 'manners and gestures' of the 'typical Galician Jew',
but from the faith which bore the taint of these things.
'Judaism' figures as one of the themes under
which Federhofer discusses Schenker' s Weltanschauung,
distinguishing it, interestingly, fran 'Religion' . But
the evidence he presents makes it clear that Judaism was
certainly not for Schenker merely another ideological or
philosophical option. Even before the advent of systematic
anti-Semitism, being or not being Jewish was never simply a
matter of intellectual choice. If it had been as simple as
that his bitterness would amount to nothing more than
personal disillusion and disappointment. The impossibility
of attaching himself with conviction to any strand of the
social fabric in which he had to live except the pariah
status of the practising Jew, which was the cause of this
bitterness, would then appear to be merely an abstract
dileirina; the emotional havoc he suffered and the spiritual
- 16 -
turmoil, which eventually became almost intolerable, would
be reduced to the level of the 'annoyance' and irritation he
so often arouses in others.
To present Schenker's career as more or less normal,
and his behaviour as merely irascible and overbearing, is to
treat as irrelevant the vast social trauma in which he found
himself caught up at a particularly sensitive moment. This
was the point at which the confrontation between the
medieval vorld of quietist Judaism and post-Enlightenment,
secular, technological civilisation was beginning to show
its potential for catastrophe. In this encounter, the real
alternatives open to provincial Jews in the Austrian
metropolis were no longer easy even to identify, as
Schenker' s dileninas, his hesitations, his false moves, his
failures, illustrate by contrast with the success stories of
an older generation. If opportunities were still great,
choices were narrowing dramatically.
Schenker's time in Vienna began when a new,
rationalised, organised form of hatred of the Jews was
intensifying. The position of the Jews in Vienna had beccine
precarious with the stock-exchange crash of 1873, for which
they were held responsible by the Christian Ixurgeoisie and
petit bourgeoisie. This calamity was followed by a wave of
conversions among rich Jews. Jews 'had been the pace-setters
of Viennese middle-class life during the Ausgleich period.
When forces of conformity swept the irrrnigrant Jews into
accepting pseudo-aristocratic social values, aesthetic
escapism and econctriic speculation as a way of life, the
Christian world followed' Ctiristian bitterness after the
crash was in proportion to Christian disappointment, and
events outside Austria concentrated attention on the
controversial situation of the Jews. In 1878 'anti-Semitisni'
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became a political slogan in the German Reich. In 1881 there
were pograns in Russia. In 1882 the Tisza-Eszlar ritual
murder case breathed new life into ancient superstition and
gave an atavistic impetus to the controversy. 7 In the same
year a new stock-exchange scandal occurred in Vienna. In
1884 Georg Schonerer was engaged in an openly anti-Semitic
campaign for the nationalisation of the Nordbahn, the
railway canpany founded by the still un-converted
Rothschild family, which had opened up carmunication with
Schenker' s haneland, Galicia. This was the year Schenker
entered the university. Alphonse Rothschild was to be his
pupil and his 'Maecenas' 8 By 1895, when Schenker read a
paper to the University Philosophical Society, anti-Semitism
was in the process of being institutionalised in Viennese
politics. In 1897 the anti-Semitic Christian Socialist Karl
Lueger became mayor of the city. By 1900 many wealthy,
assimilated Viennese Jews, in the sharpest contrast to their
Ausgleich ancestors, were trying to avoid the suspicion of
favouring other Jews econatticafly, professionally or
socially, were trying, indeed, to look as little Jewish as
possible, sorretirnes even changing their names.
The convert Wittgenstein family typifies the new
attitude. If it could not quite rival the wealth of the
steadfastly unconverted Rothschilds, it far surpassed them
in ostentation in conspicuously Viennese style. Ludwig
Wittgenstein later recorded a series of observations about
Jewish artists which give a • sense of the intensity of the
recoil of the 'second society' not only fran the poor Jews
of the Leopoldstadt but from other successful Jews,
including baptised Jews who were, nevertheless, perfectly
well known to be Jews. Jews, he claims, have talent but not
genius; they are 'reproductive'; they lack creative
'courage' and integrity; they intellectualise art. Kraus' s
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drama is 'abstract', Mendelssohn is all 'arabesques',
Mahier' s music is 'worthless'. Bruckner, on the other hand
is 'Alpine' and 'pure', Brahms above praise, Austrian art
'subtler than anything else'. Jews are like a disease, an
ancmaly in the body of other na 9 Deeply influenced by
Weininger, Wittgenstein expresses an attitude which, were it
not for the false rrodesty with which he seeks to soften the
crudity of his anti-Semitism, would be worthy of Wagner at
his rtost Pharisaic.
The Wittgensteins were champions of Brahms, and it is
presumably to this circumstance rather than to the
repulsiveness of Wagner' s Judeophobia that Wittgenstein' s
suspicion of Wagner is to be attributed. Schenker idolised
Brahms and very much wanted to be, and to be considered,
part of the magic circle around him. In 1912 he had occasion
to approach the Wittgensteins for access to a Beethoven
10	 . -
autograph. But he was never a habitue there. His letter of
thanks to Rothschild on the publication of Counterpoint,
which Rothschild had financed, suggests the difficulty he
cou1d have had in accardating himself to that amben11
Schenker's Jewishness is at least as relevant to the
pattern of his career and to the deve1onent of his thought
as any of the theories, musical, scientific, philosophical
or political, which cane his way. In describing him as
Polish, however, the New Grove puts a finger on a feature
of his life and thought which is as significant as the
Jewishness with which it is so closely bound up: namely his
difficulty in defining himself.
*	 *	 *
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At the age of ten, Schenker went to Lemberg, where,
according to rather vague anecdotal evidence, he was
12inspired - possibly taught - by Mikuli.	 It is not
inconceivable that he was sent there for that purpose and
that the iiove to Brze?any represents a change of direction
in several senses. 13 Karl Mikuli himself cane fran
Cernovitz, which is about the same distance fran Podhajce as
Podhajce is fran Lernberg. Whatever Mikuli' s background (the
New Grove says he was 'a Polish pianist of Muldavian
origin') he assimilated to Polish culture via his connection
with Chopin, to which his forty year daninance of the
musical life of Lemberg was hardly unrelated. If, as it
appears, he was Schenker' s childhood idol, it would hardly
be surprising if Schenker entertained the same ambition. The
mere ambition, however, could not make him Polish, and if it
existed, it was, either perforce or by choice, abandoned in
favour of assimilation to the German language and culture
represented by the education system of the Austrian state.
Scheriker, as everyone knows, became an ardent, even
strident, devotee of German culture, and gradually lost
interest in virtually all non-German music. His love of
Chopin remained, however, and is ignant testimony to one
of the many cultural tensions with which he had to live.
In western Galicia there had long been a close
relationship between Poles and orthodox Jews. 14 As the
administrative language of the Cracow region was Polish, the
Jewish merchants there had to trade in that language. In the
revolution of 1848 Jewish leaders aligned themselves with
the Poles. But Schenker came fran eastern Galicia and even
in 1848 many Jews there looked towards Vienna, partly for
the sane sort of reason - the administrative language in the
east was German - but als& because the population was
largely Ruthenian and was beginning to assert itself
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politically in opposition to the Polish rrkagnates. By the
1860s the enthusiasm for Polonisation had greatly
diminished, especially among Jewish reformers.' 5 Soon it was
virtually confined to Cracow. Polish anti-Semitism, and the
rivalry between the Jews of the Haskalah and Jewish
conservatives - in collusion with Catholic reactionaries to
preserve the status quo - hastened its demise.. Besides,
while the Austrian education system offered an escape route
frcm poverty and obscurity, the Poles had nothing to
contribute to Jewish rrcdernisation and no comparable route
to assimilation for individuals.
In the 1870s the outcome of the struggle between the
Orthodox alliance with the Poles and the Gennanophile
irodernisers, who sometimes allied themselves with the
Ruthenians against the Poles, was still unclear. The threat
to the reformers from the obscurantism of the extreme
conservatives in Galicia, where the power of the Hasidim
was greater than anywhere else (except perhaps Bukovina),
made the situation of Jews like Johann Schenker, with a
modern education and occupying an official (Austrian)
position, particularly delicate. 16 It certainly cannot have
been obvious to Schenker's family that the best way for
their children to progress was to try to assimilate to
Polish society. The magnetism of Mikuli was, therefore,
inevitably a potential source of conflict. For whatever
reason, Schenker was removed fran this influence and made,
or had made for him, the decisive choice of preparing for
the Austrian matriculation examination, the Matura. At
sixteen he was sent to Vienna to study law.
The ghost of Chopin, however, continued to haunt him
and three years later he enrolled at the Conservatory as a
student of piano. He was also composing, and already making
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efforts, not without some success, to attract attention to
himself as a musician. He continued his law studies, clearly
feeling the weight of an obligation in that direction, but
on graduating, to paraphrase a remark of his own, 'converted
imrnediately...to the musical confession'.17
This conversion cannot have pleased his family. At the
end of the same year - 1887 - his father died. His nother
and the children remaining with her, rroved to Vienna where,
according to Schenker' s account, he had to help maintain
them by giving piano lessons. Whatever the reason for this,
it contributed to Schenker' s uncertainty about his career.
On the one hand he was pushed into music as the only
available means of earning noney, and on the other he was
expected, at all costs, to complete his law studies since
the material reward to be expected fran a legal career must
far outstrip anything he could realistically hope to gain
from music.
However, this may not be how the situation presented
itself to him. While still a student he evinced not only a
monumental capacity for vrk but a certain acumen in
exploiting connections. He did not suffer fran shyness and
his boldness brought him early, surprisingly easy, if small
rewards which may have fostered exaggerated optimism. His
decision to go free-lance may have been simply a gamble. If
so, although he survived comfortably enough, it was a gamble
which never paid off in material terms. This was surely not
due to lack of talent.
The social and political climate in the 1890s was
changing. The Jewish support network, with whose assistance
Schenker was able to get a start as a journalist, composer,
and performer, was in the process of breaking apart) 8 it
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did, in fact, help to sustain him throughout his life, but
with hand-outs, not the prcmotion he needed. A
Jewish-daTtinated university music-department might have
seemed a potential haven, but Adler, himself an outsider,
was intent upon establishing the partme' s
academic-scientific credentials. 'Academic', by now, in
music, at least, meant sanething rrre specific than
'scholarly'. Schenker was recognisable as a scholar,
potentially of sane substance. A music academic he was
not. 19 Meanwhile, the other relevant institution, the
Conservatory, was, despite its origins as part of Fanny von
rnstein' s Gesellschaft, Christian in temper, its
theoretical tradition harking back to church music through
teachers nurtured in the ecclesiastical tradition which had
been the obvious recruiting ground for the new pedagogic
institutions in Fanny' s 20 reover a nexus between
even this sorld and the sorld of journalism, to whose Jewish
orientation Schenker' s early success in that area must
surely be attributed, was developing despite the
long-standing hostility between the musical press, in the
shape of Hanslick, and the grandee of the Christian
pedagogic tradition, Bruckner. 2' All the loopholes which
had made possible the entry of people like Hanslick and
Adler were being closed up.
It would appear that Schenker became trapped, at least
psychologically, by the promise of success which never
came. By 1895 probably, and by 1900 certainly, there was no
obvious way forward and no way back to a 'normal' •
 Jewish
middle-class career.
Sixteen years later Schenker had occasion to justify
his decision to make no direct use of his legal
qualifications. In May, 1916, he was in conversation in the
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Vindobona cafe with a Jewish textile manufacturer named
Maiulik who expressed the opinion that it was unfortunate
Scheriker had not made better use of his share of the brains
with which his family had been blessed. 22 With his
abilities, Maiulik opined, if he had gone in for advocacy,
he could have been another Pressburger. Schenker professed
to find this a risible example of unenlightened or
half-enlightened eastern Jewish narrow mindedness, which
prized education only in so far as it led to pecuniary
advantage. But he took it seriously enough to argue with it.
Maiulik himself, he pointed out, quoted Ebn Ezra and other
heroes fran Hebrew writings, who were not advocates but
belonged to a spiritual rld quite unlike that of Dr.
Pressburger. Why should he not be allowed to follow the
example of Ebn Ezra in music rather than in advocacy?
Maiulik was not impressed by his logic, Schenker reports,
for he lacked any sense of the value of culture (Bildung)
for its own sake. In his diary he caustically observes that
Maiulik had similarly turned his back on his professional
training, but fran the opposite rrotive: t on the very day he
qualified as a Rabbi in Breslau he went to Dresden and
converted to the faith of the textile mar an' •23
It has been suggested that the main cause of the
bitterness of people like Schenker was a feeling that the
German culture so prized by then was betrayed by the
Germans. There was certainly a good deal of rhetoric to this
effect, largely starining fran Nietzsche, and Schenker made
his contribution to it. But it is surely a simplification
both in itself and as an explanation of the alienation of
the assimilee. There is in Schenker a hardly less strong
sense of the betrayal of Jewish values by Jews only too
eager to adopt the secular ethos, and betrayal of fellow
Jews.
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I lie in business,' he quotes 4aiulik as saying, 'but
not outside it' and adds that this 'sums up the vocation of
,24the businessman . People like this are no credit to
Judaism. Neither are they a reproach to it, any more than
the manners and gesticulations of the poor Galician Jews,
which they retain 'even when they have cane into contact
with better circles', are a reproach to it. Both these
occasions for embarrassment stem fran the same source. These
Jews, Schenker says, have never had the mental space to
think about their manners. 'Who lives so much fran hand to
mouth as they do, in the hardest conditions, bated,
despised, outlawed, pursued, for the most part cursed with
large families, their best qualities - for example, their
education - unrecognised...?' To expect them to 'assimilate'
is like taking soldiers from the field where, in the midst
of devastation, they are struggling merely to stay alive,
and asking them to imitate the manners of a man of the
world. 25 Even relatively successful men like Maiulik cannot
shake off their preoccupation with the struggle for material
survival.
.nd, admirer of German secular culture as he was,
Schenker was far from being sycophantic towards the Germans.
'The superiority of the Prussian officer expresses
not the superiority of his religious belief as against
that of a Jew but the superiority of a man fully
emancipated by his state, like the superiority of a
rich man over a poor one. It is a self delusion when
out of his sense of superiority the German invites the
Jew to baptism. Better grant him civil rights, let him
take part in the government of the state.... ,26
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It is clear from the material presented by Federhofer
that Schenker' s conservatism was rooted in something much
rrore profound than mere intellectual arrogance, or the
snobbery of the parvenu, or any kind of half-baked political
philosophy. If the disappearance of the Habsburg ronarchy
seemed to him to be a catastrophe, it was because, for the
Habsburg Jews, that was exactly what it was. among other
things it meant that the route which had brought him from
Podhajce to Vienna was, for future generations of Jewish
children, forever cut of f. If he clung to an aristocratic
ideal in matters artistic and intellectual as well as
social, it was not because he had a pathological need to
dissociate himself fran the poor and the down-trodden. His
hatred of Marxism was hatred of a system of thought which,
as he saw it, elevated to the status of an ideal the
spiritual impoverishment produced by poverty and oppression,
and made it a crime even to wish to transcend this
condition. If he saw genius as necessary to the spiritual
vitality of a culture, his piety and its partial
displacnt onto art helps to explain this. If he saw it as
in its nature exceptional, this is because all his
experience, the whole pattern of his life and the lives of
others from similar backgrounds, their emergence out of the
dark hinterland of unenlightened Galician Jewry into the
clear air, the spaciousness, the radiance of Goethean,
Mozartian culture, made this conclusion seem to him
inescapable.
It wuld be absurd to pretend that Schenker's
bitterness had no cc*nponent of personal disappointment, but
even his disappointment was not a simple thing. His
inability to gain an academic position in the early days was
undoubtedly due to the mismatch between his formal
qualifications and the demands of the institutional
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situation at the time. Later, as Schoenberg' s example
illustrates, this problem could perhaps have been overcome
had he been capable of compromising. Strange as it is to
have to see Schoenberg as a man of compromise, compared with
Schenker that is how he appears. As Federhofer paints out,
Schoenberg converted and then re-converted. In 1911 he
published a book on harmony in which he made sane
threatening gestures in the direction of pedagogic
convention, but he became the arch-upholder of that
convention, gaining considerable kudos from his rigidity,
which he managed to reconcile with his Modernism by
feats of rationalisation 	 about	 which	 Schenkerian
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scepticism is surely not altogether unfair. Schenker
was not only psychologically incapable of this kind
of adjustment, but could not have conformed to academic
orthodoxy without undermining his entire theoretical
rationale. It was possible for Schoenberg to keep separate
his academic and his creative activity because they were
essentially unrelated. Obviously Schenker could not. Even at
the end of his life, when, if the kind of recognition which
his friends sought for him had actually arrived, he u1d
surely have been allowed to pursue his idiosyncratic path
unmolested, his acceptance vu1d have involved recognising
the legitimacy of the regime, sailing under the flag of
Mierian musicology. It u1d have been like being baptised.
hy should he have to make such choices? This was, for
Schenker, the real injustice. Towards the end, ill, weary,
confused, his sense of the patent impossibility of fighting
institutional orthodoxy made it seem pointless to make any
further pretence of conformity. Free Canpasition, which has
been presented as the culmination of his pure-scientific
positivist endeavour, is in reality, as must be obvious to
anyone who reads it, his final confession of faith.
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Whether Schenker' s attitude was justified, whether his
faith was better or worse than that of the converts or the
cradle-Christians, whether his theory was better founded
than the faith of the musicologists, is not the main issue.
Indeed such sharp separations, as the overlapping within
Schenker' s work of musicological and metaphysical elements
suggests, are of limited validity. The issue to which the
case of Schenker draws our attention nest urgently is the
need for a livelier awareness of the nature of our cultural
assumptions and of the route by which we have cane to them.
The attempt to repudiate the human dimension in the study
of art, which the scientists of art like to call their
objectivity, is arrong the attitudes to which any open-minded
study of Schenker must present a challenge.
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1. All biographical data is taken from
Federhofer, 1985.
2. See, for example, the attack on Rinann in
Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1972.
3. The develonent of this interest is traced by
Stephen Belier in the Introduction to his
Book, Vienna and the Jews 1867-1938. (See
Belier, 1989.) The vork of William M.
Johnston (see Johnston 1972) and of Carl
Schorske (see Schorske, 1980) have been
especially influential. Belier's own book and
the rather differently cs History of
the Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918 by William 0.
McCagg are equally indispensable. (See
McCagg, 1989.)
4. See Federhofer, 1985.
5. Ibid., thapter V.
6. McCagg, 1989, p.156.
7. Ibid., p. 164. A similar case occurred in
Bohenda in 1899.
8. Eduard Alphons& James Rothschild, 1868-1949.
Alphonse's visit to Paris after passing his
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Matura was one of the reasons for Schenker's
writing to his elder brother to ask for
noney. Unless Alphonse took his Matura in his
twenties, Schenker must have been teaching
him at least by 1887. The two men seem to
have remained lifelong friends. See
Federhofer, 1985, P. 23, f.n. 43.
9. See Wittgenstein, 1989 and for a discussion,
Lurie, 1989. Wittgenstein's fate has been as
unlike Scheriker' s as possible. His fame as a
philosopher ensures that whatever he said is
taken as wisdom no matter how silly or
offensive. However, his inclusion of himself
in this 'critique' of the Jews perhaps does
less to mitigate the disagreeable effect than
his apologists might hope. What are we to
make of sctneone who is so humble as to put
himself on the same low level as Mendelssohn,
who considers himself worthless in the way
Mahler is worthless?
10. Federhofer, 1985, P. 209.
11. Ibid., p. 24.
12. Ibid., p. 4.
13. 'Our fathers, seeing no escape. . . thought up a
lottery. . .in the course of ten years or so
our town supplied the concert platforms of
the world with infant prodigies. Fran Odessa
came Mischa Ellman, Zimbalist, Gabrilovitsch.
Odessa witnessed the first steps of Jascha
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Heifetz.. .Mr Zagursky ran a factory of infant
prodigies, a factory of Jewish dwarfs in lace
collars and patent leather pumps.. . [he]
charted the first course, then they were
shipped of f to Professor Auer in St
Petersburg. . .At dinner my father told another
story about Jascha Heifetz. . .he had met
Mendelssohn, Jascha's uncle. It appeared that
the lad was getting eight hundred roubles a
performance. Just s.ork out how much that
comes to at fifteen concerts a nnth.' Isaac
Babel: 'Awakening' in Collected Stories.
London: Penguin, 1961.
Presumably country music teachers drurrined up
candidates fran the wilds of Galicia a
generation earlier to be shipped of f to
Mikuli's private music school in Lemberg.
14. See McCagg, 1989, Chapter 7, 'Galician
Deadlock', for an account of the canpiex
relationship between Galician Jewry and the
Poles.
15	 For conditions of life in Galicia, see
ibid., especially pp. 115 ff..
From the Brody area in 1920, Babel writes of
'the tJkra-inian village of not long ago
(where 1. . . poppies brightened the earth in
patches, the ruins of churches gleamed on the
hillocks. . . crouching at the feet of nobles'
estates were lifeless little Jewish
towns. . .Hidderi away behind scattered huts .a
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synagogue sqauatted upon the barren soil -
sightless, dented, round as a Hasidic hat.
Narrow-chested Jews hung mournfully
about. . . The image of the stout and jovial
Jews of the south took shape in my
memory, in sharp contrast to the bitter
scorn inherent in those long bony backs,
those tragic yellow beards. In these
passionate, anguish-chiselled features there
was. . . no warm pulsing of blood. The Jews
of Volhynia and Galicia rroved jerkily, in an
uncontrolled way, but their capacity for
suffering was full of a sathre greathess, and
their unvoiced contempt for the Polish gentry
unbounded. Watching them I understood the
poignant history of this region...'. Babel,
tr. Morrison, 1961: 'Discourse on Tachanka'.
For a more recent description of Lemberg,
Zhitariir, Brady, see Dohrn, 1991.
16. Despite Schenker' s nplaint that he had been
born in poverty it is clear that his family
was part of the Jewish elite. Johann Schenker
was Stadtarzt in Podhaje and the brothers of
his wife Julia were also doctors. One of
Heinrich' s elder brothers, Marcus, was a.
lawyer, his other, Wilhelm, a doctor. (See
Federhofer, 1985, p. 342 and pp. 3-4.) This
does not mean that they were not poor.
According to McCagg even the Polish nobility
in Galicia were mostly poor. Schenker
naturally did not canpare his lot with that
of the still poorer Ruthenian peasants, but
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rather with his wealthy Viennese patrons.
17. Ibid., p.8. Schenker wrote to Max Kalbeck,
'Ich bereite mich eben zur erste
Staatsprufung vor. Spat bends, so oft ich
das gtt1iche "R&nische Recht" von der Hand
lege, gnne ich mir die reinste Freude, em
wenig musikalisch zu denken.' Schenker
describes himself as alone', so the letter
was presumably written before his rrother' S
migration to Vienna in 1888 or 1889.
18. See McCagg, 1989, Chapter 9.
19. Guido Mler, who succeeded Hanslick as
Professor of Music in 1898, had a background
not altogether dissimilar to Schenker's,
having taken a law degree before turning to
music, but his material circumstances were
rrore favourable. He radically transformed the
atnosphere of the depa.rtmant, which had been
distinctly dilettante. He wanted to make it
scientific and professional in a sense quite
new to music. His encyclopedic definition of
musical scholarship excluded Schenker' $
synthetic approach, effectively isolating
him.
20. For Fanny von rnstein see Belier, 1989, pp.
40 & 97 and McCagg, 1989, pp. 60-63.
21. Richard Heuberger was appointed to the Neue
Freie Presse, apparently as assistant to
Hanslick (see Federhofer, 1985, p. 14) ad
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later took over Hanslick's position. He also
held an appointment at the Conservatory. As a
leading light in the world of operetta he
illustrates in his career the way in which
the various branches of institutional musical
life in Vienna were becatiing ever rrore
closely integrated, leaving less and less
space for independent activity. Or perhaps it
vu1d be better to say 'leaving itore and trore
space', full of the fresh air on which
outsiders were left to survive.
22. Ibid., p. 313.
23. Ibid., p.315: 'Hat doch gleich er selbst am
Tage nach Erwerbung des Rabbinatsgrades in
Breslau sofort den Uebertritt zur
Textilkonfession in Dresden vollzogen!'
24. Ibid., p. 313, n. 3: 'Im Gesc1iift luge
ich...aber nicht ausserhaib des Geschà.ftes'.
Schenker' s reflections on his conversation
with Maiulik recall Kafka' s 'Letter to His
Father'. Kafka' s father, also a successful
merchant, had as much time for Bildung as
Maiulik. Schenker' s explanation of the origin
of this philistinism in the struggle for
survival is reflected in Kafka's ranark that
his father's constant reference to this
struggle had 'positively worn grooves in my
brain'. These references were ranarks like,
'Then I was only seven I had to push the
barrow fran village to village"; "We all had
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to sleep in one roan"; "ce were glad when we
got potatoes"; "for years I had open sores on
my legs from not having enough clothes to
wear in the winter". The father could never
forget these things or cease to 'boast' of
them and use them to 'humiliate' his children
or to excuse the difference between hi
outrageous manners and what he expected of
them. (Franz Kafka: Wedding Preparations in
the Country and other Stories. London:
Penguin, 1978.)
25. Federhofer, 1985, p. 312.
26. Ibid., p. 315. 'In der Ueberlegenheit eines
preussischen Offiziers drückt sich durchaus
nicht die Ueberlegenheit seiner religibsen
Gesinnung gegerber der eines Juden, sondern
nur die Ueberlegenheit eines in seinem Staate
frei Waltenden Herrn aus, also gewissermassen
die Ueberlegenheit eines reichen Mannes
gegeniber einem armen. Es ist daher elne
Selbsttatischung, wenn aus dem Herrngefih1
heraus der Deutsche den Juden zur Taufe
eiriladet. Er rume dem Juden lieber alle
ffentlichen Rechte em, lasse auch ihn an
der Herrschaft des Staates teilnehmen....'
27. See Schoenberg, tr. Carter, 1983.
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Chapter 2
writing the History of Music Theory
Part I
In 1618 a young philosopher decided to relieve the
tedium of his military service by writing a book on music.1
It was written 'in the midst of turnil and rough soldiers,
by a man without occupation or office', and not intended for
publication in the form in which he gave it to the friend
for whan he wrote it. But we should not assume fran the
author' s disclaimers that he did not consider his work
highly significant. Showing clear signs of the 'haste' with
which its 'fragrrentary' thoughts had been put together, it
is nevertheless a tour de force and the subsequent fame of
its author ensured that it would eierge to influence
writing on music for centuries to care by its contents and
its form.
Descartes' Canpendiurn Musicae is a sumary of what the
author recalled of music theory and the rules of canposition
he had read about in various treatises, and what he recalled
fran his own study of musical ccrnposition together with his
reflections upon all this. These reflections take the form
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of an exercise in rationalistic reduction. He clearly did
not see hirnselE at that point as in a position to reduce the
whole of music to mathematical or quasi mathematical
formulae, arid had to limit himself to doing enough to show
that this was a theoretical possibility, given all the
relevant information, the details of compositional practice,
tranquillity and time.
*	 *	 *
The Compendium is nowadays little regarded by musicians
or musicologists. Its 'proofs' are dismissed as 'sleights of
hand' or repetitions or elaborations of the kinds of
calculations based on the division of strings which had been
going on since antiquity, a working up of things taken from
Zarlino and others, or 'anticipations' - a notion peculiarly
cherished by music historians - of things to come. 2 But
these objections miss the point. Of course, the work is full
of anticipations, airong them that of the circle of fifths
and a fun-blown theory of modulation. But crucial to this
concept is a modern notion of the division of the octave, a
scale with 'steps' iii a fixed intervallic sequence. The
steps, their order and their tuning, become crucial in a
music which shifts its harmonic focus. The concept runs
ahead of the primitive physics; the ear must set its own
conditions instead of being dictated to. Intuition demands
to be liberated from the constraints of a system constructed
phenomenally.
What was novel in the Compendium was the extension of
the mathematical approach from supposedly pre-compositionl
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'structures' to compositional patterns and a shift from
the reliance on calculations based on physical phenomena
to purely mathematical ones appealing to configurations of
pitches in composition. That is to say, Descartes shifts the
focus from a physics of sound, supposedly independent of and
prior to the art, to a mathematics of sound ex pressed as
music and accessible only through the medium of the art. The
patterns hitherto regarded as outside music, theoretically
adduced fran nature, and given to musicians to play with, he
re-interprets as constructs derived from practice.
Descartes' notion that some intervals are the primary
product of the division of the octave and some secondary -
that is that they represent the 'difference' between the
primary interval and the larger interval from which the
primary interval has been subtracted, or the 'remainder', a
notion which many historians find simply perverse, becomes
intelligible if understood in the light of this
re-orientation. The appropriate point of reference is his
explanation of the 'steps', which is based not on the
division of a string but on the practice of composers. 3 The
motive of this idea, and all the ideas in the Compendium are
comparably motivated, is to provide a rationalisation of
intervallic inversion, a compositional, not a
pre-compositional concept, though Descartes' presentation in
the traditional fashion, does rather invite the turning of
it into a preccwpositional phenomenon, leading
philosophically unsophisticated theorists to search for it
in nature.
The same thing undoubtedly happened with his theory of
'mutation', or modulation, derived from 'the sequence of
tones which', he tells us, 'the practical musicians call the
"hand" . This is a sequence of tones beginning on F which
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can be given a different meaning by substituting B flat for
B. There are, he says - again turning a practice into
an axiom - only two possible ways of 'dividing the
octave S By this he means that the octave can be
divided into the sequence tone-tone-semitone followed by
the sequence tone-tone-tone-semitone, or the reverse. The
effect of this limitation is to say that the only - workable
- division is one which partitions the octave into a fifth
and a fourth. Both patterns can be achieved by beginning on
F, depending on whether B or B flat is selected. The 'hand',
then, represents, conceptually, the principle of fifth
division, or transposition, what Schenker was to call
'tonicisation'. Play F, C, A, B, C, and F is the fourth of
the natural scale. Play F, G, A, B flat, C, and F is the
tonic. Since there are only five tones through which the
voice can nve without 'fractions or rtrvable pitches' a
single set of names for identifying the intervallic pattern
formed by these five tones divided by the semitone Cut re
ml fa sal la) will enable the pitches of the scale to be
rotated against it. Since the shift B flat to B causes Ut to
rove by a fifth, so all such shifts will tove Ut by the
distance of a fifth. The fifth transposition represented by
the two versions of the 'hand' becomes, in his circular
representation, the type of all such transpositions.
It is clear frau his refutation of anticipated
objections that Descartes' theory follows intellectually
articulated practice at sane distance and is an attempt not
merely to codify it but to extrapolate a theory which will
cover situations which appear haphazard and unconnected and
others not yet discovered by practice. We could, he says,
'go on ad infinitum'. In saying so he is claiming to have
located a law of organisation underlying the conscious
practice of composers, a law of which they are unaware but
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which nevertheless constrains them. Once fully worked out,
the theory also caine to seem to some theorists to stand for
a phenomenal entity, something somehow existing in nature,
which the musician is given, like a toy, to play with. For
Descartes it is given only in the sense that it represents
an organisational principle of which the musical patterns
are the intuitively derived expression, and which the theory
rationally interprets.
The work of Descartes is quite different from the
theoretical treatises of practising musicians. Various
rules of composition, he observes, are often broken. 'These
things are based entirely on the usage and custom of
composers,' and 'all kinds of subtle rul' can be deduced.
This does not mean, however, that usage and custom are
arbitrary. The rules are an attempt to capture the
unconscious logic rrctivating these customs, and they do this
sometimes rrore, sametimes less successfully. However, the
rules of composition are not what matters. It is the
organisational principle determining the behaviour of the
composer, which the music articulates artistically and the
rules attempt to articulate intellectually, which are of
philosophical interest. Empirical observation of
compositional behaviour must be a rrore reliable guide than
the rules of music theorists. Nevertheless these rules are
not to be dismissed lightly.
Descartes' empirical observation is not at all the same
thing as the observations which lead to the prescriptive
rules of music theorists such as the formulators of the
contrapuntal 'species'. Nor is it the same as the simple
inductivism of rrr,dern style-analytic theorists, whose
generalisations are as arbitrary as they believe the rules
of the composers to be. It proceeds from the assumption
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that scme rationally apprehensible and mathe.mabiclly
expressible organising principle exists prior to the musical
organisation, but not in the sense that this organisation
refers back to some other phenomenal one, or that the
musical organisation is a mere manipulation of physical
phenomena, bound, therefore, by the laws of physics. Nor
does it assume that music has organising principles of its
own, which are related to deeper-level principles of
organisation only analogically, i.e., that music is a
phenomenon like any other and will yield up its secrets
inductively.
For Descartes his study of music is a way of
demonstrating the fact that, in the words of Leibniz, 'the
rational soul or mind. . . is. . . an image of the De' and
'not only has a perception of the works of God, but is even
capable of producing something like them. . . in discovering
the sciences in accordance with which God had regulated
things. . . it imitates in its own sphere. . .what God performs
in the great world. '5 For Leibniz, as for Descartes, 'Even
the pleasures of the senses are in the last resort
intellectual pleasures confusedly known. Music charms us
although its beauty consists In the harnny of nurrers, arid
in the account which we do not notice, but which the soul
none the less takes, of the beating or vibration of sounding
bodies which meet one another at certain intervals.' It is
over this claim that nineteenth-century aesthetics
bifurcates and we can see the sources of both the
Intel lectualising and the metaphysical branches in
Cartesian-Leibnizian aesthetics.
'The beauty of the universe. . could be learnt in each
soul could one unravel all its folds', which, of course, is
possible only for God. 6 But in music the soul seems to
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capture intuitively, in microcosm, 'the universal harmony'
and make it accessible to reason, which can, perhaps,
'unravel all its folds' and so get a glimpse of the beauty
of the whole universe. The musician himself does not know
how music does this and his rules are only crude and
provisional representatives of the laws of orgariisation to
which he can only gain access involuntarily, as in 'dreams,
in which [he] invent[s] without effort (but also without
will) things [he] could only discover after much thinking
'7
when awake.
In moving the philosophical theoretical focus fran the
physics of sound to canposed music, Descartes expanded the
possible ways of thinking about music. There is an irony in
the fact that his philosphical theory - his desire to
demonstrate the independence of mental activity fran
material conditions - should move the study of music in an
aesthetic direction, by making the artef act the centre of
interest, since his interest is anything but aesthetic in
the ordinary sense. He does not look at music to see whether
it is beautiful, whether it corresponds to sane ideal of
beauty; he takes its beauty as given. If music is the
universal harmony in microcosm it cannot but be beautiful.
He is interested in uncovering the occult order which
produces the beauty and not because the product is beautiful
but because it furthers his grasp of the infinite. But in
demonstrating, as he believed, that the order was to be
found in the canposed music and was not merely derived fran
a prior physical order, he was making available to
aesthetics a field hitherto thought to belong to physical
science, and making a different kind of connection between
science and art.
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*	 *	 *
Other major philosophers took up this reinterpretation
of the significance of music. A line can be drawn frcm
Descartes, through Leibniz, through Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche to the one modern theorist who shares their vision
of the musical work as a mirror of the universal harmony,
different though their several interpretations of the
universal harmony are. This vision has undergone many
changes along this line. Descartes' s belief that it was
ssible to 'unravel the folds' cnp1etely, given sufficient
time and patience, is not put to the test by the leading
philosophers - although Hegel takes it as given - not only
because they lack the patience and the time. They lack also
either the mathematical zeal coupled with detailed musical
knowledge characteristic of philosophers up to the time of
Descartes, but rarer afterwards - philosophers after his
time began to be intimidated by the mystique - or his belief
that the numerical relationships are, after all, the heart
of the matter.
Indeed, Schopenbauer specifically denies the
implication in the Cartesian-Leibnizian approach that the
intuitions of the artist can all be reduced to
intelligibility. 8 This is true, he asserts, only of the
outer skin of the music, that part of it which can be
related to the phencmenal world, the world of 'sonorous
bodies'. He embraces, by contrast, their belief that music
is not an expression of the phencnenal, but of scinething
prior to all phencirena and that it is in its ccinpositional
organ! sation that it expresses its significances, its
canprehensive significance as the microcosmic representation
of the world and its more specific meanings. He adopts also
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the notion, evervwher implicit in Descartes and given an
exoress ion in ibniz so ca ptivating in its eloquence that
he cannot resist borrowing it almost verbatim: the notion of
the artist as the medium through whom the truth is exhaled
like the air that rushes through the orifices of the
Euboean cc9
Between Schcpenhauer and Nietzsche on the one hand and
Hegel on the other, a philosophical chasm opens. Hegel
believed that everything would becane accessible to the
intellect, and that art, being ultimately fully reducible
to the intellectually appreriensible, could, therefore, in
the last analysis, be dispensed with. Following
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche saw this belief as nothing nre
than a rrcnumental and disastrous form of philistinism. Music
is at the heart of this nineteenth century philosophical
crisis because music involves both intellect and intuition
in a peculiar fashion. The notion of music as consisting of
nothing but scientifically categorisable patterns of sound,
which became dctninant in music-aesthetics after the
mid-century, is clearly ultimately indebted to Descartes
- although it is noticeably unniathematical, indeed
un-technical, relying as it does on a vaguer, Hegelian
notion of the intellectual - in spite of priding itself on
the purity of its empiricism and anti-rationalism. But it
is arbitrary both in its lack of any conscious guiding
principle, music-theoretical, aesthetic or philosophical,
and in its assumption that the laws of organisation it
expects to be able to derive inductively will be a
sufficient end in themselves, for of course there is no
notion of a deity or anything metaphysical in this secular
aesthetic.
It is not surprising that the projected 'science of
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music', consisting of a purely empirical examination of
arrangements of 'groups of notes', never took shape
(although some of Schenker's followers speak of his 'system'
as if it were that science), nor that the aridity of this
approach left the field wide open to those who saw music as
either a peg upon which to hang their personal
preoccupations, which they foisted onto the public in the
form of quasi-hermeneutic interpretations, or a cryptic
cultural record, mere data for sociological, psychological,
above all art-historical enquiry. The search for a reductive
principle, like music-aesthetics, became, with the rise of
musicology, simply pass. It was left to the theorists, and
by this time, they were for the most part dreary pedagogues
whose main claim to respect was the fact that they dealt in
a jargon whose capacity to intimidate was in inverse
relation to its lucidity. The rrost modern, most 'scientific'
branch of musicology, the one which ould set the tone for
the twentieth century, wanted as little as possible to do
with it.
*	 *	 *
How had it come about that the ideas of geniuses had
become entangled with the superstitions and confusions of
pedants and pedagogues, and ended up in that great lumber
room known as nineteenth-century theory, so chaotic that
even the great Helmholtz could not make it seem orth the
effort of sorting out? Riemarin, who did venture in, arrged
covered in cobwebs which did nothing for his musicological
credibility and undoubtedly helped to clear the field for
the more circumspect Adler. 10
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To understand this we have to jo back again to the
sixteenth century. Until the period in which Descartes was
writing, music theory was hardly separable from philosoohy
and mathematics. In treatises it is often referred to as a
science. Writers of such treatises, for example Agricola,
Glaron, Vogelsang, Aaron, were not merely music-theorists
but polymaths, scholars, often clerics, who wrote about
music among other things. The seine was true of Zarlino,
although he eventually became maestro di ca poella. Theorists
of significance wtio were professional musicians and only
that, like Cerone or Galilei, ware exceptional. For
Descartes himself, like his contemporary Mersenne, music was
part of philosophy. But from this period onwards, a more or
less independent music-theoretical tradition began to
develop which was less concerned with philosophy and often
conspicuously uninformed about it, and philosophy became
less interested in the detailed pursuit of the mathematical
implications of music.
After ersenne theorists like Sauveur, whose primary
concern was scientific, or like Brossard, who had begun by
studying philosophy and only later become a professional
musician, became the exception and the main focus of theory
began to shift. Treatises began to appear which ware more
professionally biased, less speculative, rationalisations of
working-practices such as Masson' s Nouveau trait des regles
pour la composition, (1697-1738) Mattheson's Der vollkontnene
Capelimeister (1739). Speculative theory continued to
flourish but in a closer relationship with practice or
theories of practice and at an increasing distance from the
main-stream of philosophy. The work of Werkmeister,
Heinechen, Cernoborsky and his pupil Tartini belong to this
more specialised world as do the most famous of all
music-theoretical treatises, Fux's Gradus and Rameau'.s
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Thait.11
Cartesian resonances continue through all this srk. A
theorist credited by sane historians with 'anticipating'
Rameau (or being the victim of Rameau' s plagiarism) entitled
one chapter of his treatise Rduction des Accords chiffrez
aux Accords parfaits. Rameau' s English translator, Phillip
Gossett, insists that Saint-Lambert did not anticipate
Raueau because his reductive idea was wholly practical in
riotivation while Rameau ' s reduction is conceptual.12
this is perhaps to underestimate the power of ideas. It is
not necessary to think in crude plagiaristic terms to see
the remnant of the great Cartesian idea being passed to
Rameau by Saint-Lambert, or, to put it another way, to see
Rameau as the rationaliser of Saint-Lambert' s - clearly
rationally motivated - practical procedure. The extent to
which music-theory had beccrne esoteric can be judged fran
the willingness of d'Alembert, a major figure in the wider
rld of science and philosophy, to be influenced by the
physicalist speculations of Rameau, even nre than by his
reference to Rameau' s musical expertise as a source of
authority. d' Alenibert' s notives were undoubtedly mixed. At
this juncture the physicalist skeleton, which had been
lurking in the music-theoretical cupboard all the while, was
taken out and dusted. Assiduous efforts began to be made to
re-animate it. All the old string measuring began again as
if it were news, and was now supplennted by the counting
of the vibrations of 'sonorous bodies'. Music theory was
brought into line with Newtonian experimentalism by sanewhat
dubious means •13
The aesthetic problem with these theories, and their
consequent philosophical weakness and banality, was their
myopia. To quote Le.ibniz again: .... it is unreasonable. . . to
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give a judgement without inspecting the whole law. We have
knowledge of a tiny part of...eternity...yet Out of so
little e rashly make judgements about the iirmeasurable and
the eternal. . .Look at the most lovely picture, and then
cover it up leaving uncovered. . . a tiny scrap. Wriat else will
you see there, even if you look as closely as possible, and
the more so as you look frcm nearer and nearer at hand, but
a kind of confused medley of colours.. . without art. nd yet
when you rve the covering and look upon the whole
picture fran the proper place, you will see that... [it] was
in fact accanplished with the highest art by the author of
14the rk'.
The theorists who liked to think of themselves as
rational believed they could construct infallible systems of
caxosition, or, at least, infallible methods of teaching
people to canpose, by looking at how a corner of the canvas
is filled in and extrapolating fran it the process of
constructing the entire picture. Rameau' s theory of chordal
inversion lent itself beautifully to the construction of
little exercises resembling the exercises of species
counterpoint without the trouble of learning all the rules,
but, despite its claim to be 'generative', it bore
essentially the same relation to the construction of orks
of art as the game devised by Kirriberger in which pieces are
assembled fran ready-made phrases selected by throwing
dice. A truly generative idea, like the Cartesian 'hand',
expands the scope of ccniposition by facilitating access to
unexplored realms of possible music. Chordal inversion
merely explains sazthing already fully exploited, long
surpassed, indeed, and could only have the effect of
narrowing down the scope of cclTlposition by confining the
exploitation of its possibilities to those which the
'system' can acccmtodate. The impossibility even for Rameau
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himself, of explaining, much less constructing any musical
texture, hcMever primitive, in fundamental bass terms,
without resorting to exceptions and to rules borrowed fran
figured bass and species counterpoint is eloquent proof of
this. The very notion of trying to ccinpose rationally is,
anyway, irrational, a perversion of reason. We might as well
think of rules to breathe bj', or, better still, rules to
think by.
Had Rameau' s idea been applied only to the explanation
of textures it would have been impossible to quarrel with it
and it is in this role that Schenker resurrects it as a
canponent in a more plausibly generative theory. But this
kind of prescriptive theorising began to feed back,
inevitably, into the truly esoteric area of musical
practice, the craft mystery, as much a mystery in its inner
motivation to those who practised and taught it as their
practices were to the world at large. Cily faith in the
magical efficacy of these practices could keep then alive.
The impact of rationalist-physicalist theory on this closed
world in the latter part of the eighteenth century was
devastating because it destroyed this faith. Musicians like
the Bachs could see their world being torn apart by social
changes which threatened its exclusiveness and favoured
siitplified, rationalistic approaches to musical education.
It was this trend which pranpted the publication of
specifically pedagogic treatises whose motive was either to
resist the rationalist tide and defend the craft traditions
or to exploit the camiercial opportunities newly open to
expertise of a kind which had never before been marketable
on such a scale. It was not long before these styles of
instruction were being simplified, 'rationalised',
re-interpreted in the light of modern 'acoustic' theory.
- 49 -
It was riot music that was rationalised by post-
Rameauvian theory but traditional non-rationalist theory. In
the process the latter was, as a means of initiation into
the art, effectively destroyed. For a period, formal music
education consisted of training in performance. Theoretical
education was rudimentary. It extended no further than was
necessary for the student to be able to decipher scores.
When 'caosition' began to appear on the syllabuses of the
music schools it was not satething which any catposer then
or at any time previously would have recognised as having
anything to do with his art. If Brahms is to be believed,
anyone who ierged frau one of these schools as a canposer
did so in spite of rather than because of the régime to
which he had been subjected. 16 When there was no-one left to
teach the old skills canposers bad to work out their own
salvation by studying the works of their predecessors. This,
of course, ccwposers have always done, but perhaps never
with less awareness of the presuppositions of their mentors
than those who began their studies after the death of
Beethoven.
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Part 2
'The music theory of the nineteenth century took
its direction frau the musical language and
musical grarrinar of the Viennese classics. This was
especially true of Viennese music theory which,
founded on a particular local tradition, was able
to dtonstrate the change fran figured bass to
harnonic theory nore clearly and directly than
elsewhere.'
Ernst Tittel.
• . .the masters simply had no knowledge of the
theory which for a century has been learned and
taught as the only practical one; not Bach,
father and son, not Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven or
Schubert [or) Mendelssohn knew anything of that
kind of harrrony-, thoroughbass- or f'Drmal-theory,
and Brahms would not hear of it.
Schenker.2
Schenker' s interpretation of music history rarely
dronstrated the saiie clear, rigorous thinking
which is evident in much of his theoretical
work.
1llen Forte.3
Schenker' s ranark in the 'Introduction' to Free
Canposition was a response to the charge that he attributed
to cauposers behaviour of which they could not possibly be
Conscious. His reply was that this complaint denonstrated
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the historical ignorance of his critics, for the classical
canposers knew no more about the theory taught in the
conservatories than they knew about his concept of the
Ursatz. reover, he never claimed that his theoretical
concepts represented consciously constructed ccinpositional
patterns. It was the conventional theories which claimed to
represent pre-canpositional procedures and the means by
which the great canposers learned canposition. Neither
claim, Scheriker believed, was valid.
His early Merican champions found Schenker s
excursions into history an embarrassment. Unable to defend
them, they judged it best to distance themselves and point
out that Schenker was, after all, an artist at heart, not a
musicologist. This view of Schenker has becane the accepted
one. Even people who are troubled by such a strange mixture
of adulation and denigration tend to defer to it. Difficult
as it is to interpret Schenker' s history, especially fran a
rrcdern musicological perspective, it is perhaps, not
surprising that, for those who were not prepared to follow
him as far as quarrelling with musicology, the simplest
course seemed to be to find ahistorical ways of
denxnstrating the validity of the theory and to leave this
aspect of his writings alone. But the fact remains that if
the theory and historical orthodoxy are inccinpatible, they
cannot both be true.
The point of the argument was the nature of the
relationship of theory to practice. This is an historical
issue, and it was on the historical level that Schenker took
it up. The claim made on behalf of nineteenth-century theory
was, as we see not just frau Schenker' s assertion, but frau
highly authoritative musicological accounts such as the
source of the first of the quotations above, that it was
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derived from classical practice. It is tempting to regret
that he did not set out his case more fully and more clearly
in conventional musicological terms, but the attempts of his
pupil Oswald Jonas to do this demonstrate nothing so much as
the wisdom of his reluctance to involve himself in that kind
4
of thing.
Schenker himself presents historical arguments in
several places arid in several forms, sanetirres in extremely
broad cultural terms, as in Free Ccrnposition, 5
 sometimes in
much closer focus on particular historical , in
Hmony, 6 in Counterpoint, 7 and in various shorter pieces,
but always against the background of his generally
consistent interpretation of the development of instrumental
music after what Jonas calls 'the epoch of vocal music'. The
lack of an historical survey of the kind that would have
satisfied his musicologically oriented followers is clearly
not due to incapacity for detailed scholarly investigation.
It is due rather to the fact that Schenker approaches his
history from the point of view of his theory, whereas the
musicological attitude would require him to approach his
theory fran the point of view of history, musicology being,
above all, historical in orientation and fundamentally
hostile to theorising.
Schenker' s attitude is not simply perverse, however.
The first thing that has to be grasped by any present-day
reader of Schenker is that while Schenkerian theory appeared
in mid-century 1itrica (where currently dominant perceptions
of his work originate) in the context of an entrenched and
unchallengeable musicology, no such context existed at the
time of its development. In Schenker' s youth, musical
scholarship was not synoynous with a particular definition
of musicology. Many of the problems of interpreting Schenker
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stem from the false assumption that what we now understand
by musical scholarship is what has always been understood to
be that, or that modes of study which did not conform to the
musicological model were justly swept aside as essentially
unscholarly.
Because the kind of historical work which characterises
musicology at its best was in its infancy in Schenker's
time, it was difficult for him to fill out his history with
sufficient detail to make it a more obviously plausible
challenge to the conventional version. It is plain enough
now that nineteenth-century fundamental bass theory is not
the same thing as the theory of Rameau, and that when
Schenker said that the classical composers knew nothing
about it, he could hardly be wrong. Had Schenker not
challenged the accepted view, however, it is not at all
certain that all the information which now makes it so
obvious ould have come to light. It is because of his
intuitive genius that Schenker was able to construct a
theory of music history which stands up to critical
examination at least as well as many versions constructed
much later and with the benefit of far more data; and it was
his scrupulousness as a scholar which prevented him from
attenpting to turn his intuitive construct into a
pseudo-musicological, 'objective' narrative. The least
plausible aspects of his interpretation are not those which
go against the grain of the conventional history of his
time, but conventional assumptions which he was
tanperartentally unable to reliquish, most conspicuously his
prejudice against modality.
*	 *	 *
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Oswald Jonas also 'scorn [ ed] the term musicologist',
according to Irene Schreier Scott. 8 But he did present, in
his 'Introduction' to Schenker' s Harnony, and in his own
Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker,
interpretations of Schenker' $ historical viewpoint which are
specific in areas where Schenker avoids detail, and in a
manner which invites musicological scrutiny.
Jonas tells us that 'the study of theory was divided
into two parts. . . strict counterpoint. . . and figured bass'.
The rules of the fornr were derived fran 'the epoch of
vocal music' and were 'codified' by Fux. Fux's ork was 'a
study of the nature of intervals, a distinction between
consonant and dissonant notes (sic), arid a study of the use
of the latter.' It was, he adds in passing, a study in
voice-leading, but 'nore than anything else [it was] a body
of rules for training the ear', and in this role it had
'universal validity'. It was not, as Fux himself imagined, a
means of teaching canposition. Fux was mistaken because he
was 'too deeply under the influence of the vocal epoch'.
Figured bass, neanwhile, 'remained a discipline of
voice-leading and never degenerated into a mere
juxtaposition of chords'. Consequently it was capable of
being used as a training in cciriposition.
This canfortable situation was suddenly threatened by
the appearance of Rameau, to whan Jonas 'S attitude, like
Schenker' s own, is ambivalent. At first Rameau appears to be
the bringer of necessary illumination. He 'revealed the
function of harnonic steps and inversions [and] detonstrated
that the harrrcny of a triad does not change when the root is
transferred fran the bass to another voice'. But he points
out, as Schenkerians have never been able to resist doing,
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the irrelevant fact that inversion of intervals was
well-known to 'the school of counterpoint'. 'Rarneau' S
concept was much too narrow'. He 'assumed the identity of
chord and scale-step'. He 'did not even suspect... that
voice-leading could be the means for the 'cctnpositional
unfolding' of wider harnnic areas'. The chord, formerly
'endowed by voice-leading with. . . contextual logic', now
stood 'in isolation', and the bass line was 'weighted down'
by the 'ground-bass' (fundamental bass) which inhibited and
finally arrested its novement.9
Then Jonas nves to a nore detailed historical level.
Rameau' s theory was introduced to Germany by Marpurg, who
translated d ' Alnbert' s suImary of his theory) 0 Kirnberger
is represented as the chaxtpion of the teaching style of J.
S. Bach and the opponent of the introduction of Rameau' s
theory by Marpurg, his resistance supported by C. P. E.
Bach. 11
 Haydn learned 'everything' frcni C. P. E. Bach and
Fux, and their treatises were used by him and by Beethoven.
Figured bass continued to be taught, but in a version
falsified by the 'ground-bass' (fundamental bass). Brahms is
his authority for the claim that fran the time of Schumann,
no-one could learn anything since they had nothing but
'inccxiipetent textbooks' to refer to. The exception is
Mendelssohn, who 'was instructed in the old style' since 'C.
P. E. Bach and Quantz had left sare traces of their work in
Berlin.'
The trouble with this account is that it interprets
literally insights arrived at often intuitively, on the
basis of necessarily limited evidence. These insights,
considered historically, are sciretimes confirmed by
subsequent research and saretinies require re-formulation or
nore radical nodification in the light of it. Jonas was, jn
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this area, uniformly uncritical, with the result that his
claims on Schenker' s behalf made little impact on the
general picture of Schenker as historically naive and
prejudiced. Schenker did, of course, harbour sane intense
prejudices. ?ng the riost damaging to his picture of
history - although they were anything but damaging to his
theorising - were his Francophobia, which flared up with
renewed intensity in 1918, and his anti-clericalism, which
made it impossible for bin to consider the music of 'the
vocal epoch' dispassionately, and distorted his view of Fux.
This is ancng the causes of one apparent absurdity in
Jonas's account: the assertion that species counterpoint is
mainly about the abstract relations of tones and only
incidentally about voice-leading.
The corresponding absurdity, the claim that figured
bass is mainly about voice-leading and only incidentally
about chords, is less simple in origin. The notion that
figured bass 'preserved the voice-leading rules' is part of
Viennese lore and it has a certain logic, even if only by
being consistent in its absurdity. Figured bass presented
chord types and specified procedures for connecting them.
Rve the variety of chord types by treating an chords as
variants of a single type, triads in 'root position' or in
saie state of 'inver ', and its role as a codifier of
chord types becanes redundant. All that is left to
distinguish it frciu 'harnony' is the residue of the rules
for connecting :chords and for constructing out of these
connections the ripieno voices, which, of course, are quite
different fran the voices of polyphony, although this is not
generally understood by people who speak about figured bass
as the preserver of the voice-leading rules. These rules
retain sane validity even when the chords are reductively
interpreted, but far fewer are needed and they no longer
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relate to individual sonorities, since these are no longer
recognised. Thus, although pitifully enfeebled, they are
iure recongnisable as voices than anything that could
possibly develop out of 'harirony' (fundamental bass)
exercises; recognisable enough to keep faintly alive their
relation to the baroque notion of inner voices developing
out of the counterpointing of a nlody and a bass.
The reason why figured bass seeied to Schenker a
possible nodel for canposition, while species counterpoint
did not, is that it presupposes an elenentary artistic
structure, while the species nodel is a rrcdel of a learning
process, riot of a ssork of art. 1 produce the species, the
work of art is analysed rationally. It is then reconstructed
by reversing the process of analysis. For Schenker the
original, nodal, work could be pictured only very hazily and
no work which would be its reconstitution could possibly be
imagined. For him the species, therefore, could only be a
means of examining the effect of caibinations of tones
systenatically, by progressing fran simple to nore canplex
cccnbinations.
Understood in Schenker' s own terms, this approach is
not only intelligible, but sanething we need to grasp if we
are to understand the notivation of his theoretical
thinking. This is a kind of thinking which springs fran the
stock of ideas and beliefs available to Schenker in his
formative period. It has nothing to do with musicological
investigation, even though a good deal of this went on
alongside it. The role of the latter in relation to this
thinking can only be to explain it. Reduced to history the
theorising appears nerely bizarre.
The interpretation of Fux given here takes on the air
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of an historical rationalisation of the refusal to
acknowledge the 'validity' of nda1 music. In this view,
species counterpoint cannot, as Fux mistakenly believed,
lead to calçosition of real works of art since the kind of
music represented by vocal polyphony is an historical blind
alley up which the unfortunate ccitiposers were led by their
fixation on the church LTcdes. Like the strange view of
figured bass as having nothing to do with chords, this
interpretation is not entirely an invention of Schenker, but
an aspect of the conventional wisdan of his youth which had
a particularly strong appeal for him. Far fraii being weaned
away fran this view by the accumulating evidence that
Palestrina was not an anbryonic manifestation, or worse
still a still-birth, but the culmination of a nonurrental and
opulent tradition, Schenker stubbornly persisted in his
view, partly because it sens he believed his theory was in
sane way dependent on it and partly because of the nore
widely persistent prejudice against music tied to texts, the
prejudice in favour of 'absolute music'.
Even if he had been nore sympathetic to the music of
'the vocal epoch' he would still have found it impossible to
see its structure in terms of the Fuxian pedagogy, and in
this was perhaps less, rather than irore, simple-minded than
his style-analyst contt1poraries. Attupts to revive nodal
ccznposition by reviving the species only confirmed his
belief that the systan could not lead to the construction
of works of - art, since it failed to produce any such
revival. The actual impact of nodality on nineteenth and
twentieth century music - - in which, of course, he had no
interest - 'was related not to the species, but to the
psychological effect of exotic tonal relations. M3reover it
should be emphasised that these curious beliefs about
theoretical history, and the history of ccitiposed music were
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by no means confined to Schenker; we demonstrate our own
historical insensitivity if we insist on judging then in the
light of the vastly different perspective which is the
product of almost another century of intense historical
activity.
But there are serious problenis also with Jonas's
account of Rameau. Leaving aside the anachronisms - Raneau' s
inability to anticipate Schenker' s concepts - and the
attetipt to reduce his theory of chordal inversion to the
theory of intervallic inversion, while at the same time
employing the term 'root', as if the concept it represents
had an independent existence, there are difficulties about
the supposed means by which Raneauvian concepts were made
available to German and Austrian theorists, and the use they
made of them. Jonas's presentation of Kirnberger as the
champion of J. S. Bach and Marpurg as the champion of Rameau
is misleading. Such evidence as Schenker had access to no
doubt made this interpretation of the Kirnberger-Marpurg
controversy plausible. The research on which the current
picture of the state of theory in the latter half of the
eighteenth century is based is contiporaneous with
Schenker' s own rk. iccording to Tittel it was
Kirriberger, not Marpurg, who was the essential link in the
chain between Raneau and Sechter, the father of Viennese
fundamental bass theory, which is the theory referred to by
Schenker in the quotation at the head of this chapter.
Kirriberger' s hostility to Rameau was only partial, and one
retu-iant of his attitude of ccmprcmise is the often repeated
view that Razieau 'went too far', -or was 'too one-sided'.
That such a view should emerge in a Viennese context is not
surprising, since Albrechtsberger, a pillar of Viennese
tradition in the classical period, established a pattern of
theoretical accamdation and ccxnpraiiise, presenting
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rationalist-reductive concepts side by side with
traditional theories, with no apparent sense of their
logical incatipatibility, arid adapting the Fuxian species
to major and minor.'4
 Schenker's own theory, of course,
represents a curious kind of reconciliation between
Rameauvian reductivism and craft tradition. What the critics
of Raneau overlook is that Raineau also readily rtcdifies his
reductivism when confronted by the exigencies of £misical
reality. Only nineteenth-century textbook 'harrrny' refuses
to be side-tracked by the irrationalities of the art.
Part of Jonas' s riotive in introducing the
Kirnberger-Marpurg controversy is the desire to show that
the great ccznposers, including J. S. Bach, were uninfluenced
by fundamental bass theory. C. P. E. Bach' s assertion that
his father was opposed to Rarreau may seem to be important
fran this point of view. In fact, since Marpurg' s
translation of d'Albert did not appear until 1757, that
particular ork can obviously have no relevance to 3. S.
Bach at all and even Ma.rpurg ' s earliest attnpt to
pranulgate Rameau dates only fran 1749, the year before
Bach's death. For the argument to have any life in it, we
have to make the unlikely assumption of earlier independent
access by J • S. Bach to Rameau' s vvrks. Even if evidence of
such contact were to emerge, it suld be a very uphill task
to prove the influence of reductive thinking on Bach' s
music. Only the strength of the myth that the 'harnony' of
the text books represented the practice of the canposers
could explain the need for this unnecessary debate.
: r	--	 -
- That the classical canposers were uninfluenced by
nineteenth-century text-book harnxny hardly needs to be
argued. Wriether or not they were influenced by Raneau in
other ways was less easy to ascertain in Schenker' s time
- 61 -
than it is now. Since then various kinds of evidence have
appeared which fully support Schenker's and Jonas's claim
that Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, despite having been
educated in a post Rameauvian world, were instructed in
counterpoint and figured iass) 6 It is Mendelssohn who
would appear to be the nest risky of Schenker' s witnesses.
But Jonas was substantially correct in saying that
Mendelssohn was instructed in the old style - if the word
style refers to the theory rather than to the manner
of instruction - traces of which remained in Berlin. The
main trace was Zelter.'7 But Zelter' s ndel appears to have
been Kirnberger rather than C. P. E. Bach and his style of
teaching to have been, probably as a consequence of this,
much nore theoretical than Bach's. Sane of Mendelssohn's
work-books have survived, and we can see fran them that what
had been for C. P. E. Bach a very practical discipline had
becane much rrore a pen and paper procedure by the
time of Mendelssohn's youth. Nevertheless, the theoretical
assumptions behind Zelter' s exercises are those of the
figured bass tradition uncorrupted by inversion theory, even
though the fundamental bass was also taught by him to
Mendelssohn. It may be that Mendelssohn had been taught
figured bass in a nore authentic manner before he worked
the exercises which have survived, learning the chords
individually at the keyboard, as specific sonorities with a
particular hand-shape, as Bach deals with than in his
treatise. But there is no way of knowing this. The evidence
indicates a system of writing out and figuring a bass on
paper and then realising the figures. This may suggest the
influence of fundamental bass theory, merely because the
bass is treated as a harnonic starting point, rather than as
a counterpoint to the upper voice. But, of course, it does
not imply that the figures were understood to indicate the
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inversional status of triads rather than the traditional
sonorities. The role of the fundamental bass (which is added
afterwards, not allowed to determine the path of the bass as
in nineteenth-century text-books) is to 'justify' the
harironies rationally. There is, as Jonas rightly says, no
evidence of the pedagogic practices of the
nineteenth-century conservatory in the Mendelssohn records.
The notion of rational justification of irrational
artistic practice is the way in which Rameau' s theory could
be accczrnodated by, even supportive of, the craft tradition,
which, in the Voltairean atiTosphere of the Prussian court,
needed to de-mystify itself.'8
 Far frau superceding the
tradition, it could be used to validate it. But the ambition
to supercede the tradition makes fundamental bass so
obviously threatening to it that it is riot surprising to
find Kirnberger, exactly because his attitude to rationalism
appeared less subversive than Marpurg ' s, becaning the
effective carrier of the Grundbass into the theorising of
people who had not the faintest notion of the
philosophical-scientific notives of Rameau and d'Albert
and ware untouched by the Francophilism of the court of
Frederick the Great)
Mendelssohn is often treated as an ananalous figure
and in respect of his musical education, he was. Unriodified
figured bass was out of fashion virtually everywhere except
Berlin by the time he was being taught by Zelter and this
instruction was seen by sa of his contporaries -
Schumann, for example - as alnost an unfair advantage. But
its highly theoretical character, very different fran the
figured bass instruction given - to fbzart nd Beethoven,
shows the craft tradition represented by the Bach family in
an etiolated form, already tending towards a rationalised,
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schoolrocm pedagogy, as opposed to the process of initiation
into a mystery1 which the older way had been. This may
partly account for characteristics which have led sane
critics to find Mendelssohn's brilliance more a matter of
facility than of inspiration. Schenker did not join in the
fashionable denigration of Mendelssohn of his time, but it
is interesting that this canposer provides a very small
number of illustrations of his theory in Free CclTiposition.
Finally there is Brahms. Brahms is Schenker' s great
authority in every respect but one: he could not go along
with Brahms' s desire to restore the nidal version of species
counterpoint. There is no doubt that Brahms did have very
serious reservations about the harxionic theory, indeed about
all the theory taught in the conservatories. Brahms's
opposition, however, carried little weight against the
ovezhelming progress of the institutions and these
procedures flourished. Although the canposers of the
late nineteenth century tended to resist - often bitterly
- the pedagogic methods to which they were subjected,
the historical picture was by then so clouded that
resistance was all that was left to then. They no longer had
any notion of an alternative. The difficulty of Schenker' s
struggle to recover the craft tradition is itself testimony
to this. We need not, as Schenker did, draw the conclusion
that the art uld wither away unless the craft tradition
could be restored, to see that the situation of canposers of
his generation was utterly different fran the situation of
1'bzart, or even Mendelssohn, and must lead to a radically
different approach to ccwposition.
In his Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker
Jonas presents nore evidence in support of his
interpretation of theoretical history. Here again he treats
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Kirnberger, whose works, he tells us, were given to
Beethoven by Neefe, as wholly anti-Rameauvian, and
introduces the names of Vogler and Weber into the
discussion. 20 His own acquaintance with Kirnberger must have
been too slight for him to see that he was here giving away
part of his argument. If Beethoven had all the works of
Kirnberger, he nust have known about fundamental bass long
before he met Vogler in Vienna and may not have shared the
hostility of the older generation. Beethoven' s attitude to
Vogler was perhaps less negative than Mozart's. His
admiration of Cherubini also suggests that 'theorist t was
not necessarily a pejorative term for him. But even if
Beethoven was interested in Vogler' s kind of theoretical
speculation, this is a very different matter fran
involvement with the 'harmony' of the conservatories which
were being set up towards the end of his life.21
Vogler is interesting to us as the originator of the
system of supplying the fundamental bass to a composition by
means of a sequence of Roman numerals set out below the
composed bass. 22 This notational system is more than mere
shorthand. The numerals indicate not so much the triads
implied by the composed bass as the steps of the scale upon
which the triads are constructed. This concept was of
crucial importance to Schenker.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Jonas 's history
of theory is that it skips from Weber to the 1920 edition of
a book by Hermann Grabner, with no direct reference to the
developaent through the nineteenth-century of the theory
which is the focus of his, and Schenker' s, critique. This is
the more remarkable since this theory is Viennese in origin,
and both Schenker and Jonas received their musical education
in Vienna. This is the very area where they might be
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expected to be rrre, rather than less specific. Perhaps it
required a degree of rashness of which even Schenker was
incapable to be as rude about Viennese orthodoxy as he felt
able to be about Riemann, Richter and Reger. But this should
not deceive us. It was his own school experience at the
hands of Bruckner, the faithful disciple of Sechter, against
which Schenker reacted. To learn the history of this theory,
however, we have to turn to musicology proper.
An authoritative account of the developient of Viennese
theory is provided by the Austrian historian Ernst Tittel.23
In his 'Wiener Musiktheorie von Fux bis Schoenberg' he
surveys exactly the period left blank by Jonas. The
information he presents concerning the musical education of
Haydn, zart and Beethoven confirms the absence of any
trace of the kind of 'harmony' associated with the
nineteenth century text book. What he says about their own
teaching procedures confirms their faithfulness to the
traditions they inherited, their minimal interest in
pedagogy, and scant evidence of any deep involvement in
theorising of any sort. When he moves to theoretical history
itself, a story emerges which so strongly confirms
Schenker' s claims about the nature of nineteenth-century
theory, that Schenkerian neglect of this period seems even
more curious.
According to Tittel the principal figures in
Viennese theory, fran the classical period onwards, were
Albrechtsberger and Sechter. Albrechtsberger' s rk was made
famous far beyond Vienna by his pupil, Ignaz Ritter von
Seyfried, who published a compendium containing many
different kinds of theory in circulation at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. 24 Sechter, by contrast, is
principally associated with the version of fundamental bass
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theory which became the dc*ninant pedagogic theory not only
in Vienna but in many other centres as well, and,
eventually, in one form or another, the 'single practical'
one. This theory was universally taught, whatever else, if
anything, was taught alongside it. In Vienna itself sane
etiolated form of figured bass, pseudo-Fuxian counterpoint
and sate kinds of rrotivic counterpoint continued to be
taught up to the end of the century, but the core of the
'composition' course was, indeed still is, Sechter-style
'harmony'.
It is Sechter' s 'harmony', which is the conflation of
Fuxian counterpoint and Rameauvian fundamental bass, of
which Schenker and Jonas complain. It was this which
Scheriker himself learned fran Sechter' s successor at the
conservatory, nton Bruckner. But according to Tittel
Sechter acquired his knowledge of Rameauvian theory neither
fran Vogler nor fran Marpurg, but fran Kirnberger. Fran
Marpurg, on the contrary, what he learned was the north
German notion of counterpoint. 25 less important than the
role of individual theorists in this history is the role -
often deplored by Schenker - of the pedagogic institution.
Tittel also follows through the history of the Conservatory,
its teachers and their practices, fran its founding in 1817
until its association with the University music department
at the end of the century.
This history is interesting in several respects. The
Conservatory was an off-shoot of the Gesellschaft der
Musikfreunde in Wien and, as a secular institution
established to meet the needs of the haute-bourgeoisie, in
contradistinction to the court and the church, it could be
expected to favour modern notions of theory and pedagogy.26
However it sens to have modelled itself on a kind of
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institutional life in which, according to Tittel, just at
that time, musical activity was diminishing. Before the
founding of the conservatory, private tuition had filled the
gaps left by institutions such as the k.k. Normalschule zu
St Anna, and the Sngerknabenkonvikt. Sechter himself rked
in a state educational institute (the k.u.k.
Blindenerziehungsinstitut) before taking up his post at the
Conservatory. Moreover, in Vienna, 'the relationship between
music-teacher" and "church-musician" had never been
interrupted' 27 In the theory books stning fran this
tradition, the church nodes were folled even in figured
bass. It was teachers nurtured in this tradition fran whan
the new institution had to recruit its staff. This helps to
explain not only its generally conservative atnsphere but
the reason why a canpranise theory like Sechter' s, in which
the Fuxian riodel was still a discernible influence - a
theory, in fact, which was a continuation of the
nodernisation of Fux begun by Albrechtsberger - was itore
acceptable than the nodernised versions of figured bass
which it superceded. There were, of course, other factors to
do with the nature of the institution which favoured
Sechter' s system.
Tittel confirms Schenker' s observation that the
daninant theory in Vienna was a version of fundamental bass
theory - identifying this theory as the 'nork of Sechter -
and that this theory was the basis of other influential
nineteenth-century theories. Attempts to find theoretical
explanations of post-classical rks were couched in terms
of this theory, of which various nodifications -. were
proposed. Modifications made in the light of blatantly
incatipatible practice constitute the only possible claim of
the theory to any sort of empirical content.
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Nevertheless, the supposed association of the theory
with the classical repertory and its entrenchment in highly
authoritarian institutions gave crushing weight to any
notion stenining fran it. 'lb query it in Schenker' s time was
to put oneself outside a tradition which was not merely a
local phenctrenon but a universally accepted idea of musical
reality.
The theory in which Schenker, like all Viennese
students then and now, was schooled was a product of the
same time, place, and conditions as those in which the
'Viennese classics' theniselves came into being. Claims of
any other kind of association with the classics have to be
treated with caution. The theories which proliferated in
this period developed alongside the music of the time,
neither deriving fran it nor guiding it. Such cross
influences as did occur are undoubtedly far nore subtle than
the bald statements of the official historians imply.
Schenker brought to bear upon the conventional theory
ideas drawn fran outside the pedagogic tradition. Sare of
these were technical, sare philosophical both in the strict
sense and in the sense of aesthetic notions and historical
and cultural ideas. Sane were the product of his individual
approach to the works he studied, and this source became
itore important as tine went on. But however much Scheriker
distrusted the theory he had been taught, however great his
respect for Brahms and Brahms 's dislike of theory and
theorists, however low the esteem in which Bruckner was. held
in the circles in which Schenker found himself noving after
his university days, he was acutely aware of the need to
denonstrate his technical-theoretical ccmpetence. In what
other terms could technical canpetence be denonstrated than
in 'the only theory learned and taught' in the
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conservatories? Even the rrost radical critique of the theory
had to be at least initiated fran within, since there simply
existed no other position, notwithstanding the various
attempts at extension and ndification and antiquarian
revivalism. ne of these did, in fact, constitute a radical
challenge to the tradition; they were rather elaborations or
refinements or enrichments of it. It is the frustration
generated by this situation which explains Schenker's often
seemingly philosophically inconsistent reference to
authorities, such as, for example, the zart letter since
identified as a forgery.28
Schenker's theory itself is, of course, an iniplicit
critique of conventional theory and theoretical history. His
explanations in Free Canposition are often overtly
historical and accatpanied by many carnents about the
writing of history. The history of music should tell us, he
argues, when and where the phenarena he isolates first
occurred and how they developed. Free Canposition could
itself be read as such a history in outline. This history
could be canpared to the history of musical developaent
implied by conventional histories of theory.
There are several reasons why a cxxnparison of this kind
ould be premature. Yet the bulk of the existing secondary
literature not least, ironically, Forte's essay cited above,
is in effect an attempt to prove that Schenker provides a
better account of the develoçnt of music than conventional
theories. If he provides a better account of the developrent
of individual 'orks than that provided by any of the other
widely canvassed theories he rmjst be putting in doubt
accounts of the historical developnent of canpositional
techniques which refer back to less reliable interpretations
of these techniques.
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The means by which the adequacy of the interpretation
of crks has conventionally been tested has been to canpare
the explanation with the work. According to this criterion,
if a sufficient degree of correspondence is found the
explanation is appropriate. The problem here, of course, as
with any allegedly empirical theory, is that of circularity.
The explanation is seen to match the work when the work is
seen in the light of the explanation. In just the same way,
the formal theorist can claim that because his formal
construct corresponds to phenanena detonstrable in the work
it explains the wo' s structure, or the intervaflic
analysis of the works of Palestrina can claim that it
explains their structure, and so on. To the unconvinced or
the uninitiated, the devotee can only say that he finds the
procedure itore illuminating than theirs. But he can only
convince them that it is so by teaching them to see in the
same way. He cannot give then any reason why it should be
so. This is the problem of reliance on the 'purely
empirical' uncontaminated by thought, which Schenker
reminds us, with his quotation fran the Theory of Colour
at the head of Chapter 1 of Free Ccmsition does not exist.
A history of theory designed to provide logical
justification by reinterpreting the conventional history as
the diachronic aspect of the synchronic theory would be open
to precisely the same logical jection as the empirical
justification of the theory. The problem must be approached
first fran the opposite end. It is only by testing
Schenker' s underlying assumptioiis - embodied in his stated
historical beliefs as expressed in his critique of
conventional history - against conventional accounts of that
history that shall be in a position to provide - or deny
- external support for the theory erected upon then. Only
then would it be appropriate to consider the merits of
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reconstructing theoretical history using Sctenker's
analytical insights as a guide.
*	 *	 *
Schenker' s critique is t-pronged. He attacks
nineteenth century theory as theory, i.e., he questions the
explanatory powers claimed for it, indeed its whole
relationship with the rmisic it is supposed to explain. But
he attacks it also as a pedagogic systen. It is the use of
the fundamental bass as a systen for teaching the rudiments
of canposition to which he takes the most serious exception.
In the third chapter of Harmony, Schenker criticises
the conflation of species counterpoint with fundamental bass
theory. He attacks also the inability of the (Conservatory)
teacher 'to explain his own propositions' and the lack of
discernible connection between the rules and the free
catiposition fran which the theory claims to be derived.30
He focuses on the 'confusion between harmony and
counterpoint' by taking an exarrple fran a standard harmony
text-book, the Lehrbuch der Harrnonie of Ernst Frjedrjch
Richter (Leipzig 1853) whose twenty-fifth edition appeared
in English as a Manual of Harmony in 1912, and asks, 'What
does this mean?':
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Schenker pretends to be genuinely puzzled. Is this a
four-part species exercise? If so, is the bass voice
supposed to be the ca.ntus firmus? Surely not, for how can
anything as musically meaningless as this really be a cantus
firmus? Or perhaps the notes of the bass are just symbols of
the scale steps of a real composition, not the actual
sequence of tones appearing in the bass voice, but only the
roots of the controlling harmonies. But this can hardly be
right, for the parts really do look like the voices of a
counterpoint exercise, an exercise in voice-leading, in
which all the voices are real voices. Wtiat is the point of
trying to teach voice-leading rules over a symbolic bass?
Wouldn't it make more sense to use a real voice, a cantus
firmus, to which to relate the other voices? It can be
assumed that Schenker' s contemporaries were not so stupid as
to be unable to take his irony. If the systen plodded on its
way undisturbed by attacks of this kind it was not because
there was a widespread faith in its logical consistency.
'Imagine now,' he exclaims at the end of all this,
'that the whole book is based on such nonsense,' of which
the student 'cannot make head or tail'. He does not know
whether he is being taught harmony or counterpoint, cannot
even tell which is supposed to be which. And the text-books
'are all alike'. The force of 'the general tradition' is 'so
irresistible that even artists like 'Ithaikovsky and
Rimsky-Korsakov.. . fall into the same error in their
text-books on harmony' • These composers may have been
chosen by Schenker less for their artistic standing than for
their geographical remoteness which indicated the extent of
the plague.
Against this 'nonsense' Schenker counterpoises the old
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figured bass tradition, choosing an example fran J. S.
Each's Generalbassbichlein whose instructions were directed
to practical ends, to composition, improvisation and the
performance of real music. 'It is impossible that every note
of a true bass line should be a scale step and that the
progression of the bass notes should be identical with the
progression of the scale-steps,' he points out with
reference to this example.
Schenker' s argument at this point does not end with
quite the panache of its opening. It is easier to find fault
with 'the general tradition' than to offer an alternative.
Schenker' s own alternative had not, at that stage, been
worked out. As yet he shrank fran advocating the
reintroduction of fun-blown figured bass teaching,
conceding that it was out of date and having yet to grasp
its implications for musical education, and this gives his
chapter rather a lame ending. Indeed, although he does
advocate it in principle in his last book he does not make
it at all clear how such a prograimle could realistically be
implemented in a ndern music school. (Modern Schenkerians
generally do not confront the issue, addressing it cursorily
or not at all. His consciousness that he cannot present
an alternative teaching method tErlpts him into
grandiloquence whose role is perhaps rather to quell his own
uneasiness than to hide his vagueness.
But this in no way diminishes the validity of his case
against the conservatory theory, namely that it conflates
and debases the distinct traditions it displaces which had
particular practical objectives, none of which can be
fulfilled by the hybrid theory. The objectives may have
changed. Perhaps performers really do not need to know much
about the music they perform and it may be that the
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separation between performance and ccinposition is
irreversible. Perhaps those who want to listen nore
insightfully really need not trouble their heads with
figured bass and counterpoint. But in that case why put them
through this meaningless form of torture, which is hardly
less painful than the old procedures and infinitely less
useful?
When Schenker criticises the theory of the fundamental
bass, it is the Viennese teaching system founded on the use
of the fundamental bass that he means. It is important to be
clear about this because it is easy to misinterpret his
hostility to the fundamental bass as a rejection of Raneau's
nost innovative and influential idea, namely that sonorities
which may strike the eye as entirely disparate entities may
seem to the ear merely a re-arrangnt of the same tonal
material and can rationally be interpreted as such. The
attractiveness of this notion for the eighteenth century is
that it accords with the idea of natural law, of hidden
determinants which are the source of our sense of normality
and appropriateness. If it were possible to demonstrate
infallibly that the psychological laws of art and the
physical laws of sound reflect one another in sare necessary
way we might discover whether or not our perceptions
correspond to an objective reality. Whether or not Rameau's
theory was truly scientific, as d' Alanbert believed, remains
an open question.32
• The theory of inversion is not only a rationalist
theory but a theory of hearing. Rameau proposed writing with
the principle of inversion consciously in mind because he
believed that by doing so the canposer could guarantee both
the natural and psychological appropriateness of his music.
If it obeys the rules the music will sound right because it
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will be right. Whereas before the canposer had to rely on
his own sense of appropriateness, his taste, to guide him,
without understanding what he was doing, now he can
guarantee success. Even a canposer with a relatively poor
sense of musical appropriateness can produce tolerable music
if he follows the rules. There were, of course, other, much
cruder theories about how music could be mechanically
assembled. Rameau is not unique in offering a short-cut and
Schenker was just as contemptuous of the jig-saw puzzle
approach of phrase juggling, filling in of outlines, motivic
permutation and so on.
Understood in this way it is easy to see both how close
Schenker is to Rameau and where he departs fran him. The
idea that the appearance of the text can belie the way the
music is heard, that sonorities which appear unrelated are
heard as related is crucial to Scheriker. Rameau' s notion of
a sequence of understood sounds underlying the text putting
constraints upon what can happen within it is also essential
to Schenker's theorising. It is not unreasonable to see his
theory in this sense as an extension of Rameau' s. But a
vital difference is that in Rameau' s view of the thing the
understood sequence is only understood. It is a purely
psychological entity, rationally inferred fran the known
laws of sound, whereas for Schenker its constituents are
real sounds. As a sequence, however, as an understood
relationship of tones it is very much a psychological
phenanenon. The hidden sequence has to be recanposed by the
listener. He must find it intuitively, making the
indispensable connections which will provide him with the
desired sense of coherence. His finding and recognisirig it
is what guarantees his sense of the music's appropriateness.
The fact that this happens without conscious effort is
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of the essence. The magic of ccposition is the ability of
the composer to satisfy the desire of the listener without
either of them needing to know how or why this happens. To
uncover the process may enhance the discernxrent of the
listener but it could never lead to the formulation of
infallible rules of composition, not because it is too
complex - there would be tco many rules - but because it
would destroy the magic. The composer's freedom not to be
wholly predictable and the listener' s need for refreshment,
which is as great as his desire for the satisfaction of his
sense of appropriateness, would both be denied. Very great
works bear repeated hearing not because they obey the rules,
but because the resourcefulness with which they exploit
their freedom makes it impossible to exhaust their
freshness. Composition which is not free is not composition.
It could be said that the greatest virtue of Schenker' s
analytic procedure is its complexity since this derronstrates
the nonsense of trying to write rules, however numerous
and hover refined, which will guarantee successful
canposition. It explodes the notion that art can be reduced
to the rational. There is an irony in this because Schenker
set out with the belief that he was going to simplify
theory. There is a sense in which he did fulfil this aim,
carrying the reductive programe of the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century science-oriented theorists to its limit.
But the effect is to make visible the vast realm of
compositional freedom lying within the spaces articulated by
the reductive structure. Schenker' s word for this is
¶lbnraum, musical space, an articulated space which becomes
the composer's field of play. Within this his freedom is
infinitely greater than conventional theory suspected. It is
a startling thought that while Schoenberg, following the
conventional historical interpretation, felt that dissonance
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and chromaticism were disruptive forces, Schenker believed
that no amount of dissonance or chromaticism uld be
unacceptable to an ear that could hear then in a coherent
context.
If we contrast this with the compositional theory which
Rarneau saw as the logical consequence of his discovery its
rationalism looks positively simple-minded. Four-part
harmony is reductive in a different sense. It reduces
composition to a set of formulae so that it ceases to be
composition.33
If, like Sechter and so many of his contemporaries, we
see the fundairntal bass as the logical consequence of the
theory of chordal inversion, and feel justified in turning
this analytic procedure into a constructive principle, we
might feel that Schenker is inconsistent in accepting the
one and rejecting the other. But it is not a necessary
consequence. Only habit makes it appear so. Schenker
accepted the reductive implications of the inversion theory
for the interpretation of chords but he did not share
Ranau's very eighteenth century belief that every
sirruiltaneity was categorisable as a chord. For Schenker it
was neither necessary nor possible to imagine a non-sounding
'bass' line, a dumb voice, marching in step with the actual
bass.
Still less did it make sense to 'compose' a fundaitental
bass line. This would have seated a nonsense to him, even if
he had been prepared to analyse harmonic textures in
Rameau' s fashion, since he began from a different notion of
the ccmpositiorial process. What the paradigmatic system
built on the fundaxnental bass did was to attempt, quite
crudely, to construct compositional laws out of physically
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derived 'harircnic' laws.
According to , Schenker' s great contribution was
the unravelling of fundamental bass fran counterpoint with
which nineteenth century theory had conflated it. In
reality, his criticism went deeper. Neither species
counterpoint nor fundamental bass could, in Schenker' s view,
lead to canposition. The former provided a certain kind of
valuable musical training while the second was mechanical
and meaningless. But neither of these things could explain
rks of art. 1ny theory which sets out to do this must be
an aesthetic theory. The principles it locates must be
principles of art. Nineteenth-century technical theory was
primarily concerned with sanething else: devising systems
which could be taught. The gulf which opened up between
canposition and theory, which it was Schenker' s declared
ambition to bridge, did so because of this situation.
It is the educational system to which we must turn
therefore, for insight into the external conditions which
determined the direction taken by theory in the early years
of the nineteenth century, and to see whether Schenker was
justified in regarding these conditions as at best
irrelevant and at vrst inimical to art.
*	 *	 *
The nineteenth century certainly saw great changes in
the way musicians were educated, in the shape of musical
careers and in the notion of what a musician should be and
what he should be able to do. A major feature of this change
is the institutionalisation of musical education and th
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rise of a pethgogic literature - very different fran the
pedagogic literature of the eighteenth century - the
production of which expanded to industrial proportions by
the end of the century. To see whether Schenker was right in
attributing the confused state of theory to these
conditions, and how far Rameauvian theory in one form or
another contributed to it, and to see whether his view is
nore or less plausible than that of those who claim that
nineteenth century Viennese theory 'oriented itself
according to the musical language and graninar of the
Viennese classics', it is necessary to have a picture of
these changes, especially as they affected musical life in
Vienna, since it was in Vienna that the theory which became
standard in the academies was developed, and the Viennese
classics with which it became associated.
This fact is itself quite reinarkable, for at the time
when the theory was taking shape it was still widely felt
that the nost progressive theories were French in origin and
it was the supposedly scientific character of the
enlightened French school which was felt to be the guarantee
of its validity rather than any connection with contanporary
canposition. At the time when the theory taught by Bruckner
began to be established at the Vienna Conservatory, the
works which cane to be regarded as classics were not the
staple repertory they later became. The whole notion of a
repertory - rks to be repeated regularly, which formed the
bread and butter of concert-life and which were eventually
to be sanctified by this process - only began to take shape
with the rise of the great orchestras, which it was the task
of the Conservatories to man. Even in Schenker' s youth, as
we can see fran his reviews, the alnost total daiiinance of
concert prograrmes by music of the past, which characterised
concert life for nost of the twentieth century, was still to
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ccnte.34
The Vienna Conservatory opened in 1817, five years
after the founding of its parent institution the
Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, first as a choir
school arid later as a school for instrumentalists. According
to Tittel, theoretical studies developed 'slowly and
laboriously' since the teaching of composition was not felt
to be either necessary or appropriate and the theoretical
knowledge required by organists, singers, instrumentalists
and even 'musical directors' was felt to be adequately
catered for by rudimentary instruction. However, he says,
'things iroved with the times' and in 1860 a composition
class was established. He does not tell us what it was about
'the times' that prompted this change. Although it was not
until 1860 that composition featured on the curriculum as a
distinct discipline of that name, it had long been present
as the standard 'harmony' course to which Generalbass had
been reduced.
The first theory teacher, Gottfried Salzrnann, was appointed
in 1820. Simon Sechter was appointed in 1850, his pupil
Preyer having taught at the Conservatory since 1839. Another
Sechter pupil, Selmar Bagge, taught there fran 1851-5 before
becoming director of a music school in Basel. Bruckner, a
very faithful pupil of Sechter, succeeded him. It requires
no great insight to see that it was Simon Sechter whose
ideas dominated the teaching of theory at the Conservatory
at least fran 1839 onwards, not too far fran Scheriker's
'century'.
Fran 1860 classes in 'elerientary music-theory' and
'figured bass playing' under Karl Graedener, (whose son
Hermann was much admired as a composer by Schenker), Karl
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Pichier and Edward Koehier, were followed by courses in
'Harmony' and 'Composition'. Tittel speculates that the
appointment of Court Music Director Otto-Desoff was intended
as a counterweight to the style of 'old Sechter', but can
give no information about Desoff' s teaching methods. The
remark is interesting, however, because it suggests the
consciousness of a disjunction between the pedagogic style
and musical practice in the secular world. Bruckner
succeeded Sechter alongside Leopold Alexander Zeilner, who
was appointed in 1868, and Franz Krenn (1869). Bruckner was
nearing the end of his career when Schenker became his pupil
in 1887. By then a relationship had begun between the
Conservatory and the University which was to further
solidify the position of conventional theory.
The developnents in Vienna were not unique. The
establishment of a conservatory in Vienna was preceded by
that of the Paris Conservatory in 1795. Five years after
Vienna, London had its first institution of this kind, the
Royal Academy, which opened in 1823. In the same period,
i.e., the first half of the nineteenth century, such schools
were set up as far apart as Lemberg and Dublin. As in
Vienna, the setting up of the schools was related to the
founding of the many orchestral societies which date fran
the same period and which they were intended to supply with
players, as well, of course, as to produce the next
generation of teachers.
Clearly, fran the 1820s sane method of theory
instruction was called for which was mmore than rudiiientary
but suitable to the school situation and appropriate to a
wider range of abilities than were the methods by which the
children of Bach or the Ibzart bhildren had been instructed.
It can hardly be coincidence that from just this time
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'harncny' text-books produced expressly for instruction in
what were understood to be the basics of cciiposition began
to be turned out in large numbers in German, French and
English and in smaller numbers in other languages. These
books were very often aimed at a specific market. Some were
written for use in particular institutions, sciie were
advertised as having been used by teachers in particular
conservatories. Others claimed to be suited to
self-instruction. Others again were meant for use in primary
schools or for the enlightenment of teachers in such
schools, or in the 'normal' schools in which they were
trained, or for the benefit of church organists and
choir-masters.
Certain clearly defined theoretical trends are
discernible in the titles of these books. In the first two
decades the lists are dcinated by books dealing with
figured bass. The word 'harnony' appears in their titles
nore often than not. This does not necessarily iitiply the
'hazmny' of the 'fundamental bass' as it is found in the
literature of later decades but it can not be assumed that
the instruction offered under this heading was of the kind
we now associate with C. P. E. Bach. A book of this period
is just as likely to tell the reader how to figure a bass -
according to principles of bass progression, inversion,
preparation and resolution of 'chords' - as how to realise
an accanpaniitnt fran a given figured bas - and Least of all -
how to do this in improvisatory fashion in performance. ..The
ubiquitous treatment of the figures as representing the
inversional. status of a triad, or seventh chord, or sane
derivative of these, is indicative of the same set of
assumptions as those underlying the fundamental bass systan
pramilgated by Sechter and others. It is only a short step
fran using the traditional figures to identify bass tones as
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sanething other than the root tones of the chords of which
they are supposed to be members to 'canposing' the
fundamental bass in sane fashion.
In the third decade, books dealing with the theory of
harnrny begin to outnumber those dealing with figured bass.
These books are certainly instructional books pranulgating
the 'new' system of harrnny rather than new theoretical
investigations.
It was in France that books presenting a 'ncdern'
notion of harnny first appeared in any quantity, not
surprisingly since the French Conservatory led the way and
naturally took up an 'enlightened' attitude. The words 'new'
and 'science' appear rrore frequently in the French titles as
do 'rational' and 'system' •36 In Germany perhaps the ITOSt
frequent adjective is 1 y 1 and, in the circumstances, the
highly appropriate German expression for a means of
negotiating the convolutions created by the stirring
together of all manner of incanpatible systeins: leit-faden -
'guiding thread'. The amateur presumably constituted a
significant proportion of the German market.37
Speculative or scholarly works taking cognisance of
French developients had been appearing in German since
Marpurg's translation of d'Alembert, fran Kirnberger's Die
Wabren Grundstze der Harrmonie in 1773 to the bb Vogler's
Handbuch zur HarrTOnielehre in 1802. Many of these re read
by Sechter. He lists Marpurg, Kirnberger and Mattheson anong
the theorists whose works re known to him. (In later years
he was to add Ttrk, Gottfried Weber, Reicha, Marx and Riepel
to the list.) Vogler is as conspicuous by his absence fran
Sechter's list as Sechter is by his absence fran Schenker's,
but he was a praninent figure in musical and academic
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circles during Sechter's life-time. It would be
inconceivable that Sechter knew nothing of his ideas even if
he had not advertised his acquaintance with them by using
Vogler's Rcman numerals to indicate scale steps in the
Grundsätze. 38
1\mong the most prominent of Sechter's iirrnediate
predecessors in Viennese teaching theory and the most
influential on future pedagogic methods was Johann Georg
Albrechtsberger (1736-1809). It is impossible to be certain
how much of the theoretical writings given out as
Albrechtsberger' s were in fact his, but it is perhaps
significant that the books published in his life-tine deal
with Generalbass, accompaniment, the use of diminished and
augmented intervals, 'strict composition' etc., i.e,
traditional topics, while the version published after his
death by Ignaz Ritter von Seyfried is entitled
Albrechtsberger' s àmtliche Schrif ten ueber Generalbass,
Harrronielehre und Tonsetzkunst (1837). By 1837 'moving with
the times' required that theory books had sarething to say
about 'harmony'.
Tittel indicates that Albrechtsberger' s ork was based
primarily on the Gradus but that he then 'modernised' it
under the stimulus of C. P. E. Bach's Versuch, and the orks
of Marpurg and Kirnberger. In this way, he says,
Albrechtsberger' s rk collects together all the theoretical
tendencies of the classical era. Certainly Albrechtsberger
shows the influence of the theoretical trends of his time,
but to what extent he bad understood them and whether his,
or rather Seyfried' s, compendium represents sanething more
than an opportunistic canpilation is a more complex
question. Tittel seems to take the claims of Seyfried at
face value, making no distinction between the purely
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theoretical and the pedagogic significances of the
tmodernisationt of Fux
This distinction is crucial. The significance for
music-education of Albrechtsberger's 'modernisation' can
hardly be exaggerated. The assumption that a modal
contrapuntal theory can be retained as a rational part of
the preparation for the writing of tonal music through a
simple modification is anything but self-evidently true.
Even less self-evident is the relationship of this procedure
to the processes which brought about the supposedly
corresponding 'modernisation' of composition itself.
The real significance of Albrechtsberger' s
modernisation of Fuxian counterpoint was that it was the
indispensable precondition for Sechter' s further adaptation
of the system. Before the principle of the fundamental bass
could be applied to the contrapuntal species it was vital
for the latter to be interpreted chordally and in terms of
the major and minor scales.
*	 *	 *
Nothing could illustrate the difficulties confronting
the conservatory teacher more vividly than the Seyfried
compendium with its multitude of rules and examples,
adapted, according to its optimistic subtitle, for
self-instruction. To turn fran Albrechtsberger to Sechter
is to see at once what was the charm of the fundamental
bass. This had very little to do with the interpretation of
musical structures.
- 86 -
Albrechtsberger, or rather, the compendium published
under his name, straddles the great pedagogic divide, which
is riot between counterpoint and figured bass, but between,
on the one hand, these two and various compromise or
contributory harnrnic theories, and on the other, the
all-embracing fundamental bass. It tries to bridge the gap
between the old craft mysteries which require either
intensive and highly expert individual instruction - such as
that received by the Bach children from their father or the
ozart children from theirs - and the situation in which
large numbers of musicians have to be educated, mainly to
perform other people's music, and/or to teach others again.
For such students, the skills of the composer or the
improvising accompanist are not only unnecessary, but
impossible to provide for on the scale required.
The method of C. P. E. Bach required long, slow,
patient, individual teaching. Johann Qristian, for example,
spent four years studying with his elder brother after his
father' s death. These studies were carried out at the
keyboard. We can be sure of this not only from the
consistently practical orientation of the instructions but
also because C. P. E. Bach remarks on the importance of
engaging the intellect as well as the fingers of the pupil.
He acknowledges that it is possible to learn to realise
figured bass effectively without understanding it
'theoretically' given a good enough ear. He probably would
not have thought it possible to learn it theoretically
without experiencing it practically and would hardly have
approved of Zelter' s procedure. Yet a 'theoretically'
acquired skill is exactly what the producers of text-books
offered. Bach insists on the need for repetition, for the
teacher to question the pupil again and again to ensure that
everything has been learned before new things are
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introduced. We can be sure this questioning did not take the
proxy form, characteristic of institutionalised education,
of collecting in and marking paper exercises.
Teaching of this order was a very exclusive business
indeed. C. P. E. Bach's satirical letters in Der kritische
Musicus an der Spree indicate sane of the difficulties of
obtaining it, even of knowing what to look for. Bach himself
insists that it can only be provided by a canposer of the
highest standing and rru.ich experience. What he is really
inveighing against in these letters, whether or not he saw
it in these terms, is not simply a loring of standards,
but new social conditions which led to the transformation of
a craft mystery requiring a long apprenticeship into a
pastime for the nouveaux riches. The Conservatories ware the
great engine of this novernent to which C. P. E. Bach himself
unwittingly contributed, as, to his dismay, he later
realised. 'Canpendia' appalled him. But nothing published in
his life time can have been, fran his point of view, quite
as appalling as the Seyfried production.
At any one time there appears to have been a handful of
teachers taking care of the theoretical education of the
entire student body at the Vienna Conservatory. Bruckner's
t year harnony and counterpoint course consisted of mass
lectures and the 'working of paper exercises and there is no
reason to suppose that this was abnormal.
That Albrechtsberger (or Seyfried) had taken on board
Rameau' s system of inversion but not all of its implications
can be seen fran the fact that he discriminates between
situations where the notes of • a chord other than the bass
note may be inverted and situations where full chordal
inversion may take place. That is to say, he sees the
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interpretation of chords as triadic derivatives as optional.
If he has any notion of underlying musical laws it is not
the one that fuelled the Enlightenment search for a
reductive principle. The fact that he distinguishes
circumstances in which it is necessary to stick to the
ecclesiastical rndes and conditions in which major and minor
may apply suggests the nature of the cloistered, Catholic
tradition fran which he came. Caning fran such a rld it is
not surprising that the question of the logical
justification for theoretical rules arid interpretations
which was to be such a burning issue in Schenker' s time was
of no interest to him. In appearing to be au f alt with all
the latest ideas, however, he, or Seyfried, at least, is
deeply interested.
Simplification is clearly this author's aim. There are,
he says, only five principal chords. This sounds quite
encouraging, especially as C. P. E. Bach lists twenty. They
are the triad, the seventh, ninth, eleventh and thirteenth
chords. Then begin the exceptions and elaborations, the
first of which is the perfect chord. A chord is only perfect
when it has four parts. It is interesting that he seems to
have no srd for 'root'. A chord of three sounds 'is
composed of a third and a fifth to which is added in four
parts, the perfect octave...'. Each of the five kinds of
chord can be subdivided and each sub-species can appear in
various 'positions' or inversions. In the case of the triad
there are four subspecies: perfect major, perfect minor,
diminished and augmented. Within the chord, depending on the
inversion, an interval may be consonant or dissonant.
'Sometimes' he says, 'only a sharp or a flat points out the
quality of the third....This sharp, flat, or natural sign
always relates to the third only.' He is speaking of course
of the figuration of chromatic intervals in figured bass,
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hardly relevant to the listing of chord types.
In the midst of this chordal taxonany, he introduces
the notion of chordal discords as non-chord notes, i.e.,
'prolongations' of notes belonging to other chords not
'struck anew'. Eleventh and thirteenth chords are not
constructed by adding thirds above the seventh but by adding
a third, a fifth and a seventh below the seventh chord. One,
t or three tones have, hardly surprisingly, to be ariitted
fran these chords in four parts, making them, perhaps,
scewhat difficult to recognise. This problem did not exist
before since the 9/4 chord was a standard figured bass
sonority. ccording to Wessely, Albrechtsberger/Seyfried is
following Marpurg who is following Rameau. But in listing
ninth and eleventh chords as if they were on the same level,
either conceptually or in their role in ccnposition, as the
triad and seventh chord, he is following him at sara
distance. Rameau, who does not, in fact, construct them in
this way, understands them as arising through suspension,
just as everyone else did, the root being the root of the
chord on which the suspended tones are superimposed. These
sonorities exist in figured bass and therefore Rameau
believes he has to account for them within the terms of his
rational scheme. Failure to do so culd leave him open to
the charge that his system is inadequate. But he gives no
grounds for thinking that his rationalisation of the chords
is a prescription for constructing than. On the contrary,
his instructions for using then are traditional. 39 However
they are explained, treated as integral structures they are
anczalies within his system, not categories canparable to
the others.
There are here several different notions of chord: the
Rameauvian invertible triad and seventh; independent fixed
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sonorities fran the figured bass tradition; chords
constructed by adding thirds above and below a triad; chords
which include prolonged tones of preceding chords. The
'reductive' principle of triadic inversion has led not to a
simplification of chord categorisation but to further
proliferation of chord types and the actual dissolution of
any consistent concept of 'chord'. A chord is no longer
a specific collection of tones sounded simultaneously;
it can include notes not sounded and notes sounded with
it which do not belong to it. The only certain principle
is that a chord is rarely what it seems. The confusion of
the empirical with the conceptual is perfectly exemplified
by Albrechtsberger/Seyfried' s taxonany of entities which
exist half-way between the ear and the imagination.
If this already seems sarewhat less than the pranised
simplification it is nothing canpared with what is to cane
when Albrechtsberger/Seyfried embarks on the busIness o
progression of chords. apart fran the sheer canplexity of
the explanations, he shifts back and forth between
voice-leading rules governing the chordal progressions
employed by the cailposer - whether written out or simply
figured under a bass - and rules for performance or the
interpretation of the figures. reover, he does this
arbitrarily, and without acknowledging it. He seems to have
no clear notion of what kind of nusician is supposed to
enrge fran this experience. Rather, the objective seems to
be simply to pass on the accumulated information of all the
traditions to which he has been - in sate instances perhaps
sanewhat tangentially - exposed. He does this in a form
which tries by the use of headings and numbers to reduce its
miscellaneousness to sane kind of logical order. In this it
prefigures the grand schenes of the musicologists a century
later, in which the substance of the subject is determined
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not by the skills the pupil will need to fulfil a clearly
defined role but according to abstract criteria related to
the content of a body of knowledge valued for its own sake.
Pedagogic theory is beginning to resemble abstract theory
and to take on a life of its own. A decade or two later the
process of rationalisation of this theory will have to
begin, for the connection between it and any of the skills
demanded of the professional musician in practice will
beccne less and less visible to the naked eye.
If we canpare this with Bach's Versuch we see that
while the canplexity of the system is canpensated for by
the orderliness and pedagogic realism of the presentation no
attempt is made to pretend that what has to be learned is
simple, or to simplify it. On the contrary, it is accepted
as difficult to learn and to teach, hence the high level of
skill required by the teacher and a level of ccmnitment to
the pupil unimaginable by the producers of text-books. W1-iat
was at stake for Bach when he took on responsibility for a
pupil was the honour of the family name, doubly so when the
pupil was also a member of the family. The real difference
between the two books is that the Albrechtsberger/Seyfried
book is a text-book in the nodern sense. C. P. E. Bach's on
the other hand, if it can be thought of as a text-book at
all, is a text-book for the teacher, not for the pupil.
Essentially, however, it is a record of Bach's practice as a
teacher, not a mare ccrnpendium of his knowledge. Figured
bass for Bach was not a theoretical system at all but a set
of conventions, a device at the service of the artist, and
rrodifiable by him. Modifications to the figuration were
40
still being made in Bach s life-time.
Neither of these approaches offered a way forward for
institutional musical education without considerable
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modification. Teaching of the kind proposed by C. P. E. Bach
is clearly out of the question in such a context and also
superfluous in strictly utilitarian terms. An orchestral
player, even the nodern equivalent of the Kapeilmeister, was
not likely to be called upon to provide accanpaniments
extempore fran a figured bass, and if he had ambitions as a
canposer that was his own affair. By the end of the century
canposition was no longer the heart of his identity as a
musician, but, with increasingly rare exceptions, had beccme
sc*rething that a professional musician did off duty, if at
all. This situation seend the less absurd the more the
notion of genius took hold. If artistic creativity was
sarthing that descended on the fortunate individual like
the Holy Ghost the institutions need feel no sense of shams
at failing to nurture it.
Albrechtsberger/Seyfried recognIsed that what was
demanded was information rather than skill and skill in
handling information rather than practical musical skill,
which was to be increasingly confined to performance.
However, this work was altogether too canpendious, too
miscellaneous and disorganised for satisfactory classroan
use. It was, indeed, already out of date by the time it
appeared. For by the late-thirties, Sechter 's system was
undoubtedly the one being taught in the Conservatory, if not
until considerably later by Sechter himself.
Sechter' s adoption of the fundanental bass puts his
work in a quite different category frau that of
Albrechtsberger/Seyfried, although it is undoubtedly
Albrechtsberger' s conflation of the species system with
modern harmonic assumptions and the version of the figured
bass tradition resulting fran its modification in accordance
with these assumptions, which pranpted Sechter to apply the
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fundamental bass to the species.
The application of the notion of the fundamental bass,
unlike the notion of inversion applied to individual chords,
provides the basis of a rational system of progressing the
voices fran chord to chord. The difficulty with the older
systems (species counterpoint and figured bass) is that they
are not rational but intuitive. The voices progress
according to rules which guarantee desired sonic effects.
Whether these effects are thought of in terms of vocal lines
or as rtcvements between sonorites, there are distinct
perceptions of the desired results and the means by which
they are to be achieved. These effects have to be heard and
the means of achieving them simply have to be learned. This
process cannot be reduced to something purely theoretical
and abstract.
Sechter' s fundamental bass procedure offers to do
exactly that, although not, of course, without cost.
Cariplexity and subtlety, the richness of the older
approaches, everything not reducible to the system, has to
go. The inability of this system to interpret highly
chromatic music, given by later writers as the reason why it
was unable to explain Wagner and his successors, has nothing
at all to do with any supposed differential rate of progress
between theoretical and ccitipositiorial developtEnt. Sechter' S
system is just as powerless in relation to older musical
styles as in relation to Wagner. Indeed it is powerless to
explain any kind of catiposition at all except the countless
four-part harnony exercises produced under the conditions
Schenker described as 'torment' in the conservatories. The
system is unremittingly diatonic because only by being so
can it remain internally consistent and simple enough to
fulfil its pedagogic role.
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Sechter, according to Zeleny, is in the tradition of
J. S. Bach, since he begins, as Bach did, with four part
writing and goes on to three and two part writing. 41 'But',
he adds, 'Sechter' s way forward does not lead, as with
Kirnberger, to the figuring and variegation of the voices
but through the harnnisation of a given voice, by way of
strict counterpoint and the Fuxian species, to double
counterpoint.' It would clearly be irwrnsely flattering to
Sechter, and to the Viennese tradition of which he became
the centre, if he could be shown to be in the tradition of
J. S. Bach, although it is doubtful whether Sechter himself
would have felt this quite as strongly as we do. But the
substance of Sechter' s teaching makes nonsense of any such
claim. It has in its favour only this single point of
resemblance, which in fact proves nothing at all. It could
equally well be said that Kirnberger, and therefore Sechter,
follows Raneau in beginning with four parts and progressing
to three, and two parts, since this is in fact what happens
in Rarreau' s 'Principles of Canposition'. This was
undoubtedly the norm until Fux revived the older system, and
continued to be so except where Fux was adopted. It is the
Viennese situation which is the oddity, not the practice of
Bach.
Sechter 's practice in iroving fran four parts to two
rather than the reverse resembles what Kirnberger says was
Bach' s only in that it presupposes the existence of given
chord forms, but they are not the chord forms known to Bach.
Indeed they are not forms at all in the sense of the
sonorities represented by the signatures, but ideas. The
sonorous qualities of the various realisations of these
ideas are of relatively little concern to Sechter, while
these qualities were just what gave the chords of the
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figured bass their character, their identity. Ccpositicn
consisted, as far as the accanpaniment was concerned, and in
other kinds of galant music, in relating these sonorites.
Voice-leading meant doing this in a way that was pleasing
melodically, minimally, by avoiding disturbing effects, by
conforming to the expectations cultivated by the
conventions, arid, at a higher level, inventively, with
'beauty, daring and novelty'.
While the logic of a four-part canpositional ncdel is
the relating of complex sonorities rather than the
compatible rrovement of melodies, this is not what rotivates
Sechter's use of it. He uses it because he wants to derive
constructive voice-leading principles - as opposed to
prohibitions - fran the chords, a system of harnonically
rationalised voice-leading. But there can be no such thing
as rational voice-leading. There can only be more or less
consistent ways of producing and avoiding certain effects.
Reason has nothing to contribute to the question of
preference for one kind of effect rather than another,
although to judge fran the arguments adduced in favour of
and against parallels in Schenker' s time it sould appear
that it was widely felt that it ought to have. Sechter has
to presume that certain effects are desirable or undesirable
and vrk towards them or their avoidance, although if he
could rationalise an effect he felt to be aesthetically
unacceptable his aesthetic conscience seems to have been
remarkably yielding. Or, to put it more realistically, he
seems to have had little grasp of the philosophical problem
posed by the attempt to marry reason with taste. The
Austrian tradition, a Catholic tradition, simply had not
been a rationalist one. The pressure to rationalise was
external and pedagogic.
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The progression of the fundamental bass is designed to
produce the best conditions to prote inoffensive
voice-leading effects while at the same time producing a
quasi-musical texture. A succession must be provided for if
the propaedeutic aim of the indel is to be credible. But a
figured bass can only be composed on the assumption of a
succession of given sonorities with all their voice-leading
implications. These are exactly what Sechter like Rameau
wants to avoid. The existing alternative way of providing
for a succession is the cantus firmus. But to begin from
the cantus firmus and rk upwards towards four parts is to
build in the voice-leading conventions assumed by the
figured bass which, again, it is the whole objective of the
rational system to avoid.
In 'composing' a fundamental , Sechter, like
Rameau, is adopting a feature of the species system, by
contrast to the figured bass, but a feature which separates
the function fran the character that gives it meaning. What
Sechter does is to treat the fundamental bass as an ideal
cantus firrnus. Hence a melodic starting point is provided,
but it is a notional one, a notational representation of a
set of arithmetical relations, not even the realisation of
an idea. Whether or not or however it is notated, it must be
assumed to be present and determining everything else. The
voice-leading problems can be reduced to a minimum by
writing prior rules for the fundamental bass which guarantee
this. If the fundamental bass is only permitted to progress
by thirds and fifths upwards and sixths and fourths
downwards a procedure for the connection of the chords can
be devised which is aLmost infallible, and, above all,
simple.
Albrechtsberger requires sixty four pages to set out
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his rules for the progression of chords. Rameau sets out his
in twelve and these twelve contain a quantity of
rationalisation as well as the enunciation of the rules
themselves. The crucial paragraph reads as follows:
Since the fundamental bass can proceed only by
consonant intervals. . . it imposes a certain diatonic
progression on the upper parts fran which alrrcst all
rules about these consonances can be derived. If we do
not say absolutely all the rules this is only because
dissonance introduces certain liberties. We shall
always find the principal rules however...
Turning to 'Principles of Canposition' we see these
rules in action. On p. 208 Rameau lists four rules, the
fourth of which includes the rest. This rule reads:
it is enough to remember that the only three ways
in which each of these (upper] parts can form one of
the intervals of the perfect chord are: by remaining on
the same note or the same degree, by ascending
diatonically, or by descending diatonically. This is
irrespective of the path taken by the bass. Thus, if a
note in one of the parts can form the third, the fifth
or the octave without changing its position, it should
remain where it is. If none of these intervals can
occur in this manner, however, we shall find one of
them without fail by making the note ascend or descend
diatonically.'
nyone familiar with Schoenberg's method of teaching
harnny will inmadiately recognise the source of his chord
tabulations and his 'guidelines': 'Which tone is the root?
Which is the catiton tone? Which tones are still missing?',
- 98 -
43and so on. And anyone fanuliar with C. P. E. Bach will
know that these rules for the progression of ccirnn chords
were familiar to him too, whether after Rarneau or
independently. The point is that Rameau had reduced - or
liked to believe he had - all sonorities apart frctu the
seventh chord to this status, making these simple procedures
basic to all chordal progression and therefore to all
composition.
Rameau kindly allows the 'beginner' to 'cccpose any
bass they desire' in much the way that Henry Ford allowed
his customer to choose any colour of car he desired. It must
begin and end on Do, the last Do preceded by a note a fifth
above it, and it must trove only by thirds and fifths or
their inversions. Such a bass is assembled rather than
composed and the constraint of the purely diatonic
progression of the upper parts means that they, too, are put
together mechanically. All the problems associated with
actual composition are cleared out of the way.
Schoenberg seems to have imagined that by getting his
pupils to construct chord sequences rather than harrronising
a bass he is getting closer to the realities of canposition.
In fact his chord tables inescapably prescribe a Rameauvian
fundamental bass. Even this, in Schoenberg's procedure, is
not allowed the semblance of a melodic character. It is all
done by numbers, or, rather, Roman numerals. In this way he
strips the fundamental bass system of its last pretence of
being a form of ccziposition, hence the lengths he has to go
to to justify its propaedeutic use. 	 -
On p. 209 Rameau says: '...whatever direction the bass
takes, the first interval a part forms with this bass,
whether it be 3, 5 or 8, indicates the interval it should
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form with the following bass note and so on in succession
until the end.'
In his section on two part counterpoint Sechter writes
at length about 'diagonal' relationships and makes them into
various kinds of chains. The problem arises because it is
impossible to imagine a two part canposition in which the
voices obey the rules given above. If the lower voice (the
bass) proceeds by step the chordal voice-leading principles
cannot be applied. Instead of exclusively consonant
intervals between adjacent chords dissonant relationships
enter. Sechter gets around the problem by introducing a
silent chord between the two dissonant chords which will
enable the diagonal dissonance to resolve. What would 3. S.
Bach or C. P. E. Bach have made of silent chords?
Sechter was very fond of chains of connection because
these provided paradigms for the construction of an infinity
of exercises. He frequently ends a section with the remark
that the student can construct his own examples along the
lines of those provided. This, of course, is important for
the secondary role of the text-book, narrely to provide for
the autodidactic amateur. Wnat an amateur of Sechter' s
period, even a highly cultivated one expected fran a
text-book can be guessed fran Grillparzer' s account of his
study of figured bass and counterpoint. He embarked on it to
distract himself fran the politicking surrounding the
production of Knig Ottokars GlUck und Ende and found that
it served the purpose admirably. 44 C. P. E. Bach would have
found his learning curve surprising.
While the old rules were designed to lead to desired
effects, effects which are not aesthetically undesirable
now becane rationally unacceptable and rational ways o
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rendering them tolerable have to be found. Of course,
Rameau could not really escape these problems, and even
with the seventh chord which he counts as a fundamental
structure, he has to resort to the old formulations -
preparation and resolution through voice-leading procedures
prior to his rational rules - in order to provide for its
use. On p. 217, he says, 'The sharp we placed next to the Fa
need not concern us yet, since beginners do not have to use
sharps and flats until they understand them better'. This
sounds a little bit like not being allowed to enter the
water until one has learned to swim. when he does cane to
the matter of chrctnaticism he resorts to figured bass
conventions and explanations. How else is the beginner to
learn to deal with anything not diatonic? Certainly it
cannot be by means of the rational system, which has to
resort to artistic license as an explanation for such
things.
While the function of the fundamental bass is to
preclude problems, the function of the cantus firrnus is to
generate them. It is a succession of tones constructed on
principles whoUy independent of harrrcnic assumptions, i.e.,
on melodic principles. It is the friction between the
waywardness of melody and the constraints imposed by the
perceived needs of harrrcny which create the subtlety and
richness of polyphonic music which the species system seeks
to codify and capture. But if you assume with Raxreau that
melody is the product of harrrony then there seems to be no
objection to stipulating the harrnies and constructing
melodies in conformity with them. The result is a texture
whose blandness then calls for the conscious superimposition
of ccitiplexity thought of as chranaticism and dissonance.
Chranaticisin and dissonance, then appear to be elaborations
and a pseudo history grows up, according to which music
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begins by being harmonically simple and bland and grows more
complex and subtle with the passage of time.
The marriage of the fundamental bass with the inverted
species scheme produced a system whose attractiveness to
educational institutions is obvious. It provides what Rameau
and his contemporaries tried and failed to provide, a
practicable, systematic, unfigured bass, a realistic
alternative to the figured bass. Not realistic in terms of
the education of an eighteenth century musician, but highly
acceptable to the conservatory where theory meant,
precisely, the opposite of practice. Within a couple of
decades, what rnined of the old systems had vanished
cclete1y enough from the curriculum to make attempts at
their revival seem startlingly radical. Thus by the 1860s
Bellerman was able to create a considerable stir by
proposing a return to Fux, and by the end of the century C.
P. E. Bach's book had beccme an historical curiosity.45
It is not a matter of coincidence that Ceneralbass
declined in the face of the peculiarly Austrian form of
'harmony' instruction. Harmony was bound to take over, but
figured bass instruction was not as fruitful a way forward
for it, for obvious reasons, as the species vehicle prepared
by Albrechtsberger. If we look at Rameau's own vrk we can
see the practical problems of basing a system of
compositional instruction on the theory of the fundamental
bass. The idea of a fundamental bass presupposes a
composition, just as the notion of inversion presupposes an
existing sonority waiting to be interpreted in a manner
different fran the one in which it presents itself to the
ear. Interpreting an existing figured bass in terms of the
fundamental bass is one thing. 'Cariposing' a fundamental
bass is another. Rameau's 'principles of composition' hav
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rio more to do with the realities of writing a piece of
performable eighteenth century music than late nineteenth
century t acad gjc counterpoint' had to do with the
compositions of Brahms. These 'principles' embody ideas
arrived at reductively, and are not the elementary stages in
the compositional process which Rarneau tries to make them
into.
Scheriker does not object to the use of
elentary schematic musical constructs in instruction.
Species exercises are useful, he believes, even
indispensable, as means of cultivating aural sensibility.
But for that, the rationalist fundamental bass is
rse than superfluous. It distracts fran the essential
purpose of the exercise, reducing it to a piece of
arithmetic, just as the paper realisation of figured bass
does. Having nothing to do with 'free composition' it also
loses its point as a means of developing the skills
canposition presupposes, in composing melodies and
interweaving them. As for 'harmony', it teaches a mechanical
process of chord connection which has nothing to do either
with the traditional rules of voice-leading or the
transformation of the elementary harmonic material into
melody and composed harmonies. Instead, one uncomposed
harmony is tacked onto another with the occasional
special 'chord' thrown in to relieve the dullness.
Scheriker wanted to make clear how the concept of the
fundamental bass, having no musical reality of its own, had
battened onto species counterpoint, becaning nothing more
than a debased form of the latter, hopelessly inferior to
the real thing as a system of musical education and failing
to provide the insight into the role of harmony in
canpositiori which it claimed to teach. In the process i
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drove out the old system which familiarised the ear of the
musician with an array of sonorities and gave him a means to
make use of them, at orst musically, and at best
artistically.
Rameau himself, when he canes to apply the notion of
the fundamental bass to the creation of canpositions, begins
fran the presuppositions shared by species counterpoint. His
use of the figures familiar fran figured bass practice
should not deceive us about this. Although he talks about
'the succession of chords' what he actually describes is a
set of voice-leading rules, no matter how much these rules
differ fran the traditional ones. The progress of the voices
is constrained by the fact that they may only move to tones
predetermined by the meaning assigned to the note in the
fundamental bass, but the only way of expressing the notion
of musical cctnposition, even for Rameau, is in terms of
melodic successions interrelated harmonically.
Eivally important is the fact that what Rameau is
describing is an ideal model of canposition, not performable
music, again in the tradition of species counterpoint, a
point to which Schenker returns in his discussion of
counterpoint.
while there is no question that Rameau was fully
familiar with contrapuntal theory as well as with the
harmonic speculation of Zarlino, Descartes, tersenne and
others, and was undoubtedly aware of the idea of 'species' -
he gives advice on writing in two, three and four parts as
well as 'How to ccznpose a basso continuo below a treble',
etc., - he did not have the convenient and thoroughly
established instructional codification which Fux was at the
same time working out and which, appropriately modified by
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Albrechtsberger, provided Sechter with a ready-made,
well-accepted and congenial pedagogic model to which to
apply the assumptions of the fundamental bass.
• Viennese theory was dominated by the notion of the
fundamental bass fran the time of Sechter until Schenker and
Schoenberg in their different ways challenged it, although
Schoenberg' s challenge was not, of course, as Schenker' s
was, primarily to the interpretation of existing music. It
is abundantly clear that this notion came into Austrian
theory, by however circuitous a route, fran French
rationalist theory. The significance of the arguments about
the corps sonore was much greater for scientists than for
musicians. Sechter, with Vogler's srk available to him, did
not need experimental evidence in order to adopt the
implication of the theory of chordal inversion and the
fundamental bass. The fundamental bass appealed to him for
reasons unconnected with theories of sound. Nor is there
any evidence that he was greatly interested in the
compositional justification of Rameauvian theory. It was a
system of instruction which interested him.
There is nothing in this sequence of events - the
pedagogic systematisation of species counterpoint by Fux,
Albrechtsberger' s modification of the Fuxian system,
Sechter' s conflation of this with fundamental bass, together
with the simultaneous inversional modification and eventual
absorption in the ubiquitous 'four-part harmony' of the old
system of instruction in the realisation of figured bass -
to give the faintest shadow of support to the contention
that 'nineteenth century theory orientated itself according
to the musical language. . .of the Viennese classics.'
Schenker's counter-assertion, however, that the classical
composers and the Bach family simply did not possess the
- 105 -
theoretical concepts systematically presented to music
students, fran the middle of the nineteenth century to his
own time, as derived from their works appears to be wholly
justified.
The idea that Sechter' s four-part harrrny in some sense
reflects the practice of Bach, and that in doing so it is
the theoretical counterpart of a supposed synthesis of the
laws of polyphony with the laws of harrrony whose achievement
is the crowning glory of Bach's art, is obviously very
enticing to the defenders of the system. These mutually
justifying interpretations of theoretical and caipositional
history mesh satisfyingly with the belief that the history
of music is best understood in terms of discrete periods
characterised by differences of style. The great charm of
this is that it does away with the need for an explanation
of the transition from one style to another.
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at the time Schenker canpieted Der Freie
Satz'. Is this the relevant date?
Schenker' s remarks here are not an isolated
outbreak. His unequivocal public criticisms
of 'conventional theory' date fran 1906.
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represented a backward-looking enclave in
Berlin that Mendelssohn's experience was
unusual -
In Harmony Schenker could hardly be more
specific about the pedagogic system he is
attacking. This is a system conflating Fuxian
pedagogic counterpoint, a Viennese product,
and Rameauvian fundamental bass, a system
which became known as 'four-part harmony'. In
Free CanpDsition, he extends it to modified
figured bass in which the figures are treated
as indicators of the inversional status of
triads, and formal theories which displaced
the structural assumptions implicit in the
figured bass canpositional model. The
'harmony' system of instruction was
well-established in Vienna and beyond when
Riemann was born. It was this system which
Bruckner had been teaching for almost twenty
years by the time Riemann' s theory of harmony
was published (1887). breover, Schenker 's
references to Riemann in Harmony are
positively emollient caipared with his attack
on Richter, or even his aside against
Bruckner. The anonymity of the book would
have concealed its Viennese provenance fran
no-one who read this dialect quotation in
1906. (In the English edition, p. 177, f.n.
2.)
Tittel (Tittel, 1966) sees the elements of
the functional theory of harmony already in
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one of many theorists who sought to expand or
nodify the latter. No late-nineteenth century
theory of harncny instruction could fail to
be influenced by, or even exist without
Viennese fundanntal bass theory. Schenker
certainly developed a detestation for
Riemann, as editor and encyclopedic
musicologist as much as in his capacity as a
theorist. In so far as he is included in the
critique of pedagogy it can be, logically,
only as one of those who pranulgated a
version of the 'conventional theory' and
whose praninence helped perpetuate it.
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reader.
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biographical piece by A. Griesinger,
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Itzart Schiedermeier, 1922; a piece by S. J.
Tanejew, in the Jahresbericht des Mozarteums,
no. - 33, Salzburg, 1914; Mozart als
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Fugenarbeit in den Werken Beethovens' by
Friedrich Deutsch, in Festschrift zur
Beethoven-Zentenarfeier, Vienna, 1927;
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Haydn' by F. v. Reinöhl in Neues
Beethoven-Jahrbuch VI, 1935. For Schubert the
sources are Vetter, 1934 and Orel, 1939.
Other sources are available: Between 1965 and
1978 Alfred Mann published studies of
theoretical documents relating to Handel,
Haydn, Beethoven, Schubert and kzart. (The
Haydn and Beethoven studies are in English.)
Of the sources, only those relating to Handel
are not referred to by Tittel.
Invaluable informal records fran Bruckner's
time include Schwanzara, 1950 and Kiose,
1927. There is abundant (German) material on
this period. (See Tittel, 1966.)
Information on Mandelssohn is to be found in
Todd, 1983. This study is based on material
housed in the Bodleian library. Todd does not
detail its provenance, but it seems unlikely
that Schenker could have seen it. He may have
relied on information fran Brahms or drawn
his own conclusions fran the wall known fact
that tnde1ssohn' s teacher was Zelter.
Besides Tittel's own work which includes a
study of Austrian church music (1961) and a
dissertation on Sechter - (1935), other
Viennese work on the history of Austrian
theory and its institutionalisation includes
Walter Zeleny's dissertaton, Die historischen
Grundlagen des Theorie Systems von Sinxn
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Sechter of 1938 (see Zeleny, 1979), and the
Geschichte der Staatsakademie und Hochschule
fur Musik und Darstellende Kunst in Wien by
Robert Lach (1927).
This research stems fran the department
founded by Adler and later joined by Lach,
and reflects its ethos. Typically data are
meticulously presented but conclusions
satetimes seem to reflect prior assumptions
rather than the logic of the information.
verthe1ess, the attempt of these Viennese
historians to construct a context in which
individual sources - such as those identified
by Nottebohm - can be placed intelligibly, is
a vital contribution. If they do not always
correctly delineate the paths by which
theories were transmitted, they at least
recognise the need to try to understand these
processes.
13. Sechter contributed an autobiographical piece
to the Wiener Aligemeine Musikzeitung in 1845
in which he listed his own theoretical
reading. This included orks by Marpurg,
Kirnberger, C. P. E. Bach, Albrechtsberger,
Mattheson, Tirk, Gottfried Weber, Reicha,
Marx and Riepel. The rk by Marpurg was not
the translation of d'Alembert, but the
Abhandlung von der Fuge. It is for this
reason that Tittel attributes Sechter' s
knowledge of Rameau' s theory to his reading
of Kirnberger.
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This, however, seems dubious logically and
historically. The logical problem is that
Sechter' s use of the fundamental bass, and
even his term for it, is closer to Rameau
than to Kirnberger. We would have to assume,
therefore, that Sechter was not only
inventive in his conflation of theories, but
an original theoretical thinker and that the
result of his originality was to reverse the
tendency of Kirnberger's (already second- or
even third-hand) reading of Rameau.
The historical problem is that precedents for
Sechter' s particular approach to Rameau
existed and were well known in Vienna before
he wrote his treatise. Indeed we can deduce
that sane elements of Rameauvian theory could
have been in circulation in Vienna much
earlier fran the fact that it was considered
appropriate for MDzart to take lessons fran
Giovanni Martini. As the translator of Rameau
into Italian, Martini was far better
acquainted with his work than Kirnberger, and
any Raneauvian concepts which filtered
through to Vienna fran this source would be
unlikely to be any lessuthentic than those
caning via Berlin. That they did filter
through is now well-established, and the
phasis on the Berlin connection appears to
be attributable to two kinds of bias, one in
favour of a prestigious connection (however
indirect) with J. S. Bach, the other against
a far less prestigious figure, the Abbé
Vogler. (See n. 21 below.) Mozart's much
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quoted hostility to Vogler may have had
something to do with his less than
stimulating encounter with Martini. Vogler
had studied with a fellow Italian theorist,
Vallotti, who, like Martini, was well-versed
in Raineau' s theories and the controversies
surrounding them, and certainly made use of
them.
14. The relevant rk is not, strictly speaking,
by Albrechtsberger, but by his pupil Ignaz
Ritter von Seyfried who appeared as editor of
a. bz,zk entitled J½lbrechtsberger' S smtliche
Schriften uber Generalbass, Harrronielehre und
Tonsetzkunst in 1837.
15. F. W. Marpurg, Herrn d'Alembert's
Systematische Einleitung in die Musikalische
Setzkunst nach den Lehràtzen des Berm
Rameau. Leipzig, 1757. Marpurg published a
piece prciioting Rameau' s ideas in the
Kritische Musicus an der Spree in 1749.
16. See Tittel, 1966, p. 165.
17	 See Ttdd, 1983, p. 2 for details of Zelter's
background.
18. Frederick the Great's preference for all
things French had an enornus cultural
influence. The secularism of an 'Enlightened'
aristocracy undoubtedly facilitated, anng
other things, a very different kind of Jewish
assimilation fran that found in Catholic
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Vienna. Why the old pedagogic style persisted
longer there than in Vienna is a ccwplex
question. The fact that it was part of a
more unified native tradition is surely
relevant. The tradition 'native' to Vienna
was, outside the cloister, defunct.
Fashionable music was far more deeply at odds
with the ecclesiastical style in Vienna than
the rrsic of the Prussian court with the
music of the Lutheran church. This is not
obvious fran standard musical histories which
present Bach as backward-looking. In reality,
seen in progressive-historical terms, his
music was still light years ahead of that of
the Catholic church canposers in Vienna fifty
years after his death.
19. Further study of this area Is requIred. See
n. 13.
20. See Jonas, 1982, p. 124.
Jonas betrays the influence on his own
thinking of the peculiarly Austrian
harmonic-theoretical tradition by his
reference to 'the order in which the
overtones	 appear'	 (p.	 15).	 This
pre-Enlightennnt notion of partial
vibrations suggests a line back to Valotti
through the bated Vogler. (See n. 21 below.)
It is interesting that Schoenberg tries not
to confuse the relative strength of the
partials with the 'order in which (they]
appear', yet falls into the old habit in
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spite of himself when he says, 'After the C
the next strongest tone is , because it
occurs earlier in the series... ' . (Schoenberg,
tr. Carter, 1983, p. 23.) His acoustic
notions are, of course, hardly less bizarre
than Schenker' s, undoubtedly for the same
historical reasons.
21. Georg Joseph Vogler, 1749-1814. Whatever his
personal reputation there is no doubt that he
was capable of making a powerful iract and
could not be ignored. In his diary
Grillparzer describes a dinner party at which
Vogler began to improvise. Eventually the
guests, who included Cherubini and many other
celebrities, one by one left the roan. The
guest who lingered longest was Beethoven.
Browning wrote an ecstatic poem about Vogler
the improviser fifty years after Vogler's
death. One line suggests that he was less
familiar with Vogler the theorist. The poem
attributes to Vogler the architectonic
notions of imsical structure in the air at
the time of writing. (Dramatis Personae was
written in 1864.)
22. It is misleading to cast Vogler simply as
a follower of Rameau. He was a student
of Francesco ntonio Vallotti (1697-1780), a
scientifically oriented Paduan theorist. His
harnnic derivations fran cadential patterns
do not require a theory of partial vibrations
of a single sonorous body but are based on
mechanically divided strings. This fact
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reflects Vallotti's belief that chordal
inversion had been 'discovered' by his
teacher, Antonio Caligeri, before Pameau and
his 'experiments' with the corps sonore. The
presence of Rameauvian concepts in Viennese
theory in the absence of any interest in
acoustic justification is less likely to
indicate an empirical approach, as Tittel
suggests, than an Italian, as opposed to an -
enlightened - Berlin influence.
The similarities between Sechter' s emphasis
on the falling fifth arid his construction of
a scale frctn this (see Wessely, 1979 and
also Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1956 sections
16-18) and similar things in Vogler are
striking. In true Rameauvian style, Vogler
proposes a distinction between harrtonic
theory 'Tonwissenschaft' and applied harrrony,
'Ibnsetzkunst, (See Grave, 1980) which is the
separation proposed by Schenker in the
'Preface' to his book on harnny. With the
exception of voice-leading rules, which
Schenker excludes altogether, the subject
matter is shared out in the same way. All
three writers have a - notion of a kind of
• musical 'raw material', tJrstoff, or
tJrelemente out of which canpositions grow by
a process of progressive embellishment.
The rrst conspicuous evidence of Vogler' s
influence on Sechter' s rk is the use of
Raan numerals to indicate scale-steps. (See
again Grave, 1980.) Sechter's silence abott
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Vogler is no great mystery. Vogler was a
notoriously controversial figure.
23. See n. 1.
24. See n. 14.
25. Tittel, 1966, P. 180. Sechter edited
Marpurg's Abhandlung von der Fuge, but Tittel
is convinced that he did not know Marpurg' S
translation of d'Alenbert.
26. Ibid., p. 192.
27. Ibid., p. 175.
28. The letter appeared in the Ailgemeine
Musikzeitung on 23rd August 1815. Its status
is discussed in Anderson, 1966. Schenker
quotes fran the letter in Free CcctpDsition.
See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979 p. 129.
29. Ibid., p. 3. The source of the quotation is
the Preface to Goethe t s Theory of Colour, a
translation of which is to be found in
Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 159.
30. See Schenker, tr. Mann Borgese, 1954.
31. See: Forte & Gilbert, 1982. Figured bass
they say is '...a made of notation. We are
not concerned with the performance practice
of "realising" figured basses'. Thus they
revert to the kind of paper version of
- 122 -
figured bass which Schenker considered
inautheritiC. Their treatment of counterpoint
similarly pays scant regard to Schenker' s
insistence on hearing the effect of
combinations of tones. These things are
indicative of basic differences of attitude
between these authors and Schenker.
32. See: Christensen, 1989. Christensen points
out that a Cartesian, mathematical,
non-experimental methodology yielded vital
results in hydrodynamics, statics, astronany
and optics in the eighteenth century.
d' Alembert' s 'disdain for experimantal
physics' was, therefore not only not unique,
but not necessarily fatal. His validation of
Rameau's theory was, of course, crucial to
its success.
33. Sane Schenker supporters, in their eagerness
to cut Rameau down to size, boast of being
unable to see that inversion involving the
root of a triad is more than an obvious
extension of the notion of inversion of the
constituents of a triad over a root anchored
in the bass. This is a relic of Schenker' $
illogical attitude which hardened as he was
carried away by his own polemic. This grew
- - more heated under the influence of war and
post-war Francophobia. Through this potent
medium an old Viennese prejudice has been
perpetuated. This was itself a curious
mixture of prejudices, a prejudice against
the Rameuavian Vogler, and Vogler's own
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prejudice, passed on together with his
Rarneuavian concepts to Sechter. Vogler's
teacher Vallotti was probably the first to
make the dubious claim that chordal inversion
had been discovered before Rameau, thus
justifying the use of Rameauvian concepts
while denigrating Rameau, the
encyclopaedists, the Enlightenment and
everything French, satEthing whose appeal was
even greater for Schenker' s generation than
for Viennese Catholics in the wake of the
revolution. For a hint of a change see Krebs,
1988, p. 59.
34. See Federhofer, 1990.
35. Bruckner was appointed Lektor für
Harmonielehre und Rontrapunkt at the
University in 1878. It was presumably this
connection which made it possible for
university students like Schenker to opt for
a conservatory course as part of their
programne.
36. Works of this kind date frcm the 1790s, e.g.,
a Traité d'Harmonie by Jean-Baptiste Rey,
which, according to the author is based on
the principles of Rarneau and 'se rapportant
au dictionaire de J. J. Rousseau'; a Traité
by tangle of 1798 calls itself a treatise of
'la base sur le chant'. r4nigny' s Cours
ccxnplet d'harmonie (1806) refers to
'principes incontestables, puises dans la
nature..'. Other faus contributors to the
- 124 -
genre were Cherubini, Cnoron, Fétis, Gossec,
Halévy, and Reicha axiong many others less
well-known.
37. Publications	 using	 the	 wDrds
Selbstunterricht, Selbstbelehrung, or
destined for Dilettanten or calling
themselves Leitfaden include books by Goröldt
(1825), Lachmeyer (1823), Lindner (1840),
Schártlich (1837). More fanus names, anng
many others whose ork was not necessarily
oriented toward this market are Vogler, Marx,
Koch, Krause, Turk, Jocob Gottfried Weber.
Later the number of such books was added to
by teachers at the various conservatories and
countless others. In the context of the huge
outpouring of 'harrrony' books fran the
thirties onwards it is impossible to pick on
any individual, even one as praninent as
Riemann and hold him uniquely responsible for
the theory taught in the music-schools.
Procedures undoubtedly varied fran place to
place and fran time to time under the
influence of fashion, but the Rameauvian
assumptions became, with the
institutionalisation of four-part haritny,
universal and unshakeable.
38. See Grave, 1980.
39. See Rameau, tr. Gossett, 1971, p. 297.
40. See C.P.E. Bach, tr. Mitchell, 1949, p. 305.
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41. Zeleny, 1979, p. 448. This is older than the
publication date implies. It was written in
1938, as Zeleny's dissertation for the
philosophical faculty of the University of
Vienna. One of those who assessed the
dissertation was Robert Lach, dler' s
successsor, of whcn Schenker rarked, 'The
professor in the innocence of his ignorance
called himself a connoisseur of
music...'('Der Professor gab sich in der
Unschuld seiner Unwissenheit für einen Kenner
der Musik aus...'). See Federhofer, 1985, p.
53. n. 7.
42. See Rarneau, tr. Gossett, 1971, p. 142.
43. See Schoenberg, ed. Carter, 1978, p. 40.
44. See Grillparzer, ed. Schreyvogel, 1958, p.
553.
45. Gottfried Heinrich Bellermann (1832-1903).
His treatise on counterpoint was published in
1862. He restored the ncdal system to the
species. Schenker discusses his ideas at
length in his n book on counterpoint.
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aiapter 3
Philosophies of Science and the
Study of Music.
• . .Erfahrungen solle man ohne Irgend em
theoretisches Band vortragen...'
Goethe.1
These ords appear in the quotation fran the Preface to
Goethe' s Theory of Colour, placed by Schenker at the head of
the first section of Free Canposition. Ernst Oster
translates them as follows:
'one should present experiences and perceptions without
recourse to any kind of theoretical framework'. 2
Miller translates the same words as:
'enpirical data should be presented without any
theoretical context'
Translated literally, Goethe' s ords would read:
'experiences should be presented without any kind of
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theoretical connection'.
These differences in the interpretation of Goethe illustrate
what has been one of the difficulties in understanding
Schenker. He writes not only in a different language fran
the one spoken by the bulk of his readers, but in the teims
of a culture historically and geographically remote from
them.
Miller' s is the language of twentieth-century physical
science. Oster' s is that of the psychologically oriented
philosophy of science which was characteristIc of the
artistic-intellectual atmosphere in inter-war Vienna.4
Neither vocabulary is entirely appropriate to the thought of
Goethe or perfectly in touch with the vanished world in
which Schenker was educated.
By interpreting 'experience' as 'empirical data' Miller
anticipates Goethe's distinction, in the sentence which
follows, between mere looking-at arid scientific observation.
Data' might mean 'that which is given to experience' or
'that which is given through experience'. Goethe argues that
'that which is given to experience' cannot count as
scientific evidence. Blankly passive looking-at what is
'given' will never lead to understanding. What he wants to
set in opposition to experimentally controlled observation
is an active observation, also controlled but by a more
subtle and flexible mechanism than experimental apparatus,
namely, scientific self-criticism.
Similarly he believes that the product of scientific
observation cannot count as unrnediated data. When this
product is experimentally rnediated, it is not more but less
raw, since the experimental	 1 and the
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presuppositions determining them, must be added to the
reflection inherent in the observation. To treat what is
derived fran these procedures as given by nature is to
delude oneself and others. It is hardly surprising that
Schenker' s reference to this debate did not bring instant
illumination to his new readers, but tended, at first, to
add to their perplexity.
Goethe wrote about the problem of scientific
observation in an essay entitled The Experinient as diator
between Subject and Object, in which he considers the
efficacy of the kinds of experimental controls employed by
the physical scientists to guard against fallacious
interpretation. 5 By means of the kind of devices described
by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, guaranteeing the
replicability of the relevant experiences, the physicists
sought to give than universality. 6 Goethe treated these
efforts with respect but was nervous about the claims made
for them, fearing that the experimenter's faith in the
experimental apparatus might blind him to the possibility
that his controlled experiences were illusions. The
assumptions lying behind the construction of the apparatus
could determine not only the way the object was experienced
but even the object itself. The best safeguard in any
scientific presentation, Goethe thought, was precisely the
one the experimentalists (the Newtonians) shunned, namely,
• the clear statarnt of the scientist' s theoretical
presuppositions, in so far as he was able to bring them
before his consciousness, sanething he should endeavour to
do by constant self-criticism. The Newtonians' assertion
that the facts should be allowed to speak for themselves
was, he believed, less a sign of theoretical purity than an
arrogant presumption of an objectivity which was in no way
proven.
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Experimental apparatus, which could never be nore than
an extension of the scientist's human powers, was absurdly
elevated above these powers. Where ordinary experience
conflicted with the experience engineered by the controlled
experiment, the conclusion drawn was not that there existed
t'o sets of evidence to be considered, but that, since the
latter must be correct, the former must be wrong. A whole
array of evidence could be invalidated on the basis of a
single experimentum crucis, the feat upon which the
Enlightenment belief in the superiority of physical science
over all other forms of human endeavour was founded. The
withholding of the rationale behind the experiment was,
Goethe felt, anything but a guarantee of 'objectivity'. It
was merely a means of suppressing argument.
Schenker' s intense interest in this debate was
understandable. He had spent years uncovering - excavating,
as he put it - the assumptions underlying theories which
claimed to be based on observation of musical work when the
truth was that the observations were based on the theories.
Moreover, these theories were false, hence the absurdity of
the conclusions drawn fraa them. But the assumptions were
so deeply ingrained that they were taken to be tral,
'given', and were therefore beyond the reach of criticism.
He stood in relation to music-theoretical orthodoxy, he
felt, exactly as Goethe had done in relation to Newtonian
orthodoxy.
At the same time, he himself had a theory to offer and
he had to confront a situation in which a new lease of life
had been given to the idea here criticised by Goethe, the
idea that the scientist - the scholar - should present his
findings unthrdened by any theoretical connection. This new
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version of empiricism was particularly associated with
Vienna. 7 By the time of Free CaTiposition the scientists now
known as the Vienna Circle, aided and abetted by Freud
(ironically in view of their mutual hostility), having freed
themselves fran the hated intrusion of philosophy into their
territories, had begun the process of marginalising German
classical philosophy, a process which naturally met with
much less resistance when the new doctrines were transferred
to america (they were already well entrenched in England
before the war) since the native tradition was less
influential and intrinsically less resistant to them.8
It would be hard to exaggerate the hostility of
scientists in Vienna, fran Mach onwards, to German
philosophy. The feeling was intensified by the impossibility
of wholly escaping its influence. 9 As a young man Schenker
had cane under the influence of Mach, and shown sane
positivist leanings. By the time of Free Canposition,
however, he had cane to think of the people whose ambition
was The Elimination of Metaphysics as vandals) 0 But the
attitudes imported into America by Carnap and others of like
mind, and the influence of psycho-analysis and gestaltisrn,
were too pervasive to be ignored when Schenker' s highly
problematic writings had, sanehow, to begin to be presented
in English. Oster' s translation problems are only one
symptan of the difficulty of making Schenker' s deeply-dyed
Schoperihauerian theorisirig and his Nietzschean polemic
tolerable to an American public.
*	 *	 *
Anything which connects Schenker to twentieth-century
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scientific discourse has been seen as enhancing his
reputation, while any connection with nineteenth Century
German philosophy has tended to cause nervousness. Champions
of Schenker' s analytic theory have tried to present
it as compatible with the ideals of modern science
and to push to one side the philosophical aspects of his
writings. Allen Forte, for example, says that Schenker' s
work 'may be likened to a particular kind of high-level
achievnent in science.' He wants to make 'a distinction
between Schenker [the] theorist and Schenker [the]
philosopher-historian' 11
t'bre recently, Schenker' s writing has begun to be
looked at as a coherent body of work in which it is
impossible to distinguish two diametrically opposed rrcdes of
thought, a modern and acceptable 'scientific' mode and a
regressive 'metaphysical' one. But this change is only
partial. The philosophical links which have been the object
of the most intensive investigation have been eighteenth-
rather than nineteenth-century ones. The paucity of
information about Schenker' s nineteenth-century and
twentieth-century background did not encourage exploration.
'breover, the connection with the morphological theories of
Goethe became so clear that it seed quite possible that
the relationship was direct and no intermediaries need be
12looked for.
The surmise made by Eugene Narnour, on the other hand,
that Hegel was a significant influence on Schenker has not
been taken up by Schenkerians . Narnour' s ranarks
thnselves are too generalised to be illuminating; no
specific reference is made to Hegel' s writings on music, for
example, and Schenker's supporters have not felt pressed
to explore a connection which, if it existed, would further
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undermine his credibility fran the scientific and the
political point of view, his virulent anti-Marxism
notwithstanding. The mid-century tendency to divide all
debate into Marxist and anti-Marxist was bound to lead to
difficulty in interpreting Schenker, who cannot be
categorised in these terms.
Another reason for neglecting 'Schenker' s irrinediate
environment would appear to have been a philosophical
preference for the eighteenth century. Kevyn Korsyn, for
example, says that 'since Kant is the forerunner of many
fashionable trends in current thought ('a precursor of
structuralism, an ancestor of Freud, and a starting-point
for Heidegger' s philosophy') to 'connect him to Kant also
indirectly link [s I Schenker to sate of the most
radical and still viable trends in twentieth-century
thought. ,14 Whether or not these connections are entirely
advantageous, they are perhaps unnecessarily convoluted,
especially the one with his almost exact contanporary,
fellow Jew and fellow Viennese, Sigmund Freud. The
assumption ranains that Schenker rrnist prove that he can
acccinmdate himself to our way of thinking before we can
decide whether to pay attention to him. 'If a theorist
cannot speak to our future, let us leave him to the
antiquarians. ,15
Although these more recent critics refer Schenker' s
work to a broader spectrum of ideas, they offer no direct
challenge to the view that the 'viability' of the theory
depends on the extent to which it can be accarinodated to the
norms of mid- and late- twentieth-century ideologies and
certainly do not present Schenker as offering a sustainable
challenge to these ideologies. reover the attanpt to
decipher his outlook as opposed to apologising for it, or
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explaining it away, has been tolerated rather than
enthusiastically supported by the majority of Schenkerians.
*	 *	 *
The history of the reception of Schenker' s theory is a
curious one. The theory was by no means unknown in Europe
before the war. Schenker had been a public figure from his
early twenties, very well known in musical circles in Vienna
and by no means unknown outside it. The belief that his
theory is intelligible only when explained personally by
himself or by one of his pupils, does not tally with the
facts of the reception of the books when they first
appeared, or with their continuing ability to interest
German-speaking readers to whan the 2\nglo-rnerican construct
'Schenkerian analysis' is wholly unknown. The situation
which developed in knerica, therefore, and subsequently also
in England, in which it appeared tbat Schenker' s literary
output was inherently incapable of an independent existence,
its content wrapped in a cloak of impenetrable obscurity,
was a false situation.
?s time passed conditions deteriorated. While the
secondary literature proliferated the primary sources
reiained difficult of access, or wholly inaccessible, and
the myth of unintelligibility flourished. By the time the
primary sources began to appear the assumption that they
would be impossible to interpret and perhaps were not worth
the effort had taken root much too firmly to be easily
shaken.
The first book to becane easily accessible in English
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was not calculated to counteract this feeling. 16 Some of the
most readable %ork is still not available in English after
more than thirty years of intense scholarly activity in the
field of Schenker studies mostly carried out in that
language.
Recent developnents, however, have begun to change
this situation. The presentation of Schenker as an isolate,
an eccentric whose ork is a mass of mostly unintelligible
speculation, pseudo-philosophical mud from which the grains
of analyt.ical gold have had to be laboriously panned out by
experts schooled to know what to lock for, is no longer felt
to be feasible.17
From the mass of evidence now available it is clear
that Schenker' s philosophical eclecticism, the simultaneous
presence in his thinking of things which seemed to the
mid-twentieth-century mind to be mutually exclusive, instead
of marking him as an oddity, show him to be not untypical
of his place and time.
Before turning to this new information, however, it is
useful to recall the conventional view of the man and his
vork which the new evidence challenges.
*	 *	 *
There has been general agreement that if the theory
is to be taken seriously it must be in sane sense
scientific. The question is how seriously the analytic
theory is damaged by the un- or anti-scientific features of
the oeuvre in which it is thedded, assuming art agreed
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definition of the scientific.
Allen Forte's early discussion of Schenker, in the then
newly established Journal of Music Theory, probably still
18
represents the most widely held view of Schenker. Forte
referred to 'a general trend in thinking which has taJn
place during the last quarter century. . .heavily influenced
by the accelerated development of science' by which 'even
music has been affected'. 'We can now regard the late
eighteenth century concept of "modulation",' he wrote by way
of example, 'merely as a verbal inaccuracy'. Theories
dependent on the notion of 'what was "in the ccTnposer' S
mind" had, by the same trend, been so conclusively disposed
of that no further attention need be paid to them.
Schenker' s ork, he said, 'may be likened to a
particular kind of high-level achievement in science: the
discovery or development of a fundamental principle which
then opens the way for the disclosure of further nei'
relationships, new meanings'. He canpared this principle to
Freud' s 'discovery' that 'overt behaviour is controlled by
certain underlying factors'. Schenker made the 'discovery'
that 'surface events' in a musical canposition are
'related. . . to a fundamental organisation'.
Forte went on to 'emphasise' that 'Schenker
consistently derived his theoretical formulations fran aural
experiences with actual musical ccrnpositions, and verified
them at the same source'. His discovery owed nothing to
prior theorising, 'abstruse speculation', 'acoustical or
metaphysical formulations'. Schenker 'was not averse' to
such things, but, we are left to infer, his taste for them
played no part in his analytic .theorising.
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Fran his observation that, as in science - where the
'acceleration' referred to earlier had led to the
overburdening of the curriculum - the music student was
confronted by an ovezwhelming quantity of material to be
learned, it appears that the main impulse behind Forte' s
consideration of Schenker' s work was academic. 'In order to
relieve this situation we would do well to eaulate science
education where, thanks to the continual ref innent of
concepts, students cover traditional material rrore and nore
efficiently.' Here is a distant echo of Schenker' s own
remarks about the simplification of the conservatory
curriculum through his approach, made in his 1895 essay.
Forte listed the following areas where Schenker' s theory
had, in his view, a contribution to make in this respect:
'1. Constructing a theory of rhythm for tonal music.
2. Determining the sources and developrent of triadic
tonality.
3. Gaining information about caripositional technique.
4. improving theory instruction.
5. Understanding the structure of problematic nodern
works'.
He suirred up his intellectual characterisation of
Schenker as a 'uaiq'ue, original and highly gifted person'
who catibined 'the artist' s traits of courage and
perseverance' with 'the intellect and insight (which we also
associate with the true scientist)'. The characteristics of
the scientist which Forte saw in Schenker were	 ,
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opposed to 'vision', 'intellect' and a capacity for 'clear,
rigorous thinking'.
The concern that Forte was not so much responding to
what he experienced in reading Schenker as endeavouring to
accommodate him to the prejudices of the modern music
acadenic would probably not be very strenuously denied.
Scherikerians have long been ready to admit that their hero
is, fran the point of view of the American academy at least,
seriously flawed.
The question which now concerns us, however, is not
whether this interpretation of Schenker is, in the
circumstances, understandable, but whether it makes
sufficient scientific-philosophical sense and has enough
connection with the realities of Schenker' s work to allow
it to continue to stand between that work and potential
readers long after the need which gave rise to it has ceased
to exist.
Forte's view of science athraces a number of ideas. The
first to appear is the idea of certainty. Science can give
us conclusive answers and lead cumulatively to a body of
established facts. Beside facts there are also principles. A
fundamental principle' should be scientifically
productive, leading to the discovery of new facts: the
'disclosure of further new relationships'. Neither
speculation nor 'metaphysics' should play any part in the
process by means of which accumulated facts are transformed
into principles. Prior theorising or hypothesising is
unscientific.
To satisfy these criteria of the scientific, Schenker
would have had to approach music with no prior theoretical
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concepts of any kind. This, however is so obviously
nonsensical that we must assume that Forte considers some
theoretical concepts - say, 'interval', 'triad', 'tonality',
'melody' - as given.
It could perhaps - with sane difficulty - be argued
that, if music is a system of conventions and the
theoretical tradition is the intellectual articulation of
these conventions, any investigation of music must treat as
part of the data the concepts riployed in this tradition.
This, however, Schenker was by no means prepared to do,
often rejecting or modifying traditional concepts, and doing
so on empirical grounds. 1breover, Forte endorses his
rejection, for example, of the concept of 'modulation'.
There seems to be no way out of this dilna. If we
treat as given concepts such as 'inversion', 'root', 'scale
step', must we not treat the whole theoretical apparatus
which Schenker inherited as given, including such concepts
as 'fundamental bass', and 'modulation'? And if we exclude
this last because we have discovered that it is 'a verbal
inaccuracy' how do we know that this is not also true of all
the others and that we simply have not yet discovered the
evidence?
Forte' s remark that the only 'experience' Schenker made
use of was 'aural' experience is puzzling also In another
respect. This wuld have been such a strange restriction for
Schenker to have iinposed upon himself while developing a
highly visually-oriented tool for the use of others.
However, if the claim that Schenker' s theory was vrked
out entirely airically is not sustainable, this does not
prove that the theory is not scientific. All it proves i
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that pure empiricism, as the criterion for scientific
validity, is equally incanpatible with the claim that the
theory is scientific and with Forte' s own - pragmatic -
view of the scientific. For if we may speculate about how
Schenker' s theory might be used as a starting point for the
construction of new theories and how it could lead to the
'understanding [of] the structure of problematic modern
works', it is clear that speculation is not, after all,
excluded frau the definition of the scientific. No zTore is
prior theorising.
The notion of science to which Schenker is required to
acccmnodate himself here is, plainly, a cultural phencmenon,
hardly less arbitrary, hardly more logical than Schenker' s
own.
*	 *	 *
While Forte' s picture of Schenker is the most familiar
positive interpretation, the most widely read negative
critique must be that of Eugene Narmour. 19 Although Narmour
regards Schenker' s theory as having a significant
contribution to make, he is convinced of its ultimate
inadequacy, and sees this as having much to do with
its underlying philosophical assumptions. He examines
Schenkerian and 'neo-Schenkerian' theory in relation to a
number of scientific or quasi-scientific theories, among
than Chanskian linguistic theory and gestalt psychology. His
purpose is not so much to indicate the points of cctnparison
between these theories as to show that they are all flawed,
and for the same reason: they make similar use of erroneous
prior theories.
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If it is true that a theory can be proved wrong simply
by showing that it makes use of a theory which at a later
date can be shown to have been flawed, theories can only be
constructed safely by purely empirical means. Narirour might
seem, then, to belong to much the same school of thought as
Forte. But, in fact, he aligns himself very specifically
with Karl Popper according to whcin scientific progress
consists of refining the body of scientific knowledge by
'falsifying' existing theories. 20
Narmour's idea of the scientific, like Forte's, is not
at all easy to characterise. In his critique of gestaltism,
for example, he says on the one hand that there 'is
simply. . . no evidence. . .to suggest that a given whole is
anything more than its parts vrking together' and yet on
the other hand, that it 'remains an empirical truth' that
'the whole has a character significantly different frcii the
sum of its parts' . Seeming here to endorse the view that
positive evidence is the test of the scientific, he goes on
to say that 'the argument that Schenkerian analysis is based
on perception. . .is no argument at all. For we now know that
theories organise facts, not vice versa.'
We now know' is an odd way of prefacing a remark which
seems to propose a view offered in the eighteenth-century
• work quoted in Free Ccxnposition. But Narmour' s meaning is
perhaps not quite the same as Goethe' s. Goethe did not
imagine a set of neutral facts which may be 'organised' into
a theory according to whatever prior theory the organiser
prefers. Much as he detested the Newtonians, Goethe would
never have accused them of anything as crude as this. His
concern was that the perception of the data may be
inadvertently influenced by the unconscious theoretical
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presupsitions of the observer. Narrnour, however, seems to
accept the validity of the empirical observations leading to
Schenker' s theory. His problem is simply that he does not
care for the particular attitude which - in his belief -
Schenker brought to bear on the results of these
observations.
Unfortunately, he gives little indication of the nature
of his objection to this attitude, seeming to assume that
merely naming it will be sufficient to revolt the reader as
he is revolted. 'Regardless of its empirical origin,' he
writes, 'the logical formulation of the theory is
idealistic, and. . . its use in analysis is heavily
rationalistic.'22
Sane readers might indeed be steered away fran Schenker
by these revelations. Others might be bewildered. There are,
unquestionably, rationalistic elements in the theory, that
is to say, concepts derived fran reductive theories
rationally notivated, but is this what Narrrour means by
'rationalistic use' of the theory? The Ursatz may, perhaps,
be regarded as an 'idea' in the sense in which, according to
Schiller, Goethe's plant-archetype was an idea. But if it is
an idea, it cannot also be 'a logical formulation'.
'idealistic' and 'rationalistic' even as pejorative terms,
seem to be curious bedfellows.
A footnote directing the reader to Karl Popper offers
hope of illumination. Popper held that while a theory can
never be verified by rpirical instances it can be falsified
by a single such instance.
Narrrour gives a musical illustration. He seeks to show
that Schenker' s theory forces upon us an exclusive
- 142 -
interpretation of data which are open to a variety of
interpretations and therefore that it is false. He presents
the opening of the second Thio in Beethoven' s Quintet Op. 4,
to show that it is possible to hear simultaneously two
separate types of 'structure' one of which he describes as
'axial' and the other ar, and argues that Schenker' s
'reductive' procedure cxxnpels a preference for one or the
other. 24 He goes on to say that 'we can readily hear
either.. . pattern. . . or both simultaneously depending on
our. . . theoretical beliefs' and he carpares this situation
with the farrous rabbit/duck image.25
This instance is fraught with prob1s. To begin with,
it is not at all clear what role he understands belief to
play in the interpretation of the duck/rabbit image. Belief
seens to be the wrong process to invoke. Wbat is relevant to
the interpretation is not prior belief but prior experience.
Sctone who has never seen a rabbit is not very likely to
interpret the image as a rabbit. This does not imply
anything about his theoretical beliefs.
In the case of the musical illustration, Na.rirour does
not tell us what belief would lead to the 'axial'
interpretation or what other belief would lead to the
'linear' one, nor, if the hearing of both patterns
simultaneously depends on a third belief, what the third
belief is.
Here we can see the disabling power of Popper's theory
at work. If one of the interpretations is invoked as
justification of the theory, the theory is unsatisfactory
because no theory can ever be validated by enpirical data.
If, instead, the interpretation is selected on the basis of
the theory, the theory is wrong because an empirical
- 143 -
instance - the alternative interpretation - is incompatible
with it. The acceptance of both is logically impossible in
a systen which - allegedly - compels the choice of one or
the other.
In Narmour's view, the choice is canpelled by the need to
decide which elements are retained in the next level of the
analysis. The objection seeis to be impossible to argue with
because the acceptance of one as correct rules out the
other, while the acceptance of the other rules out the
first.
But Narimur has not, in fact, denonstrated that
Schenker' s systen imposes on him the need to descend on
either horn of this dilarnia. The theory need only leave us
perplexed in this instance if Schenker actuafly proposed the
kind of choice Narirour wishes on him. If that were true, his
graphing procedure would consist not of the progressive
identification of deeper levels of determination of
phenomena, but progressive elimination of phenomena. He
would then, presumably, be proposing the substitution of the
tirsatz for the work.
What is daronstrated here is a phenanenal problen. The
two patterns represent not two sets of data but a single set
of data simultaneously presenting irore than one pattern.
Schenker' s theory fully acknowledges the possibility of the
simultaneous presence of discrete patterns in the same set
of data, and interprets then as existing in a clearly
intelligible relation with one another. This relationship -
the kind presented by a simple interval elaborated by means
of auxiliary and passing notes - can easily be explained
without recourse to any elaborate theorising.
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The notion that there are notes of diffeting structural
significance is by no means exclusive to Schenker. The
conventional terms 'auxiliary note' and 'passing note' imply
this differential status. So do the ornament signs which
indicate conventionalised uses of these notes. The ability
to hear sara notes as elaborating others does, of course,
require a particular t cognitive set'. It helps if the
observer is familiar with the idea of ornamentation in music
and even more if he knows the conventions governing its use.
Armed with these concepts he will have no difficulty in
hearing a relatively sma1lattern within a relatively large
one.
It is precisely through the device of differentiating
1 levels' that Schenker is able to accarndate more than one
perceptual interpretation of the same data simultaneously.
On one level are the notes undergoing elaboration; on
another are the notes representing the elaboration. Sane
notes appear at both levels. The convention adopted by the
theory is that those notes which appear at only one level
mark that level as structurally more superficial than those
which appear at both levels. Notes 'which remain when all
notes which can possibly be regarded as elaborating sai
other notes have been assigned to other levels mark the
least superficial level. By the time this final level has
been reached, there will be many simultaneously presented
patterns.
We can see even fran Narnour' s fifteen bars that the
'axial' pattern contains and is contained by 'linear'
patterns and the larger linear pattern by the 'triadic'
pattern in which some of the tones of the 'linear' pattern
function as passing notes. Each successive stage is capable
of accctnnodating more than one of the kinds of pattern
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appearing in the previous stages. Thus the descending linear
pattern embraces not one axial pattern but five and the
triadic pattern embraces both the descending linear pattern
and the 'axial' patterns with their internal ascending
linear patterns. There could be said to be a broader 'axial'
pattern embracing all this, which consists of the
simultaneous appearance of ascending and descending lines,
the ascending ones becarting weaker and the descending ones
clearer, with a point of temporary equilibrium in bars
9-11. The precise significance of this pattern cannot be
discerned without looking at wider spans and deeper levels.
Far fran canpelling reductive choices which eliminate
what might appear to be contrary interpretations,
differentiation in terms of levels permits the
conceptualisation of the complex within which the phenarna
occur, the manifold which is grasped intuitively with such
ease but rendered transparent to the understanding with
difficulty. It is not easy to imagine a neater, rrre
econartical way of doing this than by neans of the notion of
levels. It is curious that Narmour, who joins the chorus of
criticism about the slighting of the tanporal dinension, and
has harsh rds to say about 'synchronic' interpretations of
structures, should accuse Schenker of being unable to cope
with what appears to be the simultaneous manifestation of
different entities, the impression of more than one object
occupying the same place, i.e., of ambiguity. This is the
thing such an interpretation does par excellence.
Narmour' s illustration certainly exemplifies the
difficulty of making sense of complex musical phenomena
without prior musical experience. But, equally certainly, it
fails to demonstrate that Schenker' s theory falsifies either
the experience or the phenanena. It is hard to see how it
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could. At the nost, assuming that Schenker' s procedure
ccinpelled the elimination of one of Narnour' s alternatives,
it could assert that this choice was the wrong one, in which
case any theory proposed in support of the alternative would
be falsifiable in the same way. Narrrour wants to show that
the making of the choice is the thing that is wrong, but
this particular choice is proposed only by him.
Narmour' s approach to biological science is similarly
confusing. He equates 'organic' with 'biological', although
it had a much wider meaning in the culture in which
Schenker' s thought took shape. He is, of course, able to
find plenty of rena-rks fran the part of Schenker' s oeuvre on
which his critique is based which sean in isolation to
indicate that Schenker also understood 'organic' to mean
'biological', and that when he referred to 'Nature' he meant
the world of living organisms exclusively. But it is his own
interpretation that Naritour finds in Schenker' s writings.
It is presumably because of this limitation that he
sees Darwin' s theory of evolution as capable of invalidating
Schenker' s theory of music. The theory of music is organic;
organic theories are biological; biological theory equals
evolutionary theory; the only valid evolutionary theory is
Darwin's; Schenker' s theory is not Darwinian, therefore it
is invalid as a theory of music.
Criticising Schenker for treating the musical work of
art as ccinparable to a living organism he says, 'Nature' s
,26
work and man s, after all, are not threctly canparable
Yet he himself seems to accept sane sort of theory of music
as an evolutionary organism: as an historical genus which
has developed over time and as an individual work which
reflects this historical development in its own structurl
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evolution. His criticism of what he sees as Schenker's
teleological interpretation of this entity, which means that
it cannot explain the musical equivalent of species
(styles), sens to indicate that it is Schenker' S
interpretation of the rixxlel rather than the indel itself
which he finds objectionable.
When he canes to explain the way in which Schenker' s
theory is pre-Darwinian, it is not at all clear why he
finds it so offensive. He ranarks that 'our retrospective
knowledge of what actually does cane to pass can never
account completely for what was implied'. If this means that
a single work cannot realise all the possibilities inherent
in a given compositional systen it is not clear why he
thinks Schenker would have disputed this. The word
'implied', however, has a disadvantage fran the point of
view of NaritKur' s argument. A set of conditions may contain
a host of possibilities sate of which may be realised and
sane not, but an implication is a necessity not a
possibility. The teleology to which he objects in Schenker
sens to be surreptitiously at work in his own thinking.
nother kind of logical issue works in much the same
way for Narrrour as his beliefs about organicism and
teleology. That is to say, he assumes that he differs fran
Schenker in a very simple way: he is enlightened, Schenker
was benighted, because he is up-to-date and Schenker was
out-of-date. Schenker cannitted the logical fallacy known
as 'affirming the consequent.. .in its nost blatant form', he
observes, as if this formulation represented a universally
accepted prohibition, rather than one of the oldest bones of
contention known to philosophy. 'What starts out as a
working hypothesis (the Ursatz) ends up being the evidence
of the structure itself. ,27
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Whether or not the Ursatz is an axiccn, whether or not
the theory affirms the consequent may be of burning interest
to logicians, especially those of the positivist/negativist
persuasion, but they have little bearing on the specific
cultural orientation of Schenker' s thought and the pursuit
of thea does little to help us in approaching it.
*	 *	 *
Both Forte and Narnour believed that, between the time
when Schenker' s outlook was taking shape and their own time,
a change had taken place in the nature of scientific enquiry
which was unlike any change that had occurred before. This
was not just a question of the rapidity of the accumulation
of knowledge to which Forte refers, but an irreversible
philosophical transformation, the final unchallengeable
establishment of a particular notion of what science was,
together with the belief that only a kind of thinking which
was in accord with this notion of science was evidence of a
normally functioning intelligence.
The confidence with which the claims to superiority
were made for this idea of the scientific was not matched by
the clarity of the idea itself. While there was general
agreennt that there was such a thing as a nodern scientific
way of thinking applicable to all fields of enquiry there
was no agrent arrong musical scientists about its precise
character. To say that it was empirical and
anti-metaphysical is not to •say anything very revealing
since various philosophies of science could be defined in
that way. Besides, the advocates of this 'rode.rn scientific.'
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outlook were anything but consistently empirical and
un-metaphysical. Value judgements abounded in their
cownentaries and the objectivity which they regarded as the
hallmark of the scientific was honoured more often in the
breach than in the observance. Narmour's quasi-moral
objections to Schenker' s teleology and other features of his
thinking which he disliked are a striking illustration of
this.
It is all too tempting to adopt the same condescending
attitude towards the 'scientific' theorists of the
mid-century as they adopted to the 'unscientific' Schenker,
the more so as our picture of Schenker' s cultural resources
beccines fuller. By comparison with the energy and intensity
of intellectual life in Schenker's youth, that of the
post-war çeriod seems derivative, pale, dreary and anxious.
To criticise Schenker's scientific naivete while kning
little of nineteenth-century science; to accuse him of being
Hegelian while having little awareness of the nature of the
Hegelian aesthetic; to write the 'intellectual history' of
his theory by ectur, could happen only in a period
that liked to think it knew best about everything, and that
anything fran the past, like 'Schenkerism', was, by
definition, good only in so far as it anticipated modern
ways of thinking.28
This confidence turned out to be fragile. The gradual
recovery of information about a past which had for so long
been too painful to think deeply about made it necessary to
reconsider progress ivist assumptions. Certainty began to
crumble, a creeping disillusionment set in, not least with
science, and a sense of the aridity of a culture dominated
by it.
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Schenker' s level of culture far exceeded that of his
critics, and yet he felt that he had had to fight to educate
himself, and that, in spite of all his efforts, he had no
hope of aspiring to the level of the generation of Goethe
and &)zart. He was undoubtedly right. How much less entitled
to intellectual canpiacency are his apologists and critics?
*	 *	 *
A third canmentator, viewing Scheriker fran a different
angle and rather rre distantly than either his followers or
his analytic rivals, Joseph Kerman, sees Schenker as himself
a positivist. 29 Kerman's concern is not primarily analysis
but musical scholarship as a whole. He criticises Schenker,
along with analysts generally, for his 'dogged concentration
on internal relationships within the single work of art'
since this is 'ultimately subversive as far as any
reasonably canplete view of music is concerned. ,30 He goes
on: 'Along with the preoccupation with structure goes the
neglect of. . . the whole historical cariplex' and 'everything
that makes music affective, noving, anotional, expressive.'
Schenker, having been chided for being insufficiently
single-minded, is now chided for being 'myopic'. Having been
accused of being 'tharrassingly metaphysical' he is now
blamed for a positivistic narrowness and coldness.
Kerman' s rEnarks are part of a general canplaint
against the influence of positivism on the study of music
since the war mainly in America but also in England. The
consequences of this influence he sees as a narrowing of the
scope of musicology, assisted by the cult of objectivity
in theory and analysis. Schenker he sees as a strong
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contributor to this narrowing of focus since Schenker' s
analytic ideas, as he understands them, not only fit very
comfortably into what he calls the merican flea-positivist
ideology, but constitute 'a true underground link between
merican flea-positivism in music and the original
nineteenth-century German rrvement' •31
On the one hand, Kennan seems to accept as given that
analysis is a self-contained discipline, outside the main
musicological domain, yet on the other, he criticises the
analyst for neglecting other things. In fact, Schenker' s
analytic work had to be torn rather messily out of his oevre
because of this arbitrary academic barrier and in order
to make him conform to the positivist ideology for which
Kerman wants to burden him with sane degree of
responsibility.
Writing in 1983 Kerman did not, of course, have the
benefit of more recent research which would have helped him
to differentiate Schenker fran his Ai11erican interpreters.
He could not have known, for example, that Schenker himself
voiced an objection strikingly similar to his own to the
positivism of Hanslick. 32 But it is disappointing that he
found nothing in Harmony or Free Canposition to alert him to
the enormous discrepancies between their message and
'iAmerican neo-positivist' interpretations like Forte' s and
Narmour' s and incline him to recruit Schenker to his cause.
The Beethoven editions which he regards as evidence that
'Schenker had no quarrel with positivist musicology', and
which clearly do conform to sane of the principles generally
- but incorrectly - understood to be the exclusive property
of musicology, are in fact overflowing with evidence of
Schenker' s distrust of musicological caipaxtinentalism and
aesthetic obtuseness, a feeling often expressed with
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ferocious intensity, utterly indifferent to bloodless
notions of scholarly propriety.
In the Preliminary Rnarks to his edition of
Beethoven's Op. 110, Schenker gives clear expression to his
sense of the vital links between textual research, editing
for performance, canpositional theory and history, and of
the evil effects of separating these studies in such a way
that they cannot contribute to a coherent approach to the
interpretation of works of art. Schenker attacks not
only the baneful tradition of the camercially Irvtivated
performing edition prepared by the virtuoso, full of
editorial 'improvements', but the hardly less dismal state
of a species of scholarship whose impoverished artistic
vision substitutes one form of progressivism for another.
Rinann is as great a sinner as any ignorant and nercenary
publisher. Because his snendations are based on scholarship
they are even nre dangerously insidious. Riernann misreads
because his expertise in matters of notation is not matched
by musical insight. Even this expertise is, in Schenker's
view, worthless since it approaches Beethoven' s notation
(Notenbilder) as an abstract systea severed fran the
artistic content. Does Riemann really believe, Schenker
asks, that Beethoven' s scores, which have inspired canposers
frcn Schubert to Brahms, can convey artistic truth only with
the aid of his corrections?34
Riemann exemplifies just the same sort of problem as that
presented by Reisenauer' s fingering of Brahms's Op. 24,
'which never once evinces any inner relationship to
Brahms' . Schenicer would have been just as willing to apply
the question to himself. thy should he be trusted? Because
he was a scientist, an empiricist, a postivist? Not at all.
He could be trusted only because of his 'inner relationship'
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to 'the masters'.
Whether Schenker' s belief about himself was justified
or not does not affect the issue. It is not a question of
empiricism versus historicisrn or idealism, but sanething
quite different: a question of art as a living entity on the
one hand and as the mere object of abstract theorising on
the other. Part and scholarship can be separated only at
great cost to both, possibly at the cost of the very life of
the former.
Schenker, despite his contributions to musical
scholarship, cannot be considered representative of orthodox
German musicology. Rather he is representative of a quite
different 'underground' tendency, a tradition of dissidence
harshly critical of academic institutions, their ideologies
and their exclusiveness, indeed of the whole tendency of the
study of an area of human activity to becane rrore important
than the activity itself, even to replace it, to render it
obsolete by defining it as the object of historical study.
For Schenker, study of art which is not in the service of
art is an unforgivable betrayal of genius. The fact,
however, that his own work, like musicology, was oriented in
so many respects by assumptions of philological origin -
philology having severed its own connection with living art
long before - sets up trandous philosophical tensions. To
these are attributable many of the features of his writing
which make its interpretation difficult for readers unaware
of the conflicts underlying the artistic-intellectual
turnoil of his period.
In his remark in passing that 'the re-discovery of
Schenker at Princeton and YaTh in the 1950s represents a
true underground link between Prican neo-positivism in
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music and the original nineteenth century German movnt' -
presumably the movement he has in mind is that which led to
the academic establishment of 4usikwissenschaft - Kerman
nevertheless raises two very important questions: to what
extent was Musikwissenschaft a positivist movement and what
was Schenker's relationship to it?36
There are two possible senses in which Viennese
Musikwissenschaft, at least, could be said to be positivist,
one general and the other specific. Its methodological
orientation is empirical-inductive, which is in keeping
with the approach advocated by the positivists . But this
in itself cannot imply the influence of post Ca'ritean
positivism, since çiricism and inductivism are much older
than this, as are many other important attributes of
Musikwissenschaft. What it suggests instead is that
Musikwissenschaft and German, or, more precisely, Viennese
positivism were parallel developoents.
But the possibility of direct influence upon the
particular definition and practice of musicology in Vienna
nevertheless seems to be strong. Idler had written his essay
on the science of music in 1885 and established the
Vierteljahrschrift ftfr sikwissenschaft, together with
Spitta and chrysander, in 1884, while Mach, the great
Viennese representative of positivism, became active in
Vienna only fran 1895. Mach and adler had earlier held
professorships in Prague, however. 38 The setting up of a
department of Musikwissenschaft at the University of Vienna
only occurred in 1898 when Mler was appointed to the
professorship originally created for Hanslick, but Pdler bad
been Privatdozent for Musikwissenschaft in Vienna fran his
habilitation in 1882 until his Prague appointment in 1885.
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The demarcation lines between disciplines were far
less rigid than later became the norm, as we can see fran
the definitions of appointments, the titles of
dissertations, and so on. Indeed, it is ironic that the
attet to confine philosophy to a field which in no way
impinged on any other discipline was only a feasible pursuit
in a situation where disciplines were so loosely defined
that a physicist could lecture on philosophy, a philologist
or a lawyer or a physiologist on music, a philosopher on
psychology and so on. It did not seen at all strange for
Scheriker to refer his music-theoretical ideas to Mach, who,
in turn, referred him to Richard Wallascheck. The latter,
Federhofer tells us, was at that time preparing his
habilitation for the faculty of 'Psychology and Aesthetics
of Music' under Mach and Friedrich Jcdl. 3 This was in 1896.
If the connection remained anything like as close as this
after 1898, methodological similarities between Mach' s area
and Adler's would not be surprising.
Whatever the relationship between Mach' s advocacy of
his version of positivism and the implementation of Adler' s
prograirine it could not warrant the description of
Musikwissenschaft as simply positivist, either in the
Machean or in any other sense, even though there are certain
characteristics of MusiJcwissenschaft which give the
description a superficial plausibility. Musikwissenschaft
selected certain areas of traditional musical scholarship
because of their suitability for empirical treatment, areas
such as textual research, notation, the collection of facts
about canposers, their lives, the times in which they lived
and so on. Works of music were examined fran the point of
view of the characteristics which would enable them to be
placed historically and to be assigned a provenance. The
music-analytic approach favoured by Musikwissenschaft wa
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oriented towards a historicist notion of style, a supposedly
empirical 'morphological' approach purporting to be
theory-free but leaning methodologically on Goethe and
theoretically on the Viennese pedagogic tradition. 40 At the
same time it excluded or assigned to subordinate positions
areas deemad less susceptible of empirical treatment, such
as harmonic theory, which carte to be routinely designated as
'speculative', aesthetics, hermeneutics and other kinds of
analysis. All this is, of course, very much in keeping with
the positivist hostility to metaphysics.
There are also certain points of carparison between
Mach' s scientific philosophising and Musikwissenschaft which
may be more than coincidental. The treatirent of harmony as
something outside the main concerns of Musikwissenschaft
could be just a historical accident, the relic of the
peculiar relationship which existed between the University
and the Conservatory, the former dealing with matters
historical and the latter with matters practical. But it
uld have been open to adler to change this, and there did
exist strong precedents for the inclusion of harmony in any
scheme for the study of music which called itself
scientific. 2dler' s preference for the history of harmony -
the topic he chose for his habilitation - over the study of
harmony itself may be a conscious rejection of the
scientific philosophical orientation of Helmholtz,
comparable to Mach's similar rejection of Helrnholtz's
realist philosophy of science, but it is much more likely
that it reflected the historicist tendencies in the
humanities generally.
The teaching of a set of harmonic conventions which
remained - anomalously in ideological terms - part of the
university programue, made it necessary to assert an
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empirical basis for these conventions, a continuing feature
of musicologica]. accounts of Viennese theory, a fiction
which Schenker did not endear himself to the academics by
denouncing. Schenker's own radical historical approach to
harmony and to counterpoint reflects the nineteenth century
tendency to precede the critical examination of any cultural
phenanenon by an account of its origins and historical
development, but, again, this is a tendency emulated by
Musikwissenschaft, not initiated by it, and one which was
later to be modified under the influence of specialisation.
Kerman' s drawing of a parallel between
Musikwissenschaft and nineteenth century positivsm on the
one hand and musicology and 'A1nerican neo-positivism' on the
other certainly raises interesting issues. The outlook he
describes as 'ican neo-positivism in musjc' is
unquestionably connected with the positivism of Mach, whose
anigr followers took the theory to merica where it
acquired almost the status of a religion, canplete with the
kind of ethical overtones which vibrate through the writing
of Narmour. 41 Pnd it is true that ?erican musicology is
deeply indebted to Viennese Musikwissenschaft. This suggests
a nexus involving all four phenanena.
Schenker was tangentially involved in the circumstances
leading to the establishment of Musikwissenschaft as the
central music-academic discipline at the University of
Vienna at the close of the last century, and was in sate
kind of relationship to MusiJcwissenschaft until his death.
In those early years he was actively involved in the
business of giving definition, in an academic setting, to a
modern, 'scientific', all-embracing musical scholarship. His
lecture to the Philosophical Society of the University in
1895, the year of Mach' s appointment to a newly created
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chair in 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' (a title
which indicates the the way the academic wind was then
blowing) is an example of this kind of endeavour, if very
42different fran adler s far nore systematic 1885 essay.
With Hanslick's retirement the situation was fluid for a
time. Had Schenker taken a rrore positivistic line in his
lecture, or had the nature of Mach' s appointment not
recently put the seal of official approval on inductivism,
making the metaphysical tendencies exhibited in the essay
deeply unfashionable in the relevant quarters, it might
have led to his being drawn into the academic fold in one
way or another, and the direction, not to say the tone, of
his subsequent work might have been different. As it was, he
was driven back on sources of support - noral, intellectual
and material - outside the institutional-academic system,
subsequently adopting the role of critical outsider, a thorn
in the flesh of the establishment. If there had been any
prospect of an academic appointment for Schenker, Adler' s
arrival, the year after Brahms's death, must have greatly
diminished it.
Kerman' s belief that Scheriker was favourably disposed
towards musicology, and indeed indulged in musicological
practices himself (to better effect, Kerman implies, than
when he was delving into internal structures) seems on the
face of it obvious and irrefutable. If this were indeed
true, it would not be unreasonable to see him as
representative of the positivistic trend in musical
scholarship. In reality, however, this is simply not the
case. It can appear so only because of our habit of thinking
of musicology and its satellites, the other off-shoots of
Musikwissenschaft, as the only possible type of musical
scholarship. But the scholarly activities Kerman alludes
to are neither exclusively musicological nor exclusive]..y
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positivist. They were representative of existing types of
research fran artong which Pd1er chose those to be included
in his scheme for an all-embracing science of music, but
were in no way dependent upon this scheme or its rationale.
It is quite mistaken to see Schenker' s editorial and
historical studies merely as contributions - even though
one of them has this s.ord in its title - to a collective
endeavour to accumulate knowledge for its own sake.
It is conceivable that the Beitrag zur Ornarnentik began
as an attempt on Schenker's part to reconcile himself to the
new situation. 43
 Its historical orientation, its connection
with the style of a particular period, its narrow focus on a
relatively obscure segment of an already specialised topic,
suggest a musicological rxtivation. But it is not necessa-ty
to propose such a irotive. Schenker' s music-philosophical
outlook, fran the time of the publication of his first essay
- which already contains a dig at the musicologists'
historicising zealotry which could not wait for Brahms' s
death before periodising his oeuvre - was formed by Brahms
and his circle. 44 Schenker' s attitudes in very many ways
echo the attitudes of Brahms, saretirres rather stridently.
They are not always irridiately recognisable as emanating
fran the canposer whose hunour Schenker was less able to
emulate than his asperity, and his taciturnity not at all.
He idolised Brahms and found himself on the fringes of the
Brahms circle just at the time when it was breaking up and
its influence on musical life waning. Brahms died in 1897.
Fran 1894 Hanslick no longer occupied either of his tsv
positions of influence, having retired also fran the Neue
Freie Presse, where his place had been taken by Heuberger,
to Schenker' s disappointment since he had had ambitions of
his own in that direction. 45 Schenker remained faithful to
the Brahmsian ethos, continuing to associate himself with
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the survivors o. the , anng them Kalbeck, Brahms' S
biographer, and Mandieczevsky, a successor to Nottebohm as
archivist to the Gessellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien. In
later life he came to see himself as the sole surviving
representative of the values it had championed.
Mandieczewski and Kalbeck represented traditions of
musical scholarship older than musicology. It was fran this
direction that Schenker' s interest in and knowledge about
autographs and sketches caine, not fran Adler or the
University. Representatives of the scholarly tradition like
Nottebohm, Forkel, the Spittas, the Belleririan family and
Adler himself, sought to emulate not psitivism, a
derivative of the French Enlightenment, its science and its
rationalism, but the example of German classical
scholarship. By contrast, tso figures whose role was more
public, Hanslick who came fran the romantic tradition of
musical journalism and pular theorising, and Helmholtz,
who came directly fran physical science, had different
agendas.46
German musical scholarship' s preoccupation with the
ccrnparison and authentication of texts 1 with the
interpretation of antique notations etc., reflected the
central activity of philology. Musikwissenschaft' s
fascination with what lay beyond the great divide separating
music written according to organising principles which could
be traced back to antiquity fran the music of the
major-minor system, and its passion for making such
distinctions in terms of sharply demarcated historical
periods, are indications of the overwhelming sense that
true scholarship was clasical scholarship in its
modern historicist form. The interest in musical forms that
began to displace the scientifically motivated taxonanies
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and the exploration of systems which had been the great
preoccupation of the eighteenth century, is attributable
to the same German influence. (In France the
acoustic-scientific emphasis remained paramount for longer.)
The focus of modern philology was the artefact, the object
and the cultural information it carried. Fran about the time
when philology began to exert its decisive influence on
German musical scholarship, interest in other kinds of
significance in the artwork within philology itself sharply
declined.
All the characteristics of musicology which Kerman
finds regrettable and which Schenker deplored - its tendency
to fragmentation, to the isolation of various areas of
study, to ever more refined specialisation; its aesthetic
indifference; its neglect of the intrinsic significance of
works of art - were characteristics of the new philology
which was its model. Similarly, its egotism, its sense that
the things it neglected were left out of consideration
because of their insignificance, even their unreality, and
not because of the limitations of its approach, had its
origins in an attitude which undoubtedly welcaned the
additional rationalisation of such behaviour provided by
positivism, but which did not originate in that.
Nevertheless the coincidence of the academic entrenchment of
Musikwisserischaft with the academic sanctification of
positivism helped Viennese Musikwissenschaft to dispense
with any pretence to the kind of connection to current
artistic activity fran which philology had taken a century
to free itself, and to establish itself at the outset as an
autonomous scientific enterprise.
In the work of Nottebohm and Bellerruan there is still a
belief that the study of the texts is justified by the
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aesthetic value of their contents, that the significant
truth is the inner truth of the work and that the scholarly
task was to render the medium of transmission as transparent
as possible so that this truth was accessible. They had not
succumbed to the species of scientific disinterestedness
and the accanpanying aesthetic relativism according to which
the establishing of a pure text is an end in itself, but, of
course, their work was inevitably a contribution to the
developiient of this outlook.
The cctrrron assumption that musicology was a natural
growth out of earlier forms of musical study, the
systsmatisation and professionalising of what had before
been desultory and amateur, that it could not have been
otherwise, although perhaps the hasis might have been
different, ignores the noisiest artistic-scholarly conflicts
of the nineteenth century. To understand how it was possible
for Schenker at one and the same time to cling - with great
fervour - to the textual-empirical principles derived fran
philology and yet have an attitude to the work of art
antithetical to that of the musicologists it is essential to
take into account this central nineteenth century
music-cultural argument.
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Notes
1. Quoted by Schenker at the head of the 'Erster
Psbschnitt' of Der Freie Satz. See Schenker,
ed. Jonas, 1956, p. 25. See also Schenker,
tr. Oster, 1979, p. 3.
2. Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 3.
3. Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988. See the 'Preface',
p. 159.
4	 Where Oster helped edit Der Dreikiang before
fleeing to 2\marica.
5. Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. U.
6. Kant, tr. Meiklejohn, 1991, p. 10.
7	 See Magee, 1978, p. 119, ff..
8. For an instance of intellectual history still
influenced by these doctrines yet concerned
to re-establish traditional connections, see
Berthold-Bond, 1989, p. 247. Strangely, while
Berthold-Bond points out scxre of the
ancznalies	 in	 Freud' s
	
attitude,	 he
nevertheless	 'situate [s] him within the
tradition of German philosophy beginning with
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Kant' s endeavour to "trim the wings of
metaphysics"' and including Nietzsche who
'cautioned against...the excesses of
metaphysics'. Such interpretations are bard
to reconcile with the writings of the authors
referred to. For example, Kant (see p. 11
Kant, tr. Meiklejohn, 1988) says1
'[Metaphysics] is the oldest of the sciences,
and could still survive, even if all the rest
were to be swallowed up in the abyss of an
all destroying barbarism'. Nietzsche (see
Nietzsche, tr. Kaufmann, 1967, p. 120) says,
'Let us recollect fuither that Kant and
Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit
of German philosophy. . . to destroy scientific
Socratism's canpiacent delight in existence
by establishing its boundaries'. People
interpret Kant as setting the bounds of
science or as setting the bounds of
metaphysics according to their own
metaphysical inclinations. While the
arrogance of metaphysics may have been the
main problen in Kant's day, this was hardly
the case in the nineteenth century, and is
still less so in the twentieth. With Freud,
as with the original logical positivists, few
of whan were philosophers, the argunent is
less philosophical than defensive and
ideological.
Berthold-Bond' s attitude to Freud ses to be
similar to Kevyn Korsyn' s to Schenker. See n.
14.
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9. Ernst Mach, Professor of Inductive Sciences
in Vienna frail 1898, was a figure of
formidable and wide-ranging influence, a
precursor of Einstein, a populariser of
science through his public lectures, a
philosopher of science who prepared the way
for logical positivism, which originated in
the department he founded under his successor
Schlick. He reviewed the history of
mechanics, with epoch-making consequences, and
of optics including Goethe ' s contribution to
the latter. His theory of knowledge is
reminiscent of Locke's.
10. The Elimination of Metaphysics was the title
of a paper by Rudolf Carnap and of the first
chapter of Ayer, 1952. Kant and Schopenhauer
both anticipated this. Kant says, 'Besides,
these pretended indifferentists, however much
they may try to disguise themselves by the
assumption of a popular style. . . unavoidably
fall into metaphysical declarations and
propositions which they profess to regard
with such contempt.' See Kant, tr.
Meiklejohn, 1991, p. 2. Schopenhauer regarded
it as a sign of progress to be capable of
recognising what was going on when a new
philosopher 'behaves like the new Sultan,
whose first act is the execution of his
brothers' ('macht wie jeder neue Sultan,
dessen erster Akt die Hinrichtung seiner
Brider 1st') declaring the work of his
predecessors 'niii and void and starting anew
as if nothing had ever happened
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before... '('null und nichtig [zu erklären]
und ganz from Neuem anhebt, als ob noch
nichts geschen sei...'). See Schopenhauer,
ed. Spierling, 1986, p. 97.
11. See Forte, 1959.
12. See Pastille, 1985.
13,	 Narmour, 1977, p. 31, ff..
14. See Korsyn, 1988, p. 1.
15. Ibid..
16. Elizabeth Mann Borgese's translation of the
Harrnonielehre actually appeared five years
before Forte 's paper. (See n. 12 above).
Edited by Oswald Jonas, it was presumably
meant to be the beginning of a irore extensive
presentation of Schenker' s work to the
English speaking public. The next volume of
the magnum opus did not appear, however, for
another thirty three years. It was not until
after the publication of Beyond Schenkerism
that Harirony became as easily accessible as
Narrrour' s attack on it, that is in a
relatively inexpensive edition.
17. A suniriary of the change of hasis in
Scheriker studies in English from Fbrte
onwards is to be found in Pastille, 1985.
See pp. ix-xiv.
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18. See Forte, 1959.
19. See Narmour, 1977.
20. See, e.g., the entry 'Popperian' in Bullock,
1990, p. 665.
21. Narrnour, 1977, p. 33.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 25, n. 22.
24. See appendix.
25. Nanrour borrows this fran Ganbrich, who got
it fran Wittgenstein who used it in his
lectures in Cambridge in 1947, having got it
fran Kohier (Gestalt Psychology, 1929) who
in turn refers to Goethe, not for the
image, but for rroral support.
Wittgenstein, according to Ray Monk,
(MDnk, 1990) relates the image to Goethe's
notion of an Urphananen. There are all
sorts of irony here. A notion taking its
inspiration fran the sama source as the
Ursatz is used to datonstrate the
backwardness of the concept. Narimour, who is
dismissive of Gestaltism, appears not to be
aware that this is a Gestaltist device.
Gccnbrich attributes the trick to Wittgenstein
- surprisingly since he knew Kohier. The
interconnections - theoretical and personal
- make the whole area an intellectual
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mine-field. Gombrich, Wittgenstein, Popper,
were all part of the Viennese intellectual
elite, to which Schenker had belonged, and
which was fragmented by the events
culminating in the Anschluss. The ideological
demarcation lines are not nearly so clearly
drawn as the epigones sctretimes assume.
26.	 Narirriur, 1977, P. 40.
27.	 Ibid., p. 29, n. 27.
28.	 See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975. The 'Introduction'
above all is essential reading for an
understanding of nineteenth-century
developitents in the study of the arts, for
which it provided a powerfully enabling
rationale. Hegel represents a pivotal point
between the aesthetics of the classical
period in Germany and the very differently
oriented academic study of the arts of
the nineteenth-century. It is in the
'Introduction' that Hegel pronounces art 'a
thing of the past' and proclaims the future
of art to be the science of art. The section
on music shows him to share the tonal
presumptions lying behind all subsequent
theories. Music is conceived of as a tenpDral
extension of the content of chords.
'Identity' is possible only as 'a
dispersal. . . in time.. . a succession' and the
'return to the triad' is the 'return of
identity into itself'.
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29. Kerrnan, 1985.
30. Ibid., p. 73. See also pp. 74-lao.
31. Ibid..
32. See Federhofer, 1990, pp. 280-1.
33. Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1972.
34. Ibid., see 'Vorbemerkung zur Einführung', p.
10. 'Eine noch viel scharfere ZuLickweisung
gebUhrt Herrn Professor Riemann. Unter
srrnrtlichen Herausgebern ist er der einzige,
der die traurige Uberhebung hatte (und noch
hat) auch die Notenbilder des Meisters in
tiefgreifender Weise zu verndern, nur urn sie
den eigenen Theorien anzupassen.'
(Professor Riemann deserves even sharper
reproof. Of all the editors he is the only
one who had (indeed still has) the soeful
presumptuosuness to make far-reaching changes
even to the Master's notation, solely in
order to make it correspond to his own
theories.)
35. Ibid., see p. 6. ' ...so wiirde denn also vor
unseren ugen der Fingersatz eines Pianisten,
dessen innere Beziehung zu Brahms gar nicht
einmal erwiesen sind auch schon in die platte
eingefugt.' This is riot a gratuitous attack
on Reisenauer, but a protest at Simrock's
announced intention to introduce onto the
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original plates of Brahms's Op. 24 the
fingering of Reisenauer, so creating
confusion nest of all arrong those whose need
for clarity is greatest. Schenker's objection
is two-fold, first to the corruption of the
original plates by any inauthentic fingering,
and secondly to the choice of Reisenauer
whose fingering style is manifestly not
Brahms' s. The first could be considered the
'musicological' objection. The other is less
simple. It is musicological to the extent
that the simplest level of evidence for the
judgennt is the dissimilarity of Riesener' s
fingering to Brahms's own. But far beyond
this is Schenker's feeling that the way the
music is, so to speak, held in the hand, is
enblematic of the degree of imaginative
sympathy between the performer and the
canposer, sarething which cannot be reduced
to 'scholarship'. The role of scholarship is
to clear obstacles out - of the performer' s
way. It cannot do irore. Moreover, even the
scholarly endeavour can be successful only to
the extent that it is founded on this
imaginative sympathy. Hence the objection to
Rienann.
36. Translated literally Musikwissenschaft is
'the science of Music' or 'music-science'.
The German ord is kept here to distinguish
what Kerrnan calls 'the original German
nvanent' fran the corresponding discipline
in English and American universities. Both
are distinguished fran 'musical scholarship'
- 171 -
since the latter embraces the former but is
not encccnpassed by it. Musical 'scholarship'
is very much older than
Musikwissenschaft/musicology; it does not
imply any ideological commitment, connection
with or dependence on institutions of
learning.
37. 'Positivism' here refers not simply to a
metaphysical outlook, but to an ideological
rrovement. The roots of this rrovement
undoubtedly lie in seventeenth century
English and Scottish empiricism but it took
on a different character at the end of the
eighteenth century especially in France and
therefore inevitably exerted pressure on
German thought, meshing with secularising
tendencies already at work. In the nineteenth
century, science began not only to challenge
religion but to compete with it. It is ironic
that the nost passionate resistance to what
was perceived here as the religion of Marinon
was manifested first, not as Nietzsche
believed in 1871 (the date of publication of
The Birth of Tragedy), but much earlier in
England, when it caine hare to roost in the
form of the Industrial Revolution, whose
evils were associated by the (Gerrnanophile)
English romantics rather too exclusively with
French rationalism. n airrost inquisitorial
fervour characterised positivism's rrost
extreme and highly abstract form, which was,
of course, Viennese. It cooled a little in
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crossing the Atlantic, but rained fiercely
dogmatic and intolerant of other ways of
thinking, which tended until quite recently
to be defined in pathological terms.
38. Julius August Spitta, (1841-1894). A
philologist who, in 1875 became Professor of
Music in Leipzig, then Director of the
Musikhochschule in Berlin, he was an editor
(notably of Buxtehude and Schutz) and a
biographer of Bach.
Friedrich Chrysander (1826-1901) was the
biographer of Handel. Before collaborating
with Adler and Spitta he contributed to the
Jahrbuch fir musikalische Wissenschaft,
(1863-7).
Guido Adler (1855-1941) attended the Vienna
Conservatory, left to matriculate, took a
doctorate in law and then reverted to music,
attending Hans lick's lectures. He
'habilitated' in 1882 and became Privatdozent
in Musikwissenschaft, a novel subject of
which he gave a detai1	 initio ir L82
in the paper he established to further its
aims. In 1885 he became Professor in Prague
and in 1895 succeeded Hanslick in Vienna. As
well as being a copious writer he was a great
organiser. Relations between him and Schenker
became increasingly strained, having begun
cordially. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 49, ff..
39. Schenker was briefly in correspndence with
- 17
Mach. See Federhofer, 1985, p.14.
40. The morphological tendency is undoubtedly
most directly related to Hanslick' s
association with Robert Zininerman to whctn Van
Musika1isch-Schnen is dedicated. Zirrrnerrnann,
Hanslick's colleague as Professor of
Philosophy at Vienna University, wrote a book
entitled Die aligemeine Aesthetic als
Forrnwissenschaft, in which, according to
Hanslick he • applied the morphological
principle	 with	 strict	 logical
consistency. . . to music'.
The widespread belief that Goe's
scientific writings sank into oblivion at his
death where they ould have remained had not
Schenker researchers stumbled upon them, can
only be a symptan of the cultural hiatus
referred to elsewhere in this study. (English
suspicion of a detractor of Newton,
especially one who wrote in German, is hardly
surprising.) How far this is fran the truth
can be seen, for example, in Amrine, 1987.
The ceaseless flow of literature and its
sheer volune alone belie this view. Anyone
who reads the aesthetic, scientific and
philosophical literature of the nineteenth
century encounters Goethe' s scientific ideas
at every turn. But it was not only outside
mainstream science that he was influential.
ndel, Darwin, Helmholtz, Mach all studied
Goethe.
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41. For a recent discussion of Mach's
philosophical outlook see Hamilton, 1990, p.
117.
42. This lecture was published later as Der Geist
der musikalischen Technik. See Federhofer,
1990, p.139. n English version by William
Pastille is to be found in Theoria, Volume 3,
1988, p. 86, entitled, 'The Spirit of Musical
Technique'.
43. For an English version see 'A Contribution to
the Study of Ornamentation' translated by
Ned! Siegel in The Music Forum, Volume 4,
1976.
44. See Federhofer, 1990, p. 2.
45. Richard Heuberger, cariposer of Der Opernball,
succeeded Hanslick at the Neue Freie Presse.
46. Max Kalbeck (1850-1921), studied law, then
philosophy before music. Journalist,
biographer of Brahms and editor of his
correspondence, at one time a Wagnerian, he
was taken under the wing of Hanslick, had tvo
of his poens set by Brahms and wrote in 1896
a book with the - for Schenkerians -
fascinating title Hutroresquen und Phantasien.
Schenker determinedly cultivated him,
eventually to sane effect. See Federhofer,
1985, p. 8 and p. 15, ff..
Mndieczewski (1857-1929). rchivist fran
- .1_I
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1897, editor of Schubert, Haydn and Brahms.
Nottebohm (1817-1882) is noted mainly for his
recognition of the significance of
Beethoven's sketches but also canpiled
thematic catalogues. The philological
influence is unmistakable.
Forkel (1774-1818) studied with Humboldt,
Schiegel and Tieck. He was, according to
Meyers Taschenlexicon Musik, 'the first
representative of the Musikwissenschaft which
developed out of the protestant musical
writings of the eighteenth century'.
Johann Joachim Bellerman (1754-1842) was an
early ethnanusiclogist, writing about Russian
music. His son Johann Friedrich (1795-1874),
writing on Greek music, illustrates the way
musical scholarship of his period can be
thought of as part of philology, i.e., a
contribution to the recovery of antiquity.
His son, Gottfried Heinrich (1832-1903),
reverts, as philology was doing in his time,
to the oldest of philological preoccupations,
the notation of old - in this case medieval -
text.s. His interest in Palestrina and the
revival of Fuxian species counterpoint is
clearly related to this but also shows the
persistence of the idea - paraitount in Fux as
it had been in Winckelmann - that the purpose
of the recovery of the art of the past was to
revivify that of the present. It is this
characteristic which gives his counterpoint
- 176 -
book the old-fashioned air fran which the
nre positively historicist Jeppeson's
up-dated version of the species is free.
It is the occasion also of much argurrent
with Scheriker - speaking figuratively, of
course. There is no apparent evidence that
the two ever met.
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chapter 4
A Science of Art
• . - history .. . degenerates fran the moment it is
no longer animated and inspired by the fresh life
of the present. Its piety withers away, the habit
of scholarliness continues without it and rotates
in egoistic self-satisfaction around its own axis.
Then there appears the repulsive spectacle of a
blind rage for collecting, a restless raking
together of everything that has ever existed. Man
is encased in the stench of rmast and mould. . .he
succeeds in reducing even a more creative
disposition, a nobler desire, to an insatiable
thirst for novelty, or rather for antiquity and
for all and everything; often he sinks so low that
in the end he is content to gobble down any food
whatever, even the dust of bibliographical
minutiae.'
Nietzsche.'
Philology has always been more than is obviously
implied by 'classical scholarship'. When 'the new movement'
began in Italy in the fourteenth century it followed 'seven
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centuries or more' when there had been hardly anything
worthy of the name of scholarship at all. Classic texts were
known and treasured as objects during those centuries, but
with little interest in their contents and less insight.
'What the middle ages bestowed upon classic texts' writes a
British scholar of Schenker's time, 'was not appreciative
,2
study but mechanical labour . The revival was therefore far
itore than the recovery of an historical object. It was the
revival of the life of the mind after a long torpor in which
it had been 'fettered by rigid dogma'.
The revival and continuation of classical learning, as
philologists themselves understood it, was always associated
with light, enlightenment, freedan fran dogma, fran
intellectual and political despotism, in short, with
humanism, and therefore by authorities, especially
ecclesiastical ones, with subversion. Yet somehow, by
Nietzsche' s time, it had managed to becane an intellectual
despotism in itself, with its own dogma which blighted
instead of illuminating intellectual life. This in spite of
its key contribution to the achievrents of the eighteenth
century, a great flowering of free thought which had seemed
capable of dissolving the deepest divisions, inspiring
toleration in the most unlikely quarters, embracing Hebrew
scholars and setting in notion a parallel enlightenment
among the Jews. 3 This blight was a deadening, mechanical
historicism, without any motivation beyond itself, a means
which had becane an end. So, at least, Nietzsche, a
philologist of distinction himself, had come to believe.
For traditional philologists of Hardie ' s generation,
going their way unruffled by Nietzsche' s fulminations, the
source of illumination had always been Greece. Rome, he
tells us, had never ceased to exist in the memory
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Italians. For Dante, Virgil was still 'the poet of poets',
but it is with Petrarch 'who knew sortie Greek in his old age'
that Hardie saw the breaking of the new dawn. If the impulse
was Greek, however, the focus was Rome and the next two and
a half centuries saw the loving study and imitation of much
freshly unearthed Latin literature. 'A renewal of
ecclesiastical restrictions' arrested classical studies in
Italy but they flourished until the end of the sixteenth
century in Protestant France where they became less 'the
object of taste' and more 'the object of science'. Interest
in the contents rather than the style of the classics turned
enthusiasm into 'learning'. When the French endeavour was
once again interrupted by ecclesiastical pressure, forcing
scholars like Scaliger arid Casaubon to flee to Holland and
England, a 'critical and grairrnatical' period began, lasting
until the end of the eighteenth century. Textual exegesis
became the core of philological activity. It was 'more
scientific', it strove for 'clear and exact canons of
idicm. . . laws of metre', and it 'discriminated the spurious
and authentic'. Manuscripts were now compared and
interrogated in the light of knowledge - especially of metre
- and a rational approach to their contents.
In 'the fourth and last period' Germany was supreme and
the supreme representative of the German phase was, by
consent, Friedrich August Wolf. 4 What distinguishes
this last phase is that, for the first time, philology saw
itself not as the type of the intellectual life, as
'scholarship' tout court, but as one kind of scholarship.
Others, all, in their modern manifestation - philosophy,
the physical sciences, medicine, history, art-history,
literary criticism - ultimately its offspring, had developed
an independent existence and were now jockeying for position
not only with one another but with their illustrious parent.
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Philology - through Wolf - saw the necessity, as philosophy
had already done through Kant, of taking 'cognisance of the
alarmingly successful procedures of their main rival,
physical science. German philology now became scientific in
this new sense not just in style, but systematically. The
Wissenschaft in Altertumswissenschaft was not mere
knowledge', not simply 'learning' . it was knowledge of the
kind characterised by the certainty which was the
consequence of the manner in which it had been acquired. The
method, not the content, defined the discipline. The crucial
effect of the metamorphosis of scholarship into science was
the accarinodation of the content to the method. What could
not be known 'with certainty' began to be rnarginalised.
German philology was to be the pattern for the new
humanistic disciplines. As the first exnent of the
systematic application in an institutional setting to a
field outside the natural sciences of principles of enquiry
derived fran that source, philology became the carrier of
these principles into all the new disciplines then beginning
to define themselves. The importance of the new philology
in determining the future style of scholarship generally was
hardly exceeded by science itself, especially as the
scientific models so highly regarded by German thinkers, as
Kant describes them, were not directly applicable to other
fields. In no field was the philological example more
closely followed than in the new science of music which
began to take shape in the 1830s and which, fifty years
later, was given its determinate definition clearly modelled
on Wolf's synopsis of the science of antiquity.
Wolf was a Homer scholar, and it is his orientation
which partly accounts for Hadie' s sense that the soul of
philology was Greek. But there was another, older, far more
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glamorous influence working towards the Greek emphasis in
German scholarship. Hardie's silence about this is eloquent
of the insularity which led to the conditions so bitterly
criticised by Nietzsche, and to philology's eventual
displacement fran the centre of intellectual life. This
influence originated with Johann Joachim Winckelmann.6
Winckelmann stirred enthusiasm for the art of antiquity
to new levels, within and outside the scholarly fraternity,
in the shape of the notion of a German renaissance, deriving
its inspiration fran the civilisation of the Greeks, and his
work was followed by a sudden and spectacular flowering of
German art. The success of the German brand of academic
classicism in the nineteenth century owed an incalculable
debt to the success of German classical art, not least
music. German scholarship, German culture in general, had
always before lagged behind French science and French
culture and this situation could hardly have been
transformed by the efforts of German scholars alone.
Winckelmann disrupts Hardie' s narrative, which presents
a steady evolution fran the aesthetic to the scientific, as
he disrupted philology itself by reverting to the Petrarchan
mode. If he was himself no Petrarch, he was the spiritual
father of a generation of Petrarchs, striving for Heflenic
grace as Petrarch had striven for Ranan elegance, not by
direct imitation of Greek models, but inspired by what they
understood - fran Winckelmann above all others - as the
Greek spirit. This new renaissance manifested itself less
splendidly in the plastic arts, which were the main focus of
Winckelmann's studies, than in philosophy, poetry, drama,
science and - this perhaps as important as it was the least
to be expected, since antiquity provided no accessible
precedent for it - music.
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In bringing German culture to centre stage and keeping
it there through the nineteenth and into the twentieth
centuries, even the mighty Goethe, Schiller and Kant were
hardly rrore responsible than Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven.
The pre-eminence of German scholarship fran the end of the
eighteenth century was a cultural, rather than simply an
academic phenanenon.
Winckelmann is nost remembered for his characterisation
of the beauty of antique art as 'noble simplicity and quiet
grandeur', and in the weaker significance given to it by
Lessing. 7 It was not only this notion which made Winckelmann
revolutionary. Far nore boldly opposed to the dryness of the
philology of his day was his emphasis on the freedctn of the
artist, the liveliness, the joy, the energy of Greek art
which he relates to the conditions of Greek life. He may
have been inconsistent in this as in many other respects,
for example, in referring to Sparta in his explanation of
Greek vitality when his theme is ostensibly freedau. But the
contrast he makes between the hygienic regulations of the
Spartans and the 'stiffening habit' and 'squeezing stays',
which reflected the 'narrow-spirited formality' of the
militaristic Prussian srld in which he grew up, has its
aldi 8
 'art claims liberty,' he proclaimed; t th
springs frau the feelings of the heart'. Ps Lorenz Either
remarks, these sayings are 'as revolutionary in [their]
implications as Rousseau's fantasy of a primitive state of
natural virtue t and the two 'fantasies' have not a little in
caurcn. 9 These words caiie fran Winckelmann' s early pamphlet:
Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek rks of Painting and
Sculpture which has rather little to do with the realities
of Greek art and much rrore to do with idealist
'fantasies' His nore strictly historical contribution,
helping to revolutionise eighteenth-century philology,
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contributed greatly to its consolidation as the leading
academic discipline in the nineteenth.
It is obviously wrong to give Winckelmann exclusive
credit for these changes in the orientation of classical
studies. It can hardly be the case that it was Germany,
through Winckelmann, which 'initiated a quite new passion
for the Greek world', since a preference for Greek
architecture, and the perception of Ranan architecture as
imitative of the Greek and debasing rather than perfecting
it, was expressed by Cordy a decade before Winckelmarin
U
was born. This view was taken up by Fench and English
contemporaries of Winckelmann. 12 Nor can it be Winckelmann
alone who was responsible for the shift of emphasis frau the
text to the artefact, since such a shift must be implied by
the great excavations which began seventeen years before the
canposition of Thoughts. 13 Winckelmann's significance must
rather be that he brought together the Hellenism and the
enthusiasm for the artefact, capitalising, so to speak, on
the excavations, to prise German philology away fran the
exclusiveness of its preoccupation with texts, and, at the
same time, directing its gaze towards Greece.
Winckelmann' s Hellenic emphasis accounts for the
importance attached to Wolf' s HciTeric studies, and probably
for Wolf's orientation itself; his systematising activity,
culminating in his History of Ancient Art, creates the
conditions in which Wolf' s systematisation of philology
itself could sean a desirable project. 14 Either writes that
this history 'eclipsed all the antiquarian researches that
had preceded it'. Winckelmann' s superiority rested in two
main achievements. 'He was the first to put into systematic
order the bewildering accumulation of sculptures, frescoes,
decorative fragments, gems and coins, by bringing to bear on
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it not only his knowledge of literature, but also his powers
of disciplined observation and critical áanparison ' - the
characteristics of philology of Hardie' s 'third period'.
'More important still, he was able to gather the separate
monuments and individual artists into one developaental
sequence, the guiding principle of which was the progressive
unfolding of a style. This he saw as an irreversible and
regular process, the typical main stages of which were most
evident in the history of Greek art.
The significance of this as a model not only for Wolf,
but for philosophy in its historical and aesthetic modes -
Hegel springs to mind as the most obvious example - can
hardly be exaggerated, and it is easy to see why WinckeLrann
was, at the same time, the architect of the artistic culture
which, Nietzsche believed, truly contained the possibility
of a new Hellas, and an unwitting force behind the fatal
separation between philology and living art, which Nietzsche
found so calamitous for both novanents.
The nenoly of the revivifying effect on German ait of
the new Hellenic rrovanent, its values largely oriented
by Winckelmann, pervades German cultural writings throughout
the nineteenth century. However, criticism of the
scientistic-historicist outlook began to appear quite soon,
often revolving around the philosophy of Kant, whose
influence was as contradictory as it was powerful. The
cctnbination of the scientising tendency, which took its cue
fran Kant, and the historicist impetus of the resurgence of
interest in Greece, fed by the arguments about the relative
merits of Greek and Rcinan civilisation which were an
inevitable consequence of the aesthetic claims made by
Winckelmann and others on behalf of Greek art, came together
in a particularly potent, and peculiarly German, mixture.
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With rare exceptions, every aspect of post-Kantian
artistic and intellectual activity, from romantic excess to
the 'objectivity' of the new scholarship, claimed Kant as
its authority. It was this tendency to penetrate everything
and to introduce self-consciousness and, at least in the
hands of his admirers, to run to extremes, which Goethe
found alarming in Kant and which provoked his resistance.'6
The English romantics, bitter critics of the effects of
scientific secularism, and of its offspring, the Industrial
Revolution, saw the source of the intellectual disease
in the work of the French Encyclopaedists. German
neo-classicism was for them the antithesis of this soul-less
rationalism. This sense of antithesis also appears in German
writing in the nineteenth century and continues to surface
itmch later in writings such as Schenker' s after
Versailles
This kind of interpretation is present in the early
work of Nietzsche, who still believed the artistic energy of
Germany capable of overcoming the debilitating influence of
an institutionalised, industrialised scholarship, a faith he
later lost. But this antithesis is nre than an
over-simplification. There may have been specifically French
impulses behind German classicism, but a desire to assert
independence from French culture was far nre conspicuously
present. The notion of a canprehensive science of antiquity
is certainly encyclopaedic, and the style of the new
disciplines is rrore rationalist ti-ian experimental, for
obvious reasons. It might be possible to argue a case for
Altertumswissenschaft as a lapse into Francophile
rationalism after the surge of German creativity had spent
itself. But that could not be the whole story. Schenker's
perception of these matters is excessively influenced by his
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preoccupation with Rarneau, who is burdened, in his account,
not only with his own sins but with thdse of his German
imitators. dust as the French element in nineteenth-century
fundamental bass theory is overlaid by a mass of Germanic
and Austrian accretions which have nothing to do with him,
so the rationalist element in the various branches of
German scholarship are overlaid by a characteristically
German style of systeniatising. Musikwissenschaft, whose
scope is determined by German or Pustrian conditions
and attitudes, is a prime example. The cariplex
inter-relationship between French and German scholastic
thought in the early years of the nineteenth century is
particularly evident in zmsic theory, where, just at the
point where the old German and Austrian practices were
finally responding, in their peculiarly irrational way, to
French rationalist theory, Viennese theory was exported to
France by the Italian Cherubini.18
It was under the impression of the controversy
surrounding the publication of his first book that Nietzsche
launched his direct attacks on German classical scholarship
and its influence, not least on education, in, anong other
writings, the Untimely Meditations, attacks which were an
inspiration, if not the inspiration for Schenker' s
anti-scientific, anti-institutional polenic) 9 Nietzsche' s
deeply negative assessment of the scholarship of his time
provides powerful support for Schenker t s attacks on
musicology; if Nietzsche' s criticisms are considered worthy
of being taken seriously, Schenker's cannot be dismissed out
of hand.
Nietzsche sees in the scholar - not only the classical
scholar - of his time the following characteristics:
'Firstly, probity.. . (a] very worthy thing provided
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[it] is sanething more than. . .lack of practice in
dissimulation, for which, after all a certain amount of wit
is needed. . . . Secondly, sharpsightedeness for things close
up, combined with great myopia for distant things
and for what is universal.... Thirdly...sobriety and
conventionality.... Fourthly poverty of feeling and aridity.
It makes him capable even of vivisection.... Fifthly, low
self-esteem.... Though confined to a wretched little corner,
[scholars J feel no sense of being sacrificed or wasted....
Sixth, loyalty towards their teachers and leaders. . . for it
is only through them that they have gained entry to the
rthy halls of science, which they would never have been
able to do on their own.... Seventh.. .a conception of truth
determined by unthinking subjection to an acquired habit. ,20
Nietzsche's description indicates the intensity of the
distrust the nineteenth century scholar was able to arouse,
and focuses on kinds of behaviour which might have been
harmless enough in individuals like the pre-Enlightenment
lovers of antiquity who pursued their interests much as
others pursue fishing or any other private amusement, but
becci'ne altogether nore problematic when their activities are
institutionalised, taken up by the state, and begin to
acquire a near-nonopoly of intellectual life. t'bst, though
not all, of the characteristics on Nietzsche's list are
characteristics of institutionalised scholarship rather than
of the scholar per se: the dcininance of conventional ideas
of truth; the slavish pursuit of information for its own
sake; the absence of any criteria by which to judge what is
worth pursuing and what is not; the 'unthinking subjection
to acquired habit'; the seeking and conferring of approval
related to the seeking and conferring of appointments. None
of these is a necessary feature of scholarship but any or
all of them can become characteristic of institutions and
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networks of institutions such as those which constituted the
educational systems of nineteenth-century Europe.
Worst of all, perhaps, is the fragmentation of study
which reduces the individual scholar to the status of a cog
in the machine, not only unable to see the broader objective
to which his mite is a contribution, still less to evaluate
it, but increasingly unconscious of any need for a broader
perspective. When all scholarship is conducted on this
myopic level no-one is in a position to evaluate it.
Nietzsche imagines the scbpla as a nole: 'secure against
any artificial or extravagant hypotheses; if he sticks at it
he will dig out all the canrronplace motives that inform the
past', but he is not good at differentiating between these
commonplace things and what is 'rare, great arid uncarl]:on',
indeed makes a point of not discriminating in this way. The
scholar who no longer feels a 'sense of being sacrificed' by
being 'confined to a wretched little corner' bears very
little resemblance to the species of scholar to which
Winckelmann or Lessing or Herder or Goethe belonged. He is
more like the factory worker, except that the factory worker
is at least allowed his resentment. Scholarship had its
division of labour, its Taylorism before Taylor, and this
phenomenon, with the endless possibilities for abuse
inherent in its incitement to the repudiation of individual
responsibility, Nietzsche saw, prophetically, for what it
was. It was another century before the reduction of the role
of the scholar to that of mere research worker, obediently
pursuing goals determined by his camiercial or political
masters began to cause serious and widespread concern.
It was the combination of the historicist ambitions of
the philologists with the notion, inspired by Kant, of
applying the modern - that is to say post-Newtonian
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concept of the scientific to the techniques for the
recovery of the past which lay behind Wolf's systematis
-ation of philology and its transformation into
Altertumswissenschaft, which presupposed an institutional
application and a division of labour vividly reminiscent of
the factory system springing up at the same time.
Institutionalised scholarship was, in effect, a kind of
industrialisation of the intellect.
Wolf's project was to work out 'a systematic
description of the vast fabric that he called by the name of
Altertumswissenschaft', and 'to arrange and review its
component parts and to point to a perfect knowledge of the
many-sided life of the ancient Greeks and Ranans as the
final goal of the rrodern study of the ancient world'. So his
plan is described by the historian of classical scholarship,
J. E. Sandys. 21 Wolf was following WinckelmaniYs lead. But
there are very important differences between what he
projected and what Winckelmann had done. To begin with,
there is a basic difference between a projection and an
achievement. If Winckelmann' s first pamphlet about Greek art
contained an eleitent of fantasy, it could hardly compare
with the fantasy of creating sane vast intellectual
construction mirroring the Greek world in its entirety.
Winckelmarin' s history of Greek art may have have been based
on less than canpiete knowledge and a less than
canprehensive range of instances, but it was, nevertheless,
the product of observation and therefore quite different in
kind from any scheme outlining knowledge desired but not yet
possessed.
Writing about the same time as Hardie, Sandys says that
Wolf raised 'the study of the ancient world to the rank of a
single comprehensive and independent science'. It is this
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independence, the 'new autonomy' of the new 'science', which
was, according to M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, 'its rrvst
decisive innovation of all', since it led to '...an ever
widening gulf between classics as a study and the creative
,22
art and life of the time . But to speak of autonomy
implies a previous state of dependence and it is hard to see
how philology, the nother and father of rrcdern secular
scholarship, can have been thought of as dependent on
anybhing but the ancient cultures which were its object,
least of all contrary art. To say that it gained from
its connection with the art of its own times a vitality and
a relevance it suld otherwisehave lacked is not the same
as saying that it was dependent. Sandys's phrase,
'independent science', to which 'rank' philology had been
'raised', suggests rather that philology had fallen into a
sense of its own inferiority vis vis physical science.
Certainly, by the Weimar period, it had been upstaged by the
doyens of that court and their philosopher-hero, the 'sage
of Königsberg'. By making itself 'single and comprehensive'
it was undoubtedly hoping to recapture renegade activities
like archaeology, and art history. Winckelmann had already
made the latter rrore glamorous than palaeography, the
central philoogical discipline. This was the one to which
philologists perhaps felt themselves in danger of being
confined. It is in these notions of philological
independence as new, and of its having to drag itself up to
the level of science, that we can see the source of the
pusillanimity necked by Nietzsche. Scholarly amour propre
and an urge to 'realise' had replaced the passion for
Greece and the desire to anulate.23
Wolf's work makes him, according to Sandys, the
'hero of all the long line of later scholars'.
Not only classical scholars. Guido Idler' s similarly
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systematic description of a science of music was clearly
inspired by Altertumswissenschaft, whose name it
imitated. 24
 If we substitute the word Musikwissenschaft for
Altertumswissenschaft, we can see that his project to give
'a systematic description of the vast fabric that he called
by the name of Musikwissenschaft,' and 'to arrange and
review its canponent parts and to point to a perfect
knowledge [of it] • meant exactly the same thing in relation
to music, as Wulf' s scheme meant to antiquity, except that
the object of musicology was not the music of antiquity but
the music of the past as a whole. This means that the gulf
which opened up no less dramatically here was not between
'the art and life of the [present] time' and the art of a
far distant past, but between contemporary music and the
music of fifty years before, i.e., before the death of
Beethoven. Musicology's problem with phenaiena such as
Wagner or Brahms was solved not by recognising that it had
nothing to say about the art of the present, since it could
only function in an historical node, but to historicise
them. As it could hardly do this by seizing them and
carrying them across the ravine separating the historically
real fran the contemporary unreal, in order to subject them
to musicological treatment, it was forced to nove the
ravine, by bringing 'the past' closer and closer to the
present, so close that it threatened to swallow it up
altogether. Canposers were historicised, their work
periodised within their life-times. It thus became every
composer' s ambition to canpose not the music of the future
but a music which could be absorbed into the past, to beccme
as quickly as possible an historical figure. No art -
musical, literary or graphic - is so aesthetically aberrant
or trivial that it cannot be be reified historically.
Achieving the status of an historical phenomenon becomes an
end in itself, quite different f ran the aesthetic ends of
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art free of historical self-consciousness. In this way the
26Hegelian prophecy of the death of art fulfils itself.
The application of science to areas of human activity
not obviously amenable to it was nothing new. Because of its
acoustic dimension, music has always been vulnerable to the
encroachment of science. The attempt to extend the scope of
physical-mathematical explanation into the realm of art.
had been pursued by a long line of theorists whose srk
culminated in the collaboration of Raireau and d'
In the nineteenth century, this endeavour achieved a level
of academic recognition beyond the wildest dreams of its
originators, then quickly descending into scmething rrore
like military training than scholarship and becaning
ossified. Its influence was soon confined to its ability to
operate as a stumbling block in the way of art, which became
so agonisingly self-conscious that it dare not innovate
without at the same time being able to produce sar nore or
less plausible rationalisation of its activity in terms of
academic theory. There was no future for nodern scholarship
in this nodel.
Philosophy too had come under the very specific
influence of experimental science in the xrk of Kant. K-Lift
announced his project to be to give to philosophy the
certainty enjoyed by the natural sciences in their nodern
guise. Kant' s influence on the scieritising of the humanities
was a profound irony, however, for his work was as much the
product of a triumphant individualism as - say - Faust and
was about equally capable of systematic extension and
routine imitation. Wnat happened in philosophy after Kant
was not unlike what happens in art. In just the way that
zart engages in a dialogue with Haydn through the medium
of the string quartet, or Beethoven with Mozart through that
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of the piano concerto, Schopenhauer engages in a dialogue
with Kant, Nietzsche with Schopenhauer. Philosophy could
orly become scientific in the style set by
nineteenth-century philology, on the other hand, by
confining its activities within the bounds of a rigidly
defined empiricism. This wasting process led almost to its
disappearance, an outcome contemplated with undisguised
satisfaction by many people, among them not a few who called
themselves philosophers. This, too, was hardly a way forward
for disciplines with dreams of expansion and colonisation -
of ten of the areas left vacant by philosophy.
The prestige of philology, on the other hand, knew no
bounds. This might seem strange in a scientific age. Wnat
has modern science to do with, for example, the scene
depicted on a Grecian urn? The answer is two-fold. In the
first place, modern science determines the mode in which the
modern philologist contemplates such a scene, and in the
second, it provides him with the wherewithal to pursue this
mode of contlation in relation to this kind of object.
The mode of contemplation in question is the antithesis of
the artistic, the aesthetic, the mode of a Winckelmann or a
Lessing. The eighteenth-century mode is one in which the
object is contemplated without a consciously predetermined
purpose. It is ironic that the modern philologists, like all
scientistic thinkers, claim to have replaced the artistic
involvnt of people like Winckelmann with scientific
objectivity, ascribed to the influence of Kant. Yet Kant's
own perception of science was that it had been successful
precisely to the extent that it had been pursued with the
most exactly defined, indeed measured and therefore
perfectly replicable, set of conditions directed towards a
previously determined objective. If Winckelmann approached
antique art with his own particular predilections, cultural,
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aesthetic, idiosyncratic, his successors would approach it
with a far more precise set of questiohs to which they
rquired a very precise set of answers. Nor were these
questions necessarily anything whatsoever to do with the
conscious or unconscious motivation of the artist. They
were, thus, doing to the remnants of antiquity what,
according to Kant, Toricelli did when he 'caused the air to
sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be
equal to that of a definite coluiin of water' .28
Nothing could be clearer than Kant' s own explanation of
this new 'objectivity'. With these experiments, Kant
remarks,
'...a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They
learned that reason only perceives that which it
produces after its own design; that it must not be
content to follow, as it were, in the leading strings
of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles
of judgement according to unvarying laws, and caiipel
nature to reply to its questions.'
This inquisitorial approach, strenuously opposed by
Goethe, indeed caricatured by him as the science of the
torture chamber, was adopted by researchers into antiquity
who now looked at the art of antiquity not as the occult
bearer of universal truths accessible only to an imagination
attuned to their aesthetic, but simple, if cryptic,
containers of ordinary information accessible to anybody who
knew the - eminently teachable - devices for decoding then.
The teachability of these devices was a crucial factor in
the institutionalisation of philology which had formerly
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been a rather private pursuit. 29
 Now it was possible to
train an army of researchers, to divide up the work of
gathering, ordering and decoding the data, and to conceive
of the possibility of recovering antiquity in detail, and
theref ore of understanding it. The understanding thus
envisaged was not at all of the kind the dreamers of a
German Hellenic renaissance had had in mind, a recapturing
of the spirit of ancient art and its revivification through
a new German art, but an assertively camon-sense
understanding, banality elevated to the level of a
principle, fran whose standpoint the feeling and imagination
of the artist could be laughed out of court, the court of
scholarship, at least, where it could no longer be a judge,
hardly even a witness. Only the art of the past was
admissible and then only as a silent witness, an exhibit,
an evidential object.
The encounter between the Hellenism represented by
German classical art and the Hellenism of the new philology
was acted out on a personal level in the 1870s in the
dispute between Nietzsche and Wilhiarrowitz, with Rhode, so
to say, playing Laertes to Nietzsche's Hamlet.3°
Wilhiarrowitz 's position was that the use of imagination in
the attenpt to divine the nature of Greek tragedy was
nothing nore than 'bad scholarship' and he expended a good
deal of venan in identifying instances of this in the
flights of iiraginative divination in The Birth of Tragedy.3'
It would be beside the point to say that The Birth of
Tragedy is, quite simply, an inappropriate target for this
kind of critique. This is true to the extent that
Nietzsche's book is not intended to be a work of scholarship
in the sense in which WilliamOwitz understood the word. But
it is also true that it is far fran being simply a work of
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the imagination. It proposes, in fact, a kind of scholarship
which harnesses the imagination, not in o±der to fill holes
in the research, but in order to make connections, to
perceive significant relationships, to arrive at a level of
understanding that is rrore than a platitudinous assenblage
of facts gathered together around sane arbitrarily selected
point of reference, in short a kind of scholarship which is
the antithesis of the historicist, scientistic dessication
deplored by Nietzsche in his essays 'On the uses and
disadvantages of history for life' and 'Schopenbauer the
Educator'.
Williarrowitz's objection to the making of connections
between the present and the past, of interpreting the past
in the light of present experience, or vice-versa, goes to
the heart of the difference between the attitude of the
founders of German classicism and the rrodern philology. To
interpret the past in its own terms may be a laudably
objective aim, but baldly presented as a simple imperative
it is merely naive. Few things require nore imaginative
exertion than the attatipt to rid oneself of one' s own
assumptions and to accartxdate a quite different set of
assumptions. In the first place, one has to be able to
isolate one's own assumptions and view then objectively.
Wnat tends to happen instead, as we can now see quite
clearly in the nineteenth-century denythologisers - David
Strauss, for example - is that the prejudices of the scholar
are substituted for those he seeks to reduce to what he
calls rationality, namely, his own way of thinking. 32 The
whole attanpt to reduce Hellenic, Hebraic or thristian
irrationalities to nineteenth-century corriron sense now ses
rather like the obtuseness of the disciple who' asked Jesus
for a route-map to heaven.
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Of all nineteenth-century writers Nietzsche is surely
the one most able to distance himself fran the prejudices
built in to his education, the distinction of his
scholarship being only one of the prerequisites for such an
extraordinary achievement, which the Williamowitzes thought
was all a matter of drawing the obvious conclusions fran
facts assembled through conscientious toil. For Nietzsche,
as for Winckelmann, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and indeed Kant,
honest toil carried out with the uthiost meticulousness and
conscientiousness guarantees nothing. 'Reason,' said Kant,
'must approach nature with a view, indeed, of receiving
information fran it, not, however, in the character of a
pupil, who listens to all his master chooses to tell him,
but in that of a judge...'. It is only 'the principles of
reason' which 'can give to concordant phenanena the validity
of laws'. This saying can be turned against the naive
rationalisers, since it contains also the implication that
the scholar must recognise his conclusions as judgements and
take responsibility for them.
But in fact interpretation became less and less the
goal, the mere assembling of information becaning more and
more a sufficient objective. Styles of scholarship aJ.most as
old as antiquity itself were revived as modern and
scientific because they were supposedly more objective than
the aesthetically motivated activity of Winckelmann and the
Weimar classicists. Thus the accumulation of objects -
texts, artefacts, their classification, dating, and
interrogation for the information they carried about the
life of the place and time in which they originated -
supplanted the attempt to recover the spirit of Greek art,
to locate and tap the source of its creative energy. The art
of antiquity, in this new climate, ceased to be thought of
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as part of a continuity, the creative effort of the human
race as a whole, and became instead an historical entity,
partly a source of historical evidence, partly scmething
itself to be treated historically, in the manner set out by
Hege]. in his Aesthetics. 33
 Aesthetics itself had to be
re-defined, given a new role.
Hegel's view of aesthetics before his own time is
indicative of the distance between his generation and
Winckelmann' s. He sees the aesthetic tradition as
prescriptive. This is how he interprets the attpt of the
philosopher to explain the effect of art, to define it, even
simply to praise it. Because Winckelmann and his followers
inspired a new burgeoning of art, it sened to Hegel that
the role of such writers was to tell the artist how to make
art. This role no longer had any purpose. There was a value
in studying art but not in order, as he puts it, to 'make
art again', but in order to know what art is and to extract
fran it information about the people of the past which,
because of their intellectual under-development, they could
only express through art and religion and which therefore
cannot be known about except through these media. The
judgement of art, which, strictly speaking, had not been
what the older aesthetics had been about, according to the
new philology, must be in the terms of the culture of which
it is part. The philosophical difficulties in the way of the
fulfilment of this notion only became apparent with
hindsight and undoubtedly are part of the explanation
for the distance philology increasingly put between
itself and aesthetics, aesthetics meanwhile also being
gradually historicised. Hegel's misrepresentation of
eighteenth-century aesthetics sens to have nore to do with
the judgenental 'criticism' characteristic of his own time,
which, ironically, increasingly took on just the
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prescriptive character he believed 'scientific' aesthetics
had outgrown, tost shamelessly of all in music.
The implications of this changed outlook both for
contemporary culture and for the study of the arts were
far-reaching. In the long term, relativism in alt history
and criticism had the effect of making available new sources
of inspiration to art, sources which uld eventually play a
role in loosening the strait-jacket into which historicism
itself was busy confining it. Johann Joachim Eel lermann
grandfather of the rrore fanus Heinrich, is an early
fore-runner of etbnomusicology. 34
 Ethnanusicology could be
seen either as the product of the rrdern treatment of art as
an historical object, or as a remnant or revival in a
musical context of the literary-aesthetics of Herder, in
which the notion of folk-art as the source at which the
contempora.ry artist could seek refreshment, as the artists
of antiquity had done, was of such imxrtance. The idea of a
folk-art lies, after all, as potently behind the notion of a
specifically German culture - conceived in opposition to
French sophistication, and continuing to be thought of in
that way up to The Birth of Thagedy - as it does behind the
other nationalisms which defined themselves through it in
opposition to German claims to universality, especially in
music. Bellermann' s interest was in Russian music, which
makes him perhaps the first shy harbinger of a new artistic
spring, working under the very nose of the grandiloquent
prophet of the doan of art.
But the ininediate effect was rather the isolation of
the contemporary artist fran the art of the past. The new
academic scholarship, instead of bringing the ancient and
contemporary artist into closer relationship as that of
Winckelmann and his successors had sought to do, interposes
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between them its notion of culture as an historically
specific phenomenon which renders the artist's sense of
affinity unreal. Ancient art's potential for the cultural
regeneration of the rrdern world evaporated as suddenly as
it appeared as the scientific enterprise overtook the wider
cultural one.
The separation applied not only to ancient art.
Historicism and scientism became characteristic of the study
of all art, that of the recent past, indeed even the
present, as much as that of the retote past. The sense of a
gulf was felt by artists thiselves as well as carrientators
on their work. What Hegel described as the fatally
disruptive interference of thought in the creative process
was a re-working of Schiller' s notion of the reflective
element in the 'sentimental' art of ndern times as opposed
to the 'naive' art of the an en The difference between
the original idea and Hegel' s use of it is that while
Schiller simply tries to identify what distinguishes itdern
fran ancient art, Hegel regards this change as fatal to art.
Art, in his view, represents one kind of process by which
the human mind expresses itself. This process consists of
the material nbodiment of concerns of the human spirit to
which the spirit cannot give direct intellectual expression.
It cannot simply explain itself, therefore it draws pictures
using the images of nature, or clothes itself in imitations
of action. As soon as the artist begins to mix explanation
with this imaginative concretisation of the nDvaients of the
spirit, art is corrupted.
Hegel contrasted the work of Schifler himself with that
of Goethe in terms of artistic self-consciousness or
reflection. Both careers constituted marriages of intellect
and imagination in the spirit of the German renaissance. But
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in Schiller's case the poise was less perfect. His art is
'infected', to use Hegel' s word, by reflection. Up to this
point in the argument, we are dealing with aesthetic
judgement, if of a highly intellectualised kind, a judgernent
in which Hegel is by no means alone. But he suddenly takes
of f in a flight of historicist speculation which has nothing
to do with aesthetics. By the 1830s, he avers, this
'infection' had become an epidemic. There simply no longer
existed, he believed, any place where the artist could
escape the insidious influence of reflection. His
imagination could not operate without the constant
interference of thought. As a result, art 'in its highest
vocation' was no longer possiile. 36
This idea of the fatal corruption of ait is supported
also frcm another theoretical angle. Science, according to
Hegel, consists of the unfolding of the inner necessity of
an object, the laws which govern its being. This idea of
law, which is a much stronger notion than the law of the
inductivists, entails the notion that an entity (being)
which ceases to operate according to its intrinsic law
ceases to be itself. Art is such an entity, and its
departure fran the law which constitutes its inner necessity
is the beginning of its dissolution. The argument, of
course, is circular. It is meaningless to speak of a thing
being, but not being itself. This is the arrogance of
science carried to the extreme where, if the object does not
conform to the laws have 'discovered' for it, it is
deemed to be not true to itself.
Hegel' s pathological terminology is symptomatic of his
deeply uneasy attitude to what he saw as an inevitable stage
in a process of human developnent, which was one of
progressive amelioration. His account of the effect of this
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process on the arts is profoundly nostalgic, mapped by his
own definitions, he was compelled to bury the arts by the
inescapable evidence that the age of reason, incompatible
with the finest artistic activity had, by the 1820s,
arrived. The deaths in close succession of Beethoven and
Goethe were a gift of fate to what was bound to be, in the
prevailing circumstances, a highly infectious and
debilitating notion. 37 What could be ncre paradoxical than a
theory of progress which leads to what even Hegel felt to be
a culturally pessimistic conclusion? His perplexity is
apparent at the end of the Introduction to the 1820s
lectures, where, turning the normal view of these matters on
its head, he speaks of the 'poetry of the imagination' being
'transcended by the prose of thought'.
But Hegel has a way of interpreting the situation, in
the light of his optimistic philosophy, which makes the loss
tolerable. The death of art, depressing as it is, is rnre
than compensated for by the birth of the new science of art,
which has a double richness. First, it represents that
higher stage of spiritual develoçment in the human race in
which thought is capable of everything, in which there are
no concerns of the spirit inaccessible to the intellect,
and, in addition, it sets before us the whole orld of the
art of the past which it is capable of illuminating for us
in such a way that we can read through it those central and
deeply significant things which former cultures could not
transmit in any other way. Art, to put it crudely, was only
a temporary makeshift, pending the coming of age of the
intellect, and art's true significance is as a conduit for
information otherwise incczrnunicable. If it is no longer
possible it is also no longer necessary. Thought transcends
art; at the same time art history preserves for us the art
of the past and the science of art reveals its meaning. The
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historicist's notion of the ancient artist seems to be no
longer of someone holding out the hand of fellowship, but of
a tortured, inarticulate soul, dumbly gesturing across the
centuries in the hope that hIs message will finally be
deciphered.
*	 *	 *
It is not easy to determine the extent to which
theories like Hegel' s were more significant as
rationalisations of existing situations - whether or not
these were accurately interpreted - or as instrumental in
the develotnent of those situations. They reflect much more
convincingly the conditions of scholarship - the increasing
influence of academic institutions, the increasing
institutionalisation of activities hitherto conducted
informally, domestically, privately - than the conditions
of the creative arts themselves. To say in the 1820s that
art was 'a thing of the past' seems indecently premature.
Hegel's escape clause, however, is crucial. Art 'in its
highest vocation' only was what he meant. Art as
entertainment, adornment, pass-time, would of course
continue, perhaps even flourish more profusely in the
absence of the genuine thing.
This idea was extremely potent precisely because it was
so flexible, giving limitless scope to the critic to whose
level the noble tradition of aesthetics was quickly reduced,
since invidious comparisons couched in a lively journalistic
invective naturally had more appeal to the new public than
the philosophical reflections of a Longinus or even a
Schiller, for these latter were assimilable only by an
elite. The line marking the end of high art could be drawn
in all sorts of different ways. As far as music was
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concerned, for sane, following Grillparzer, the decisive
marker was the grave of Beethoven, though for Grillparzer
himself Beethoven had already transgressed the boundary of
an art wholly faithful to itself, and for many people the
Ninth Symphony stood on one or other side of this imaginary
'ounaaxy 38 For others it was much rrre fluid, even elastic
enough to take in Brahms, while excluding much of what was
cctnposed between Beethoven' s death and the death of Brahms.
N3thing could better daronstrate the absurdity of this kind
of historicist theorising than the convolutions resorted to
by its exponents in order to explain the stubbornly
ananalous Brahms. The Wagnerian idea of an altogether new
kind of music was the only possible response to the notion
that music, as it had hitherto existed, came to an end with
Beethoven and that anyone who wanted to write music
thereafter must begin again at the beginning - a piece of
eulogistic hyperbole in Grillparzer, seized upon and taken
literally by those of an Hegelian inclination. F'br the first
time ccxnposers had to write mariifestos, not to canpete with
other canposers, not to defend one taste against another,
but to establish the possibility of their work being
considered as art. Wagner' s ploy became standard practice.
Art henceforward had to be presented under a rubric which
would exeipt it fran the Hegelian ban.
To respond to Hegel by pointing out that the music of
the nineteenth century displays a richness altogether
incarpatible with the idea of the artist striving to find a
quiet corner in which to be himself and failing is useless.
Hegel would reply that these people - Berlioz, Schubert,
Chopin, Schumann, Liszt, the Russians the Bohemians, the
Italians, were not practitioners of art 'in its highest
vocation'. Pressed on the criteria for assigning composers
to one side or the other of this line Hegel would have
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given not an aesthetic but a culture-historical answer.
These composers could not be artists in the highest sense
because they lived in a time of reflection, the era of
science. This does not mean that their work is rthless,
any rrore than Schiller' s thought-infected dramas were
worthless. It simply was not, could not be, wholly
authentic. It represented art in its death throes.
The artist might have replied that it was not his
inability to be true to art, not the interference of thought
with imagination in the head of the artist which was
threatening to the very existence of art, but the much nore
concrete phenarenon of the interference of scholarship with
artistic activity. Long before the nineteenth-century
'crisis' Goethe saw the effects of a conscious application
to art of Kant' s aesthetic theory without in any way
feeling obliged to experience the inevitability of the
corruption of creativity by reason in his own case. The use
of Kant's theoretical elevation of the human mind above
nature to justify the romantic cult of excess struck him
with particular force on his return frau his journey to
Italy. This journey had made the art of antiquity live for
him by placing it in a landscape, not a historical context
but a living one: the concrete continuity of nature.39
Goethe' s response to theoretical perversity was to withdraw
into one of those places which, according to Hegel, scarcely
existed any longer, where the noise of theory could not
reach him, there to caripose his Ranan Elegies. Daresticity
was perhaps one of the few remaining retreats, not frau
contemplation, to which Goethe was no stranger, but frau
40
acadeimcism.
Hegel' s pranulgation of the idea that art is no longer
necessary is itself an instance of the interference of
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scholarship in art, not in the mind of the artist, though
the derroralising effect on that could be dvastating, but in
the sorld of academic politics and the construction of
careers, of the material support for artistic activities,
which is so crucially affected by art sponsors' perceptions
of cultural value. The rrost conspicuous feature of artistic
life in the early years of the nineteenth century was the
transfer of energy, resources and esteem frau creative to
academic activity, and the parallel developuent of the
notion of authenticity in art, of a genuine article which
could be certificated, so that the sponsor or the public
need not exercise judgerrnt or taste before making up their
minds about it. By the time of Schenker and Schoenberg the
notion of art as fixed in the past, sarthing the artist had
to learn the right way of doing from experts who were rarely
artists of any significance themselves, and often not
artists at all, was pervasive enough to bring about a
potential or actual artistic paralysis. They perceived their
own situations as cariposers as intrinsically unstable,
historically anomalous and either wholly unsustainable or
sustainable only with the assistance of theoretical props.
These are surely not solely the effects of subjective
'reflection' or the exhaustion of music, proposed by
Grillparzer and repeated ad nauseam ever since.
*	 *	 *
What was the role in all this of the nineteenth-century
movement, presumably sterrrriing from Cante, which Kerman has
in mind when he refers to positivism? This is a difficult
topic to deal with because of the vagueness with which the
term is habitually used. In most accounts of positivism its
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ancestry is traced to earlier empiricist and inductive
theories. But if nineteenth-century positivism really was no
rrre than another version of inductivism it could hardly
have made the impact that it did. Goethe, after all, had
been unable to gain any wide acceptance for his work on
colour precisely because it relied too heavily on empirical
observation rather than experiment of the Newtonian kind,
and actually dared to challenge experimental results from
the standpoint of observation of phenomena in normal
conditions.42
Nineteenth-century positivism was very far from being
only a philosophy of science. It was rather a scientising of
philosophy and a theory of human developiient in many ways
similar to Hegel' s and benefiting from exactly the same
cultural conditions as those which gave plausibility to
Hegel' s aesthetic theories. It undoubtedly profited also
from the success of philology in establishing inductive
criteria as the criteria for scholarship in areas of study
where the experimentation of the hard sciences was
impracticable, in historicising and scientising the study
of culture and of human developnent. Latter-day positivists
ought - though it seems they rarely do - to find the
metaphysics of Cante at least as ' embarrassing ' as Hegel's
(or Schenker' s). Comte wanted to found a religion on the
belief, based on much the same kind of speculative reasoning
as Hegel ' s, that the human race has reached a stage where it
no longer needs any kind of mental activity other than the
rational. Comte was part of a procession of nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century social theorists, frau Hegel to
Spengler, who saw human developrnt in terms of historical
stratification, differing only in the kinds of strata they
identified and the meaning they attributed to the particular
progression represented by them. 43
 There is little reason to
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see Musikwissenschaft as in any need of this species of
positivism to provide it with a rnethodolbgical rationale,
but what positivism could do was to assist musicology, like
all other cultural 'sciences', to consolidate its social and
academic status vis--vis the living art whose survival it
had no great interest in assisting.
The character of musicology and its
institutionalisation at the end of the nineteenth century
was certainly not hindered by the enthusiasm for sane
version of French positivism in sane quarters in Germany,
and the process which led to its rise to academic power
shows tendencies canparable with those which led to
positivism itself. Both developnents had their roots in the
Enlightenment. But there is no possibility of accounting for
musicology as nothing more than positivism applied to music.
The origin of Musikwissenschaft and its motivation is,
without question, German, its model philology and its
rationale rooted in the German Enlightenment and German
philosophy. The latter-day contribution of French positivism
was undoubtedly of considerable academic-political
significance. Ideologically it could be no more than a
confirmation of certain tendencies already thoroughly
entrenched.
Schenker was, of course, not untouched by
nineteenth-century developments in musical scholarship, but
he was, for a number of largely biographical reasons, more
conservative than Mler, and was much more strongly
influenced than the musicologists by other tendencies. These
other tendencies were by no means insignificant. Porful as
academic musicology eventually became, it is easy to
exaggerate the ease with which other attitudes and practices
gave way to it.
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rBy no means everyone accepted the outlook of the new
scholarship. Nietzsche's was not the only voice crying in
the scientific wilderness. But the voices of protesters
undoubtedly became, as his did, more strident, occasionally
bordering on the hysterical. Those inspired by his final
outpourings sometimes descended into vulgarity, as they were
driven more deeply into their internal exile by the
triumphs of technology, and by the scientism on which it
conferred, for most people, overwhelming conviction. But
older, calmer habits of mind, like art itself, had never
been without philosophical champions. A figure of crucial
importance to the developnent of Nietzsche' s outlook, and
those who followed him, giving powerful support to belief in
the continued necessity of art, was Schopenhauer, whose
work, undoubtedly partly as a consequence of Nietzsche's
ever growing fame, began to gain a new following in the
early years of the twentieth century, in an atmosphere at
first sight as inhospitable to his ideas as could be
imagined. while Schenker shows very clearly a Hegelian
tendency - indeed, the very notion of a theory of music
analysis is deeply Hegelian - it is to the philosophical
tradition represented by Schopenhauer, in contradistinction
to that represented by Hegel, that we have to look for the
sources of Schenker' s most innovative ideas, rather than the
apiricist exclusiveness of a science of music modelled on
philology, which saw itself, in Hegelian fashion, as in a
transcendent relationship to nu.isic.
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N3tes
1. See Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1983, p.75.
2. See Hardie, 1903, Chapter IX.
3. Religious toleration - or indifference - in
Prussia under Frederick I and Frederick the
Great, and the interest of the latter in
philosophy and the arts, aided the German
Enlightenrrent and its diffusion, in spite of the
militaristic ethos and Frederick' s preference for
French culture. It was in Berlin that the
friendship of Lessing and Moses nde1ssohn
flourished, and the salons of Jewish nen such
as Rahel Varrthagen, who was a model for Fanny von
rnstein when she went to Vienna. F. A. Wolf was
among those who frequented Rahel' s salon. Of
course, religious toleration was neither
canplete, nor exclusively the product of
humanistic learning; it also had to do with the
self-interest of the 'enlightened' despots. The
interrelationship between enlightenmant and
political and econanic conditions in Germany as
in the rest of Europe is, of course, just as
important as the internal history of scholarship
and the Aufk1rer have to be distinguished fran,
scinetimes contrasted with, the classical
revivalists. A good source for Germany is Germany
in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Backqround
of the Literary Revival by W. H. Bruford.
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Cambridge: C. L1.P., 1959.
	
Bruford quotes on his
title page the following remark of Goethe:
• . . die schne Literatur einer Nation nicht
erkannt noch empfunden werden kann, ohne dass man
den Korlex ihres ganzen Zustandes sich zugleich
vergegenwrtigt'. This is surely true not only of
'sch'óne Literatur'.
4. 1759-1824. In their account of Wolf's career Silk
and Stern CM. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 13)
say that when Wolf went to Gottingen 'there was
no such "subject" as classics, but that a
generation later philology had becane 'a
discontinuous academic subject' and was
'institutionalised as such'. Previously 'for the
educated classes' the classics 'constituted a
natural part of experience'. C Sic.)
In the Protestant education syste, instituted
under Luther' s aegis by Melanchthon, classical
education, which was the foundation of all
education, cu].minated in the master's degree,
which preceded entry to one of the senior
faculties in the university. This degree
conferred little status on the scholar and no
clearly defined social role. Only if he went on
to study theology, medicine or law was there
a clear career path for him. Tutoring,
schoolmastering, even teaching in the university
were only stop-gaps, although many scholars
never progressed to the rrore prestigious and
lucrative legal, medical or clerical careers, and
sane of the rrost illustrious names in German
letters are arrong then - Winckelmann, for
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example. So the issue is perhaps one of status.
But the transformation of lhis situation was not
the work of Wolf. Göttingen was a centre of
classical studies of great renown and widespread
influence long before Wolf, first under the
leadership of J. M. Gesner, then under Christian
Gottlieb Heyne (1729-1812) 'the founder of
classical archaeology'. Heyne was at Gttingen
fran 1763, so it is a mystery why Wolf would
have to 'fight to be allowed' to study
philology there in 1777. Halle, on the other
hand, remained a relatively philistine, very
Prussian establishment, a suitable hane, sane
would say, for a systematiser like Wolf. Indeed,
while assisting in and profiting fran the rise in
the 'institutional-academic' status of philology
(fran Bruford we learn that Wolf was paid twice
as much per sheet by the publisher Goschen
for his edition of Haner as Goethe was paid for
his Collected ), his re-definition of
philology led to a breed of scholar - the
research worker pilloried by Nietzsche - hardly
rrore exalted than the arts and philosophy men who
had had to tutor to survive: Jean Paul, Kant,
Voss, Fichte, Hegel, Hblderlin, Schleiermacher...
5. Altertumswissenschaft : the science of antiquity.
6. Winckelrnann (1717-1768) was one of those who
never got as far as one of the senior faculties
in the university. His career was the product of
the limitation on his progress in!posed,
presumably, by his poverty, and is a fascinating
illustration of the social consequences of the
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Prussian education system. His frustration at the
contrast between the ideals he had imbibed fran
his classical studies and the realities of 'life
in the backwoods of Protestant Germany' where
schoolrnastering provided a poor outlet for his
intellectual energy, was channelled by his
fortunate contact with the art collections of
Dresden. He was a classicist because he could not
be anything else, but was able to make that a
mission, part of the 'new humanism', very much
the work of schoolmasters like himself, Gesner
and Heyne among them.
7. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing's
is a significant influence not only on aesthetics
but on the consolidation of 'the new humanism'
and the propagation of its ideals. Nathan der
Weise, takes his friend Mses Mendelssohn as the
model of the enlightened Jew.
8. Winckelmann grew up in the Prussia of the
militaristic Friedrich Wilhelm I. He was
twenty-four when Frederick the Great caine to the
throne and thirty-eight when he wrote the
pamphlet that made him famous - in Dresden where
he had becane the librarian of Count Bunau of
N5thnitz, and was befriended by Oeser, a painter
who later befriended Goethe.
9. See Either, 1981.
10. Gedanke uber die Nachahmung der griechischen
Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, 1755.
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11. See M. S. Silk & 3. P. Stern, 1981, p. 5.
12. See The Age of Enlightenment, ed. Simon Eliot and
Beverley Stern. Vol. 2. Indon: Ward Lock, 1979,
p. 22, n. 2..
13. The excavation of Herculaneurn was begun in 1738
and of Paripeii in 1748.
14. Published in 1764, it was the product of nine
years' study of antique objects in Rane, Naples
and Herculaneum
15. See Either, 1981, P. 13.
16. See Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, 'Fortunate
Encounter', p. 18.
17. See Schenker, 1930, 'Raineau oder Beethovent.
18. Crierubini produced his opera Faniska in Vienna in
1806. He met Beethoven and subsequently produced
a French - major-minor - version of Fux,
rivalling Albrechtsberger' s. This became the
counterpoint textbook at the Paris Conservatory
and returned to Vienna and was in use there
still in 1895, to judge fran a rnark of Schenker
in Der Geist der musikalischen Technik. It was
much translated and used in other conservatories
and was thus a force in the dissnination of
Viennese theory. Cherubini 's reputation as an
operatic canposer, and as an influence on
Fidelio, helps to explain the association of his
version of Viennese theory with the Viennese
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Classics. His conservatism in his role as
director of the conservatory in Paris led to
many clashes, notably with Berlioz, who, if
the latter's account is to be believed,
positively baited him. (See Berlioz, tr.
Cairns, 1981.) This would do no harm to his
standing in Hanslickian Vienna, Hanslick
having fallen out with Berlioz, to whose
appearance in Prague, when Hanslick was a law
student there, Hanslick owed the start of his
career as a musical journalist.
19. His first book was The Birth of Tragedy,
1872.
20. See 'Schopenhauer as Educator' in Untimely
Meditations, p. 170, ff.. (Nietzsche, tr.
Hollingdale, 1990.)
21. J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical
Scholarship, 111, Cambridge, 1908. Quoted in
n. 12, on p. 381 of M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern,
1981. N. 13 refers to Heyne, in a manner
relevant to the rarks in n. 4 of the
present chapter. But Heyne was not merely a
forerunner of Wolf. His ethos is closer to
the aesthetic, idealistic side of
Winckelmann, Wolf's to the historicist,
systematising side, which, in him, of course,
runs to an extreme wholly antithetical to the
spirit of Winckelitiann. Moreover Heyne's role
is no recent discovery. See, e.g., Bruford,
1959, p. 245.
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	 M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 12. This
account differs consistently with Hardie
(Hardie,	 1903,) for whati the first
scientific' phase of philology,
characterised by the ccmparison of texts and
their rational evaluation in the light of
historical knowledge, and the examination of
manuscripts, did not follow, as Silk and
Stern believe (p. 13), but preceded the
phase ushered in by Wolf, whose contribution
was a nore systanatic collation of
information drawn fran a far wider range of
sources. Textual and especially manuscript
study, aided by archaeological progress,
was undoubtedly irore systatically
scientific in the nineteenth century, but the
Wolf ian tendency, building on aspects of the
work of Heyne and Winckelmann, was away fran
exclusive focus on texts.
These matters are of significance not merely
fran the point of view of the Nietzschean
caricature of scholarship, but because the
reorientation of philology under Wolf was as
crucial to the dissolution of the
artistically productive relationship between
history and life which Nietzsche felt so
grievously, as it was for the character and
art-suffocating potency of art history in all
its forms in the nineteenth century and
since. 'Schenkerian analysis', especially in
its posthurrous guise, is inconceivable
without the prior displacement of philology
by an 'institutionalised' and 'academic'
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Altertumswissenschaft. Yet such systematising
as a substitute for creativity by no means
automatically follows fran archaeology or
even German classical aesthetic theorising
- as a reading of Hegel might suggest.
23. See M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 11.
To 'realise' the antique world is surely the
fantasy to end all fantasies!
24. See n. 38 of Chapter 3 above.
25. See	 Schenker's	 essay	 on Brahms in
Federhofer, 1990, p. 2.
26. See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975, 'Introduction'.
27. See Christensen, 1989.
28. See Kant, tr. Meiklejohn, 1991, p. 10.
29. Goethe speaks in many places about the
reliance of xrcdern science on instruments and
its tendency to forget that 'man himself is
the best and irost exact scientific
instrument' • 'Nature will reveal nothing
under torture,' he says, and predicts,
'Scxneday sarone will write a pathology of
experimental physics.' For a selection of the
scientific writings in English see Goethe,
tr. Miller, 1988. Goethe's critique of
experimental science rains controversial.
See, e.g., ?inine, 1987. His attitude is
reflected in Nietzsche. In a remark which
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makes a neat link between Kant, Goethe and
Schenker (see Federhofr, 1990), using
Kant's own rds, he says: 'There are people
who believe that German music could have a
transforming and reforming effect on the
Germans: they are angered, and consider it an
injustice when they see such men as Beethoven
and Mozart already engulfed by all the
learned dust of biography and carpelled by
the torture instruments of historical
criticism to answer a thousand impertinent
questions'. See Hollingdale, 1983, p. 97.
30. For a detailed account of this controversy
see M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, Chapter
5.
31. See Nietzsche, tr. Kaufmann, 1967 and
Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993.
32. See Nietzsche's essay, 'David Strauss, the
Confessor and the Writer', in Hollingdale,
1983. This point is made in concrete terms by
Silk and Stern. See M. S.. Silk & J. P. Stern,
1981, p.l0l.
33. See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975.
34. J.J. Bellerman, 1754-1842. For Heinrich see
n. 46 of Chapter 3 above.
35. In On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 1795-6.
36. see Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975, p. 11. '....a-rt,
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considered in its highest vocation, is and
remains for us a thing of the past'. It
'invites us to intellectual consideration,
and that not for the purpose of creating art
again, but for knowing philosophically what
art is'.
37. This was the period of the Holy Alliance
which 'muzzled intellectual life in Germany'
by rreans of Metternich's system of
censorship and his secret police. Grillparzer
was one of the victims of this rgime. Social
changes since the end of the eighteenth
century had also radically changed the
conditions of artistic life, especially in
music, not necessarily in favour of the
appearance of figures such as Beethoven.
38. It was Grillparzer who read the eulogy at
Beethoven' s funeral.
39. 1786-8. See his Italienische Reise, ed. H.
von Einem & A. Horn. Munich: Beck, 1985. For
an English version, see Goethe, tr. Auden,
1970.
40. The Ranan Elegies were also an expression of
the spirit of German Hellenism, Ranan as they
were - the connection between contemporary
art and antiquity. They remained unpublished
until years later. See, 'A fortunate
Encounter' in Goethe, tr, Miller, 1988, p.18.
41.	 Auguste Comte, 1798-1857.
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42. See	 'The Experiment as Mediator between
Subject and Object' and the Preface to the
'Theory of Colour • in Goethe, tr. Miller,
1988.
43. Oswald Spengler. See Johnston, 1972 for his
influence on Austrian thought in the latter
half of the nineteenth century.
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chapter 5
A Metaphysics of Music
'A single thought, however canprehensive it may be,
must preserve the rrost perfect integrity. Even if, for
the purposes of camtunication, it is broken up into
paxts, the coherence of these parts must remain
organic, i.e., one in which each part preserves the
whole just as it is contained in the whole. None is the
first, none the last. The whole thought gains clarity
through each of the parts and even the smallest part
cannot be canpietely understood unless the whole is
first understood.'
Schopenhauer)
'Music. . . is the melody to which the world is the text',
writes Schopenhauer in his Metaphysics of the Beautiful.2
Schopenhauer distinguishes music's 'husk' (Schale) and its
'external significance' fran its 'quite other far deeper and
irore serious significance'. In relation to the first he
accepts Leibniz's observation that 'music is an
unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the spirit is
not aware that it is counting'. But the second is a kind of
'significance in respect of which the canpiex of numerical
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relationships into which music may be analysed, cannot
remain as the signified, but is itself no rare than the
,3
sign.
Like Hegel, Schopenhauer believes that music is
governed by laws, but whereas these laws, for Hegel, are at
the heart of music, for Schopenhauer they are strictly
confined to its outer skin, its carapace, its container. The
form of this 'container', he says, can be traced t4Jough
quite precise numerically expressible rules, from which it
cannot deviate without ceasing to be music'. But the sense
in which music is related to the world, just as the other
arts are, as the copy to the rrcdel, remains deeply hidden
beyond these laws. Music, he asserts, is tthe copy of a
rrcdel which can never itself be brought before the
imagination.'
Schopenhauer believes that the reader who is at one
with his philosophy in general and has often listened to
music in the spirit of this philosophy will have no
difficulty in understanding his interpretation of the inner
significance of music. Our world is nothing other than
the objectification of the will, through the ideas, in
the bewildering multiplicity of phencfnena. 5 The purpose of
the arts is to make the ideas recognisable in the phenanena
by means of the principle of individuation. But since the
• phenomena which objectify the will do so only indirectly,
through the medium of the ideas, the arts, which represent
phenomena, are even rrore indirectly related to it. Music, on
the other hand, because it goes beyond the ideas, is
catipletely independent of the world of appearances, simply
has nothing to do with this world, could equally well exist
if the (phenatenal) world itself did not exist. Music,
unlike the other arts, is not the representation of the
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ideas but the representation of the will itself. The will
objectifies itself in one way through the ideas and in
another through music. Music is not a likeness of the ideas
but is analogous to them, parallels them.
Nothing is alien to rrnisic, Schopenhauer says. It gives
a voice to everything. It 'makes accessible the most secret
meaning of every scene [of the opera as of human life or of
unfathomed nature] and is the truest and clearest ccirrnentary
upon it. 6 This is why it is possible to set a poem to
musIc, why opera is possible. Music gives the deepest and
most inward illumination; as continual cairnentazy on all
that presents itself on the stage, it exposes the innermost
soul of the drama - and of life itself.
The constant universal significance of melody means
that one melody can correspond to various equally
arbitrarily chosen situations. It expresses unchangingly the
inner essence underlying all phenomena, while the phenomena
express this inner essence variously. Thus the same melody
can be used for a series of strophes. That a relationship is
possible between a musical ccrnposition and a poem or a
dramatic presentation originates in the fact that the two
are alternative expressions of the same inner essence of the
world.
*	 *	 *
This account of Schopenhauer' s music-aesthetic ideas is
based on Chapter 17 of the 'Metaphysics of the Beautiful',
the third part of the Philosdphical Lectures delivered by
Schopenhauer at the University of Berlin in 1820. It is
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taken from the 1985 edition of the lectures first edited by
Franz rbckrauer as part of the Deussen edition of the
collected works. 7 This version of the metaphysics of music
differs substantially fran those referred to by the writers
whose work is discussed in this chapter. The differences are
significant enough to raise doubts about the date at which
sane passages in these versions were written. The dating is,
of course, crucial to the interpretation of the
music-theoretical concepts of which Schopenhauer makes use,
and therefore to any discussion of the relationship between
his metaphysics of music and Schenker's theory. It is
obviously relevant, too, to the question of the confusion
which so many readers find in Schopenhauer' s musical
explanations.
The 'didactic' version of the metaphysics of music is
distinctly nore consistent in terms of its
music-theoretical content than any of these other versions.
The surge of interest in Schopenhauer discernible about 1913
can hardly be unconnected with the appearance of Deussen' s
edition, and the radical change in attitude exhibited by
Schenker between the first and second volumes of
Counterpoint makes it not unreasonable to suppose that this
text - unquestionably superior from a musical and literary
point of view - was known to him.
The first edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung
in 1819 consisted of a single volume. 8 Wrien it appeared in
its second edition in 1844 it was accompanied by a second
volume containing the later reflections of the philosopher
on the topics treated in the first. On the publication of
the second edition Schopenhauer insisted that he had altered
nothing in the original work arid that the publication of the
afterthoughts in a separate volume was intended to avoid
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'spoiling the work of my earlier years with the carping
criticisms of old age. '9 Whether or not this was true of the
1844 production it does not appear to be true of the
versions read by any of the writers discussed here, fran
Nietzsche onwards, with the ssible exception of Schenker.
A third edition appeared in 1859. This is would appear
to be the one referred to by Nietzsche and Wagner, at least
until the Frauenstadt edition appeared in 1873. Hanslick and
Helmholtz may have read earlier editions.
In 1873 Schopenhauer' s literary executor, rauenstadt,
published a collected edition and this was unchallenged
until Griesbach published a rival version in 1890 and,
indeed, kept on reappearing, not only after Griesbach but
also after the much later Deussen edition. Frauenstadt
claimed to represent the author' s intentions, revealed in
sketches prepared just before Schopenhauer' s death, for an
edition of his collected writings, but Griesbach disputed
this, only to be accused of inaccuracy in his turn. In 1911
the first two volumes of an eleven-volume edition by Paul
Deussen appeared. These were the two volumes of Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung. The volume containing the version of
the metaphysics of music referred to at the head of this
chapter, Volume VIII, appeared, according to Volker
Spierling, the editor of the 1985 production, in 1913.
Volume VIII of Deussen' s edition was sanething quite
new to the public, namely the content of the Berlin
lectures of 1820, and found in the Berlin Library airong
Schopenhauer' s literary rnains, which went there after
Frauenstadt' s death. This volume had been a talking point
for sane years before its appearance. In a book which also
reached the press in 1913, the French writer, Fauconnet,
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warmly praised the extant volumes of the Deussen edition and
spoke of the constraints imposed on writing about
Schopenhauer when the unknown Berlin material remained
pending. 10 In 1937 rthur Hubscher published another edition
which made use of manuscript material not available to the
Deussen team. It did not, however, include the 1820
lectures.
The differences between the ckrauer version of the
metaphysics of music and the one appearing in Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung make it surprising that German writers
on music who deal with the subject, notably Dahlhaus, show
no interest in it. This is presumably explained by the fact
that the Hubscher edition has pushed the Deussen edition
aside. That English caunentators are not aware of it is
understandable as no English translation exists and mention
of it is cinitted by Payne in his survey of the history of
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in the introduction to
the current English version. This is unfortunate, because,
if the lectures date frcii only one year after the first
appearance of the book, and they have not been, as that vvrk
has, subjected to many layers of revision, beginning with
Schopenhauer' s own, they ould seen likely to be closer to
the original than any other text, except the authentic,
unrevised manuscript fran which the 1819 publication was
prepared.
Payne's own source is Hubscher, who undertook an
examination of the original manuscripts of 'most of' the
orks, to which he was the first to have access . It ought
to be possible to assune that an edition collated with an
authenticated manuscript is beyond reproach, and, presumably
for this reason, Payne did no1 feel the need to canpare the
text he chose to translate with Deussen. But Schopenhauer' s
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manuscripts present a host of problems. The anomalies in the
Hubscher-Payne version identified here may be a symptom of
wider problems, or they may be confined to the musical
section. For people with an interest in the musical theory,
however, they are crucial, since they seriously affect not
only its logical consistency, giving rise to accusations of
music-theoretical ignorance on Schopenhauer' s part, but even
its intelligibility.
That part of the authentic manuscript of Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung dealing with the metaphysics of music,
would seen not to have been examined in detail by Hubscher,
at least from a musicological point of view. On the • basis of
music-theoretical and music-historical evidence, it seems
clear that the text of the lectures must be older than
any but the first edition of Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung, antedating Schopenhauer's own emendations, as
might logically be expected. Certainly there are
anachronisms in Payne's version of which the version found
in the lectures is free.
Of the two blatantly anachronistic passages in The
rld as Will and Representation, the first refers to a
rule about the progression of the bass which belongs to a
nineteenth century version of fundamental bass theory.
according to the English translation of the Hubscher
version, Schoperihauer writes:
'The deep bass noves nost ponderously. . . its rising and
falling occur only in large intervals, in thirds,
fourths or fifths, never by one tone, unless it be a
bass transposed by double counterpoint' 12
This passage constitutes a departure from the musical
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model which provides the basis for the chapter as a whole.
In the later versions of the work this departure can be
explained in relation to the gradual displacement of figured
bass by a form of fundamental bass in the teaching of
canposition, beginning its spread in the decade preceding
the appearance of the second edition of The World as Will
and Representation. In 1818 it is much more difficult to
explain, not because Schopenl-iauer was not aware of
fundamental bass theory, but because the prescriptive use of
the theory referred to here was not part of any established
music-pedagogic practice until much later. Even the
originator of the theory had no such rule for fundamental
bass progression as the one referred to here, nor does the
secondary source claimed by historians of the theory for the
instructional system - the system developed by Sechter,
adhered to by Bruckner and passed on to Mahier and Wolf
and countless others, including, of course, Schenker and,
indirectly, Schoenberg - in which it does appear.
Ironically, the fact that Schopenhauer did possess and
make use of the concept of a fundamental bass in his
original xrk is not clear fran the English version because
of the mistranslation of Grundbass •13 His use of this term
shows his theoretical source to have been Prussian rather
than Viennese. Grundbass is the term used by the
eighteenth-century Berlin theorists for 'fundamental bass'.
The connection proposed by Viennese historians between
Kirnberger and Viennese theory tends to blur the
distinction, which is a crucial one, between Kirnberger' S
attitude to fundamental bass and that of the nineteenth
century pedagogues 14 Mendelssohn' s notebooks, containing
exercises vrked under the supervision of Zelter, show that
the German attitude to the fundamental bass was quite
different fran Sechter' S. 15 The concept had minimal effect
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on their methods of instruction or their approach to
composition. The role of the fundamental bass was not to
prescribe, but to 'justify' the traditional procedures
rationally and not in any way to displace them. It was a
means of proving the authenticity of traditional concepts
and rules. The nature of the authority to which the
reductive construct appealed would depend upon the
metaphysical outlook of the theorist. It might be human
reason, natural law or divine law, or Schopenhauer' s
universal will.
Seen from this standpoint, the Grundbass is the
rational validation of the practice of Bach. As a
constructive, prescriptive theory it is inccxripatible with
that practice and contributed to its destruction. This,
rather than quibbles over the precise interpretation of
individual clusters of pitches, which were symptoms of
Kirnberger' s deeper uneasiness rather than the reason for
it, is the real point of the Kirnberger-Marpurg controversy.
The pedagogic-caositional application of the theory is
something quite separate from the theory itself, involving
exactly the same kind of ilogicality as the atta'npt to
re-construct Palestrina-like works interval by interval.
That the marriage between two such illogicalites took place
in Catholic Vienna rather than enlightened Berlin is hardly
surprising. Nineteenth century 'harrrony' was an accident of
history, not an 'organic' growth.
Schopenhauer' s source of inspiration was the
eighteenth-century Berlin tradition, not nineteenth-century
Vienna. After his father's death, Schopenhauer' s nother
moved to Weirnar where she held a salon at which Goethe was
sometimes a guest. 16 Among Goethe' s scientific interests was
music, on which he took advice from Mendelssohn's teacher.,
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Zelter. Schopenhauer was a passionate admirer of Goethe,
defending his scientific attitude against 'the 'Newtonians'.
Schoperthauer himself studied in Berlin from 1811-1814.
Zelter was then director of the Singakademie and the
Ripienschule, in which the Bach tradition was fostered and
where theoretical debate was very much alive. The
probability is that Schopenhauer, who adored music, derived
infinitely ITore from his musical experiences in Berlin than
from the lectures of Fichte, which were the ostensible
reason for his presence there. Influences on his thought
are said to have been few. Goethe was certainly one of them,
and the resemblance between Goethe' s theories of biological
deve1optnt and Schopenhauer' s picture of the growth of
musical structure, which, for him, is an analogue for the
srld, suggests that he was a profound one. There is no
doubt about Schopenhauer' s music-theoretical orientation or
about the attractiveness of this orientation to the Viennese
dissident, Schenker. The problem with the versions of
Schopenhauer' s musical theory available to Schenker before
1913 was one of intelligibility.
The second much nore glaring anachronism in later
versions of The World as Will and Representation is a
reference to Rossini.'7 This is so startlingly out of place
that it requires no esoteric musical knowledge to spot it.
Whether the appearance of this reference in the first volume
in Payne is attributable to Schopenhauer' s own revision, or
to editorial confusion, it is clearly anaralous.
Schopenhauer' s remark that 'no-one has kept so free of this
mistake as Rossini' has so distinctly retrospective a tone
that he ould seem unlikely to have intended it to appear in
the first volume of the later editions without some
indication that it was an aftezthought. To interpolate it in
such a way as to make it appear part of the original uld
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be at odds with his declared intention not to 'spoil s his
early work.
Although Rossini had his first success in Venice in
1813, his international reputation was not established until
1822, four years after the completion of Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung. Even if Schopenhauer himself already knew
Rossjni's music (he lived in Dresden from 1814-18, but
Rossini was well known in Italy from the time of Tancredi in
1813) he could hardly have assumed that his example would
mean much to German readers at the time of writing
(1814-1818), but rather would have had to introduce this new
music to them. But the remark clearly reflects a
consideration of a body of work with which the (musical)
reader is supposed to be familiar.
These anomalies are highlighted when the version of the
chapter on music in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung is
compared with the 1820 version, for neither passage appears
in the latter. If Hubscher had examined the lectures text of
this chapter therefore, he must at least have wondered
whether there might be other material appearing in the
various versions of Volume I which does not really belong
there. If he had examined the section on music in the
authentic manuscript of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung
he must surely have found it to correspond nre closely to
the version in the lectures than to any later text in at
least these two crucial instances, even if the difference
between figured bass and fundamental bass theories meant
little to him.
Of the two English translations of Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung, the one by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp,
entitled The World as Will and Idea was made before the
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exhumation of the text of the lectures. The more recent
(The World as Will and Representation) by E. F. 3. Payne, is
based on an edition which was produced after the publication
of the lectures but does not include them. English readers
relying on Payne are therefore likely to be unaware that
this text is doubly problematic: first in that it is based
on admittedly controversial material (although, of course,
according to Payne, Hubscher has at last got it right), as
all ts-volume versions of Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung are, and secondly because its editor has not
considered one of the major sources of evidence.
The English version presents the original srk,
together with the 1844 supplement, as a single work. This is
quite proper, as Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung appeared
twice in this format in Schopenhauer' s lifetime. However,
the suppintary volume cannot really be considered part
of the original work and the music sections make this
particularly clear. Payne recounts the history of the text,
but, rather than impressing upon the reader the differences
between the original work and the catrnentary in Volume II,
he emphasises the consistency of Schopenhauer's basic
philosophical ideas, which, it is true, remained in essence
unchanged to the end of his life.
But it is no less true that the Schopenhauer of the
suppint is a very different writer fran the author of the
original version of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.
Moreover, musical life had undergone a transformation since
the decade in which it was written. It is not difficult to
understand Schopenhauer' s fear that his music-metaphysical
theory might, without adaptation, be unintelligible to
people for whatt the baroque model, on which it was based,
was a thing of the past, and a past that had vanished
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almost without trace. How well founded such a fear would
have been can be seen from almost all subsequent
curimentaries on the technical aspects of the metaphysics of
music. The temptation, therefore, to revise, despite his
wish not to 'spoil' the original, can nowhere have been
harder to resist than here. The issue, of course, is not
whether he revised his interpretation. He certainly did
this. The question is whether he intended his revisions -
contained in the interleaved notes - to be substituted for
or added to the corresponding material in the original or to
be confined to the supplementary volume, and, even if he
intended the former, whether such an intention is
historically and philosophically appropriate.
The changes which music theory underwent in the years
between the writing of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung
and the publication of the supplement show up sharply in
Schopenhauer, yet it is rare to find a cairnentator who sees
any danger in conflating material from the two volumes.
Whether this is acceptable practice in relation to the other
topics is a question for the philosophers. In the case of
music it is txund to lead to confusion. English-speaking
corriiientators on Schenker, who are in the best position to
notice these differences, just like their musicological
counterparts of all backgrounds, and like aestheticians and
philosophers who are not experts on music, let alone on
Schenker, rrove back and forth between the treatment of music
in the 1819 volume, and that in the 1844/59 supplement, as
if they contained a single continuous argument, illustrated
by a single coherent set of theoretical concepts. This is
clearly not the case.
For reasons discussed at length earlier in this study
it is not altogether surprising that these dates do not
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themselves alert readers, even the musicologists among them,
to possible changes in theoretical outlook, and still less
to the meaning of such changes. But since a great part of
Schenker' s effort was directed towards the illumination of
the crucial transformation of music theory which took place
between Schopenhauer' s youth and his later years, when his
problem (and it was clearly a problem) was how to maintain
the logical consistency of his interpretation in the light
of the, by then, ubiquitous Viennese version of fundamental
bass theory, it is ironic that this transformation should be
ignored in discussions of Schenker' s relationship to
Schopenhauer. Nothing, in fact, could better illustrate the
importance of reading Schenker in context in order to
appreciate the significance for cultural history of what he
has to say.
To have any hope of being fully understood, and for any
sense to be made of the relationships of observations
staming fran widely different periods of his life,
Schopenhauer' s metaphysics of music must be set in the
context of the state of music theory at the time when it was
formulated and the changes it underwent during the
philosopher' s career. This in turn must now be considered in
the light of Schenker' s critique of nineteenth century
theory.
Schoperthauer's musical ideas of 1814-18, as is to be
expected, were derived fran eighteenth-century traditions.
It is certainly not a pedagogic exercise which he takes as
his aesthetic counterpart to • the world'. It is clear fran
the Spierling edition that his interpretation of the nature
of the musical work of art is based empirically on a notion
of structure derived fran the canpositional practice of what
we now think of as the 'figured-bass' tradition. The model
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for this is a piece of music in which a melody and a bass
are fully composed but the inner parts only sketched by the
composer in the form of figures written under the bass
indicating specific harmonic sonorities which it is left to
the continuo player to realise and to connect according to
convention. While during the later baroque it became more
and more carrion, and eventually standard practice, for the
inner parts even of keyboard accanpaniments to be supplied
by the composer, the structural assumptions remained
unchanged and the notion of harmony and of harmonic
progression assumed by canposers was the one presupposed by
this tradition. This remained the case at least until the
middle of the nineteenth century and, indeed, it was not
until well into the century that this concept of harmony
began to be displaced, even in textbooks, by the new theory.
Even the new chord concepts were at first absorbed into the
familiar conventions, their reductive implications being
ignored, e.g., by Albrechtsberger. Only when applied to the
species system did they begin to motivate a new pedagogic
model in which the schematic bass, with the peculiar
character of its Rameauvian progression, was substituted for
the cantus firmus as the basis of the comFxsitional
exercise.
The rule referred to in Payne, however, relates
to Simon Sechter' s Pndamentalschritte (fundamental bass
progression), which is not found in Zelter or Kirnberger.
For Kirnberger, the relevant succession is a succession of
specific 'chords' conceived in terms of the figured bass
tradition, not a succession of roots) 8 The only
rd Schopenhauer uses which is associated with
nineteenth-century harmony is Stufe (step). He uses this in
a pre-compositional context and, in reference to
composition, in a sense much closer to Schenker's concept of
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structural level - level of elaboration or differentiation -
than to Sechter's schematic bass progression, of which, in
1818, he is highly unlikely to have had any knowledge.
In later years Schopenhauer was not alone in confusing
this schematic bass with the bass voice of a canposition.
His confusion is obvious in Volume II where he tries to
reconcile the two notions of bass and entangles himself in
invertible counterpoint and secondary 'accaianying' basses,
and still rrore so in the Parerga and Parelipanena. This
confusion illustrates the extent to which his thinking had
been affected by the all-powerful prescriptive version of
fundamental bass theory. Yet it is interesting that he does
not canpletely succumb to the rrcdern theory, still insisting
that melody is the essence of music and that harrrony is
given too much importance. Here he is not only true to his
own theory but to the musical tradition in which his taste
was educated.
There is nothing of this confusion in the musical
chapter of the text of the 1820 lectures whose supreme
philosophical confidence presupposes an equal confidence
about the nature of the art which is its subject. The whole
beauty of the piece is this serene siniplicity and sureness
of touch.
There is no question that the Deussen text of the
metaphysics of music, as it appears in Spierling' s edition,
is incctnparably superior to the text translated by Payne.
While the latter creates an impression of prolixity,
music-theoretical vagueness arid repetitiveness, the former
is entirely coherent and fully lives up to the reputation
for 'beauty of style. . .power and lucidity of expression'
to which Payne refers 20 P'rom the Spierling edition
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Schopenhauer's ideas emerge with rnarvellously persuasive
simplicity. The poetic quality of the writing is not
undeimined, as in The World as Will and Representation, by
metaphorical inconsistencies arising from a clash of
music-theoretical concepts. There is a single concept of
musical structure, derived not from abstract theory but from
works of art, and this is presented with vividness and
precision.
We cannot know, of course, which version of
Schopenhauer Schenker read or preferred. What is highly
suggestive, however, is the fact that his attitude to
Schopenhauer undeient a marked change and that this change
occurred between the publication of the two volumes of his
book on counterpoint. This is not simply something to be
inferred from the developinent of his theorising, but quite
explicit. In Book I of Counterpoint he is dismissive of
Schopenhauer. In Book II he quotes him as an authority in
just the fashion that he quotes Goethe. 2' It was in this
period that Deussen' s edition of the canpiete works of
Schopeithauer, containing the 1820 lectures, appeared. The
novelty of Schopenbauer' s conception of the musical work of
art - which would surprise no-one when it first appeared,
but, like C. P. E. Bach's Versuch, would alitost have ceased
to be intelligible by the late nineteenth century - viewed
from the perspective of 1913, when the patent noribundity of
nineteenth-century theory had left a theoretical vacuum, is
striking. The crucial stimulus to Schenker' s radical
re-thinking of the nature of musical structure, must have
been Schopenhauer' s picture of the musical work. There is no
doubt that this picture had the capacity to give coherence
to the various strands of Schenker' s theoretical
investigations, a coherence which, up to that point, they
certainly lacked. Yet it seems unlikely that any sudden
- 238 -
flash of illumination could have cane frail the convoluted
text upon which the English version of the chapter
containing the metaphysics of music is based, as the
confusions of ccmxentators on that text testify.
The central part of Schoperthauer' s theory of music is
developed only in Schenker. Even Nietzsche shows no
awareness of it. It sens reasonable then to assume that
Schenker knew this clearer version. The notion of musical
structure found in it is therefore taken, in the following
discussion, to be definitively the one Schopenhauer held in
1818, and to be the one to which Schenker' s theory
essentially relates.
*	 *	 *
Payne writes: 'more than any other philosopher of modern
times [Schopenhauer) had to contend with fractious
contoraries who were ever ready to denigrate and denounce
him, to secrete and suppress his orks by the simple
expedient of silence, and who did not scruple to misquote him
blatantly and unblushingly fran his own wr tin' •22
However, it sou1d be a mistake to assume that no-one
read Schopenhauer, even before 1853, when he became famous
overnight through a series of accidents, or that his
influence among those who did read him was confined to the
thoughts contained in the unattributed quotations Payne
refers to. He was widely read after 1853, and ultimately
far more widely read than philosophers usually are, partly
because - and this is always surprising to readers of English
versions of his work - 'German philosopher had written so
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well and so readably before'. The lucidity of his prose made
'the problems of metaphysics. . .comprehensible to the
non-specialist reader' 23 Schopenliauer was enormously widely
read from the closing decades of the last century until well
into the present one.
There are few writers on the aesthetics of music of any
significance after Schopenhauer who do not show his
influence, either directly or in sane modified form. Among
nineteenth century writers relevant to Schenker are major
figures from many fields of intellectual activity and no less
prominent figures from the arts: Hegel from philosophy,
Helrnholtz from the physical sciences, Nietzsche from
philology, besides Wagner and a writer from a future world of
mass circulation journalism and music-academicism, Eduard
Hanslick.
However, it was not his notion of musical structure as
an analogy for the sorld, which interested these writers but
other aspects of his theory which fitted better the
music-aesthetic preoccupations of the period. Sc of these
Schopenhuaer himself had taken up and refined. Among them
was his idea of the musical genius as madium. Another was
the notion that genuine music was not imitative of phenomena
or words, but spoke a language of its own, capable of giving
expression to universal human feeling, defining a choric role
for music in relation to stage illusion and dialogue. Given
sufficient ingenuity, he could be interpreted as supporting
almost any of the music-aesthetic theories in circulation in
the nineteenth century.
His notion of the technical shell of music as containing
a deeper meaning is turned by Hegel into the idea of art as
concrete clothing of the spriritual essence, an idea
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reappearing in the title of an early essay by Schenker: The
Spirit of Musical Technique. 24 Nietzsche's notion of the
Dionysian unity achieving individuation in 1polline form,
hidden Dionysian reality manifesting itself through Apolline
illusion, is clearly related to this aspect of Schopenhauer's
metaphysics of music, and many other ideas in The Birth of
Thagedy are related to the Schopenhauerian aesthetic. Wagner
coined the term 'absolute music' directly or indirectly under
the influence of Schopenhauer' s insistence that music spoke a
language of its own, and yet he was also able to derive fran
the rretaphysics justification for his use of music to express
the secret meaning of the drama, in a way that was anything
but 'absolute'. 25 Harislick also seized on the idea of an
autonctrous musical language and used it as a stick with which
to beat the affect-theorists and canposers of prograrnae
music, such as his one-time-hero, Berlioz. Helmholtz
struggled with the relationship between the technical 'shell'
and the inner, affective significance of music in a way that
assumed the truth of Schopenhauer' s notion of the derivation
of musical-acoustic phenctnena fran a single sound. Yet,
sophisticated as he was in dealing with isolated musical
phencxena, and convinced of the character of the over-all
structural canplex as the elaboration of material derived
fran a single undifferentiated sound, Helmholtz ses to have
had no interest in the nature of the structural connection of
'every note' in the 'mass of sound' and the single 'tonic'
fran which they all came and to which they all returned. Yet
he must have been aware that formal schanata do not address
this relationship. 26 If he did not pursue the ITorphological
process, the Goethean concept of structural developnent
applied to music by Schopenhauer, this was very likely
because the music-structural rrcdel on which Schopenhauer
relied had been buried under the quasi-rationalist theorising
which had swamped the traditions still surviving in Berlin in
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Schopenhauer' s youth, and it was impossible simply to invent
a new one. This vagueness about structure continued through
all the tonal theorising of the nineteenth century, despite
the conscious application to music history of rrorphological
theory.
*	 *	 *
Hanslick was one of a number of people whose interest
Schenker tried to engage in his various projects between 1890
and 1900.27 In February 1894 Schenker was proposing to write
a history of melody which Hanslick pranised to discuss with
him. In August of the same year, he acceded to Schenker 's
request that he should recariind an essay on Smetana to the
Neue Freie Presse, but he was either unable or unwilling to
persuade Bather to take him on as music-critic. Schenker was
familiar with Hanslick's work and esteemed him as a manber of
the Brahms circle as much as because he was music critic of
the Neue Freie Presse and Professor of the History of Music,
but he had doubts even in 1895, when he wrote a rather
strange piece on the occasion of Hans lick' s seventieth
birthday. 28 In this he canpares Hanslick's Negation
(Schenker's word), his denial of the expressive capability of
music, to an 'ice-field' and quotes at length Helmholtz's
criticism of Hanslick 's point of view. This back-handed
tribute may satething to Schenker' s disappointment that
Hanslick was not rrrxe useful to him, but it has irore than
curiosity-value. It enables us to focus precisely on the
state of the music-aesthetic debate and the texts relevant to
Schenker and at least for sane of the readers of Die Zeit, in
1895. It also illustrates a means of indirect access to the
ideas of Schopenhauer.
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Although Hanslick was undoubtedly familiar with sane
vaguely Schopenhauerian ideas before he wrote The Beautiful
in Music the date of its appearance, its emphasis on music's
autonomy, and even its title, point to the newly celebrated
author - thrust suddenly into prominence in 1853 - of a
chapter entitled 'On the Metaphysics of Music', as a crucial,
if poorly understood influence. 29 N3-one writing on the
aesthetics of music in 1854 could pretend ignorance of
Schopenhauer, and even if Hanslick saw The World as Will and
Representation at first hand for the first time only in the
course of writing he could hardly have failed to recognise
the source of the long familiar ideas, however rrdified, of
which he was making use. It would be ta'npting to see The
Beautiful in Music as a kind of layman' s metaphysics of music
- a metaphysics of music without the metaphysics - except
that every aspect of the discussion is impoverished in
Hanslick's book, in spite of its much greater length.
Schopenhauer' s concept of a musical work of art, a coherent
structure fashioned Out of the steps of the scale, collapses
into a notion of music as fragments of sound passing over the
ear of the listener in an apparently chaotic flux. Any
underlying coherence could consist only of sate mysterious
relationship arrong the patterns into which they may be
perceived to fall, patterns which have to be read of f the
surface, inductively, to reveal the underlying laws, as if
they were natural phenomena rather than features of a work of
art.
The reasons for Hans lick' s approach are not far to seek.
He is listener-oriented because he sees himself as the
representative of the listener with whom he allies himself in
the role of judge. Judgenent, which was only a part, and a
relatively insignificant part, of traditional aesthetics, is
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the raison d'etre of the musical journalist. Because he can
conceive of no other point of view, Hanslick does not
discriminate between perception and conception. This is the
crucial element in the reduction of aesthetics to criticism.
Because he only reads off the surface, he has no interest in
any idea of what may underlie that surface, not even a
Leibnizian formal idea deriving fran acoustic-mathematical
determinants analogous to the mechanical determinants of
architectural forms, and much less to Schopeithauer' s idea of
a 'signified' of which this form is only the 'gn. Nor can
he distinguish between 'signified' and 'intended' because he
does not understand Schopenhauer's notion of genius.
In this he resembles Hegel, whose adaptation of so many
of Schopenhauer's ideas to his historicist theory went before
Schopenhauer' s own ork into the public danain and continued
to hang about it like a miasma. 3° The vrld of music, indeed
of the arts altogether, and the whole of European culture,
changed so radically between 1814 and 1853 that
Schopenhauer' s sork could not possibly be read then as it
would have been in the twenties. For Hegel the idea of the
artist as the medium for sane significance beyond himself is
reduced to the prosaic, psychologistic notion of the artist
as a kind of autanaton, an ety vessel into which the
Zeitgeist pours itself. He signifies what he represents. 31 In
similar fashion, Hanslick reduces the idea of the non-mimetic
character of music to a notion of music as - literally -
insignificant. This is, of course, the inevitable consequence
of phencmenalism. If nothing beyond the phenomena can be
apprehended then any significance behind the phenatenon, even
if its existence could be imagined, might as well not exist.
The meaning of the notes is the notes. For Schopenhauer the
uniqueness of music lies in the fact that, exactly because it
is not tied to phenarena, it is capable, as no other art is,
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of making that which lies beyond the phenomenal directly
accessible to consciousness, even if consciousness is not
capable of reflecting what it receives in any but analogical
terms.
Hanslick' s focus on the musical surface, conceived of
not in the sense Schopenhauer attributes to Leibniz, but as
data flowing across the ear, has been more influential than
has been generally recognised. Its main contribution was
almost to eliminate the notion of music as a work of art
constructed out of sound, and to substitute instead a notion
of sound patterns as phenaiena of perception. This n way of
thinking about music had the field almost to itself for
reasons quite external to aesthetic theory. Musical
scholarship generally was shifting anyway from consideration
of music as work of art, to matters not even of the surface
of the work, but of the representation of the work, and the
work' s historical - Hegelian - significance, towards, that
is, the art-historical.
One of Hanslick' s contributions was to sterilise
music-aesthetics, among other things by driving the mystery
of acoustics, which had fascinated the best minds for
millennia, into the enclave of the pedant and the dogmatic
pedagogue and rendering it, ultimately, a joke. It is as a
consequence of this that Schenker' s preoccupation with this
mystery makes his followers writhe with nbarrassment and
seize with unsenly glee upon his diatribes against Rameau.
another was to make it possible to conflate any notion of
music as 'a language of the soul' with the lowest form of the
'hermeneutic', the amateurish, journalistic prograime note.
These are the consequences of the famous Hanslickian coolness
and elegance, the smiling disinissiveness of everything that
the long list of musicians, from whose writings he quotes in
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order to rrock them, believed they had been doing from time
irrinernorial, and of their attempts to articulate their
•	 •	 .	 •	 32intuitions about it.
The rise of journalism was a crucial factor in the
transformation of musical scholarship in the nineteenth
century. Hanslick cannot be considered simply as a successor
to the tradition represented by Schiller or Schumann. Unlike
his romantic predecessors, Hanslick was primarily a
journalist and he was to be followed by a vast army of people
who were primarily or even only scholars. We are now so used
to this that we are puzzled by Schenker' s insistence that he
wrote fran the point of view of an artist, and we can no
longer easily see the difference between an
aesthetic-philosopher - if such an animal any longer exists -
and a music critic.
Its indebtedness to metaphysics notwithstanding,
Hanslick's notion of music was propounded with a lofty
disdain for the spiritual. This disdain seems to cane fran a
belief that the grandeur of the philosophical conception is
mere inflation which needs dispersing by means of a healthy
dose of scientific camon sense. it is in this respect that
Hanslick and his successors are the nodern counterparts to
the 'Euripidean' tendency in Greek artistic life as Nietzsche
describes it in The Birth of Tragedy. Euripides, Nietzsche
explains ironically, 'liberated tragic art fran its pcinpous
corpulancy.. . the spectator now actually saw and heard his own
double on the. . . stage and rejoiced that he could speak so
well. But this joy was not all: one could even learn fran
Euripides how to speak oneself.. . fran him the people have
learned how to observe, debate and draw conclusions fran the
*	 .	 ,33laws of art with the cleverest sophistication.
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In similar fashion, as Nietzsche observed, criticism in
the nineteenth century became a substitute for aesthetics.
The critic became what the philosopher could never have been:
the representative of the spectator, the public, whose tastes
became the standards of art. Hans lick' s writings had enough
of a philosophical air about them to impress Nietzsche for a
time, but his real role was to narrow the gap between the
philosophy of aesthetics and the public, partly by initiating
the public into the niceties of the notion of aesthetic
debate current in sophisticated circles at the time, but more
by assisting in the reductjon of aesthetics to the question
of beauty understood as that which is pleasing to an
'educated' taste. Hans lick' s influence on Schenker was,
despite Schenker's contrary instincts, hard to resist and
long-lasting. Perhaps he never altogether escaped it. It is
hard, indeed, to stand out against the opinions of a
well-drilled public. Schenker did eventually take up
Nietzsche's theme of 'civic mediocrity' but he saw himself
initially as being limited to the choice between Hanslick' s
belief that music was about notes and nothing but notes, and
34Helmholtz's that it expresses 'states of mind'.
*	 *
It is intriguing that it should be not the artistically
inclined and literary-minded lawyer Hanslick, his enthusiasm
for music fed by the excitement of contact with great
ranantic artists such as Berlioz, Schumann and Wagner, but
the physical scientist (physiologist and physicist), Hermann
von Helmholtz, who clung to the 'unscientific' belief that
music, while not a mimetic art, is still an expressive one.
while Helmholtz' s approach is strictly and inevitably
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sensationalist, his enquiries focusing on the physical means
of making music, and the physical explanations of its
audibility, only once in The Sensations of Tone does he fall
into the trap of attempting to explain music's significance
directly in terms of its sensational effects. 35 It is
clearly Helmholtz Hanslick has in mind when he derides the
attempt to cross the 'mysterious bridge' between the body
and the mind.
On one level, of course, Hanslick is right. Helmholtz
does leave himself open to the charge that he is trying to
construct a route fran sensation to otion such that the
latter would seem in some vague way to be a product of the
former. The art of music, in this interpretation, would be
no more than a cold-blooded harnessing of the devices known
by experience to stimulate - physiologically - the desired
responses, by acting on the nervous system to evoke feelings
associated by the hearer with moods previously evoked by
other stimuli, so that it will seem to him to be
'expressing' these moods, or even the conditions giving rise
to them. Something suspiciously like such an interpretation,
but deeply confused, appears in the passage fran which
Schenker takes the quotation he uses in his seventieth
birthday 'tribute' to Hanslick. 36
But Hanslick, not uncharacteristically, while taking to
task Helmholtz and his fellow physicalists for their
philosophical obtuseness in treating the mind as a mere
extension of the nervous system, gives himself away: '...how
the excitation of the auditory nerve. . . is transformed
into. . .an rction. . . lies beyond the bridge that no
philosopher has ever crossed. It is the one great
problem. . .the connection between mind and body. This Sphinx
will never throw herself into the sea'	 .ithough this is
- 248 -
splendidly put, it does not really challenge sensationalism
at all, since it assumes, actually much nre blandly than
Helntholtz does, that the connection exists, that it is
uni-directional and that we know what the direction is. So
much conceded, it seems hardly worth denying the hope that
the one remaining unknown, the nature of the path, is in
principle discoverable.
In general Helmholtz seems to recognise that while he
can offer acoustic/psychological explanations, such as the
one he gives for the notion of dissonance, when it cas to
the expressive use made of given sound-canbinations he can
do no better than any of his predecessors, and is ccztpelled
to fall back on poetic affective language. But his appeal to
the theory of association, in the attempt to understand why
music is experienced as expressive of particular wtions,
results in an explanation which is, on the one hand,
circular and, on the other, so individualistic - the
associations in question being arbitrary - as to be
culturally, and certainly scientifically, meaningless.
He believes, for example, that the association of
successions of extremely consonant sound cctibinations with a
feeling of ethereal calm is universal, at least within the
culture defined by the western tonal system. But
simple, randan associationism contradicts this. According
to this interpretation the connections people make do not
follow frau any supposed universal - neurologial or
neuro/psychological - response to particular stimuli, but
frau what was happening internally or externally when they
heard such sounds before. Yet affect theory, which is
clearly Helmholtz' s starting point, assumes that, at least
within a given culture, everyone who hears the same thing
will put approximately the same affective interpretatiQn
- 249 -
upon it.
It is exactly the fact that this is not the case that
Hanslick uses to mock affect theory. His most extreme
example is the section from the Overture to The Magic Flute
'changed into a vocal quartet of quarrelling Jewish
pedlars' 38 The absurdity, however, is not so much in the
theory he derides as in his choice of illustration, which
suggests an inability to appreciate the nature of parody,
where the laughter is generated precisely by the incongruity
of the elements juxtaposed. This is, of course, treacherous
terrain, and Hanslick actually falls into the error - if
indeed it is an error - for which he castigates others, in
the very act of laughing at them. Rousseau, he remarks, was
'moved to tears by the air from Orpheus - 'J'ai perdu mon
Euridyce...'. The music, he points out, vuld sound just as
fitting if the words were t J , ai trouv mon Euridyce'. He
adds, incautiously, 'We are not entirely of the opinion that
in this case the composer is quite blameless, for music most
certainly possesses far more appropriate tones for the
expression of anguish'. 39 r'bre subtly, he does not see the
difference between saying that the music can be heard as
expressive of Orpheus' s grief and that it can only be heard
as that. This however did not prevent his remarks from being
ideologically effective. No-one wanted to be thought to
belong to the affective school of thought, however destitute
of alternatives its critics were.
The problem of variable interpretations of the
emotional significance of the same music was clearly a much
discussed topic long before either The Beautiful in Music or
The Sensations of Tone. It was a problem just because it
conflicted with a widespread and deeply held belief.
Hanslick was either unaware of or did not understand
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Schopenhauer's solution to the problen. Helmholtz was
undoubtedly aware of it, but while the question Schopenhauer
poses to the affect theorist - the categorical rejection of
the idea of music as phenomenally derived - was taken,
Schoperthauer' s solution - that the phenanena invoked are
analogical interpretations supplied by the hearer - is, for
him, no solution. On the contrary, his attanpt to adapt it
to his own needs shows it to be a trap for him.
Helmholtz' s approach to the problen sens to have been
prompted by Hanslick, but his attempt to extricate himself
from the conclusion Hanslick draws from it - which uld
render his entire enterprise aesthetically redundant -
drives him to Schopenhauer. 40 Unlike Hans lick he does not
want to see inconsistent interpretative behaviour as proof
that all such interpretations are equally invalid. On the
contrary, he prefers to grant then equal validity, as
Schopenhauer does, while, also like Schopenhauer, distancing
himself from the affect theorists by avoiding - in
principle, at least: in practice he does it all the time -
attaching any specific meaning to any specific constellation
of musical tones.
He is thus cctnpelled to propose sanething on a higher
level of generality than the 'outward circumstances'
described by listeners in their efforts to convey 'the
impression of instrumental music', but he is barred from
Schopenhauer's solution by the impossibility, for him, of
the notion of something underlying the empirical, of which
the empirical is the expression or the objectification. The
canpranise entity he proposes therefore is the 'state of
mind', itself an adaptation of Schopenhauer.
As in Schopenhauer, music only seems to express the
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'scenes of life'. But whereas with Schopenhauer the seeming
lies in the fact that the 'scenes' are themselves mere
phena-neria, and our impression that music refers to them
arises only by way of analogy, with Helmholtz the 'scenes'
are connected to states of mind by association. The 'scenes'
are not the expression of the state of mind, nor the music
the expression of the 'scenes'. But the state of mind can
only be rendered intelligible to the observer (including the
introspective observer) by way of association with 'outward
circumstances' which he has previously observed to accompany
these states of mind. The music, by recalling them evokes
the 'corresponding' states of mind. 'rds', says Helmholtz,
clearly referring to the remarks in the 1844/59 'Metaphysics
of Music', 'can represent the cause of the frame of mind,
the object to which it refers and the feeling which lies at
its root, while music expresses the kind of mental
transition which is due to the feeling.' This 'kind of
mental transition' is the 'frame' or 'state of mind' •41
The philosophical problems presented by this convoluted
attempt to rationalise the irrational are manifold. If we
cannot describe a mental state, how- can we know that this
mental state is what music expresses, rather than the
corresponding circumstances, or the feeling, which we can
describe? How can we know that this mental state exists? If
there were such a thing as a state of mind, transitional
• between feeling and the word, act or outward appearance to
which the feeling gives rise, what could it be other than a
disposition towards the word, act or feeling, a watered down
version of the will, perhaps? If so it is very dilute
indeed, since it is an externally motivated will, which is
hardly will at all.
Why rrn.isic can express this (indescribable) 'kind o
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mental transition which is due to the feeling' but not the
(describable) feeling itself remains wholly unexplained and
can therefore only be regarded as an arbitrary judgement on
Helmholtz' s part. Either he has not understood Schopenhauer,
or, while accepting the existence of an entity which
Schopenhauer understands as a subjectivity capable of
expressing itself musically, he can recognise this entity
only as the object of sate other subject. Only as an object
(albeit incapable of being described) can it be observed,
and only by observation can it be known. Subjectivity is, to
adapt a remark of Nietzsche's, 'the unscientific
,42	 .
excellence . The subjective, for the physical scientist,
equals the unreliable. .nything known only subjectively is
not known. It can at best be hypothetical and must be tested
objectively before it can acquire the status of the real.
Yet Schopenhauer' s musical theory is founded entirely on his
belief that subjective knowledge is not only possible but is
the only direct knowledge of the real, of that which is not
'my representation'. For Schopenhauer, this belief in no way
brings him into conflict with science, whose realm is the
world of representation and by whose means alone the will
can be known through its phenanenal objectification. The
conflict only arises when the scientist either denies the
existence of anything beyond this world, claiming that the
world of representation is the only reality, or when he
accepts that there is a reality beyond the phenarenal but
claims the power to gain direct access to it by the same
means that he eniploys to investigate the world of
representation - claims, that is, that by pursuing these
means to the limit of the phenarenal he will force the
ultimate mystery to reveal itself.
By proposing a kind of subjective knowing, however,
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Schopenhauer does not mean to propose the arbitrary
'subjectivity' we have seen Helmholtz trying to rationalise
as a mental 'state' which can be an object of observation,
either externally or internally oriented. What Schopenhauer
proposes is the subject's non-reflective, involuntary
awareness of self. The importance of his musical theory is
that the 'self' to which the composer, under inspiration,
gives expression, is not his individual self but the
universal self. He speaks, that is, not for his arbitrary
self, not about his accidentally conditioned emotions, but
for all selves, for eiiotion itself, the fundamental desire
for existence. This alone can explain the sense of the
listener that music articulates his own soul, whose
agitations he cannot himself express. The music, he feels,
does it for him, and when he tries to explain this process
his explanation naturally falls far short of the
universality of the music, is broken down into fragments as
he grasps at this or that emotion fran the flux of his
feelings, or this or that experience, with which a
particular feeling is associated for him. This is not to say
that the music does not express what it seems to him to
express. It does, but its expressive scope is not
circumscribed by the rotional or imaginative range of an
ordinary individual. 'I know my will not as a whole, not as
a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in
its individual acts and hence in time,' Schopenhauer says.
This is the condition of the individual' s apprehension of
will. But the cccrposer, inspired, is no longer an
individual, least of all an individual, and what he 'knows'
in this condition is not the 'individual acts' of the will,
not events occurring in time, but 'the will. . . as a
whole,. . . as a unity, . . . completely according to its
nature'. 43 His music is, therefore, expressive of
everything, including whatever each individual finds in it..
- 254 -
In Helmholtz 's interpretation the uñiversality is thiowxi
away as the thing expressed beciorres, Once again, the
experience of an individual. The whole argument loses its
point. The metaphysical cannot be reconciled with the
psychological, since the latter is inescapably tied to the
phencirenal, yet music, as Helmholtz is vivdly aware, cannot
be tied to the phencinenal.
Further, if the 'subjectivity' which music is capable
of expressing is conceived of as object, i.e., as the
(indirectly) observable condition of a subject, like the
sptcm of a disease, considered either introspectively or
as the (indirect) object of another observing subject, and
therefore phenanenal, it is illogical not to allow music to
express other sorts of phenomena. Similarly, it is haid to
see how, if states of inihd, becauàe of their relative
irical inaccessibility, are less objectionable than
'outward circumstances' as the things which music may be
allowed to express, feelings, which offer no access at all
to the external observer, should be any nore so. What is
gained, in short, by substituting 'state of mind' for
tfeeling'?
One answer is that the accusation of adopting the
'corrupt otional theory of aesthetics' might possibly, by
this means, be avoided. In the atztsphere created by
Hanslick this was not an insignificant consideration.
Fashion is hardly less despotic in musical scholarship than
in science. But to avoid this - which in recent times even
Schopenhauer has not succeeded in doing - by enliting the
Schopenhauerian concept of the will would have been
unthinkable for an empirical sciehtist b' l62. 	 -
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Yet when it comes to music, the notion of the
elimination of the subjective becomes patently absurd. If
music is not a representative art,. not representative of the
external world, and not expressive of an interior one, what
is it? Is it just an abstract play of numbers for their own
sake, not even a Caxtesian reflection of the universal order
in microcosm, but quite meaningless? Again and again,
Hanslick canes perilously close to saying that it is, but
always shies off. It is too much even for him to swallow and
he recognises the futility of trying to force it down the
throats of his readers. He therefore allows the listener to
respond anotionafly, since he is hardly in a position to
prevent it, but tries to argue that this erotional response
in no way implies an e'notional correlative in the music.
For Helmholtz this is too, illogical - arid
counter-intuitive. .But he cannot bring himself to say simply
that music expresses.. arotion, - and the. logic of
Schopenhauer's philosophy is not available to him. He cannot
theref ore say that our sense •of music' s enotional content is
analogical, because this would imply a duality, a subject of
which this outward expression is the objectification.
The 'state of mind' may sound like an abstraction and
be eripiricafly difficult to pin down, but logically it is
acceptable to the realist as 'will' is not, because it
refers - theoretically - to an objective condition of an
objective entity: mind, not intuition of self, and prior to
all objectivity, but itself object, not the source of all
phenomena, but itself a phenomenon, an aspect of the body.
States of mind are therefore effects of physical
stimulation, as are the enotions to which these effects give
rise. One such stimulation is music. In this way Helmholtz
is able, so to speak, to have it all ways. Music does not
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'. notion as such. But it is still expressive. Yet
what it expresses is not pure subjectivity but the
objective state of mind induced by rotions and stimulated
by causes which may be such circumstances as those imagined
by the listener to the music. What is rrcre, since these
states and their stimuli are arbitrary, whatever one
listener imagines is as valid as whatever is imagined by any
other listener.
What Helmholtz says ariunts to little rrre than a
confession that he experiences music as in sate sense the
expression of feeling and that he believes that others do so
too and is not prepared to dismiss this experience as
trivial or invalid. He really cannot afford to do so since
so many of his best insights depend on the assumption of an
effect on the hearer which it is impossible to characterise
except in terms of feeling. For example, he cannot explain
the effect of the 'favourable' and 'unfavourable'
dispositions of chord tones - i.e., fran the point of view
of the generation of 'false combinational' tones - except in
terms of the feeling evoked by their use in music. In his
observations on ozart' s Ave Verum Corpus, for Instance, he
finds himself describing the effect of the contrast beten
the first and second 'clauses' of the piece in terms of the
different rotions suggested first by a succession of chords
whose disposition is calculated to produce the minimum of
such tones and then by the use of 'many. . .minor chords,
which, as ll as the major chords scattered artong then, are
for the nost part brought into unfavourable positions'. The
effect of the first 'clause' is of 'perfect harrroniousness'
and of the second of a 'veiled, longing, and mystical'
effect as the music 'laboriously nodulates through bolder
transitions and harsher dissonances' a clear echo of
Schopenhauer's description of 'the long journeys, straying
- 257 -
far fran the tonic, the great, noble striving after a
distant goal, and its final achievement, which disdains all
trivial pleasures' which characterises the Allegro Maestoso
of a great work.45
All this tends to the conclusion that the elaborate
experimental work undertaken by the acousticians, and the
physiological investigations of the ear, in the end offer us
no more than a description of the physical conditions for
the production of the mixtures of vibrations which make upon
us such and such effects and the physiological process by
which we beccxne aware of them as sounds. when it canes to
describing the effects themselves these investigations
contribute nothing new. Still less do they tell us we
experience certain kinds of sounds - or rather successions
of sounds, since it is only in canposition that these
effects occur - as 'laborious' or 'veiled' or 'bold'.
Helmholtz accepts that what he has discovered Mozart already
knew by 'instinct'. But this still gives Mozart too little
credit, for without musical compositions Helrnholtz would
have had no object for his investigations into what produces
the harmoniousness of harmonious sounds or the harshness of
harsh sounds, for these concepts are music-aesthetic
concepts applied to acoustic phenarena, not acoustic
concepts applied to musical phenomena. That is to say that
they can only exist, as musical effects, in a musical
context.
The fact that a physical scientist found himself unable
to articulate his experimental findings without recourse to
the vocabulary of the tions might have been expected to
temper the haughtiness of music-critics in their treatment
of Schopenbauer. Not so, however. It merely wrong-footed the
scientist. By the time of the the first edition of The
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Sensations of Tone the terms of the academic and
journalistic aesthetic-critical debate had been established
by Hanslick.
A further level of irony is that while the aesthetic
implications of Helmholtz' s work were ignored, the support
his acoustic investigations seemed to give to fundamental
bass theory, and to the structural and formal theories
derived fran it, was taken to confer the seal of scientific
approval on the official dogma.
On the structural level, in spite of the fact that
Helmholtz' s picture of the musical work arising out of a
single tone is clearly taken fran Schopenhauer' s theory,
according to which the developtent of the work is- a process
of progressive division, his notion of the work is of an
aggregate of individuals, whose origin in the tone is
unexplained, and whose relationship to it appears to
be arbitrary. Thus, while Schopenhauer equates the
undifferentiated tone with the ' mass' of matter from
which individuals emerge, Hehholtz applies the term 'mass'
to the sum of all the sounds which make up a piece of
music.46
It is not difficult to see how, initially, Schenker's
interest in Helmholtz was bound to stand in the way of full
accord with Schopenhauer, just as his inability to resist
the spell of Schopenhauer' s artistic concept, together with
his lack of interest in the fine detail of Helmholtz' s
physiological and acoustic investigations, was bound to make
it impossible for him to stay within Helmholtz's orbit. But
it is equally easy to see how very much nore Helmholtz had
to offer him than the 'negative' Hanslick. Schenker's term
is precise, for Hanslick negates not only affect theory, nO
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only hermeneutics, not only psychological and physiological
approaches, even taking delight in ridiculing the idea of
music's therapeutic possibilities, but analogical attempts
to understand music - comparisons with architecture or with
speech - as well. Nothing escapes the supercilious frgidity.
This would be less dispiriting if anything were offered
in its place other than the wholly unsupported and not even
properly articulated assumption that musical works can be
examined empirically like natural phenartena. It is as if the
laws they mysteriously obey owed nothing to anything outside
themselves, neither the known laws of acoustics nor the
unknown 'laws' of art, and certainly not the will of the
artist, either his own or that of the Hegelian 'spirit'. Nor
is music the expression of Schopenhauer's universal striving
for existence - the will - speaking through the artist, nor
the divine patterning of the universe in microcosm seen in
it by Leibniz or Descartes. It is merely a series of dots
arranged in arabesque-like patterns, audible ice-crystals
from his enctional arctic, like the tintinabulations of his
own word-play, all hollow virtuosity.
*	 *	 *
The German musicologist Carl Dahihaus makes the large
claim that Schoperthauer' s 'aesthetic philosophy. . . owed its
pre-eminence in the later nineteenth-century entirely to its
'47
adoption by Wagner
Wagner' s attention was drawn to Schopenhauer when the
latter's 'discovery' by Oxenford made him suddenly very
fanus. It was 1853 that a translation of Oxenford '.s
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crucial review appeared in the Vossische Zeitung. 48 It was
'in the later half of the nineteenth century' that
Schopenhauer was least in danger of sinking into obscurity.
It seems iore likely that Wagner's association with
Schopenhauer was a factor in Wagner' s enorrrous influence on
music-aesthetic debate and in the seriousness with which his
own ideas were taken, for example by Nietzsche.
It is impossible, of course, to know to what extent the
influence of Wagner arid Nietzsche kept in view sane notion
of a Schoperihauerian aesthetic which would otherwise have
disappeared. What is certain is that Wagner's peculiar
interpretation has been responsible for widespread
misunderstanding of Schopenhauer.
The argument in which Wagner was mmost deeply involved -
the question of the inter-relationships of the various
aspects of opera (words, music, stage-action) - was
peripheral to Schopenhauer' s. The issue which preoccupied so
many exclusively musical-writers: music versus words,
appears only very briefly in Schoperihauer' s first essay and
only becares problematic, like other reflections of the
music-aesthetic turnoil of the twenties and thirties,
focused by the Ninth Symphony, in the revisions. There is
little need for protracted discussion in the early piece
since Schoperihauer' s starting point is the belief that what
music expresses is not only prior to words but to the
phenarenal world in its entirety. The contest between music
and words is, for early Schopenhauer at least, no contest.
As a problematic issue, it cannot seriously arise. For
Wagner, on the other band, the issue would not rest.
Schopenhauer notwithstanding, the debate was stirred up
again and again, notably by Hañslick.
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One of the grosser discrepancies between Wagner's
thought and Schopenhauer's appears again in Nietzsche, and
later again in Schenker. It is part of a theory of culture
which harks back to Hegel and to Herder and plays a vital
role in Nietzsche's notion of a revival of tragedy through
German music and even in his interpretation of Greek
tragedy in itself. This is the idea of the role played in
German music by the Lutheran chorale. This topic is
important enough in both the Nietzschean and the Schenkerian
contexts (the former having a relevance for the latter which
will emerge in due course) to justify a digression.
Wagner writes a history of music which goes as follows.
The essence of antique music was in the tunes accanpanying
the dances which were part of pagan cereftonies, their
melodies governed by the rhythm of the dance. Dance being
anathema to the early Christians, the music they took over
frcii the Greeks was purified of all traces of the rhythmic
vitality of the dance. Harrrony was invented to provide the
expression of which the melody had been robbed by the
suppression of its rhythmic character. In Italian secular
music we see a lapse back into paganism with the revival of
rhythmic melody applied to verse and a canpiete collapse of
the Christian harironic-polyphonic tradition. In Germany, by
contrast, church music was itself secularised, re-vitalised
by the introduction of 'rhythmic primitive melody' which
instead of ousting harnny, was canbined with it to produce
a 'rhythmic melody' whose 'lyrical impulse. . . seems to surge
through an ocean of harmonic
	
'.49
The Wagnerian 'history' may well lie behind the
discussions of the contrast between the cantus firmus and
the chorale melody in the ffrs part of Counterpoint and all
the arguments about nx)dality and tonality woven around it.
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But Schenker' s return to this specifically historical
interpretation in Free Canposition, with its direct
ref erence to Luther and the Protestant tradition clearly
indicates the presence of the admired Nietzsche in his
thinking. We need look no further than this - than The Birth
of Tragedy and Nietzsche' s polemical writings - for an
explanation of Schenker's sense of musical issues as
philosophical and cultural issues, and his scorn for the
academic canpartmentalists and scientistic exclusivists.
But we need only recall Schopenhauer' s distaste for
Protestantism to see that Wagner was no short-cut to the
Schopenhauerian aesthetic. On the contrary, all this
stentorian profundity, all this German depth and solemity
is belied by Schopenhauer' s musical tastes which are
distinctly Latin-oriented, in spite, it is tempting to say,
of his Berlin experience. But it may have been because of
that experience. His tastes were formed before the era of
the great orchestras, grand opera, the Ninth Symphony, the
symphonic poem, formed, in fact, on music designed for the
smaller ensembles of the galant era, and on revivals of the
baroque. Even Haydn' s large-scale works gave him problems.
Nevertheless, there are similarities between Wagner' s
quasi-Schopenhauerian thinking and certain passages in
Schenker which might tend to suggest that, for sane
musicians at least, reading Wagner' s interpretation of
Schopenhauer was a substitute for reading Schoperihauer. It
is unlikely to be a coincidence that Schenker presents a
typically Wagnerian amalgam of two Schopenhauerian notions
in Harrrony, at a time when he still had a high regard for
Wagner. The reference to the musical 'motif' by Scheriker
shows that whatever else he had been reading when he wrote
the first chapter of HarETony he had certainly been reading
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Wagner.
'The sonata represents the motifs in ever changing
situations in which their characters are revealed, just
as human beings are represented in a drama'
Schenicer' s reference point is undoubtedly the passage in
Wagner's Beethoven essay of 1870, which illustrates Wagner's
continuing attempt to reconcile the rival claims of music
and dramatic action.
'Of itself, music includes drama entirely within
itself, since drama in turn expresses the only idea of
the world which is ccnrrensurate with music. ,52
But then Wagner tries another approach, that of making
music analogous to drama. Here he makes use of
Schopenhauer' s observations on drama to turn upside-down
this judganent of musical priority.
'Just as drama does not depict human characters, but
enables then to present themselves directly, so a piece
of music, in its motives, gives us the character of all
the phenatena of the world in their innermost
'53
essence.
The 'innermost essence' cares, as we know, fran
Schopenhauer' s musical theory. But the characters of the
drama who now becane the model for the musical motive care
fran sanewhere else. A page or two before the chapter on
music Schopenhauer is writing about tragedy and he says -
developing an insight of Goethe's:
in the novel, the epic and the drama, the objective
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of the manifestation of the ideas is achieved
especially by two means: true and deeply conceived
presentations of significant characters and the
invention of significant situations through which these
unfold themselves'.
The role of the musical rrotif is explained by Wagner as
derivative, analogous with the characters in a drama, and
the implication of a relationship between the irotif and
phenanena canparable to that between the dramatic character
and human beings is difficult to avoid. At best, Wagner is
playing with Schopenhauer' s ideas in a way which suggests
ambiguities which do not exist in Schopenhauer' s
presentation of then.
In fact there can be no doubt that, despite his own
muddled perception of Schopenhauer' S thought, Wagner did
influence the use Nietzsche made of the Schopenhauerian
aesthetic, if only by influencing the framing of the
questions to which Nietzsche sought a Schopenhauerian
answer. To this extent, and no doubt in other ways, Wagner
can be thought of as helping to sustain interest in
Schopenhauer. Yet, while Schenker fairly certainly
encountered this derivative of Schopenhauer' s thought in
Wagner, and was sufficiently struck by it to incorporate it
into his own writing, this very instance derronstrates that
he, at least, did not arrive at an understanding of
Schopenhauer with Wagner's assistance. On the contrary, he
had to get rid of the Wagnerian confusion before
Schopenhauer could beccne intelligible to him. It was only
when he abandoned the notion of the rrotif as the primary
element in the musical work of art and began to construct a
theory on the notion of the scale-step, that his work began
to develop coherence. 55 The Wagnerian adaptation of the
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dramatic analogy may have contributed something to
Schenker' s elaboration of his theory of structure but it
contributed nothing to his arrival at that theory. The
Schopenhauerian inspiration was of a quite different kind,
one which Wagner could not have mediated since he did not
himself fully understand it.
*	 *	 *
Schopenhauer' s neglect in the nineteenth century has
been surpassed in the present one by the denigration he has
suffered from writers so sure of their public that they
felt no need to adduce any evidence of the evil influence
they attributed to him. The prejudices which made life
difficult for the advocates of Schenker were the same as
those that made Schopenhauer unreadable.
Post-war German intellectuals, not least those who were
refugees, were confronted with a very difficult problem.
They desperately needed to salvage as much as possible of
their cultural heritage but, in the face of universal
suspicion of everything German, many of them seem to have
felt that this could only be done at the cost of
energetically dissociating themselves fran anything likely
to feed this suspicion. What was suspect was to sa
extent a matter of chance. Schopenhauer was a natural
victim of this process since he was an object of particular
loathing to the highly influential enigr positivists, whose
attitudes were much more in tune with the intellectual
environment of the dominant culture of the post-war world -
the american - than those of people faithful to the ethos of
German classical literature and philosophy.
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The desire to posit two kinds of Germanness, one
including aspects of German culture capable of accanicdation
to Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and another which consists of
anything that might be construed, however rtely, as being
implicated in the rise of National Socialism, reflects the
two sides of the problen facing the nigrs: the need, on
the one hand, to preserve sane sense of cultural identity,
and, on the other, to make that identity as inoffensive as
possible. The problen was naturally especially severe for
intellectuals.
In Germany itself the same problen had to be confronted
fran a different angle. What, for example, did a post-war
German cultural historian say about Wagner? He could hardly
discard him, but he did not want to be associated with sate
of the things with which the name of Wagner had care to be
associated. The response was much the same: whatever was to
be salvaged had satehow to be sanitised, detached, as far as
possible, fran whatever was beyond rednption. Into the
latter category fell ideas and theories which were
considered 'metaphysical' or 'spiritual': 'organicism,'
' I 'idealism', theories which might be
considered 'teleological', 'pre-Darwinian' evolutionary
theories.
It is against this background that we have to read the
advice of Nietzsche's translator, Walter Kaufmann, not to
read the last third of The Birth of Tragedy, a work of no
small imxrtance to the study of Schenker. 56 	 5
extraordinary advice is ostensibly based on aesthetic
judgement, and on the fact that Nietzsche added this section
after having intended to present the book without it. Thus
he canbines the journalistic criticism and the
trappings of philology denounced by Nietzsche to justify
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dismissing a vital part of Nietzsche's project, namely to
celebrate the German renaissance and to suggest a way
forward for German culture. Not surprisingly, his other
concern is to rid that book of the 'cadaverous odour' of
Schopenhauer.
''What is of lasting importance [in The Birth of
Tragedy] is not the contrast of the 2pollinian (sic)
and Dionysian as such: that smacks of Schopenhauer' s
contrast of the world as representation and the world
as will; and playing off two concepts against each
other like that is rarely very fruitful, though it has
been a popular pastime among German scholars.
It is depressing to find a similar, albeit less
intense, prejudice against Schopenhauer still at work in
England in 1981 in a book about The Birth of Tragedy which
seeks to remove prejudice against Nietzsche.
'Nietzsche...offers discussion on a metaphysical level,
much of it ($$ 5-6, 16) unashamedly Schopenhauerian in
vocabulary and hardly calculated to impress the
uncarrnitted reader. ,58
From this one might suppose that the realm of the
metaphysical and the language of Schopenhauer are peripheral
to the work of Nietzsche, even to The Birth of Tragedy,
when, of course, they are central. Such cursory
consideration of a source openly advertised by Nietzsche,
not hinted at by his 'vocabulary' but set out with chapter
and verse, and, in reality even more particular, more
pervasive than Nietzsche himself confesses, is curious. It
can only be supposed that advocates of Nietzsche fail to see
the extent of his involvement with Schopenhauer not because
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they do not bother to read him, but because their reading is
hampered by their unwillingness to recognise somathing which
is at odds with the impression of Nietzsche they wish to
present. The similarity with the post-war reception of
Schenker is hardly coincidental.
The climate of philosophy itself, of course, hardly
prarKtes unprejudiced reading of these writers, indeed
hardly encourages reading them at all. When he is not
ignored, Schoperihauer is consistently presented as
incomprehensible. D. W. Hamlyn, for example, remarks that
Schopenhauer' s notion of what music represents is 'not
altogether clear' but that he 'seems to have in mind the
idea that aspects of music express in a universal or general
form what lies behind the generality that conceptual
thinking abstracts frcm phenanena' Schopenhauer could
hardly make it clearer that music does not express anything
conceptual, either anything abstracted fran phencLrena, or
any idea of which the phenarena are the objectification.
In another study of Schopenhauer' s aesthetics Israel
Knox complains that Schoperthauer overdoes the idea of
inspiration and the notion that the artist can 'seize and
ccmrmunicate. . . the qualities of nature without 'knowledge" -
an idea with which even a physical scientist such as
HeLnholtz had no difficulty. But at least he does not fall
into the species of perplexity exemplified by Hamlyn. He
writes: 'The very consolation of music, the very thing that
explains its universal appeal. . .15 the fact that it allows,
as no other art does, the recipient to become a creator, to
invest the feeling-pattern of music with the ixmediate,
irrefragable content of his own rtod, of his own
being...' •60 Knox, at least, has arrived at Nietzsche' s
point of departure.
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For the German musicologist Karl Dahlhaus, on the other
hand, it is not Nietzsche in whose defence Schopenhauer has
to be slighted. His concern is Wagner. At first sight, he
seems to be happy to acknowledge Wagner ' s debt to
Schopenhauer. He develops the thesis that Nietzsche worked
out a theory of absolute music which he used against Wagner
by means of concepts derived fran Wagner' s own thought.
Nietzsche 'demolishes' the theory developed in Wagner's
Opera and Drama',
'....by the use of critical categories based on
Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music, that is on an
aesthetic philosophy which owed its pre-eminence in the
later nineteenth century entirely to its adoption by
Wagner. .. .Thus the fragment 'On Music and Words'
contains the elements of a critique of Wagner which
Nietzsche, by adroit, selective emphasis, was able to
derive directly fran Wagner' s own aesthetic theory and
the two-fold truth it contained' •61
This is a canplicated picture. Wagner builds an
aesthetic theory which, it is conceded, owes scrnething to
the stimulus of reading Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer' s own
theory, meanwhile, would have passed into oblivion had not
Wagner 'adopted' it. Nietzsche, it seems to be littplied,
would have been one of those who remained ignorant of this
aesthetic philosophy but for Wagner. Having acquired
Schopenbauer' s 'critical categories' fran Wagner, he turns
them against Wagner. Thus, while Schoperthauer' s influence is
admitted, it is reduced, and we have to infer that Wagner,
in his innocence, was unaware of the sinister elements in
it. The cunning Nietzsche, by contrast, unerringly locates
the poison, and uses it against his benefactor.
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It uld hardly be possible to construct such a story
were there not some element of truth in it. It is
undoubtedly true that Wagner and Nietzsche read different
things in Schopenhauer and that while Nietzsche knew exactly
what Wagner read in him Wagner had no idea how Nietzsche
read him. Nietzsche was certainly far irore philosophically
sophisticated than Wagner and was deeply troubled by the
differences of perception and understanding between himself
and Wagner, so ntich so that he was compelled, eventually, to
bring the friendship to an end. reover, Nietzsche can
fairly be accused of biting the hands that fed him,
including both Schopenhauer' s and Wagner' s. This is perhaps
his least remarkable characteristic. It is the contrast
between the vividness of Nietzsche's enthusiasms and the
generosity with which he aknowledges influence, on the one
hand, and the veharence of his repudiations, on the other,
which draws our attention to a kind of behaviour which is
airtost universal.
However, Dahlbaus' s interpretation of this situation is
tendentious. There is nothing in the known facts of the
situation that caripels the iutation of dishonourble
rrotives to Nietzsche. But the facts are presented less than
clearly. We are left to infer that Nietzsche learned his
Schopenhauer fran Wagner, which is not the case. Similarly
Dahlhaus' s attribution to Nietzsche of the idea that 'music
is not the likeness.. .of an totion' but 'the emotion is a
metaphor for the music', and, at least by implication, to
Wagner of the origin of the formulation 'deeds of music',
are simply incorrect. The first is entirely Schopenhauer' s
and the second is an adaptation of Goethe' s 'deeds of light'
although probably derived fran Schopenhauer' s adaptation of
it, 'deeds of water' •62 Perhapt Dahlbaus 's acquaintance with
Schopenhauer' s aesthetic writings, as is the case with
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so many of his detractors, was not intimate. But this
does not explain the depth of his hostility. He accuses
Schopenhauer, astonishingly, of 'corruption'. In comparing
him unfavourably with Hanslick, whose 'sobriety' he praises,
he demonstrates the preference for the dilettante over the
philosopher characteristic of a philosophically arid and
philistine period.
All these writers, from Hanslick to Knox, are
preoccupied by the problem of musical significance as in
sane sense related to emotion. For Schopenhauer, the
significance of music as a parallel objectification of the
will and an analogue for the phenomenal world is expressed
primarily by its artistic structure and only secondarily,
even almost as a side-effect, by its relation to feeling.
This location of the significance in the structure is
hardly noticed until Schenker' s theoretical model
re-presents it, and by very few thereafter, despite
Schenker' s promptings.
*	 *	 *
That Schopenhauer and Goethe - as scientist - were
eventually recognised as influences on Schenker is
remarkable in view of the depth of the prejudices against
them and the difficulty of gaining access to their ideas. We
are fortunate in now possessing an accessible German text
of Schopenhauer's major essay on music and a clear and
readable English version of a substantial proportion of
the scientific writings of Goethe, including many
long-neglected, but vital pieces. These good things make it
all the more regrettable that both the second German edition
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and the English translation of Der Freie Satz cut and
shuffle the text, and that the translator's preference for
abstraction, by contrast with Schenker's love of the
concrete, conveys such a curious impression of his style.63
Schenker is in even greater need than Schopenhauer of
translation that proceeds, to adapt a saying of his own,
from an inner relationship with his thought, and which is
not ashamed of itself. It is, as much as anything, to the
continuing rroteness of Schenker' s own work that one of the
crucial sources of his inspiration remains largely
unrecognised and little understood.
*	 *	 *
A decade has passed since Jamie Croy Kassler's
path-breaking essay identifying Schoperihauer and Goethe as
crucial influences on Schenker. 64 This essay is a nre
substantial and unbiased examination of Schenker' s
non-technical sources than anything preceding it and has
set a new tone for Schenker studies. It contains some
extraordinary insights which have been the nost significant
stimulus to the exploration of the wider significance of
Schenker' s work.
The rrost important of these explorations is William
Pastille' s study of the similarity of Schenker' s structural
ideas to Goethe' s norphological theory. Pastille' s study
leaves no doubt that Schenker' s notion of the process of
transformation, without which the structural nodel would
have remained frozen, is derived from Goethe's theory of
norphology. His insights are all the trore remarkable since
they do not rely on the intermediate layer represented by
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Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music. There is no given
musical model to which to apply the notion of
transformation, and such a model has to be inferred with the
aid of the botanical model alone. In the light of this
implied model, Schenker' s account of the inner workings of
65the structure has to be examined.
Kassler does not propose a line of developtient fr Goethe
through Schoperthauer to Schenicer. Although she is aware of
Goethe' s influence on Schopenhauer and discusses both
Goethe' s theory of plant developtient and Schopenhauer' S
presentation of musical structure as analogue for the world,
itself clearly indebted to Goethe's theory, she presents
Schopenhauer and Goethe as parallel influences on Schenker.
The difficulty under which she labours is partly to do with
the Ursatz itself. This in turn arises fran lack of
familiarity with the model of musical structure to which
Schopenhauer refers. So obscure is this model that she
assumes, as most readers do, that Schopenhauer invented it.
It appears to occur to no-one what a fantastic feat of
imagination such an invention would have been; yet instead
of wonder, Schopenhauer arouses only criticism for making
rather a poor job of it. Kassler is not guilty of this, and
her recognition, in spite of this lack, that 'Schopenhauer
provided the outline of a text to which Schenker supplies
the technical details' is all the more remarkable.
She relates the tJrsatz to 'the lowest grade of the
will's objectification in the phencinenal world.' This is a
technical as much as a philosophical misunderstanding. The
misunderstanding leads to misreadings of both the
Schopenhauerian rrodel and the Schenkerian response to it. It
consists in failure to distinguish between the tone, which
corresponds to the 'raw matter', and the contrapuntal
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structure ('einen kontrapuntischen Satz') which corresponds
in Schopenhauer' s explanation, to the work of art as
analogue for the world, not to the tone, nor to the scale
which is merely the abstract articulation of the tone. The
Ursatz is not a reduction, but 'that upon which is inscribed
the work as a whole' ('er ist es, der dem Stuck als Ganzen
auf die Stirn geschrieben ist'), in just the same way that
Schopenhauer's picture of music is a picture of 'the
world 66
It is this false relationship which leads to the
supposition that the Ursats & general musical archetype
rather than the archetype of a particular music.
Schenker' s connection with Schopenhauer is not
primarily a philosophical or scientific one, in the shape of
a morphological model of the pherianenal world, strained
to form a picture of music, a picture whose technical
inadequacy drove Schenker to formulate a better model of
the musical work. On the contrary it was precisely the
music-structural model, interpreted in this fashion by
Schopenhauer in the light of Goethe's morphological theory,
which focused Schenker' s theoretical work.
Modern ccmrentators fail to see this model in Schopenhauer
for the same reason that Schenker' s contemporaries and
Schopenhauer' s editors and translators failed to see it.
They could not think of Schopenhauer as being in full and
intelligent possession of a clearly defined, widely
understood model of musical structure and therefore could
not recognise it. Musical structure, as opposed to musical
form, is still thought of as scthing deeply mysterious
which only a dogged researcher and tenacious thinker like
Schenker could 'discover', whereas what Schopenhauer
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presents is blindingly simple, something all musicians up to
his time took for granted. The composers would no more have
thought of subjecting it to scientific investigation than a
shoemaker would have thought of researching the structure of
a shoe. Yet by Scheriker's time, indeed long before, this
model had disappeared from view. Schenker discovered it not
in the sense that a scientist discovers a phenaneonon
hitherto unknown, but in the sense that an archaeologist
discovers soemthing that has been buried. He discovered the
fact that this model was still operative in the work of the
classics and that it succumbed much later than might be
supposed to the process of attrition which was the result of
the substitution of pseudo-rationalist theory for the craft
tradition in the education of composers.
Why Schenker could recognise this musical model when
neither his contemnporaries nor his later readers could, in
spite of his constant references to it, is indeed a
pertinent question, for scarcely anything in the character
of musical scholarship in Schenker' s time would have been
likely to suggest this model of musical structure, still
less the particular biological analogy to be found in
Goethe, which, with such startling imaginative insight,
Schopenhauer had applied to it, something Goethe himself had
not thought of doing. Yet without Schopenhauer we would have
to suppose that it was Schenker, not Schopenhauer, who
performed the feat of making the connection between Goethe' s
model and the structure of music. Further, we would have to
propose the even more staggering feat of inventing a model
of musical-structure by analogy with Goethe' s model. This
would have meant his doing something comparable with what
Goethe had done in his study of the growth of the date-palm,
but under the restriction that he was allowed to examine
only the equivalent of the full-grown plant.
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The unlikelihood of this is clear. The observation of
the visible development of an object in nature is a totally
different matter from the divination of the wholly invisible
process of developrrent of a work of art from the appearance
of its final form, which is complete, fixed, unchanging.
This process, iroreover, is not even the sane as the process
of cccnpDsition. However strictly anpirical the analyst is,
he cannot observe the process of the formation of the
structure, since it does not take place under his
observation in the manner that that of the plant took place
under Goethe' s. He can only attempt to deduce the process
from the fully developed structure. Yet it is precisely this
process of developnent that Schenker seeks to depict. That
he understood the nature of the difficulty can be seen from
his interest in compositional sketches, and the magnitude
of the difficulty under which he laboured by comparison with
the natural scientist can be judged from the importance he
attached to the minute amount of evidence such docunents
could furnish. Moreover, the invention of such a model is
not only unlikely but would, in fact, have been superfluous.
Such a rrodel already existed. It was the work of generations
of ccnposers. How absurd to try to better it theoretically.
Schopenhauer had two clearly defined existing models, a
musical and a scientific, which it was only necessary to
bring into relationship. Schenker had to begin by
reconstructing the relevant model of musical structure
from scattered pieces of historical evidence before it was
possible even to recognise it in Schopenhauer' s description.
This in itself is no irean feat, as we can see not only from
the perplexity of ccmrientators on Schopenhauer but from the
hardly less serious puzzlement f ccznnentators on Schenker 'S
relation to him. It was not an easy connection even for
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Scheriker to make, much as he needed to make it. However, it
was there for him to make, for the model was there for him
to recognise, to help him cariplete his reconstruction, like
a picture of an ancient vase which validates the
reconstruction of the original from the shards into which it
had been shattered.
Schenker's use of the model, in the light of the
morphological analogy, to delineate the precise nature of
the quasi-morphological processes in actual works, is
wonderful enough. It is not necessary to ascribe super-human
powers to him.
*	 *	 *
From one problem Schopenhauer was not able to save
Schenker. It is not a problem that in any way harms his
theory, rearing its head only in his canmentaries on it.
But it has led to much confusion among corrrnentators.
Schopenhauer is partly to blame for it, since the problem is
present in his own writing, not, of course, in the original
metaphysics of music, but in the supplementary volume. The
theoretical confusion arises when the catuentator fails to
distinguish between the theory understood as a theory of
structure and the theory understood as a theory of
perception. Schenker' s frequent failure to spell out this
distinction, leads to a multitude of problems for his
readers and interpreters.67
aningless sound developing coherence through levels
of progressively refined articulation and differentiation
can hardly culminate in chaos. But Scheriker often equates
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surface with chaos, and, in the coments on the metaphysics
of music in Volume II of The World as Will and
Representation there is sanething resembling this notion. It
occurs in Schopenhauer' s remarks on Beethoven.
Now if we glance at purely instrumental music, a
symphony of Beethoven presents us with the greatest
confusion which yet has the rrost perfect order at its
foundation. .68
But if this is taken to mean that the surface of
Beethoven's music really is confused, it is at odds with
schopenhauer' s own notion of musical structure as he
described it in 1820. In the light of that description we
should be cautious about how we interpret this remark. Wnat
Schopenhauer is saying is that Beethoven's music seems
chaotic but that he believes it, nevertheless, to be
ordered. The order is difficult to grasp not because of
confusion in the music but because of the listener' s
confusion which arises fran the novelty and unfamiliarity of
the idicm. If we hear a conversation in a language we do not
fully understand, we will find it confusing, although we can
readily believe in the graninatical coherence of the
language. But we would not, on the basis of such an
experience, formulate a theory of language in which language
is coherent only in its underlying structure and chaotic on
the conversational level.
Schcpenhauer has two notions which might be considered
notions of surface. One is the Leibnizian notion of form.
This is anything but chaotic. It is, on the contrary, that
aspect of the musical work which is governed by the rrost
precisely definable laws, truly laws in the sense that the
breaking of them constitutes departure fran music
- 279 -
altogether. Schopenhauer puts it better: '...its form allows
itself to be traced to entirely precise numerically
expressible laws, from which it cannot deviate without
ceasing to be music t . Unlike the essence of music, then,
these laws will respond to rational inquiry. The other idea
of surface is of the culminating level of the progressive
individuation of sound: melody, whose special meaning
Schenker eventually, and apparently uniquely, understood.
Far from being equated with chaos this level corresponds to
'the highest level of objectification of the Will, the
steady flow of human life at its sanest' •69
The Beethoven reference, nevertheless, is of some
importance because of its influence on the musical thought
of Nietzsche, and there can be little doubt of its influence
on Schenker. It is highly likely that the problem - a
serious one for some commentators on Schenker - of where
the coherence of the structure is understood to be, whether
it is a function of the perfection of articulation at what
Schenker calls the surface of the music, or of the primitive
form, should be referred back to this rnanent in
Schopenhauer.70
The problem is to do with the point of view fran which
the art work is approached. Even Schopenhauer, in later
years, begins to write about music as if from the point of
view not of the philosopher who concerns himself with the
essences of the things he studies, but of the public, as a
member of the audience, a critic. For the spectator the
surface of a work is that which presents itself izmediately
to his senses. This, of course, is not what Schopenhauer
means by surface in his 'Metaphysics of the Beautiful'. To
confuse the two is to confuse the world and our
representation of it, the rrost fundamental of all
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confusions, the escape frcm which is the dawning, as
Schopenhauer puts it, of 'philosophical discernment'. The
recognition that one can not know 'a sun and an earth, but
only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels the earth',
is Schopenhauer's point of departure.7'
What is true of the sun and the earth is true of a
Beethoven symphony. The musical structure considered as
object - by a member of an audience seeking to be
entertained, or a critic required to produce an instant
judgarerit - may seem incoherent on the surface. Considered
as subject, on the other hand, its coherence depends on its
integrity, the faithfulness with which it represents the
whole. To this coherence we can never gain access by
pondering the processes of our perception, however
fascinating these may be. We must eriploy another node of
apprehension.
Much irore ii'riportant than the perceived problem in
Schenker' s structural theory, however, is the potency of the
original Schopenhauerian nodel.
*	 *	 *
Kassler ' $ account of Schoperihauer' s picture of musical
structure is rather a meagre basis for judging its technical
sufficiency, or indeed for making sense of it at all, yet
without a clear impression of this picture any reliable
judgement of its role in the formation of Schenker' s theory
is clearly impossible. We must return, therefore, to
Schopenhauer himself.
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Schopenhauer presents his analogy in two forms, in one
of which music is a set of pre-compositional acoustic
phenomena and in the other a work of art 72 The second is in
a sense an elaboration of the first, but it is more than
that. In the first there can really be no question of
musical structure, but only the technical prerequisites for
the structure of the musical work of art, even if these are
seen as having a structure which is a primitive analogy for
the musical structure which evolves out of them. In the
second the concepts are quite definitely structural. The
structure envisaged is layered, emergent, and autonarus and
is conceived with reference to an existing musical rrdel,
not, it should be emphasised, a formal model. This is just
what makes Schopenhauer so useful to Schenker. It does,
however, presuppose a notion of tonal unity. The notion of a
single sound out of which the structure arises and to which
it returns is the motivation of the whole analogical
rationale.
Schopenhauer understands the artistic structure as an
elaborated copy of the acoustic phenatienon. This has two
levels. First there is the fundamental tone with its
partials as the most abstract analogy for the levels of
objectification of the will in the phenomenal world; then
there is the scale, the 'ladder of tones' whose steps
[Stufen) parallel these levels ITore clearly; finally there
are the voices of a musical composition which articulate the
levels of objectification in a far more canplex fashion. The
process of progressive individuation by whose means they
come into being implies movement. Through this movement
relationships develop within and between levels mirroring
the drama of strife and reconciliation which is the world.
These voices articulate a structure of a quite different
order from the 'tone' with its 'overtones' and the scale
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with its precise divisions of pitch, divisions which have to
be modified in order to make the tonal, modulatory,
aesthetic structure possible. The voices becane an aesthetic
structure, a work of art.
It is important to make this distinction, because it is only
when we reach the stage of the work of art as analogy for
the world that we reach a model which can be of any use to
Schenker. Neither the tone nor the scale can provide an
intelligible model. They are merely its indispensable
preconditions. It is only in the voices which are the
prolongations of the registral levels articulated by the
scale that we have sanething that can function as an
artistic archetype. The work of art arises not directly out
of the tone, but, as Schenker never tired of reiterating,
out of the relationship of the voices, out of counterpoint.
That is the significance of the Ursatz as opposed to
Helmholtz's single tone, Ftis's tonic, or any canparable
concept. If the work of art arose directly out of the tone
we would not need the Ursatz. This is what Schenker already
dimly knew when, in Harmony, he spoke about the difference
between nature and art and played about with rtotivic theory,
which is a move in the direction of a structural concept,
73but, as he later came to believe, a false move.
*	 *	 *
Schoperibauer stands on the dividing line between
irica1 and rationalist theories of music, which is
exactly where we should expect to find saneone dealing with
his topic between 1814 and 1820. He began Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung in 1814, the year in which the abbé Vogler
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died. Albrechtsberger had died only five years before that.
It would hardly have been possible to guess in 1814 that
Vogler and Albrechtsberger were to be crucial figures in the
development of a new nineteenth century Austrian theory
which would sweep away all other theories and meths of
teaching composition, and establish itself, with a fixity
only surpassed by the absurdity of its claims, as the
theoretical aspect of classical composition. It was only
after this time that Cherubini published the work on which
his reputation as a theorist rests, and this was a version
of the old Fuxian theory, if with an admixture of the
rationalist harmonic ideas which had begun to infiltrate
Austrian theory at the beginning of the century. It was in
the 1830s that the famous Albrechtsberger/Seyfried book
appeared, a canpendium of old and new theories, and only in
the 1850s that Sechter published his major work containing
the theoretical principles which had begun to be established
in the Conservatory sane years before. clearly, in
1814-19, it was not possible for Schopenhauer to have any
premonition of the state into which music-theory would
settle by the mid-century. Any departure fran eighteenth
century notions of musical structure could only be hints of
what was to cane. The transformation of theory after this
time was partly institutional in origin, and the most
influential institution - the centre of the musical world by
the 1800s being indubitably Vienna - was Viennese. But the
• Vienna Conservatory was the offspring of the Society of the
Friends of Music which was itself formed only two years
before Schopenhauer began the writing of his major work.
Music theory was certainly already in a state of flux
and this is reflected in Schopenbauer' s terminology, but it
had not settled into its familiar and, later, universal
nineteenth century Viennese guise and did not do so until
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much later. The significance of this, for Schenker's
relationship to Schopenhauer is vital. Schenker's interest
in pre-nineteenth-centu.ry theory had been aroused by his
work on C. P. E. Bach, in whan he saw the last representative
of an empirical-pragmatic tradition gradually eroded and
occluded in the late years of the eighteenth century by
Rameauvian and other rationalist-pedagogic theories and
finally swept away or distorted out of all recognition by
the Austrian version of fundamental bass theory. That
Schopenhauer' s musical habits of thought had been formed in
the old tradition not only made him attractive to Schenker
when he once properly read him, but intelligible in a way he
could hardly be to theorists whose own musical habits of
thought were cciripletely determined by nineteenth century
assumptions, into which category, of course, rrost nzxern
writers on music inevitably fall.
If, as appears to be the case, Schenker turned back to
Schopenhauer between the writing of the first and second
volumes of Counterpoint, he came to him at a time when he
had a need which only Schopenhauer could meet. It was a time
when he was perhaps uniquely able to understand
Schopenhauer' s music-aesthetic theory because, like
Schoperthauer and unlike most, if not all of his
contemporaries, he was familiar with, and sensitive to,
the notion of music still current, among rposers at least,
in the period of German classicism. In a certain sense the
very fact that Schopenhauer was a musical amateur and not
a professional musician gave his perceptions of theory
greater conviction. Schopenhauer' s interpretation of the
significance of music is highly original but his view of the
character of musical works is .trustworthy precisely because
it is not original at all. His discussion of musical
structure (in its unmodified form) is couched entirely in
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the technical language of the late baroque, its practice or
the theory developed during that period. Schopenhauer shows
no interest in species counterpoint, no evidence that it
played a part in his thinking. Yet he speaks continually in
terms of voices. This is of the greatest significance for
Schenker. Voice means either upper voice, or bass voice, or
ripieno voice, the first two through-composed, the latter
fragmentary, fillers, 'stuffing', to translate the term
literally, bulid.ng out the form. Very important stuffing, of
course, but structurally secondary to the two outer voices.
The equality, the complete and independent develonent of
all the voices in the rrodel referred to by species
counterpoint, is characteristic of a totally different kind
of structure.
Schen]ce.r recognised, as his contemporaries failed to
do, that the voices in classical composition are no nore
the voices of polyphony than they are the ciphers of
fundamental bass chordal progressions. The cocept of
voice-leading employed by the classical composers is that to
be found in figured bass theory, which is not a theory in
the sense that fundamental bass theory is, not a rationalist
concept, but only an abstraction from practice. As these
voice-leading rules in no way presupposed the need to
construct continuous parallel voices but related only to the
connection of specific sonorities, they gave rise,
inevitably, to the kind of fragmentary inner-voice and
multiple-voice melodic structures which are characteristic
of classical music, the only completely coherent melodic
structure being found in one single emergent melody, the one
which presents itself nost accessibly to the ear, which is,
of course, not confined to a single vocal register in the
polyphonic sense. If in classical music this emergent melody
is not always in a high register, it is sufficiently often
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so, especially in early classical music, to make
Schopenhauer' S characterisation of the structure
intelligible. This characterisation derives, as classical
music itself does, frcm the practice of the baroque - not
frcm haxiixny exercises or exercises based on a cantus
firmus.
Early classical music, music contemporaneous with other
manifestations of the German classical , is, like the
music of the baroque, constructed on the assumption of two
principal, fully-articulated voices, an upper and a lower,
between which lie the ripieno voices which fill out the
harmony implied by the relationship of the upper voice and
the bass. These ripieno voices never have the fullness of
articulation of the other two, nor of the inner voices of a
polyphonic texture, not even, as Scheriker insisted - mostly
in vain, it appears - in Bach. Bach' s counterpoint is not
rrerely a tonal translation of Palestrina' s. It is sctnething
differert in kind.
Schoperihauer was crucial to Schenker because it was
through Schopenhauer tbat he carte to the vital insight that
classical music, which he already knew to have nothing
whatsoever to do with fundartental bass theory and to be
incccnpatible in any direct application, even with the much
more acceptable species counterpoint, was the natural sequel
to the basic structural model of the baroque. This model
consists of the basso continuo, the concertante voice or
voices and the ripieno voices which are the realisation of
the conventional figuration. This insight, so obvious and
simple after the event, rendered the whole convoluted
nineteenth century debate about form and the relationship
between form and structure, between harmony and form, to say
nothing of the idea of 'contrapuntal forms', simply
- 287 -
redundant for him.
It is not difficult to see how such notions fitted in
with the post-romantic idea of the identity of form arid
content, nor how this idea, thus reinforced, could lead to
the endless and inevitably arid debates about the nature of
musical content, the gradual crushing of any concept of
a content having a significance beyond itself, and the
proliferation of schematic pseudo-mathematical (gecinetrical,
architectonic) notions of the constitution of works of
music. The ubiquity of scientism and thus of the elevation
of the idea of 'objectivity', of the elimination of the
subject, was bound to make this notion preferable to
anything humane. Seen in a narrow way - the way Hanslick
chose to see it - the Schopenhauerian idea of music as
independent of the phenomenal in a way the other arts -
except architecture - could not be, seems to add waight to
this notion of music as non-expressive, as having no meaning
beyond the internal relationships of its acoustic
components. Equally, if Schopenhauer is understood as - say
- Dahihaus understands him, he can be dismissed as a mere
affect theorist out of his time or a giver of aid and
comfort to the despised popularist 'herrreneutical' writers.
Schoperthauer, of course, gives support to neither of these
species of theory and it is only by wilfully misreading him
that he can be regarded as doing so. It is precisely because
he is no latter-day simple-minded affect theorist nor a
proponent of the various kinds of arid schematicism, so
hollow as to collapse under any attempt to give them
intelligible definition, that he is able to offer a
resolution to the problem with dnich Schenker had grappled
for so long: the problem of musical significance and its
relation to musical structure.
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*	 *	 *
With hindsight it is obvious that the possibility of a
meshing of Schenker' s theoretical ideas with Schopenhauer' s
philosophical interpretation of music existed fran the
beginning of his career as a theorist. Schenker, as everyone
knows, developed a theory of levels. Before this theory was
fully s!rked out, he expanded a merely mechanical feature of
traditional Viennese theory into sarthing with a
quasi-philosophical gnican 75
 This was the notion of
the 'scale-step', a concept, as we have seen, which not only
existed long before Schenker, but long before its appearance
in Sechter t s version of fundarrntal bass theory.
In nineteenth century theory, a scale-step is simply
that mnber of the given scale on which a triad is
constructed in a harrtony exercise. It is indicated by a
Ranan numeral under the bass-line of a fundamental-bass
exercise. Certain prescribed sequences of scale-steps
determine the harmonic progression of which the exercise
consists. Scinetimes, because of the hybrid character of the
theory, voice-leading rules still in operation conflict with
the rules governing the progression of scale steps, and in
sate situations a given scale step has to cover tones which
cannot be part of the triad constructed upon it. Thus the
role of the scale-step is canpelled to expand by the
voice-leading assumptions upon which the theory is no less
dependent than the rationalist notion of chordal inversion.
Schenker observed that the compranises forced upon the
harmonic theory by the voice-leading theory corresponded to
phenanena in canposed music, i.e •, to situations in which a
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single triad, not any triad, of course, but the scale-step
appropriate to a predetermined harmonic sequence, seemed to
contain within its ambit not only individual tones, such as
passing tones, auxiliary notes, appogiaturas and
suspensions, but motifs, apparently independent chords, even
sequences of chords. Later he began to feel that entire
modulatory passages could be considered as chratatic
elaborations of a single harmony. The scale-step, the Stufe,
thus became the germ of the idea of levels of harmonic
control, levels of determination, levels of structural
significance.
Schopenhauer uses the term Stufe to signify progressive
levels of differentiation fran the 'rawest matter' to the
'idea', the purest objectification of the will. No-one
familiar with Schenker' s writings could fail to be struck by
Schopenhauer' s use of this term. His perception of the
develotrient of musical structure as analogous to the
progressive individuation out of the undifferentiated mass
of raw matter through the whole of the evolutionary
progression to the highest level of human consciousness, is
charted in a fashion which, in spite of certain crucial
dissimilarities, no-one familiar with Schenker' s work could
think of as other than proto-Schenkerian. In music the
analogous quasi-evolutionary progression is described as
follows.
'The deepest bass is to us in hazuny what in the world
is unorganised nature, the rawest mass out of which
everything originates and develops. Furthermore the
whole texture of the inner voices, (Ripienstirrinen),
which fill out the harmony, which lie between the bass
and the leading, the melodic voice, are in music what,
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in the phencirienal rld, constitute the progressive
steps through which the will objectifies itself. The
voices lying nearer the bass correspond to the lower of
these steps, the still inorganic, but already severally
expressed bodies: the higher of these voices
representing the rld of plants and animals. '76
Schopenhauer' s idea of progressive differentiation
clothes itself in the shape of the concerto grosso for the
good reason that, before 1818, there did not exist any
coherent theory of post-baroque music, certainly no coherent
structural theory. All theory which was not based on the
polyphonic rrcdel was based on baroque ndels. For Schenker
this rrodel was highly congenial precisely because it
referred to older theories not implicated in the nineteenth
century Viennese theory to which he had such strong
objections and which he certainly did not regard as
representing theoretically the changes in practice that
distinguished classical fran baroque canposition.
Schopenhauer' s vision of musical structure is already
radically different fran any theory of canposition existing
even in Schenker' s time, since the voices, as he understands
them, correspond neither to polyphonic 'daiocracy', nor to
harophonic melody and chord-block-accanpaniment theories.
Students of Scheriker will recognise this characteristic as
the thing that distinguishes Schenkerian theory fran either
traditional contrapuntal or traditional harironic theories,
or rrcdern versions of them in the rk of such people as
Kurth on the one hand and Riemann or Schoenberg on the
other, and, in this difference, will recognise the reason
why Schenker can explain the. entire texture while others
can only explain aspects of it.
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Schopenhauer's use of the term Ripienstirtrnen places his
rrdel. The ripieno voices are the orchestral voices which
alternate antiphonally with the concertante voices in the
concerto grosso. Schenker would at once have recognised in
Schopenhauer' s terminology a style of musical thinking
which, even in Schoperthauer's youth, was rapidly becatiing
out of date. For Schenker this would be a very strong
positive reccttrnendation. It is in terms of the baroque
concerto grosso that Schopenhauer' s notion of musical
structure has to be understood. He sees music as
three-layered: the basso continuo, the Ripienstirtinen and the
Concertante voices or the Hauptstirrime, (caripare Schenker' s
Oberstirrrne) the principal voice. The significance of the
appendage of Stin-rnen (voices) to ripieno is that while these
voices are understood as 'filling out the harrrony' they are
nevertheless voices, they have sane kind of identity
expressed in some kind of continuity, of connectedness,
however fragmentary, fleeting, unfulfilled. (This, again, is
lost in yn' s translation of Ripienstiirrnen merely as
ripienos.) The incanplete development, the inability of any
individual ripieno voice to differentiate itself frau the
texture, to becane a concertante voice is what makes it an
appropriate analogy for a rrnber of that order of being
which is striving towards full individuation but has not yet
achieved it. But the inner voice, however renote fran full
articulation, is still, analogically speaking, such a
striving being, it is not the mechanically placed cipher of
fundamental bass theory which has nothing to do with
composition but is rationally determined before the
compositional process begins.
Strongly as Schopenhauer' s ideas contrast with the
theory which began to gain dominance only after the tine
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when he was writing Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, he
shares with the post Rarneauvian theorists a sense of the
primacy of the bass voice. This idea, of course, is
derivable fran figured bass theory, but only by a kind of
role-reversal: the accanpaniment has to be riore important
than that which it accanpanies. It is the eighteenth century
attempt to reduce musical textures scientifically which
brings about this aesthetic sanersault. Nevertheless, in
Schopenhauer - and in Schenker too, and this is the
condition which makes possible the concept of the iJrsatz -
the primacy of the bass voice is balanced by the high
significance attached to the upper voice, and it is this
sense of a fozm-creating relationship between treble and
bass which links Schenker to eighteenth century aesthetic
theory. This theory concerns works of art, as distinct fran
what Schenker called the theory of the French Enlightenment,
eighteenth century scientific, or quasi-scientific, theory
of music. This is in keeping with his affection for C. P. E.
Bach and his dislike of Rameau, and with his identification
with German classicism.
Schenker' s theory resembles the baroque in treating the
outer voices, the highest (Schopenhauer' s Hauptstirrrne,
Schenker' s Oberstime) and the lowest (Schopenhauer' s
BassstiniTe sic, Schenker' s tinterstinine) as the only
articulated voices in the structural outline. The other
voices develop out of the. relationships of these t. But
this does not mean that the highest 'melody singing' voice
does not also develop in his conception as in
Schopenhauer' s, or that it develops independently of the
inner voices. The two given, eebryonic voices merely mark
the boundaries of the structure. They mark them in a manner
already heavily weighted with implications. From a technical
point of view, what is remarkable in Schopenhauer's
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conception, by contrast with nineteenth century 'thematic'
theories, is that he too sees the principal voice as
emerging, not given, or given only ideally, in spite
of the high level of articulation of this voice in
baroque instrumental music. But here again, Schopenhauer
demonstrates an understanding of the baroque scheme
sensitive to the realities of the baroque tradition. However
fully the upper voice is realised by the composer, the
distinction between the melodic outline and its elaboration
- a distinction whose importance for Schenker needs no
spelling out - remains, just as the distinction between the
bass voice and the inner voices, whether realised
improvisationally by the continuo player or composed-out in
the form of a ripieno by the composer, remains one between
a given - obligatory - outline and a variable elaboration.
Still more remarkable is a notion of the melody as emergent
- because of its incorporation of the harmonic dimension -
technically more complex and musically subtler than any of
the motivic theories, however dressed-up as organic, with
which Schenker 'S theory is often inappropriately canpared.
Schenker's Ursatz would lose much of its inscrutability if
it were to be seen as a logical reduction of the baroque
two-voiced outline in which the whole texture, including the
full articulation of these two voices themselves, grows fran
their contrapuntal-harrronic relationship.
Into this one idea so many notions are canpressed, not
least importantly, a clearly intelligible notion of a work
of art which is conceptually independent, as the thing
itself is actually independent of any other kind of art.
There is nothing in Hanslick - whose influence on Schenker
at a superficial level is not in dispute - out of which so
rich a theory could develop.
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Schopenhauer further elaborates his analogy in a manner
familiar to us fran the Ursatz. In his diagram of the first
level of individuation of the tones of the tonic, Schenker' s
Oberstirrme is distinguished fran his tJnterstinine by the
fluidity of its novenent as opposed to the slower, nore
ponderous novenent of the bass. The reason for this is the
presence in the upper voice of 'passing-notes', the
peculiarly melodic phenatna which, in Schenker' s theory are
the origin of all connectedness in music. The relevant
passage in Schopenhauer reads as follows.
All these bass and inner (Ripienstinmen) voices that
constitute the harncny, lack that connectedness
(Zusaxmnhang) in their progression, of the highest,
the melody-singing voice, which, again alone, noves
swiftly and lightly in [coherent] passages (Laufen [for
Schenker Züge]) and riodulations. While all the others
nove nore slowly without having any individual
coherence. frbst laborious of all is the novetent of the
deepest bass, the representative of the rawest
matter: . . .Quicker, yet without melodic coherence
(Zusarirnenhang) and logically connected progression,
flow the higher of the inner voices (hhren
pienstinmen) which run in parallel with the animal
world. The incoherent progress (unzusarnienliangende
j) and rule-dependency of all the inner voices is
the analogue of the absence - in everything in the
entire irrational world, fran crystal to the nost
Perfect animal, of any succession of - spiritual
- develot, of any self-fulfilment through education,
of any coherently systenatic course of life; instead
everytg renains unchanged throughout tirne, in
aCCOrd with its type, determined by ineluctable
laws. Finally in melody, singing in the logically
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directed, uninterrupted, lofty connectedness of a
thought, frau beginning to end, a fully articulated
principle voice (Hauptstirrme), we recognise the highest
level of the objectification of the Will, the rational
living and striving of mankind.'
Canpare this with Schenker.
• Even in the fundamental structure, the fundamental
line presents its arpeggiation filled in with seconds,
whereas the bass presents its arpeggiation bare. This
is because of the general difference between high and
low register. . .Because of its low register the bass
d±Tlinution always remains nxre restricted than that of
the other voice.'78
tbr is this, frau the technical point of view, a simple
idea in which the melody is, so to speak, precipitated out
of the harnony, leaving the harrrony behind. On the contrary.
'A plain iioral philosophy, without the ilhuuination of
nature, such as Socrates proposed, is analogous to a melody
without harnony, which Rousseau wanted; the converse of
this, plain natural philosophy, pire physics and metaphysics
without ethical context is like mere harnony without
melody.' The higher levels of objectification of the will
presuppose the lower and cannot exist without them.
Similarly in music. 'The high leading voice of the
melody.. .needs, in - order to make its ccxnplete impression,
the accanpaniment of all the other voices, downwards to the
deepest bass, which is to be understood as the origin
(Ursprung) of all the others.
This is the sense in which music, as music, parallels
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the rld as a revelatory caritentary upon it in the manner
that the music parallels the rds of a song, or the action
of an opera. It arises not in imitation of these eupirical
entities but in the same way that they do as a parallel
objectification of the will.
There are ts concepts rking in analogical relation
to one another in Schopenhauer' s explanation: the notion of
quasi-tenporal etergence of an articulated surface fran the
musical raw material, understood as the uncanposed harxxnic
root, and the notion of a statically perceived structure,
picturing this process. This structure can be apprehended in
another tençioral rrcde, since its 'melody' - in the special
Schopenhauerian-Schenkerian sense of the rd ('a melody of
a far higher order than a 'melody' or 'idea' (in the
'conventional' sense]') - can be read like a story, or like
the history of the will illuminated by consciousness.
Schenker' $ theory encanpasses both concepts and rks theni
out in a fashion that is no less impressive as a feat of
imagination than as one of technical subtlety.
In view of his earlier misperceptions of Schopenhauer' s
meaning, the closeness of Schenker' $ mature theory to
Schopenhauer' s is very striking, signifying a change of
direction of great nrtient, or, rather, the final discovery,
as it must have seetied to him, of the right direction, one
which not only made sense of all his previous researches,
but enabled him to follow his own artistic impulses, his own
intuitive inclinations, if not to the extent of abandoning
his project - clearly a psychological impossibility - to
make music intelligible, nevertheless significantly
mudifying the conception of the nature of its possible
intelligibility. Understanding becanes much less an aridly
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intellectual thing and much note a question of hearing and
feeling, of the cultivation in the hearer of the same kinds
of sensibility to be found in the creative artist himself.
Schopenhauer' s fanous remark about the intellectual
incanprehensibility of music - at which Schenker at first
ignorantly demurred, for which piece of thilistinism he
surely made nore than ample amends - has, of course, a
significance beyond the aesthetic. It has a vital cultural
significance. If music speaks of things eternally
inaccessible to reason, Hegel' s idea that a science of art
can make the things spoken of by art directly accessible to
intellectual contemplation, and that the poetry of the
imagination can therefore be transcended, put plainly, made
redundant, by the prose of thought, is mistaken. rt - music
at least - can never be replaced by science.
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3tes
1. 'Em einziger Gedanke miss so umfassend er
auch sein nag, die volikarmenste Einheit
bewabren. Lsst er dennoch, urn Behuf seiner
Mittheilung, sich in Theile zerlgen; so nniss
doch wieder der Zusaninenhang dieser Theile
em orgnischer, d.h. em soicher seyn,
• • jeder Theil then so sehr das Ganze erhalt,
- als er van - Ganzen gehalten wird, keiner der
erste und keiner der letzte ist, der ganze
Gedanke durch jeden Theil an Deutlichkeit
gewinnt und auch der kleinste Theil nicht
i/óllig verstanden —werden kann, ohne dass
schon das Ganze vorher verstanden sei.' Die
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, V. I, p. 7.
Quoted in Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986,
• ---V.I,p.17.
In this chapter Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung refers to the German text of
which there are currently t versions
available, one in the Srntliche Werke edited
by arthur Hubscher, in seven volumes,
Wiesbaden, 1972; the other in the Smtliche
Werke edited by Wz)lfgang Frhr. von Ichneysen;
in five volumes, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main,
1960.
The r1d as Will and Representation, refers
to the current English version by E. F. J.
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Payne, in two volumes. New York, 1965. It is
only in V. II of this work that a chapter
entitled 'On the Metaphysics of Music'
appears. References to the metaphysics of
rmisic relate to this chapter only when that
fact is indicated. Otherwise they relate to
Schopenhauer' s metaphysical theory of music
in general.
References to the lectures relate to the text
of the lectures delivered in Berlin in 1820
as they appear in the Philosophische
Vorlesungen aus den handschriftlichen
Nachiass, ed. Volker Spierling in four
volumes, Munich, 1984-1986. The volume
containing the section on music is V. III:
Metaphysic des Schonen; the chapter on music
is Chapter 17: 'Von der Musik', p. 214, ff..
2. '. . .die Musik im Ganzen ist die Melodie zu
der die Welt der Text ist.' Schoperihauer, ed.
Spierling, 1986, V. III, p. 222.
3. 'die Musik... eine ganz andre viel ernstere
und tiefere Bedeutung haben muss, eine
Bedeutung in Hinsicht auf weiche die
Zah1enveràltnisse in die die Musik sich
auflsen 1sst, sich nicht vethalten als das
Bezeichnete, sondern selbst erst als das
Zeichen.' Ibid., p. 215. 	 -
4.	 Ibid., p. 215, ff.
5.	 Schopenhauer' s philosophical systen is based
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on the notion of a universal will to
existence, which is the source of everything:
Sieh dich doch iin! Was da ruft "Ich, ich,
ich will dasyen". Das bist du nicht aflein,
sondern Alles, durchaus Alles, was nur em
Spur von Bewusstseyn hat'. ('Look about you!
That which cries, 'I, I, I, will exist' is
not -only you, but- everything, absolutely
everything that has even a trace of
consciousness.') See Schcperihauer, ed.
Spierling, 1986, V. I, p. 23. The world of
phencxrQna, 'the object of experience and of
science' is one aspect of the objectification
of this will. Music is another. Spierling, in
- - - his introduction to the lectures, points to
Goethe t
 s influence on Schopenhauer, while
Payne emphasises that of Kant. Payne gives a
list of works on Schopenhauer in German and
English.
Although Schopenahuer was right to insist
-that parts of -his work -- the section on music
is very much a case in point - cannot be
understood without sate degree of insight
into the whole, a high level of philosophical
expertise is much less important, at least in
this instance, than imagination, and freedan
fran the literal-mindedness that so often
acompanies the attnpt to be 'scientific'.
Reading Schopenhauer in translation can be
dispiriting, but for anyone with basic
ccxetence in German the Schoperthauer of 'Von
der r4isik' is wonderfully direct and
transparent, far easier to read than nost
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cQmntators and greatly refreshing after the
dreariness of so much of the technical
literature. If there could be such a thing as
a legitimate short-cut to the philosophy of
Schopenhauer it ou1d surely be his
ntaphysics of music - in its original form.
6.	 See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V.
III, p. 222: 'So er'óffnet sie den
geheimnisten Sinn jener scene und ist ibr
richtigster und deutlichster Iaanentar.'
7.	 Seen.l.
8	 See	 Schopenhauer,	 tr.	 Payne,	 1969,
'Translator's Introduction'.
9	 Ibid., p. xxii.
10	 See Fauconnet, 1913.
11.	 See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. xi.
12. Ibid., p. 259. The section fran 'its rising'
to 'counterpoint' appears to be an
interpolation since it is missing fran the
lectures text:
'Nn schwerfalligsten bewegt sich der tiefe
Bass, der Reprsentant der rohesten Masse;
diese langsan Bewegung ist ibm
wesentlich...' ('Most ponderous of all is the
novnt of the deep bass, the representative
of the rawest mass; this slow novnt is
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essential to it...') See Schopenhauer, ed.
Spierling, 1986, V. III, p. 218.
The contrasting anission in Payne of the
footnote included in Spierling (p. 219)
strengthens the impression that Schopenhauer
wanted to get rid of references to the
out-of-date baroque canpositional xrcdel and
substitute the 'nodern' fundanental bass
ncdel for his mid-century readers. Many of
the differences between the text of the
lectures and the English text referred to
by caiinentators on Schenker are less
substantial, consisting of the anission or
addition of a word, a few words, a sentence.
These subtler changes are hardly less
damaging because they disturb the balance and
rhythm of Schopenhauer's prose, which is so
important a part of the neatness of the
argutient, and they absolutely detolish its
poetry. The writer of the fornr text is
scarcely recognisable in the latter. One
example will have to suffice.
Payne: 'I recognise, however, that it is
essentially impossible to dtonstrate this
explanation, for it assuns and establishes a
relation of nu.isic as a representation to that
which- -of its essence can never itself be
representation, and claims to regard music as
the copy of an original- that can itself never
be directly represented.'
Schopenhauer:
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.allein dieser Aufschluss is von der Art,
dass er nie bewiesen werden kann, weil er em
Verhlthiss anniinnt und feststellt zwischen
der Musik, die doch ijm-ier in Gebiete der
Vorstellung liegt und dem was wesentlich rile
Vorstellung warden kann, dem Ding an sich
selbst, dem Willen selbst: sonach stelit rnein
Aufschluss der Musik dar als Nachbild eines
Vorbildes, weiches nie vor die Vorstellung
gebracht werden kann.'
C'.. .only this explanation is of a kind that
can never be proved, because it supposes and
traces a relationship between music - which
of course dwells forever in the realm of the
imagination - and sanething which, of its
nature, can never be imagined: the thing in
itself, the will itself. Thus nry explanation
presents music as the copy of a ndel which
can never be brought before the
imagination.')
Particularly irritating is the substitution
of 'I' for 'we': 'I recognise' for 'we
recognise' ('erkennen wir') and even for the
impersonal form, which gives the writing a
dogmatic, even slightly banbastic air wholly
foreign to the early text.
13.	 Grundbass means fundamental bass, but
is	 translated by	 Payne as 'ground
bass' which means satthing entirely
different.	 mazingly, the same mis-
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.translation appears in the English
version of Schenker' s Harnny, in the
'Introduction', p. xi.. Other ccmientators
have also followed Payne.
14.	 See Chapter 2, Part 2, above.
15,	 See Todd, 1983.
16. See Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p.
26, ff...
17. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. 261.
The passage beginning, - 'Therefore music does
not express', and ending with the reference
to Rossini is absent fran the text of the
lectures.
18. See Kirnberger, tr. Beach & Thym, 1982,
Chapter 6, especially section 92.
19. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1974. It is
surely not insignificant that Raireau is
rcentioned by name in the Parerga but not in
the lectures, and in a fashion which leaves
no doubt that are reading an adurnbration
of an adumbration. Here, too, Rossini appears
alongside r'bzart (p. 438). A long discussion
of opera follows. It is clearly to this
period that the up-dating of the
harrtonic-theoretical passages belongs.
20. Schopenhauer, t±. Payne, 1969, p. viii.
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21. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1987, p. 16, of
Book I and p. xvii of Book II. It is
interesting that Schenker' s caiiplaint about
Schopenhuaer' s 'lack of clarity' follows the
quotation fran a passage in Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung which is simultaneously
an interpolation into and a garbling of the
text as it appears in the lectures. Schenker
(in Rothgeb' s translation) quotes,
'represents the innerrrost core preceding all
creativity, or the heart of things'. Payne
gives, 'the innermost kernel preceding all
form, or the heart of things' in a passage
(Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. 263)
beginning, 'For to a certain extent... and
ending, 'universalia in re', which is not
found in the Spierling edition. (See,
Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, p.
223: '. . .blosser Form aussagt. Utgekehrt..').
22.	 See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1974, p. ix.
23.	 See Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p.
34, ff..
24.	 See Schenker, tr. Pastille, 1988.
25. For the origin of the term 'absolute' applied
to iiusic, see Dahihaus tr. Whittall, 1980, p.
32.
26. See Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930, p. 249.
27. See Federhofer, 1985, p.12.
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28. See Federhofer, 1990, p. 280, ff..
29. See Hanslick, 1990. For an English version
see Hanslick, tr. Cohen, 1974.
30. The relationship with Hegel is obscure.
According to Spierling, Schopenhauer' s
habilitation took place in Berlin in
1820, 'with Hegel' s co-operation' ('unter
Mitwirkung Hegels'). Hollingdale recounts how
Schopenhauer chose to deliver his lectures at
'the precise hours at which Hegel. . .delivered
his principal course'. He lectured to an
aty roan and preferred to abandon his
career rather than change his time.
(Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p. 24.)
If this story is nore than mere anecdote,
Schopenhauer' s quarrel with Hegel uu.ist have
begun during, or ininediately after the
'Mitwirkung 1 . Schopenhauer certainly came to
hate everything for which Hegel stood.
This might be connected with the problen
to which Payne refers in his introduction
to the Parerga and Parelipernena. Hegel' $
own lectures on aesthetics were delivered
after Schopenhauer' s. The 'Introduction' and
the musical section are full of distorted
echoes of Schopenhauer but make no reference
to his ork. Hegel ' s 'co-operation' can only
have ben formal, since the rk Schopenhauer
offered for his habilitation in 1820 had
already been published, but it put him in a
unique position to make use of the rk of
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the young unknown. Schoperthauer' s anger is
the more justified by the use to which Hegel
put his ideas in the service of an aesthetic
theory which is, in effect, hostile to art.
31. See FIegel, tr. Knox, 1975, 'Introduction'.
32. Hanslick, 1990. chapter 1 concludes in
bizarre fashion with a list of quotations
fran iorks ranging frau Mattheson to Wagner,
all sharing the notion of music as
expressive. He contrasts their attitude with
that of Herbart, who turns Schopenhauer' s
explanation of the external and internal
significances of music inside out. For
Herbart the inner being ('innere Wesen') of
music is the formal-numerical: fugue, simple
and double counterpoint. The 'meanings'
(Bedeutungen) are associated with 'outward
appearance' ('aussern Schein').
The curious thing is that Herbart offers as
his authority the technical expertise of the
'artists'. But who can these technical
wizards have been if they were not such as
- N Kirnberger, Koch, Ma.rpurg,
Gottfried Weber? Hanslick is quite happy to
be on the wrong side not only of these
susceptible double contrapuntists but also of
Schumann, Wagner and Bellini, preferring
Hegel, Vischer and Zimuuermann.
Schcpenhauer says, 'There is more to be
learned frau each page of David Hurne than
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fran the collected philosophical works of
Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher taken
together'. Perhaps he knew sanething Hanslick
did not know.
33. Nietzsche, tr. Kaufrnann, 1967, section 11.
34. See Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930, p. 250 ff.
35. Ibid..
36. Seen. 28.
37. See Hanslick, 1980, p. 116: 'Diese Sphinx
with sich niemals van Felsen sturzen'.
38. Ibid., p. 40.
39. Ibid., p. 39. 'Wir sind zr durchaus nicht
der Meining, dass in dieseii F.1le der
Kcziiponist ganz freizusprechen sei, inden der
Musik fur den sudruck schnerzlichster
- Traurigkeit gewiss weit bestinnitere Töne
besitzt.
40. Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930, See footnote,
p.25O.
41. Ibid..
42. -	
-- See Dahihaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, Appendix,
p.110.
43. See Schoperthauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. 101.
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44. See n. 34.
45. Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, Vol. III,
p. 220.
46. Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930 p. 249.
47. Dahihaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 28.
48. See n. 22.
49	 See Wagner, tr. Jacobs, 1979, p. 24, ff..
50. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1990, Chapter 2.
51. See Schenker tr. Mann Borgese, 1954, p. 12.
52. Dahihaus, tr. Wnittall, 1980, p. 35,
53. Ibid..
54. See Schoperthauer, tr. Payne, 1958, V. I, p.
251 and Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V.
III, p. 199, ff..
55. This insight, of which further use is made in
this chapter, is developed by William
Pastille. See Pastille, 1984.
56. See	 Nietzsche,	 tr,	 Kaufmann,	 1967,
translator's introduction, p. 9.
57. Ibid., p. 10, ff..
- 310 -
58. See Silk & Stern, 1981, p. 242.
59. See Hanilyn, 1980.
60. See, Fox, 1980. For a picture of the
philosophical ethos of this period in general
and the probls it generated for the reading
of Schoperthauer and others of his time, there
can hardly be a better introduction than
'Dialogues' 6 and 7 in Magee, 1978. Ayer's
account of the Vienna Circle (p. 118, ff.) is
particularly useful.
61. See Dahlbaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 26.
62. See n. 54. Schopenahuer's choice of water to
illustrate this notion of the objectification
of the idea of man in drama links it with
Goe's 'colours are the deeds of light'.
See Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 158.
63. The restoration of sate of the excised
passages in an appendix is to be welcomed,
but it can hardly fail to highlight the
strangeness of the whole situation in which
Schenker is treated like a distinguished, but
unfortunately slightly denented relative, on
whan, in order to avoid serious enbarrassirent
all round, it is necessary to keep a careful
eye.
64. See Kassler, 1983.
65. See Siegel, 1990. In the original version of
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his study (Pastille, 1985, p. 133) the author
remarks, 'Unfortunately there is very little
evidence in Schenker's published writings to
support... [the belief] that Schenker's
ontology accords with Goethe's'. Nevertheless
he believes this to be the case, as he
argues, entirely convincingly, in the
succeeding pages. However, the splitting of
theories into their epistemological and
ontological apsects seems to canplicate the
issues rather than to illuminate them. The
central importance of Goethe' s morphological
theory must be developnent, rather than the
philosophy of science implicit in his
theorising about his theory. Unlike the
latter, his morphological theory made a
tremendous impact and finds echoes, not only
in science, but in all fields of study in
the nineteenth century. Schenker u1d not
need to spell out his acknowledgement of
morphology. Everybody had a morphological
theory of sane sort. What is particular
about Schenker's, as opposed to other
music-morphological theories, is that it
evinces a genuine affinity with the original
theory. Hopefully the evidence of connection
presented here is 'solid' enough to provide
further support for Pastille's belief.
Another writer who takes up ideas suggested
by Kassler, the Schopenhauerian as well as
the Goethean, is Nicholas Cook. (See Cook,
1989). Cook asserts that 'if we want to
understand Schenker' s thinking about music
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in his terms...we should not discount..the
polemical and quasi-philosophical nature of
his writings' but concedes that it is
possible to 'apply Schenker's theories to
technical issues in music without much
consideration of the philosophical and
historical background fran which these
theories emerged'. But he does not concede
that ignorance is a good thing and the rest
of the study is just such a 'consideration',
raising many of the doubts any careful
examination of the issues must pratçt. But is
Schenker' s imagined opinion of the use made
of his theory really of any rrore than
sentimental interest? The limiting effect of
our narrowness on our own thinking is surely
itore important. We should perhaps beware of
historicising Schenker as the critics of his
day historicised Brahms. We need to know
about his orld not as collectors of
information but in order to understand him
better, to make better use of him, to
understand our thought, our quasi-philosophy,
our polemic. For the attacks on Schenker' s
'quasi-philosophising' have been a long
sustained polemic.
66.	 See, Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1956, p. 28.
67.	 See, e.g., Solie, 1980.
68.	 See, Schopenbauer, tr. Payne, 1959, V. ii, p.
450.
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69.	 See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V.
III, p. 219.
70	 See n. 68.
71.	 See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1959, V. I, p.
3-
72. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V.
III, p. 217, ff..
73. See Schenker, tr. Mann Borgese, p * 4, ff..
74. See Chapter 2, Part 2 above.
75. See n. 55.
76. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V.
III, P. 217., ff..
77. Ibid., p. 219.
78. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, P. 15,
section 20 (p. 45 in the German edition).
This is of great importance to Schenker' s
theory. He develops the point in the sections
he refers to: 53, 64, 185, 210, 257. See also
section 251. This notion may also explain why
Schopenhauer was seduced by the prohibition
of bass progression by step in fundaxrnta1
bass theory.
79. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V.111,
p. 218.
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Qapter Six
Renewal Through Fire
• . . in our day of greatest affliction, you
have returned. Weiccine, Zarathustra! You will
tell us what to do, you will lead us. You
will save us frcin this greatest of all
perils.'
Hermann Hesse.1
In October 1917 Otto Vrieslander wrote to Schenker that
he had once read an unpublished piece by the young
Nietzsche, entitled Uber Thn und wh.icli contained the
following sentence.
'Whoever takes feelings to be the effects of music,
makes of them, so to speak, an intermediate x)rld of
symbols which can give him a foretaste of music but at
the sate tine shuts him out of its innst sanctuary'3
I-
Vrieslander ccmtented that this was not only a blow
against herneneutics but proof that, in spite of hijiself,
even while under the spell of Wagner, Nietzsche' s artistic
instincts canpelled his thought into ncdes which were
essentially anti-Wagnerian. The premises of The Birth of
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Tragedy itself, Vrieslander added, were, properly
understood, so ccaipletely against Wagner that the Wagnerian
panegyric had to be based on forced and oblique
conclusions.
Schenker replied with great warmth. 'You are so very
right in your observations about Nietzsche! A pity that you
do not get then into print.' He had never had any doubt, he
said, that it was only because of his ignorance of the craft
of music that Nietzsche had such a poor grasp of it. What a
tragedy that he had to turn for help to people like Bizet
and Peter Gast. How different his life might have been had
he responded to Wagner in a more realistic fashion. 4 Ah, if
only, we can almost hear Schenker thinking, if only he
had had a Heiririch Schenker to turn to!
For this is still the Schenker who thought that
Schopenhauer would have been a better philosopher if he had
done sane counterpoint. 5
 Similarly he thought that his piano
teacher, Ernst Ludwig, would have been a happier man if time
could have run backwards so that he could have had Schenker
for his teacher.6
It is not so itu.ich that Schenker considered himself
cleverer than Schopenhauer, Nietzsche or even Ludwig, but
that he imagined himself, because of his historical position
and his musical insight, to be in possession of sanething
they did not have, namely, the truth, and that this gave him
the right, indeed the duty, to pass judgnent even on those
whose achievanents he acknowledged he could never hope to
match. He spoke not for himself but for this truth. For his
readers, however, it sens that, in spite of believing he
had 'outgrown' the world of journalism, he had never really
lost the reviewer's sense that what is required above all
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is an opinion. Even at this itrnent, when Vrieslander had
offered him, so to speak, a permission to admire Nietzsche,
a way of having Nietzsche on his side, what cares to the
surface first is his sense of Nietzsche' s shortcauings.
If we canpare his response to Nietzsche with Nietzsche's
response to his heroes, to Schopenhauer, for example, ('our
Direr Knight'), or Wagner' s to Schopenhauer ('a gift fran
heaven'), or Schopenhauer' s to his 'marvellous Kant' there
is a strange contrast. These writers' capacity for polemic
ferocity is balanced by an equal capacity for whole-hearted
assent to the insights of another. When they depart fran the
views of their heroes there is a sense of developint, of
the new ideas growing out of the old. Even Nietzsche's wild
tearing-up of his intellectual heritage at the end of his
creative life can be set against the strength of his earlier
affirmations. We rarely find such unstinting, generously
articulated affirmations in Schenker. Even his praise
sanehow manages all too often to take on a negative tone.
When he argues with his heroes he is apt to give the
impression of quibbling and these quibbles are sanetimes
simply philistine. The flirtations with the ecclesiastical
nodes of Beethoven and J. S. Bach, and even Brahms,
for example, perplexed him deeply. He might have been
expected to think again about an issue on which so much
genius was ranged against him. But he could not get beyond
seeing these things as ideological lapses which it was,
unfortunately, impossible to overlook. The theory had becane
nore important than the art, and certainly than its
creator. 7
 Fear of the taint of the 'hermeneutic' made it
desperately important not to betray just the kind of
profoundly personal involvement so characteristic of the
artistic tanperanent.
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For Nietzsche, on the other hand, spiritual intimacy was
a great enrichment which it would not have occurred to him
to repudiate. I strove, he writes with reference to
Schopenhauer, '.. . to see through the book and imagine the
living man...', and later, 'to understand the picture one
must divine the painter' This is the very opposite of the
kind of scholarliness in which Schenker found himself
enmeshed. When he admits a personal involvement, as for
example with Bruckner, he sees it as satthing he must set
9
aside in the service of truth. Personal regard, admiration,
even affection, must not be allowed to stay the hand of the
scrupulous critic. Scholarly values are elevated above htzoan
ones. Where Nietzsche praises what he admires, Schenker
holds up as an example what he approves of. Similarly, when
he speaks of what he dislikes, he adopts a tone of
rroralistic denunciation. Where Nietzsche rages he merely
rails. His early writings make it clear that this was not
simply a matter of tnperairent, an incapacity for
enthusiasm, or even the fault of a narrow education. It was
rather the way he came to feel himself called upon to
behave.
He was, of course, far fran unique. The atrrsphere one
breathes in Schenker is characterised by Elias Canetti in
his essay on Karl Kraus. 10 Kraus has becare a kind of icon
of Viennese M,dernism and it is rare to find any account of
him which does not see him rather as he saw himself, the
scourge of all that was false, slovenly, self-deluded. But
Kraus was, like many lesser negative thinkers, of which
Austria was as full in Schenker' s tine as Schopenhauer' s
Germany had been of philosophers, if not actually 'incapable
of formulating a position except to denounce specific
abuses', apt to leave that impression. 11 He cannot have
helped encouraging a joy in denunciation for its own sake
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airong members of his huge audiences, a joy which undoubtedly
seemed to them to be Nietzschean. Canetti describes Kraus as
engaged in the construction of a wall, a cultural Great Wall
of China. It is a wall 'built with ...judgements'.
'The sentry had becare addicted to judgrents. The
production of his ashlars and the construction of his
wall, which never stopped, required nore and nore
judgents, and he procured them at the expense of his
own empire. He sucked out what he was supposed to guard:
for his high goals, to be sure, but everything around
him became emptier and emptier; and eventually, one
could readily fear that the erection of this
indestructible wall of judgrents had beccxne the true
purpose of life.'
Such was the effect of this wall of judgements that
Canetti records with gratitude that Kraus was not much
interested in fiction and he was therefore able to indulge
his love of novels without guilt. (ie of the benefits of his
experience of living under the intellectual 'dictatorship'
of Kraus, Canetti says, was that it 'forever ruined for me
the deplorable custan of accusing others'. Canetti' s essay
is, of course, ambivalent. He is full of praise for Kraus's
'high goals' and for his incanparable eloquence, and clearly
admixes many things in him. But his own judgetent is
nevertheless and inevitably severe. Under the influence of
Kraus, he recalls:..
I had my 'Jews' - people whan I snubbed when passing
them in restaurants or on the street, whczn I did not
deign to look at, whose lives did not concern me, who
ware outlawed and banished for ire, whose touch ould
have sullied ire, whan I quite earnestly did not count as
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part of humanity: the victims and enemies of Karl
Kraus 13
Many years before, Nietzsche had observed that such was
the state of cultural life that the torch was now carried by
journalists. 14 By Schenker's day, he might have felt the
flame had been reduced to a plume of bitter black stoke.
Schenker 's generation reaped the fruits of this
appropriation of aesthetics by journalism, its narrowing
into critical judgement, which was the inevitable
consequence of the journalist's role, the forming of
opinion.
In such an atmosphere should not be surprised if
Schenker's joy, even relief, in finding a justification for
his love of Nietzsche, expresses itself in the shape of a
regret: the seemingly almost laughably irrelevant regret
that Nietzsche was hampered by technical incapetence in
music. In fact it is neither laughable nor irrelevant.
*	 *	 *
In Schenker' s view, technical expertise in music places
the individual who possesses it on a higher plane than that
of ordinary mortals, certainly than that of any mere
philoscphising amateur, even if that amateur happens to be
Nietzsche. He goes so far as to canpare it - distantly, at
least - to artistic genius. But the context in which he
does this suggests that what seems to be an excess of
self-confidence is, in fact, exactly the opposite.
Unintelligent people who lack the ccinpetence to deduce
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effects fran particular causes mistakenly treat their
incaripetence as an advantage whenever they cane up
against sateone who possesses this ability. The
incanpetent quickly transforms his lack into a supposed
canpetence for life. .. . and.. . the capability of the other
[into) sarething pathological, a vulnerability. In this,
in microcosm, is reflected the picture which the
practical man, with his eternal sturdiness, has of the
supposedly vulnerable genius. '
Here we can catch a hint not only of Schenker's problem
but also of his eventual solution to it, and of the source
of this solution, even in the expression of the problem. For
there is here nore than the suggestion of an echo of
sanething in The Birth of Thagedy. In describing the
medieval celebrations of St. John and St. Vitus, Nietzsche
remarks:
• Sate people, either through lack of experience or
through obtuseness, turn away in pity or contempt fran
Ithenariena such as these as fran "folk diseases",
bolstered by a sense of their own sanity; these poor
creatures have no idea how blighted and ghostly this
sanity' of theirs sounds when the glowing life of
Dionysian revellers thunders past them' l6
Schenker 's problem was to find a definition for himself
which did rxt merely satisfy his own criteria of cultural
value but also cairnanded the respect of bthers. But the
criteria of value he proposed were not those that did this.
The things that did - were noney, fame and prestigious
appointments. People like Schenker' s old acquaintance
Malulik were not nnich concerned with whether these things
were well-earned. 17 Schenker could not claim respect on any
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of these grounds, nor could he brush his failure aside by
pretending that worldly success did not matter to him. His
only recourse was to persuade himself and his followers that
he was misunderstood, misinterpreted, wrongly judged in the
same way that the greatest geniuses were, if only $ in
microcosm', and to hope that at scitie future date the higher
values to which he had dedicated his life would be shared by
a better, less philistine public. In the meantime he craved
reassurance.
Kraus' s appeal could not have been so great if there had
not been a large reservoir of people, irre or less able,
sanetimes highly gifted, who felt themselves shut out and
denied recognition by the cultural rronopoly of official
institutions) 8 This was the inevitable consequence of a
caripetitive education system which held up as ideals ways of
living nore appropriate to tiny and enlightened
principalities than to a sprawling empire sinking under the
weight of its own bureaucracy, and at the same time
continuing to behave like the myopic oligarchy it actually
was, a system which cultivated hopes on a scale on which the
state had no possibility of fulfilling them.
Recent writers have pointed to the peculiar
vulnerability of Jews to cultural disappointment in this
situation because of the systematic exclusions which worked
specifically against them) 9 The role played by secular
education in Jewish ziodernisation was bound to produce such
dLsappointents 20 But this can hardly have been an
exclusively Jewish experience. It could be argued that Jews
had two sets of possibilities: the official careers which
many of then pursued with great success, and the unofficial
network - which of course, neshed in all sorts of ways with
the official one - which arose precisely out of Jewish
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exclusion. Schenker s career illustrates the way in which
a young Jewish intellectual could fall between these two
'cultures', voluntarily rejecting the legal career for which
he was trained yet finding the unofficial culture, if still
capable of providing him with the possibility of survival
while he pursued the interests which his education had
fostered, incapable either of providing the opportunity to
build a prestigious career on these interests or, in an
increasingly unfavourable political c)±Tlate, of enabling him
to penetrate the official culture. Like so many others,
therefore, Schenker was canpelled to construct his own
value-system, cultivate his own public, create his own
prestige.
The dangers in this situation are obvious. Lacking any
kind of external confirmation, any individual, no matter how
self-sufficient and strong willed, is at risk frati the
suspicion that his perspective is in sara way flawed, that
he is the victim of sate social or individual sickness or
inadequacy, and is always in danger of falling into despair.
The louder Schenker protests the nore clearly we can hear
the murmurings of doubt, about the point of pursuing his
work, about his cultural role. Occasionally he gave these
doubts direct expression; nore frequently his frustration
showed itself in anger.
In one sense Schenker's problem was eased by the notion
of the death of art, in another made nore difficult. The
position of the artist was now deeply uneasy. It was not so
much that the role of the artist had changed as that it had
disappeared. There was, of course, a need for art as the
gilt on the gingerbread of life. But this need could be net
increasingly by the art which already existed, by dead
artists, above all in the case of music. It was with this
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vast army of the dead, ever growing as more and more of the
forgotten were resurrected by the musicologists, as well as
with each other, that artists now had to compete. Schenker
gradually came to the conclusion that in this race he was
simply not a runner, and he opted out of the role of
performer, in which increasingly specialised field the
competition was hardly less daunting. It was the easier to
do this without loss of self-esteem in a climate where
art-criticism was valued at least as highly as any but the
highest art. Such behaviour, therefore, need not lead to the
conclusion - as it uld have done in earlier times - that
the individual was a failure. In Bach' s day, even
Beethoven's, indeed even Brahms's, the idea of a
non-practising rrusician would have been as bizarre as the
idea of a non-practising butcher or a non-practising baker.
But now the artist' s need was not so much to please the
patron as to satisfy the critic, without whose pronouncement
the arrrphous patron did not know whether to be pleased or
not. Thus there was an opening for the expert who was expert
not in practice but in judgement. In fact many of the
critics, like Schenker, possessed a level of practical
caetence which, in former times, uld have enabled then
to survive as part of the anonymous body of work-a-day
players and composers in whctn history had - as yet - no
great interest. But the new patron, who had swallowed up all
the others, demanded only the best and this patron knew -
Hegel ' s pronouncement on the death of art had reached its
ears - that the best were dead.
This was not quite how Schenker explained the situation
to himself. He could have said, along with Hegel, that the
artist could no longer function in a society where the
constant and ubiquitous hum of 'thought', of 'reflection'
bad made it impossible for him to find a quiet cornr
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in which to listen to his intuitions, to escape
self-consciousness. As Federhofer describes it, his position
seems nore straightforward. He felt that he could not
caripete with the great geniuses. But this should not
necesarily be taken for mare rrodesty. He believed - that his
critical judgeient outstripped his creative ability and was
so refined as to be able to tolerate nothing but the product
of genius. He preferred to align hiiself as critic with the
geniuses rather than as ccxnposer with the catposers of the
present, who were, he believed, 'average' ccxnposers for the
'averag& man.
As critic one sets oneself up by ixrplication in sane
sense, above even the creative genius. This is possible
without incurring the charge of personal arrogance for those
who subscribe to the Hegelian aesthetic. 1ccording to this,
thought' - the function of the intellect - is a higher
level activity than imagination, and imagination -
creative-artistic activity - is no nore than the dumb
striving of intuitions towards the condition of thought. But
if that is true, as soon as intellect has developed to the
point where it can articulate everything, new art becanes
superfluous. The art of the past, however, rnains as the
repository of all those things which were nerely felt by the
people of the past, things which they were incapable of
putting into the language of the intellect. It remains as a
bottcznless reservoir fran which the art-historian can draw
sustenance for his activity, his translation of art out of
the poetic language of the imagination into the fully
articulate 'prose of thought', for evernore.24
It is exactly this claim that Forte makes on Schenker' S
behalf: that Schenker is like a great scientist, who in
turn is canparable to and at least the equivalent of the
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artistic genius. 25
 Appropriately enough, for this is at
first the unspoken, perhaps even unadmitted, assumption
underlying Scheriker's thinking, but one which surfaces in a
fashion which it is hard to think of as anything but forlorn
in Free cariposition. 26 Here Schenker looks alarmingly like
the kind of 'scientist of art' Hegel' s theory proposes. In
such a scientist we uld not expect to find the
unrestrained enthusiasm of Nietzsche' s or Wagner' s praise of
Schopenhauer. Rather, we look for that ratote
disinterestedness, the farxus objectivity of the scientist,
the sense of occupying a position altogether hors de canbat,
the position of a spectator on life who, like the audience
at a Greek tragedy, can judge as if he were God.
Schenker' s irresistible urge to judge is indicative of
the role he perceived for himself. That role was one which
Nietzsche helped to define for him and to justify, but also
to ncdify in a way that was to transform his work, to make
it rtore constructive, to enable it to anploy the residue of
that impulse to create, to be artistic, which had originally
been so strong and which had airrost been swallowed up by the
notion of scholarship. Schenker was not content with the
role of scholar, and not simply because in this role, too,
he had failed to make any great impact. He detested the
world of official scholarship even as he was half-seduced
by it, in a fashion only Nietzsche was capable of
articulating. But he was dissatisfied with the ircdern notion
of scholarship altogether, and Nietzsche did niore than
simply explain to him the nature of his own dissatisfaction:
he helped him to see a possible escape fran it.
We should riot be misled by the apparently negative
assessment of Nietzsche' s cartence to contribute anything
to the study of nuisic, therefore, into thinking that
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Schenker' s enthusiasm is no ncre than a formality, a desire
to be on the side of the the great and the good. There is no
doubt that Schenker read Nietzsche with an intensity of
involvement of which his exclamation to Vrieslander is a
sign.
*	 *	 *
As a philosopher Nietzsche was at the centre of the
aesthetic debate in which music played at least as important
a part in the nineteenth-century as the plastic arts and
literature had done in the eighteenth. The rk of a
philologist whose claims about the place of music in
irodern German culture here caibined with a critique of
'scientific' philology clearly had relevance for musical
scholarship, especially at the very irarent when the latter
was being transformed into Musikwissenschaft, in direct
imitation of philology,.
But while Nietzsche' s cultural critique has great
relevance for &isikwissenschaft, Musikwissenschaft was
unlikely to pay heed to it. By 1898, when Nietzsche's real
fame began, 'main-stream ' musical scholarship was no longer
capable of dealing with the cultural-aesthetic issues
Nietzsche raised, or even perhaps of recognising the
relevance to itself of his canplaint about philology's
treatment of antiquity as a closed historical entity severed
fran current life and art. The reasons for this are exactly
the reasons for Schenker' s distrust of Musikwissenschaft,
namely specialisation, timidity, aesthetic indifference,
coldness, ideological inertia.
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The musicologists, much as they Lright individually
enthuse over Zarathustra or Nietzsche' s iconoclasm in
general, could not afford to take on board officially his
critique of nodern scholarship, and this was anng the
reasons why Schenker was bound to find this critique deeply
satisfying. As a scholar and writer on culture, rking
against the grain of institutionalised learning, Nietzsche
provided a indel for Schenker. He helped him to orient
himself intellectually, and cleared the way to a better
understanding of Schopenhauer. Schenker was able to follow
Nietzsche's retreat fran the Hanslickian, positivist
aesthetic back to a relationship with music nore congenial
to his tnperarnent and one which would be intellectually
liberating, in contrast to the deeply inhibiting Hanslickian
negativity. re specifically, Nietzsche opened the way to a
theoretical synthesis.
Self-definition, an intelligible cultural role, and a
constructive - as opposed to a critical- aesthetic, were so
important that they might seen to be enough. But Nietzsche
offered still nore: he offered a contextual rationale. That
is to say, he provided a picture of the German cultural
situation in which the role - he- offered -Schenker, and the
cultural-theoretical synthesis which he helped him to work
out, were of central significance. In Nietzsche's
interpretation culture - the whole life of society - is
intelligible only in aesthetic terms; conversely aesthetics
is a cultural concern, not the property of acadenic or
journalistic coteries - interested only in canpiling pecking
orders of - artists. - It simplified matters for Schenker that
neither - Nietzsche - nor Schopenhauer attached their theories
to any living religion, but it was equally important that
neither was a champion of secularism. Nietzsche, indeed, saw
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the secularizing, de-nythologising tendency as one of the
causes of the cultural debility of ucdern Germany and this
was a main thne of the book which was undoubtedly a source
of inspiration and canfort to Schenker.27
*	 *	 *
The Birth of Tragedy which appeared in 1872 is an essay
on culture, not rierely an aesthetic-historical enquiry; it
is not only about about the birth of tragedy, but also about
its death and regeneration. 28
 In so far as it can be
considered philological in irotivation, it is so in the sense
that Nietzsche uses philological material as the basis of
his cultural theory. Conversely, he uses his cultural theory
as an implicit critique of philology through a
reinterpretation of philological data.
Nietzsche's account of the death of Greek tragedy, which
provides the rationale for his diagnosis of the state of
nineteenth-century culture, echoes several characteristics
of earlier accounts of the death of art. Like Hegel, he sees
the desire for knowledge as leading to the dQnise of art,
but far fran sharing Hegel 's belief in the superiority of
the intellectual over ail other nrdes, and in its triumph
as the sign of a higher level of culture, he sees the seeds
of cultural catastrophe in the scholarly obsession with the
accuiuilation of arid and unconnected facts.
He proposes ts solutions to .the problem faced by
contemporary culture. One is the revival of tragedy, which
for him maans scxrething much nore significant than the
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revival of a theatrical genre, and the other is a rather
vaguely defined reconciliation between the scholar and the
artist. The two visions are aspects of the same thing, since
the revival of tragedy presupposes the kind of scholarship
without which Nietzsche would not have been in a position to
formulate his theory. But in this theory the justification
for scholarship is its role as midwife at the birth of this
new tragic art. The other kind of reconciliation,
represented by the prosaic art of the novel, is one in
which, according to Nietzsche' s own diagnosis, scholarly
values, Socratic values, triumph over the irrational values
of art, taming than and producing a species of art which is
dctnesticated and canpatible with science.
This second idea clearly owes much to Nietzsche' s own
situation as a writer, and specifically as the writer of The
Birth of Tragedy, which is, as every camentator has
observed, a peculiar one, one to which it is difficult even
to give a name. 29
 Nietzsche's own formulation is perhaps the
only name for its author: the 'Socratic' artist. The
Socratic artist is certainly not a purely Nietzschean
invention, but rather Nietzsche' s interpretation of the
situation of people with a strong artistic impulse but for
whan 'naive', unreflective art is impossible and who find
their artistic impulses ccznpelled into des of activity
which are to a greater or lesser extent intellectual, either
into 'sentimental' (in the Schillerian sense) art, or into
art-critical or art-historical activity. In one sense,
Nietzsche's notion might be regarded as an acknowledgaient
of the creative elenent in the work •of people like
Winckelmarin, and indeed, of the creative elenent in all
constructive theorising. The notion of the Socratic artist
represents, perhaps a refusal to pretend that the
constructive drive in the writing of history, of philosophy,
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of aesthetics, even of physical science, is merely the
end-product of induction. Nietzsche in fact is being
Goethean. 30 There is another sense in which he is giving -
perhaps unwillingly - a kind of approval to Hegel's notion
of the dissolution of pure art under the pressure of
contemplation, which is sarwhat at odds with his belief in
the possibility of a new tragic culture.
As Peter Sloterdijk says, the conflict is a biographical
one. 31 Nietzsche did not want to be, did not feel himself to
be nothing but Wagner' s acolyte. But he could not at that
stage think of himself as a creative artist in the Wagnerian
sense. As a musician he had enough talent to enable him to
recognise Wagner' s genius. He had much ground to cover
before he could consider himself a poet. Yet he could only
with difficulty disguise frcm himself his intellectual
superiority. To put it in his own terms, he was nearer to
Socrates than to Sophocles. The ostensible purpose of the
project which culminated in The Birth of Tragedy was to
establish his credentials as a philosopher. This ambition is
indicated in the opening sentence of the book in which
Nietzsche announces it as an essay in aesthetics rather than
an essay in philology.32
The relevance of this dilama to Schenker hardly
requires elaboration. Without any suggestion that Schenker' s
philosophical talent approaches Nietzsche' s,. it is easy
enough to see how his sense. of superiority to other
zmisic-critical,--music-historical writers was grounded in his
sense of the power and urgency of his creative impulse,
which enabled him to enpathise with ccnposers in a manner he
considered indispensable, but which is quite alien to the
self-consciously self-effacing 'scientist' of music.
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But this is only one of the attractions of The Birth of
Tragedy for Schenker. Another, hardly less obvious, is
Nietzsche's high estimation of the role of music in culture
and its defining, originating position in the tragic culture
which is its highest form. Music's centrality to the health
of culture - culture understood as the coherent life of a
society, not merely its decorative or intellectual surface -
confers the highest status on those involved in it, a
quasi-religious status, confirming Schenker' s sense of his
calling as ccttparable to that of Ebri Ezra, and helping him
to defend himself fran the philistinisn of people like
Malulik. Music, in this view, is so important that the study
of it cannot be considered less dignified than science arid
must be recognised as infinitely nore so than the vulgar
pursuit of wealth.
Nietzsche gives a significance to music which exalts
it above the science to which the Hegelian aesthetic had
threatened to reduce it, and, indeed, above any other form
of art, by making it the unique carrier of a truth by
caiiparison with whose profundity the 'probity' of science -
which too often in practice consists of little nore than
'lack of practice in dissimulation' - is merely banal, a
basic decency, not a noral consumation.33
Nietzsche thus satisfies ts of Schenker' s deepest
needs: the need for a defence against the charge that he had
thrown away his ordly opportunities out of dilettantism and
the need for inner reassurance, for confirmation of the
sense of the seriousness of a devotion to art that did not
issue in artistic production in the conventional sense,
which was scientific without being merely scientific. As
Peter Sloterdijk remarks, Nietzsche had caanitted 'suicide
as a scholar'	 Yet, by Schenker' s time, he was hugely
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celebrated. Schenker, who had caiiiiitted suicide as a lawyer,
and failed to resurrect himself as a musicologist, just as
Nietzsche had failed to gain his chair in philosophy, could
find here sate justification for hope of the recognition for
which he waited with Schopenhauerian stubbornness.
*	 *	 *
Long before 1917 indications appear in Schenker' s
correspondence and in his diary entries of his interest in
Nietzsche. In 1912, writing about what he believed to be a
tendency arrong artists to turn to older styles with
increasing age, he ranarked in parenthesis, 'All this can be
understood fran the chorus in Greek tragedy and also fran
the voice-leading principles of older music. . . .That we no
longer anploy a chorus and in music rk in scale-steps
does not cancel out the validity of the antique chorus and
voice-leading principles' . But there is little evidence in
this - supposing it was inspired by reading Nietzsche rather
than Wagner - that he had understood the import of the The
Birth of Tragedy, or perceived in it the particular
significance it might have for him. It appears rather to be
a straining of any ideas he found vaguely congenial to try
to make than fit in with his current preoccupations. By 1917
he had noved on in many respects ,and Vrieslander' s letter
is a marker of the nore fruitful approach to Nietzsche which
had begun to - take shape in the neantine and. which
Vries lander's discovery' now sanctioned.
It is not difficult to see why, Wagner notwithstanding,
The Birth of Tragedy should be capable of exerting a
powerful influence on Schenker' s thought. Although Nietzsche
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is, as Vrieslander points out, anti-hermeneutic, a sine qua
non for Schenker's approval, he was a far removed as
possible fran the 'ice-coldness' which the young Schenker
had found so repellent in Hanslick. No-one who has read any
of Schenker 's writings can doubt the passionate intensity of
his feelings about art, or fail to be sanewbat perplexed by
the suspiciousness of etotionally oriented explanations of
music to be found in his middle period writings. In fact,
his hostility to interpretations in terms of feeling was by
no means as rigid as sane advocates of his system uld
have us believe, and at the very end of his life he
reverted unequivocally to the notion of music as
expression. 36
 Fran the start there was a dilemna at the
heart of Schenker' s attitude to music. Nietzsche provided a
means of solving this dilemtia, partly through his own ideas
and partly by making Schopenhauer accessible and his theory
usable, which it had clearly not been in 1910. Schenker's
final understanding of Schopenhauer' s aesthetics of music is
closer to Nietzsche's understanding than to that of nost
nodern readers.
*	 *	 *
The Birth of Tragedy remains a deeply controversial
book and gives rise .to vast1y different interpretations.
Even the familiar Nietzschean opposition -between the
po11ine and the Dionysian is regarded in very different
ways by different carnentators and the nature of Nietzsche's
relationships to Schopenhauer and to Wagner are an endless
source of argument. But the controversies over The Birth of
Tragedy concern us here less than the particUlar
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significance of the book for Schenker.37
The opening pages, with their biological imagery,
the notion of art being born out of the mating of contrary
impulses, and the association of one of these impulses with
form and the other with feeling, are full of things to
capture Schenker' s interest. No less engaging will have been
the notion that these ts artistic powers 'spring fran
nature itself, without the mediation of the human
artist' 38
The idea of the highest art being not merely beautiful,
static, unresponsive, but imbued with the profoundest
seriousness and an energy derived fran life itself will have
had great appeal for
Nietzsche goes on to describe the relationship between
the Apolline and Dionysian tendencies in a manner which
Schenker' s later writings again and again recall. 'In order
to understand this' he says, ' we must level down, stone by
stone, as it were, the elaborate construction of polline
culture until we can see its underlying foundations' •40
Underlying the Apolline illusion lies 'the mysterious
foundation of our being whose phenanena we are', the 'primal
Qieness' which needs the illusion 'for its constant
redemption: an illusion that we, utterly caught up in it -
as a continuous becaiiing in time, space and causality, in
other rds - are required to see as empirical reality'. In
Harnony, rather than including human beings in the fabric of
illusion, Schenker accords vitality to musical tones. It
cczies to much the same thing: what we share with the musical
sounds is our 'continuous becaning in time (and] space' .
The Apolline tendency is primarily the tendency towards
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individuation, to separation, the describing and maintenance
of boundaries, while that of the Dionysian is back towards
the 'primal Onenness'.
It seems alnst vulgar - like quibbling with
Nietzsche's idea of Greek harnony - to draw a ccirparison
between his poetic flights and Helniholtz' s observation that
a piece of (tonal) music arises out of a single sound and
that every note of it - relates back to that sound. It is
inconceivable, however, that this canparison did not strike
Schenker. Nietzsche's thought greatly enriches Helmholtz' s
by giving it a deeper aesthetic significance and relating
it to the nature and neaning of human existence.
Nietzsche' s idea of music as an expression of the
universal Oneness' centres his whole cultural theory and
gives a single focus to a number of theories which might
seem to have little in camon but which were all anong the
offspring of the marriage between ts of the great
nonotheistic religions and the science of the Renaissance
and the Enlightenmant, a marriage which grew out of the
rediscovery of the science of antiquity. The resemblance
between Helmholtz 's claim that every note of a piece of
music arises out of a single sound and must return to it and
Newton's theory of colour is not fortuitous. Newton hinelf
doggedly pursued a way of expressing the spectral divisions
of light as precise as the harnonic series to which he felt
it to be cauparable. The similarities between Schoperthauer's
universal will, out of which all individual wills arise, and
the will which is the creative impulse of a unique god is
obvious. Schopenhauer' s atheism , is heavily dependent on the
prior proposition of a single creator. His universal will is
not a concept one can imagine occurring to an Attic thinker.
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The Goethe-inspired evolutionist picture he paints of
the development of musical structure resembles the Hebrew
creation myth, in which the world is filled with the objects
of the imagination of God beginning with inert matter and
ending with conscious humanity; similarly, it resembles the
Darwinian theory which its proposition of progressive
refinement, through conflict and canpetition for space,
seems to anticipate. It stands as a point of balance between
the two, a hint of how far the latter was fran total
emancipation fran its cultural conditioning. And it has a
similar role in relation to Nietzsche t s theory of tragedy.
Nietzsche later said that this book was anti-Christian, and
much of what it contains certainly runs counter to the ethos
of Christianity as he characterises it, but there are clear
enough resemblances on the mythical level in Nietzsche's
interpretation to make the passionate references to Lutheran
chorale less startling than they ought, perhaps, to be. And
if Nietzsche rejects Christian nrality as enfeebling, he
rejects no less what had beccine the stereotypical and
exclusive notion of Greek art, the too often repeated
'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur' which Winckelmann saw
in the Laocoon, by making central to his interpretation of
tragedy the oriental myth of God dismembered but finally
re-integrated, restoring to pre-eminence the power of depth
and seriousness which it is the purpose of the noble
quietude to contain.	 -
• The notion of the form-creating potential of a single
generative sound had been slow to develop because of two
long-standing assumptions. The first was that music took its
form fran other arts, fran dance patterns, military
mancevres, verse metres, verbal cadence, strophic recurrence
and so on; the second, related, assumption was that it
derived its form by means of imitation of phencinena. About
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the latter belief Nietzsche is emphatic. For him imitative
music was 'cuunterfeit' art, music which 'has been utterly
robbed of its mythopoeic power'. He characterises it as
neither Dionysian nor Apolline but Socratic. 'Tone
-painting' is not just another sort of music. It is 'the
very opposite of true music' . If music attempts to imitate
phenanena it forfeits its right to be considered as art
since it is merely an imitator of other art. It is not a
question of the possibility of employing musical means to
imitate phenaena. That is possible but it is not the way
art is made. To beccme art music must go back beyond the
ords or the imagined picture, even though these may be the
irrinediate stimulus which stirs the ccinposer's creative
impulse into activity, and speak directly of the impulse
fran which these rds and images arise.44
When the concept of a generative tonic did enter into
analytic thought it was preceded by mechanistic analogies
which were canpietely incanpatible with it. Functional
harnnic theories confine the function of sound to the
articulation of predetermined forms conceived either in
accordance with the traditional analogies or sane version of
the mechanical one. Nietzsche's category of the Apolline as
illusion loosens the notion of form fran the forms of
objects already existing by generalising it to the
aearance of whatever object constitutes its content.
Nietzsche was indebted to Kant for this distinction between
appearance and underlying reality upon which he imposes his
a.in mythical meaning. But there is also a debt to Goethe,
whoa Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, revered not only as
artist bit also as thinker. Ebr Goethe, unlike Kant, did not
believe that the gulf between the to was unbridgeable, only
that sane different quality of insight was needed if the
bridge were to be crossed. Yet Goethe's angle of approach,
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like the one proposed by Nietzsche, and unlike
Schopenhauer's, is essentially empirical and inductive, a
gradual levelling down of the phenanenal structure. But then
what? Does the levelling down process of itself reveal the
truth? According to Goethe it is the necessary preparation
for the leap of imagination he calls apperception.45
Nietzsche explains it in a different, but related way.
The search for the truth is a kind of hunt, like the
hunting by King Midas of Silenus, whose capture brings only
the appalling revelation that 'the best of all things is
.not to be born' and the second best 'is to die 46
'Now,' says Nietzsche, 'the Olympian magic nuntain opens up
before us revealing all its roots'. The truth, that is to
say, is accessible only through myth and myth is about a
kind of knowing that canes only through intuition. 'The
Greeks knew and felt the fears and horrors of existence.'
The subjective-objective debate is not only about art, but
about ways of knowing.
Nietzsche' s Goethean, Kantian, Schopenhauerian vision
is thoroughly German, rooted in the German Enlightenmant,
which never lost touch with the metaphysical, as opposed to
the mechanistic theories of art which are imbued with the
rationalistic, secular atrsphere of the French
Enlightenment. He illuminates a path back into the heartland
of the culture which the mechanistically inclined scientists
felt to be an embarrassment. In doing so he incidentally
provides, for those who need it, and Schenker had great need
of it, a justification for devoting life to this effort to
'level down, stone by stone, the elaborate construction [si'
of art 'until we can see its underlying foundations'.
Nietzsche offers to this dubious 'science of art' the
possibility of 'redemption' by making it a way of
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understanding existence, by making it philosophical.
The relationship might not be so obvious if Nietzsche
had not chosen to explicate his notion of tragedy in such
overtly musical terms. It is the fashion in which he does
this that opens the way to Schopenhauer, for it is the
Nietzschean-Schopenhauerian solution to the problem of
subjectivity in art out of which Nietzsche constructs his
theory of tragedy.
Nietzsche begins his approach to 'the true goal of our
enquiry' by investigating yet another opposition, that
between Hater, the father of epic, and rchilocus, the
lyric poet, the objective and the subjective artist
respectively. So the conventions of ncdern aesthetics sxuld
have us categorise them. These categories, Nietzsche says,
are unhelpful to us, first because they do not allow us to
acknowledge the lyric poet as a true artist at all since
subjective art is, by definition, 'bad art', and secondly
because the lyric poet is, of all artists, the least
appropriate to whan to apply this description, since being
identical with the imisician, 'as a Dionysiac artist he has
been thoroughly united with the primal Oneness'. Thus he
'has already abandoned his subjectivity in the Dionysiac
process'. This 'process' Nietzsche describes as follows.
Wnen Prchilocus. . . proclaims his raging love and at the
same time his contempt for the daughters of Lycambes,
it is not his passion that dances before us in
orgiastic frenzy; we see Dionysus and the Maenads, we
see the intoxicated revefler Archilocus sunk in sleep -
as Euripides describes it in the Eacchae, asleep in a
high nountain pasture in the midday sun - and now
Apollo caes up to him and touches him with the laurel.
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The Dionysiac musical enchantment of the sleeping man
now sends out sparks of images, lyric poems which, at
the peak of their evolution, will bear the name of
tragedies and dithyrambs.
The lyric poet is 'the nving centre of the sorld.
Archilocus the man. . .is only a vision of the genius who has
already ceased to be rchilocus and instead becanes the
rld enius'. Elsewhere Nietzsche says, 'The individual
who wills and furthers his own egoistic purposes, can be
considered only the adversary. . .of art. But in so far as the
subject is an artist, he is already liberated frcm his
individual will and has becane a medium through which the
only truly existent subject celebrates his redtion
through illusion'.
This is Nietzsche's alternative to the solution offered
by Schopenhauer, the alternation of self as subject and self
as object.
'It is the. . . singer' s own willing that fills his
consciousness. . . always as enotion, passion, an agitated
state of mind. Besides this, however, and
simultaneously with it, the singer, through the sight
of surrounding nature, becanes conscious of himself as
the subject of pure, williess (sic) knowing. . .The
feeling of this.. .alternate play is really what is
expressed in the whole of the song, and what in genera].
constitutes the lyrical state. . . .The genuine song is
the expression or copy of the whole of this mingled and
divided state of mm' 48
Schopenhauer' s solution is unsatisfying to Nietzsche
because it leaves lyric poetry as 'an incanpietely achieved
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art'. But the sense in which his own formulation is offered,
'according to (Schopenhauez' s] spirit and in his honour' is
not at this point spelled out, and the next section refers
to him only in passing. It is only much later when
Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer again in section sixteen of
The Birth of Tragedy that we catch a glimpse of the
characteristic of the musical genius upon which his
definition of the lyric poet is based. This characteristic
is a responsiveness to 'the inner nature of the rld',
Nietzsche' s Dionysian, which involves no rational mediation.
The real source however is that point in the chapter on
music in which Schoperihauer describes the canposer as a
sleep-walker.
'The invention of melody, its uncovering of all the
deepest secrets of humeri desire and feeling is the rk
of genius, whose action. . . has nothing to do with
reflection and conscious intention and could be called
an inspiration. . . . The canposer reveals the inneritost
nature of the rld and expresses the deepest wisdcm in
a language that his intellect does not understand, as a
medium under hypnosis speaks about things of which,
waking, she has no notion. For this reason, the men and
the artist are quite different and separate, itore so
in the canposer than in any other artist. ,50
But this is the idea which actually daninates section
six. Nietzsche does not merely develop his arg.unent fran
this point in terms of the Schopenhauerian vocabulary, as
SaTe caTuentators suggest. Section six is entirely derived
fran Schopenhauer' s musical theory. Every iten here canes
fran the chapters on music and poetry in The World as Will
and Representation, saretines in the shape of paraphrase and
scinetimes in near-quotation: the primacy and universality
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of rreloc1y; 5 the explanation of strophic poetry as series of
images, alternative objectifications of the significance of
the music; 52 the reference to Des Knaben Wunderhorn; 53 words
as analogous to music; the interpreting of Beethoven
symphonies; 54 music as will, the one thing Nietzsche
directly attributes to Schopenhauer; the claim that 'music
cannot be exhaustively interpreted through language', that
language cannot 'uncover the innerxiost core of mu55
because music relates to a sphere 'beyond and prior to all
phenanena' 56 reover, the penultimate paragraph of section
six, where the lyric poet is depicted in the Schopenhauerian
image of the man in the boat who 'sees. . . his own desire
[which]. . .become [5] a symbol with which he interprets music
to himself' approaches Schopenhauer' s alternation between
contemplation and self-absorption a little too closely for
canfort.58
Pnyone familiar with Schopenhauer' s metaphysics of
music must find it difficult not to see the developlEnt of
Nietzsche's argument fran this point onwards as a synthesis
of the Schoperthauerian theory and Nietzsche's philological
material, an interpretation of that material in the light of
the Schopenhauerian metaphysics of music. This impression
remains even if Nietzsche' s interpretation leads him to an
un-Schopenhauerian, an un-resigned conclusion, and even if,
in a sense certainly not intended by Nietzsche, it is a
contradiction of Schopenhauer' s deepest insight about music,
which is exactly that the content of music cannot
adequately be discharged in words and images. 59 We must
see Greek tragedy, Nietzsche says, 	 -
'as the Dionysiac chorus, continually discharging
itself in an polline world of images. These choric
sections which recur throughout the tragedy are
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therefore, so to speak, the snb of what is called the
dialogue.. .this primal ground of tragedy radiates that
vision of the drama which is entirely dream phenatenon
and thus epic in nature, but, on the other hand, as the
objectification of a Dionysiac state, it is not
polline redemption through illusion but rather a
representation of the fragmentation of the individual
and his unification with the primal being' 6O
The chorus, being 'Dionysiac', is, by definition,
rrnisical. The 'primal ground t corresponds to Schopenhauer's
will. The music is the expression of this will, through the
anorphous unity, the un-individuated cctntiunal being, the
chorus. The tragic action and dialogue correspond to those
'sparks of images', 'lyric poems' sent out by the musical
enchantment of 'the sleeping man' Archilocus, touched by the
laurel of Ax)llo. They are the objectifications of the
musical content through form, individuation, illusion.
It is easy to see why Schenker was overjoyed at the
thought that he could read The Birth of Tragedy without
having to feel that he was giving a vote of confidence to
Wagner. But it is not difficult to see also why The Birth of
Tragedy was not sufficient in itself. For Nietzsche music
might be the heart of everything, the source of all art,
but, by itself it seems to be incapable of being a cariplete,
a perfected art, like tragedy. It may be that the dialogue
of the tragedy is secondary to the music, but it is also
hard to escape the feeling, Nietzsche's disclaimers
notwithstanding, that it is only by means of 'discharge'
into images that the 'primal ground' can express itself
fully. Music is not capable of articulating the will in
itself. Indeed, here there is just the trace of an Hegelian
sense that while language cannot fully represent the
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significance of the music, it is, at any rate, better at
doing so than the rru.isic. Wtiy else would the enchantment of
the music issue in images, in illusions of people, action,
dialogue? Nietzsche' s objection to Schopenhauer' s
interpretation of lyric poetry seems to apply to his own
interpretation of music.
That the argument of The Birth of Thagedy culminates
in the Wagnerian idea of the • Gesarntkunstwerk, the Greek
tragedy in its new guise, as, apparently, a higher form of
art than music itself, inevitably presents a difficulty to
Schenker. Fran his point of view, Nietzsche's application of
Schopenhauer' s aesthetics of music to the problem of the
origin of Greek drama and to the solution of the problem of
a declining 'Socratic' culture, such as Nietzsche t s Germany,
is not an aesthetic advance, but a regression, despite its
extreme usefulness as the basis of a cultural polemic of
tremendous power and appeal.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche's notion of music as primary,
arising out of a unity - the inarticulate cry referred to by
Schenker in Der Geist der Musikalischen Technik - which, to
beccitie art, must became l½polline, individuated, formed,
beautiful, corresponds satisfyingly, and perhaps not by
accident, to the already familiar idea of the 'tonic' as the
source of all the sounds making up a piece of music. But it
allows that idea to expand to accarmdate the significance
of the primal cry and creates the possibility that the
individuated forms can themselves be not merely forms, but
the expressions of that significance, not less authentic
than images and words, but irore so. Meanwhile, the notion of
the Apolline, once the imagination, the capacity to dream,
ceases to be limited to the visual, as Nietzsche seems to
limit it, provides a notion of the phencmenal in which the
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musical substance can find objectification - definition,
articulation, beauty, clarity, in a crd, take shape,
'beccaie', without resorting to the imitation of other
phencinena. This notion, in addition, has nothing to do with
the 'scientific' notion of the patterns into which the
musical structure can be analysed, but has everything to do
with that kind of science which proposes a kinship between
nature and art, namely Goethean science, which was so
powerful an influence on Schopenhauer' s thought and
therefore - and undoubtedly also directly - on
Nietzsche' s.61
Clearly Schenker had several incentives arid several
routes to a notion of a generative impulse at vrk in nature
and in art, and the similarities are far rrre profound than
notions picked up in passing merely as part of the
Zeitgeist. Goethe the scientist is the great inspiration,
the great energiser of the creative, as opposed to the
aridly critical-analytic side of nineteenth-century
aesthetics, and much nx)re. His rejection and neglect is a
nonumant to the philistinism which issued in that nost
deadening of twentieth-century orthodoxies, the
thought-policing which forbids us to speak of that
which we do not know with certainty. The consequence of
this kind of inhibition is perfectly exlified by a
svrk like The Beautiful in Music which consists of the
progressive elimination of every possible way of thinking
aböüt. nnisia; outside the art-historical, which contains
any trace of illumination or joy.
In Schopenhauer, as we nave seen, this notion of a
representation of the will consisting of the interplay of
articulated forms in pure sound preceded Nietzsche's notion
of its discharge into images and ords. But it may have
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taken the stimulus of The Birth of Tragedy to bring home to
Schenker its full significance, and, no less important, its
essential simplicity. For Schopenhauer, far from inventing a
notion of nuisical structure, merely describes an existing
one, which no one had done in such a way before, because
those who understood it well enough were lying asleep in the
midday sun under the twin spells of Dionysian enchanbnent
and Apollo's laurel, emanating divine sparks.
For Schopenhauer there is no problen about music's
expressive capacity. Its ability to express, to speak, is
supret, far exceeding that of any other art. Nor is there
anything false about our sense that what it expresses is
related to our deepest feelings, and he 	 the probl
for Schenker, who speaks in highly Schopenhauerian fashion
about this in F'ree Ccttiposition. 62 only, Schopenhauer reminds
us, and here his emphasis is different fran Nietzsche' s in a
way that is significant for Schenker, we should not imagine
that when we tell ourselves stories about what the music is
saying, these are either necessarily or exclusively the
stories the music is trying to tell us and which, because of
its inadequacy, we have to supply for ourselves. It is
because our intellectual faculty is incapable of
understanding the language of music that we feel a need to
reinterpret it in the language of images and rds.
Nevertheless, these re-interpretations are analogica].
representations, faute de mieux. They are not translations.
It is, of course, only sure listeners who propose
visual or conceptual illusions to themselves as they listen.
Many find this way of listening a block to full engagrent
with the 'inner significance' of the music. This is not to
say that such listeners are t±ierefore confined to listening
to the markers of the music' s mathematically expressible
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structure, any rore than the reader of a novel has to choose
between reading the story and reading the syntax.
It should not surprise us that Nietzsche the
philologist - while he does not deny that music is fully
capable of 'discharging' its own meanings by means of its
own language, and says that the meaning of myth cannot be
fully discharged in images - could not escape implying by
his theory of words and images emerging fran the music that
this is the only way in which these meanings can be made
accessible to us. It is this implied denial of the
possibility of music as an autonarous art and the apparent
elevation of drama over music, despite the ascription of
priority to music, with which Schenker was bound to dissent.
Nietzsche's theory, however, helps to illuminate what
appears to be a strange contradiction in Schenker: the
notion that music began by imitating words, that before
music existed as an independent art it existed as an art
which took its form fran words. 63 Ni idea of such a
pre-Dionysian music also exists in Nietzsche.
In Nietzsche's description, pre-Dionysian Apolline
music has two characteristics which, again, could have been
derived fran Schopenhauer. One of these is abstraction. This
must be the 'empty generality of abstraction' which
Schopenhauer contrasts with the abstraction of musical form
which is canparable to geatrical figures and numbers,
precise as well as universal, observable as the 'forms of
all possible objects of experience' 64 It cannot be the
latter because that is autoncitcus, and Apolline music is, by
definition, externally determined. The other characteristic
is the 'conscious intentionality of conceptually mediated
imitation' 65 The historical entity - pre-Dionysian music -
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is thus the close relative of all 'imitative, pictorial
music', but it is not identical with it. Pre-Dionysian music
imitates feelings and pictures no more than it expresses the
will. The object of its imitation is not the content of the
words but the form of the utterance.
The same is true of Schenker' s music 'of the
prehistoric era'. Before music had developed its own
rationale it was 'daninated by the needs of the word, the
march, the dance', Nietzsche's 'polline states' • 'The word
alone was the generator of tone successions.' A 'tone
succession' is not a melody. A melody has its own
'rationale' • 'In melody,' says Schopenhauer, 'proceeding in
the exalted, singing, directed, uninterrupted, meaningful
coherence of a thought fran beginning to end. . .we recognise
the highest level of the objectification of the win...'.66
We do not recognise this in a 'succession of tones'
determined by the needs of the word. What Schenker has in
mind, what he recognises clearly in Nietzsche, is the
musical imitation not of the significance of the words but
of their rhetorical gestures. He is talking about a kind of
music typified by what we know as recitative, as he had
already indicated in the passage in Harmony to which this
passage is closely related, and which is not, as we might be
tanpted to think, one of those conventions, like the theory
of modulation, which he later jettisoned.67
Because he says that 'the erotional_power of thetone!_
is excluded in Apolline music we cannot assume that
Nietzsche is identifying Apolline music with the aesthetic
category of restraint. If this is part of his meaning it is
so in a very particular way. For what he is saying is that
there is nothing to restrain. The emotional potential is not
restrained, not balanced by Apolline form, it is simply
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excluded altogether. There is no independent musical form
because there is no content. Thus the idea of an aesthetic
category - a category of works - which could be called
Apolline is meaningless. Works of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries may have Apolline music in then and
they may tend towards the Apofline but there can be no such
thing as an Apolline work, still less an Apolline genre.
Schenker says that this word-determined music
'continued even for a considerable time into the historical
age of counterpoint, of ronody, and in the newly found vocal
forms which, without rTodification were transferred to
instruments'. He is proposing a kind of historical scenario
in which the Dionysian substance tries to enter the hollow
Apolline rhetorical forms, in which musical patterns, which
in their origin are wholly determined by the cadences of
speech, gradually take on a life of their own. There is a
constant struggle between the needs of the music and the
needs of the word. This is not a sinçle history in which
there was first word-daninated nusic and then absolute
music. The recognition that there could be music which was
wholly independent of the word came very late, although the
reality of the superior expressive power of music had long
been so well understood that it had often provoked a
determination to suppress it. He goes on to explain how the
Italian technique of diminution suggested the possibility of
forms determined by the musical inilse rather than by the
gestures of the languag, and then he introduces his
nationalistic note. Italian diminution did not fulfil its
potential precisely because it could not finally break away
frau the word. It was German music which achieved this. And
what does Schenker see as the great liberating force in
German music, which enabled . it to develop diminutiona].
techniques which would give rise to autonanous musical
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forms, to works which were wholly musical?
The answer to this brings us full circle, back to
Nietzsche ' s idea of the source of tragedy as the spirit of
music as it expresses itself in lyrical poetry, the poetry
which, like folk-song, is an attempt to embody in the
Apolline - words, images - that which the music expresses
directly. For the great well-spring of German music is the
Lutheran chorale, this being the expression of German-ness,
German Protestantism, German depth, German intensity of
feeling, German seriousness. For the Lutheran chorale is the
marriage of the music of German folk-song and Christian
mythology, which is thus rescued fran ecclesiastical
abstraction and restored to the folk. If, at this point we
were to turn back to Counterpoint, we would find Schenker
strenuously dionstrating the difference between a chorale
melody and a mare 'succession of tones' known as the cantus
firmus. 68
 Everything cares together for Schenker as for
Nietzsche: Dionysus, myth, music, Germany.
'[We] might. . . congratulate ourselves that this so
questionable culture of ours has as yet nothing in
camon with the noble core of our people' s character.
On the contrary, all our hopes stretch out lovingly
towards the perception that. . .there is concealed a
glorious, intrinsically healthy, prItrtrdia1 per.. .It
is fran this abyss that the German Reformation came
forth: and in its chorales the future tune of German
music resounded for the first time. So deep, courageous
and spiritual, so exuberantly good and tender did this
chorale of Luther sound - as the first Dionysian luring
call breaking forth fran dense thickets at the approach
of spring. rind, in cciiipeting echoes the solemnly
exuberant procession of Dionysian revellers responded,
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to whan we are indebted for German music' •69
*	 *	 *
Nietzsche's theory of the priority of music is
unthinkable without Schopenhauer' s but the intelligibility
of the musical significance of Schopenhauer' s theory is not,
in the end, enhanced by Nietzsche' s. While Schopenhauer
stresses the absence of any relationship of necessity
between music and the words of a song or of an opera, its
independence of any phenanenal manifestation, or any
secondary representation, Nietzsche reinstates, or at least
is in danger of seeming to reinstate, just such a relation
of necessity, if in the opposite direction fran the one
usually understood. The verbalisation and image-making which
occur in a musical context are wholly riotivated by and
dependent upon the music. They are the Apolline forms by
xreans of which the listener and the poet alike attempt to
give phenarenal or quasi-phenanenal shape to the music' s
content, its (Schopenhauerian) 'deeper significance'.
However, the supreme status Nietzsche accords to tragedy
cannot help leaving us with the impression that these
phenanenal forms are indispensable to the articulation of
the ITeaning of the music, that it can never articulate its
own meanings.
The importance of Nietzsche' s idea for Schenker is not,
however, to do with image-making, but with the notion that
musical content is prior to arid determines artistic form.
With the superiority of his musical insight, which is not
invalidated by his tendency to boast about it, Schenker can
take this idea and replace the Nietzschean notion of the
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Apolline as visual with the concept of a form which may be
represented visually by analogy, but in itself is the
antithesis of the visual, a purely auditory, a purely
musical form. In this way he was able to solve the probln
that paralysed Harislick. In his early writings, like
Hanslick, he took content to be configurations of notes. He
called than notfs 70 But ntifs are forms not contents.
Eventually Schenker abandoned this idea in favour of a
notion of form as sarething which can only be perceived as
the space occupied by the content. The creative force -
whatever understand that to be - gives rise to a sonic
entity which emerges fran undifferentiated sound, develops
and makes roan for itself, takes shape. Form is not irriposed
fran without as in the imitative arts which assume the forms
of natural phenanena, but is articulated gradually fran
within.
Schenker' s image for the initiation of the process is
of an original space-creating gesture which consists of the
first differentiation of the tones of the triad, and the
first melodic line, their expansion into a space which they
articulate by means of their expansion. Fran there, through
the processes of elaboration whose exegesis requires the
technical understanding of canposition (the Leibnizian
arithmetic) on through years of Socratic - better Goethean
- 'calm contatiplation', Schenker traces the gradual
expression of the musical will as it takes on its Apolline
form and aterges into the phenanenal rld as a fully
articulated rk of art.
Now it is possible to see what Schenker had in mind
when he regretted Nietzsche's lack of technical knowledge.
It is not just the disgrun€latient of the expert at the
interference of the philosopher, as his earlier similar
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remark about Schopenhauer had been, but a sense that
Nietzsche glossed over a level of his own theory because he
did not have the technical insight to explore it or even to
suspect its existence. This lack, moreover, was not merely a
personal one, but the result of the dissemination of the
false theoretical notions which Schenker was continually
struggling to eradicate. Schenker' s remark is a camnt on
the state of culture very much in tune with Nietzsche' S
own. Schenker ' s theory develops Nietzsche' s expansion of
Schopenhauer' s notion of music by filling it out with the
'thoroughgoing precise particularity' of music itself.
If we are determined to read Schenker in literal-minded
fashion, we will not get very far. The rhapsodic, poetic
expression of his last book is partly the product of his
growing recognition that the attempt to express these ideas
fully in purely literal terms is, by definition, impossible,
hence his increasing reliance on graphic exposition. He had
become less Socratic and more artistic, taking the point
which Hanslick himself had failed to take of his own
Schopenhauerian dictum that 'music is a language which
cannot be translated', and demanding that the reader make an
effort of imagination.
*	 *	 *
Our consideration of The Birth of Tragedy could, fran
the point of view of its contribution to Schenker's
theoretical synthesis, stop at this point if Schenker' s
interest in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in the second decade
of the century had been purely theoreticaf. The theoretical
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significance to his rk of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer,
which had been there all along, undoubtedly presented
itself more clearly, partly because of the stage of
developnEnt his own thinking had reached, partly because of
the appearance of the new edition of Schopenhauer and partly
because of the political situation. Schenker's personal
circumstances - he was now middle-aged, his health was not
good and his hopes of ever gaining an institutional
appointment were becaning ever more renote - must have given
the anti-institutional polemics of both men particular
piquancy for him, and, as has already been observed, The
Birth of Tragedy is far more than an exercise in philology,
if it is that at all. The cultural critique which
constitutes the last third of the book depends more on
Nietzsche's account of the developrnt and decline of the
tragedy than the account of its origins which is of the most
direct relevance to Schenker' s theoretical concerns. As it
cannot be understood without this context, the context must
briefly be examined.
Nietzsche begins his account of the development of the
dramatic character of the tragedy by defending Schiller' s
'pseudo-idealism' against the naturalism of his own day.71
The stage on which the drama was enacted represents an
'ideal' place, cariparable to that ideal place which the
Greeks called 'Olympus', and it was as real to them as
Olympus was, without being real in the sense in which daily
life is real. On the contrary, just as civilisation is
'annulled' by music 'as lamplight is annulled by the light
of day' so the social and political realities of Greek life
were annulled by the 'satyr chorus. . . living ineradicably
behind all civilisation...'. The danger in this is that on
returning to the everyday the tragic spectator is struck by
a debilitating sense of its absurdity and may sink into
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Hamlet-like lethargy. It is, however, not 'reflection', the
Hegelian contemplation, which paralyses him, but
understanding which has been given him through the chorus,
'in a single glimpse'. What saves him fran this paralysis is
art. But this art, tragic art - which alone possesses this
redeeming power - has nothing to do with the pastoral idyll
of the cultural masquerade. Much later, in section nineteen,
Nietzsche elaborates on the cultural 'lie' of the pastoral
in an attack on the first attempt to revive Greek drama,
Italian opera: this is a topic which Schenker takes up in
his ccirlparison of Italian and German 'diminution' in Free
Ccinposition.72
We have already seen how Nietzsche understands the
dramatic dialogue, personae and action as the Apolline
distillation of the Dionysian truth into the imagery of the
dream, which veils reality, making it endurable. The
Dionysian lyric inspiration is condensed in epic forms. P3nd
these forms have healing power. Nietzsche writes in a way
that tells us he has been reading Goethe on the subject of
light. When we look into the sun and turn away we see
patches of darkness. When we look into the terrible
darkness of the dithyrambic abyss and turn away we see
patches of healing, consoling light. These light-patches are
the polline masks of the Sophoclean and Aeschylean heroes.
This is the sense in which art restores the spectator' s
courage to go on with life. This is the real meaning of
'Greek cheerfulness', not the 'untroubled contentment' of
the catiplacent spectator of the merely beautiful. The
consolation of art lies in its Pratethean challenge to the
gods, its defiant rivalry in creativity.
hI\'.o developaents led to the demise of tragedy. One was
the loss of the sense of myth as myth and its substitution
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by the notion of myth as cult-validating history, the
second was the related phenarenon of dramatic realism,
the representation of the ordinary individual in all the
'bourgeois mediocrity' of his ordinariness, with his
'mundane, ccamcnplace everyday-life', on the stage.
Euripides 'brought the spectator onto the stage', taught him
to philosophise, enlightened him, made him shrewd and
74 I
entertained him with images of cunning and guile. The
pleasure of the nnt, wit, whimsy and caprice', the
characteristics of the slave mentality, 'came into their
own' with Euripides .
What also came into its own was critical aesthetics,
judgnt, which dananded intelligibility above all.
Euripides ensures this by means of his prologue, which
provides all the information the spectator requires to
understand the story. But he also makes the drama
intelligible in another sense. It is no longer a series of
incanprehensible happenings to which the mythic
protagonists, the 'patches of light' respond with
incorrehensible lamentations and exultations, but the
actions of ordinary individuals with ordinary individual
aictions. Tb express this in Schopenhauerian terms we might
say that the feelings read into music by the listener in his
attt to interpret it are no longer merely analogous to
the cosmic ecstasy of the Dionysian will, but correspond to
all that is actually to be found in the Euripidean drama.
Euripides himself is the archetype of the sceptical
spectator, but there is, Nietzsche says, a second spectator,
so sceptical as to be incapable of acknowledging the
validity of art at all. This spectator is Socrates.
Socrates demanded intelligibility not merely on
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aesthetic but also on noral grounds. He abhorred the
irrational, the instinctive. For him the tragedy was
senseless, it did not 'tell what's true', that is, what is
ascertainable as a matter of fact, and it served no
practical purpose. He was, says Nietzsche, 'the opponent of
' who was forced to flee 'into the depths of the
sea'. But his poetry escaped total destruction when the
Platonic 'life-boat', that genre which was a canpendium of
all genres, the Platonic dialogue, 'crarrd them into its
narrow space' and carried them into a new rld where they
found a hate in a new art-f orru: the novel . The drama,
however, took a 'death-leap into bourgeois theatre'.
The crucial factor in the death of tragedy is the
abolition of the chorus. Wnat has gone before makes it
sufficiently clear why tragedy cannot survive without the
chorus and why the chorus could not survive in a drama which
sought to replace action with dialectic, divine ecstasy with
individual totion, epic with schematic narrative, in order
to be rational, representative, intelligible.
But Socrates, just before his death, in response to a
dream in which he was adnonished 'Socrates, make music',
wrote a hymn to Apollo. This inconsistent act pranpts
Nietzsche to envisage Socrates asking himself, 'Might there
be a realm of wisdan frau which the logician is excluded?
Might art even be a necessary correlative and supplement to
science?' 76
At this point Nietzsche noves to a consideration of the
nature of the Socratic, the 'theoretical man', which
strictly speaking can have little to do with his theme, the
origin of tragedy. But it turns out to have everything to do
with his thene of its re-birth. For the re-birth of tragedy
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is the solution to the problem of a senescent Socratic
culture such as Nietzsche believed he found himself born
into. The significance of the Socratic music-making now
beccznes apparent: Socrates' s valedictory hymn is a reaction
to the excess of the theoretical in himself, and his future
role will be to provoke such reactions by just that excess.
Socrates 'established a canton network of rational thought
across the globe' • It is impossible to overestimate the
power, the beneficial effect on human life, the joy of that
achievnt. -But it is capable of excess. It 'rushes to its
boundaries' where 'the gifted man' finds himself facing the
'ineffable' where logic and empirical knowledge cannot help
him, where he canes to a new knowledge, tragic knowledge,
which only art can make bearable. Will there cane now a
'music-making Socrates'
Wriat canes here is a long critique of the Socratic
excess of the optimistic '1lexandrian' culture in which
knowledge, science, is elevated acc'je everjthing, a
to which be recruits Kant and Schopenhauer, whose insight
that the enanenal world is a 'veil of Maya' ushers in a
new tragic culture. Meanwhile, art languishes. Enmeshed in
philology and art-history, timid theoretical man sees life
as an icy river along whose banks he runs up and down afraid
to jump in. He becanes a 'critic' a 'librarian', a
'corrector of proofs', than which epithets Nietzsche has few
nore scathing. The art of this culture is 'the culture of
opera' which passed itself off as the re-birth of Greek
drama with that travesty of tragic locution, the recitative.
Nietzsche nocks the delusion of the Florentine aesthetes
that they had re-discovered, with their effete and
optimistic pastoral, the art of the Greeks. This opera, says
,78,Nietzsche, is the offspring of the critical layman .
	 It
was truly un-musical listeners who demanded that the words
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should be understood above all else. . . .Opera is the
expression of amateurism in art.' It springs fran the belief
that 'anyone capable of eitotion is an artist'. This pastoral
optimism has managed to 'divest music of its Dionysiac
cosmic significance, and to turn it into a formally playful
entertainment'.
But a new 'daerron ris [es] fran the bottanless depths',
fran 'the Dionysiac soil of the German spirit.. . terrifying
arid inexulicable, powerful and hostile - German music. . .in
its mighty sun-cycle fran Bach to Beethoven, fran
Beethoven to Wagner'. But the critics fail to recognise the
significance of this phenanenon and can talk of nothing but
'beauty'. 'While the critic held sway in the theatre and the
concert hall, the journalist in the schools and the press in
society, art degenerated into an entertainment of the lowest
kind, and aesthetic criticism became the catalyst for a
vain, distracted, selfish. . . social caripanionability....
What we must hope for is 'the rebirth of German myth'
in the same fashion that the Lutheran chorale ierged fran
the abyss at the time of the Reformation, for tragedy is
impossible without myth. A German tragedy must be founded on
German myth which must be recovered along with 'all things
German' and the 'inner necessity' which nu.ist be sought 'in
the ambition to be rthy of our sublime predecessors,
Luther as wall as our great artists and poets' •80
One last musical observation concerns the meaning of
dissonance: the pleasure of dissonance is the Diorlysiac
pleasure 'experienced even in pain'. It is, to put it
another way, part of the tragic seriousness.
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*	 *	 *
It was in October 1917 that Vrieslander wrote the
letter which crarrined the genie, Wagner, back into the bottle
and made Nietzsche, and through Nietzsche Schopenhauer, nore
fully accessible. At that point, the German army was secure
in the 'massively fortified and ccinfortable trenches of the
Hindenberg Line' while the British wallowed in 'the
shell-churned mud of the Ypres salient1 •81 That October had
seen an apparent easing of the state of siege which austria
had been suffering. It saw the rrving forward of the Italian
front frcm the Isonzo to the Tagliamento, and by November
the fifteenth, when Schenker wrote his reply, the front had
been pushed as far as the Piave. The Italians had airrost
been driven out of the Alps. , Theviso, Castelfranco,
Verona seemed under threat. The attack, planned in august in
sheer desperation and carried out with the aid of six German
divisions withdrawn fran the Russian front, had succeeded
beyond all expectations.
These military facts might seem to have given reason
for sane satisfaction on the side of the Central Powers. For
their populations, however, satisfaction was in very short
supply. It would take rrore than the pishing forward of a
front line to soothe the horror of the war. 'The earth,'
wrote Hesse in the previous August, was 'littered with the
dead and dying, so ravaged and shattered, so charred and
desecrated. .. [that]. . .the voices of the wounded, the screams
of the mad, the accusing plaints of nothers and fathers,
sweethearts and sisters, the people' s cry of hunger...'
demanded only one response: the end of the war.82
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If there was no iiood of jubilation in Vienna in the
autumn of 1917 the reason can be guessed from the joy of
General Lecquis, a German divisional cciunander on the
Italian front, at the capture of a few chickens and pigs.83
The Italian supply depots, not the Italian army, checked the
advance. Food was a greater need than territory, or even
victory. By the following June, the front line was still the
Piave, and Austria's condition was so enfeebled that all the
Italians needed to do was to wait for hunger to crush her.
A year after the forward push, Austria fell. The misery and
starvation had iterely been prolonged.
*	 *	 *
It was irortant to be able to read Nietzsche without a
bad conscience in 1917. He might have been writing for 1917,
just as he might have been writing for Schenker as one of
those readers 'who is not easy to find', an artist with
analytic abilities. There were many other things in The
Birth of Tragedy and in the Attanpt at a Self-Criticism
which must have seened vividly, urgently relevant to
Schenker. The Birth of Tragedy, as Nietzsche tells us, was
written 'while the thunders of. . . battle. . . rolled away over
Europe' • He speaks of a peace under debate at Versailles.
Wnat 'a different peace, what a different resonance that name
svuld have for Schenker.
Nietzsche sanctions pessimism, which is Schenker' s
characteristic state of mind, yet he scorns resignation,
romantic resignation, Schopenhauerian resignation, rrrst of
all Christian resignation, and since resignation, a resigned
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and anti-artistic rnrality is, in his belief, the hall-mark
of Christianity, he characterises his own book as
'anti-Christian'. It is hardly necessary to labour the rnral
support offered to a thinker who had resolutely resisted the
lure of Christian consolation by a werk so celebrated, so
fearless, in which his refusal is represented as an
affirmation of life and of art.
Nietzsche offers support to ts!x further aspects of
Schenker' s own outlook which seem to be contradictory but
which are in fact ccinplementary: his high hopes of German
culture and the depth of his disappointment in it,
especially in German music. This support is hardly affected
by the fact that Nietzsche goes too far for Schenker by
saying, in the Attnpt at a Self-Criticism, that German
music is decadent and rcznantic in origin as well as in fact.
Schenker uld hardly be disturbed by this, since the one
area in which he did not feel any need to regard Nietzsche
as authoritative was music.
When we care to Nietzsche's diagnosis of the causes of
Greek decline, we can see how apt this diagnosis must have
seemed to Schenker' s own time: the empty optimism, the
shallow ncdesty, the cheerfulness and the overweening
ambition of science, and the corresponding craving for
distraction, for trivial amusement, for beauty, all of which
• had proved so fragile. If ever the cheerful optimism of
science was out of place it must have been where Schenker
was standing in 1917. Decadence was not a threat but a
reality. The Epire to which he owed his intellectual
existence had gone, and its heartland was under siege. It
seemed the veil of Maya had been rent asunder in an orgy to
end all orgies. If pessimism was not sufficiently justified
then, it weuld find fresh justification in the horrors still
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to cane. And had not this state of affairs been preceded by
a period in which triviality had been eles.'ated to the level
of a philosophy of life, almost a religion, when the mere
suggestion that anything serious might underlie the glossy
surface of existence had either been felt to be in bad
taste, or was absorbed as part of the entertainment, a spice
to enliven the blandness? The veil was not so much a veil as
a padded wall which no cry could penetrate.
At the beginning of his career as a serious theoretical
writer we see Schenker dabbling in everything, in a climate
in which such dabbling with theories, with ideas, was very
much the fashion. Everybody had his theory, and not even the
most jejune, the most nonsensical, the most vicious went
without followers. On the one hand there were the optimists
who had cracked the 'riddle of the universe' and were ready
to reconstruct the world rationally, having first cut
thnselves free of that ball and chain known as
metaphysics. 84 On the other were the histrionic despairers
who saretimes followed up their diagnoses of catastrophe
with suicide. 85 New fields of inquiry, of whose possibility
no-one had had any suspicion a century before, were being
discovered by the day, new pasts, new species, new places,
new worlds, and new explanations, new theoretical
relationships, new intellectual partitions. The acadnic
world was a maelstran, in which the great thing was to spot
the strongest theory, seize it and hang on to it for dear
life. But this was also the age of the amateur, Nietzsche's
'layman', and the age of every species of superstition. It
was not always easy to distinguish the crackpot fran the
genius, the great healer frau the quack, or even to be sure
to which category one rightly, oneself, belonged. 86
By 1917 the enthusiasms and the denunciations of 1895
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must have seemed equally trivial and the argument of The
Birth of Tragedy, which had struck Nietzsche's
contemporaries as merely disruptive, now presented itself as
revelatory, salutary, even sober, but above all vivid,
courageous and full of the radiance of its subject which
contrasted so sharply with the grey chaos, the squalor of
daily life and the spiritual helplessness of everyone caught
up in it.
Schenker 's intellectual experience had been a curious
one. Beginning frccrt a position of eclecticism bordering on
the indiscriminate he had gradually narrowed and refined his
theoretical focus until, by 1917, he had becczne extreme in
his exclusiveness. But his exclusiveness was very different
frai that of the • specialist'. Unlike the conventional
musicologist he needed a cultural frame of reference, a
human standpoint, which would give his focus validity, one
that convinced him personally, not a mere ideology with
which to align himself. chat he now needed, therefore, was
no longer intellectual stimulation, but confirmation.
Schopenhauer' s musical theory was one supreme confirmation,
not a discovery but an independent endorsement, a
literary-artistic framework, a philosophical definition for
all his best insights. Nietzsche's cultural theory gave him
the rroral support he needed, the confirmation of the value
of the endeavour, the affirmation of self-worth necessary
for him to pursue these insights as far as they would take
him. It was a peculiarly lonely path on which he needed the
example of such figures, in the magnificence of their own
loneliness, to sustain him.
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The inipact of Nietzsche on fin de siecle cultural
debate, however variously his 'iork was interpreted and
however little The Birth of Tragedy was understood, was
clearly enormous. Nietzsche' s themes are the familiar themes
of the period of the initiation of Modernism. The
efflorescence of pseudo religions is one indication of the
extent of the cultural disorientation of the t±e. Scine of
these panaceas purported to be scientific, and sane versions
of science offered to take the place of religion. Both
science and art did became substitute religions for many
people. A descent into barbarism accanpanied by failed
attempts at a new art as a replacnt for the moribund
faiths of the past, or by scientised versions of them, was,
perhaps, the interpretation of culture thich best fitted the
day to day experience of those living through the social and
technological turmoil of the turn of the century. This would
explain the popularity of theories such as those offered by
Nordau and Spengler as well as the appeal of a figure like
Karl Kraus.
Nietzsche offered an intellectually challenging and
supremely eloquent diagnosis of this situation, not
canprariised, as so many such interpretations were, by
canplicity with the mythology they were examining. Only
perhaps in his references to the Lutheran chorale does
Nietzsche betray an tional involvement beyond the reach
of his critical consciousness. tbst important of all, at
least in his early rk, he brings plausible hope of release
fran the cultural paralysis which seeid to be the
inevitable effect of this situation. That this release was
to be through art made his message a deeply consoling one
for the artists, who were perhaps the most conscious of the
artisans for whan the technological age bad use only as
providers of nostalgic decoration.
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The idea of a 'new Socrates' answers to a need for sane
sort of saviour of the cultural situation and to the need of
individuals who found it impossible, for one reason or
another, to pursue the traditional path of the artist of
the past - that of maker whose rk was constructed on the
firm foundation of a craft tradition - but who were,
nevertheless, so strongly imbued with the impulse to be
artists that they could not be anything else. The role of
the artist became an expression of the impossibility of
acquiescing in the cultural situation, yet a tormenting
sense of the impossibility of the artist's position was the
experience of riost of the major artists of the period. Very
few were able to adopt the role in the unselfconscious
fashion of a Goethe or a !zart.
Nietzsche' s analysis of the state of ITcdern culture
makes Scheriker' s cultural pessimism intelligible. Following
Nietzsche, Schenker sees the fate of culture and the fate of
music inextricably intertwined. Schenker' s writing, fran the
late nineties onwards, treats these beliefs as given. Having
cane to Nietzsche first as a young Wissenschaftler, he
returned to him as a disillusioned middle-aged writer and
teacher in search of a rationale and professional
self-definition, sanething the institutionalisation of
musical scholarship and his own exclusion fran the
institutions denied him. Nietzsche offered t.o things which
pranised to make this situation irore bearable: an example of
a life canbining the scholarly with the creative outside the
institutions of learning, and just such a cultural
rationale.
It is impossible to know whether Schenker consciously
adopted Nietzsche' s conception of a 'Socratic artist' -
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whether as a rrdel for, or a rationalisatiori of, his own
life - but the life presents just the characteristics one
would expect to see if this had been the case. Caught
between the scientific and the artistic in a potentially
paralysing way, he found in Nietzsche a convincing
interpretation of the cultural conditions respon.ible for
his predicament. This interpretation was both calming and
liberating.
The title of Schenker' s magmmi opus, Neue Musikalische
Theorien und Phantasien, is a puzzle. 'Theories and ....'
what? Fantasies, imaginings, inventions, visions? However we
translate Phantasien it must present an antithesis to, and
at the same time a reconciliation with, Theorien, and the
reconciled antithesis is exactly that contained in the idea
of a 'musical Socrates'. This is not the kind of title
anyone would chooses if his object was to establish his
scientific credentials. The Nietzschean formulation provides
an intelligible context for Schenker' s determination to find
a way of reconciling the theorist and the artist in himself.
This reconciliation clearly could not be achieved through
encyclopaedic Musikwissenschaft, but rather through a
'synthetic' theory which parallels the synthesis which
Schenker believed to be the process of the creation of works
of art.
Many things in Schenker are prefigured in Nietzsche:
his suspicion of the 'mass', its philistinism and the
camercialisation of art associated with it; his contempt
for prograim music arid the hermeneutic writers who pander
to this philisitinism; his devotion to the idea of a German
culture, to seriousness in art; his distrust of science and
of institutions whose raison d retre was to further its aims;
his contempt for theorists, Nietzsche' s 'theoretical man',
- 368 -
and the intellectualisation of art, despite his own
involvement in it; his sense of irripending catastrophe; his
feeling of intellectual and artistic isolation. Both
Nietzschean struggle and Schopenhauerian quietism are part
of his constitution, the former manifesting itself in his
polemical writing, the latter in his contlation of the
classical masterpieces.
Schenker was not irrmune to the ubiquitous influence of
the positivist ethos which was particularly strong in Vienna
at the turn of the century, but he was no positivist.
Preoccupation with the conflict between intellect and
'instinct' in art, reason and feeling, is Schiller's theme,
a theme of the 1790s, not a twentieth-century discovery. It
is a conflict in which fin de siecle positivism takes sides,
not one originating with it. Fran Schiller to Nietzsche the
notion of a reconciliation between art and intellect,
between the external significance capable of rational
consideration, and the inner significance capable of
expression only through art, Hegel' s notion of a
transcendent art, Schopenhauer' s of a rrdern Pythagorean
philosophy, Nietzsche's of a Socratic artist, keep
appearing, interven with the notion of art as 'a thing of
the past', or a new art of the future, or an art which
begins again fran the beginning.
The preoccupations of the students of the arts at the
time Schenker 's work appeared in merica were far removed
fran these. It was not that the questions which concerned
Schenker 's generation were no longer of interest, but that
the way in which these questions were approached had
undergone a radical shift. The new approaches were already
being practised in Schenkei's Vienna. Indeed it is
inpossible to draw any sharp line separating ndern fran a
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pre-nK)dern theories of art. The separation of the world of
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer fran that of Forte and Narmour
was brought about by no sudden dawning of the light but by
historical events with which the older traditions are
peculiarly intermingled in post-war intellectual history.
That is to say, the causes of the historical events which
brought about the cultural fissure across which Schenker' s
thought had sanehow to be transferred are, in the writings
of their iirnediate aftermath, often associated with these
older intellectual traditions whose representatives came to
be seen as bogey-men. The prophets of doan were regarded as
the contrivers of the doan. It was believed that by
preaching catastrophe they had brought it about. The idea of
German culture, the notion of a restoration of an age of
glory, had been the intellectual alibi of the
National-Socialists. The horrors they perpetrated were seen
as a consequence of the abuse of social theories deriving
ultimately fran a notion of historical inevitability
peculiarly associated in the anglo-Saxon mind with German
idealism, strangely, in view of the origins of the
twentieth-century version of positivism so often set in
opposition to this tradition.
It is not surprising that the anigr intellectual above
all would want to dissociate himself fran this tradition, or
that those exiles who were already active in the dolition
of the tradition - the very people whan Scheriker and those
like him, of whan there were not a few, regarded as the
wreckers of Western culture - should have had everything
their own way. The cold war heaped yet itore opprobrium on
the German philosophical tradition which came to be seen as
the origin not only of Nazism but also of Stalinism. In such
a climate it was only necessary to shout 'Hegel 1' to make
the Schenkerians run for cover.
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F
Bit by bit 'Elerculaneurn and Panpei' - for Schenker's
image turns out to be rrre appropriate than he could have
imagined - have begun to be excavated, a little of the
rubble gingerly cleared away. The heirs of Wittgenstein
discover that, far fran being nre positivist that the
positivists, he was a closet Spenglerian, under the spell of
Schopenhauer. Modernism turns out to be canplicit with the
aesthetics of catastrophe as propounded by Karl Kraus alrong
others. It has been noticed that many of those who were in
the greatest danger fran the cataclysm were arrong the rrost
vociferous of those allegedly rking it up. It begins to
seem perverse to accuse the people crying fran the windows
of the burning house of being responsible for the
conflagration. It becanes increasingly difficult to
distinguish the effects of the critique of science fran the
effects of science on the develonent of the popular
ideologies which daninated the first half of the century.
Things are not as simple as they seemed. Certainty no longer
seens a convincing posture.
'We now know', to use an expression as characteristic
of the ncod of the middle of our own century in the English
speaking orld as it was of the popular science of the
closing decades of the last, that we need to know much
rrore before we can pass judgement on 'Schenker the
philosopher-historian. It is not simply a question of being
fair to Schenker, of applying the 'principle of historical
justice that phenarna should be measured by their own
standards, not alien ones', with which presumably Schenker' s
ndern critics would concur, although musical scholarship's
treatment of Schenker is a sorry daronstration of what
happens when this principle is put to the test. 87 Before
this process can even be bgun we have to attempt to
establish what these 'standards' were. This, as we have
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seen, is no easy task. It is not even clear that anything
corresponding to the idea of a 'standard' - a generally
accepted criterion for the scientific - will ever be
identified in the intellectual climate in which Schenker
worked. On the contrary, everything suggests a state of
turrToil in which profoundly different views were equally
strongly held by significant proportions of the
intellectual lite. But this is only part of our difficulty.
re disturbing is the realisation that an examination of
the cultural pre-suppositions of Schenker' s era is, in
effect, an examination of the roots of our own. These may
turn out, after all, not to be, as positivism would have us
believe, in the tidy and antiseptic dctnain of physical
science and its accaripanying rationale, but in highly
speculative theories of culture, theories of history:
ultimately in the metaphysics to which the positivists
thought they had put an end.
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Notes
1. Hesse, 1985, 'Zarathustra's Return', p. 79. This
essay first appeared in the Neue Zuricher
Nachrichten in 1919. Hesse called Nietzsche 'the
last great vehicle of the German spirit.. .that did
not express [itself] in the uproar of the herd or
in mass enthusiasm'. He believed 'the German mind
had degeneated long before the war' and that
Nietzsche represented the point to which it was
necessary to return, a feeling shared by people in
Schenker' s circle. Walter Dabms (Federhofer, 1895,
p. 89) wrote to Schenker in 1919, 'I escape frau
the misery of Germany into the pure world of
counterpoint and experience hours of joy with
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and see afresh with awe
how trrendously right ware these noble souls
together with Schopenhauer and other great
men...'. ('Ich rette mich aus den Deutschen Elend
in die reine Welt des Kontrapunktes und erlebe
Feststunden in Nietzsche und Kierkegaard und sehe
wiederum mit Entsetzen, wie ungeheuer recht dieser
erluchten Geister in Verein mit Schopenhauer und
anderen Gssen gehabt haben...'.) Hesse' s remarks
about 'the herd' and 'mass enthusiasm' suggest the
context in which Schenker' s anti-dcratic
diatribes in the second book of Counterpoint
should be read. The animus is absent in Hesse, who
can even respect the Spartacists. But Spartacus
'did not transform slaves into man'. The masses,
as masses, could not represent anything but a
political weapon. The whole concept of a human
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'mass 1 has quite different resonances for readers
of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer than for those who
think in historical-political terms alone.
Schenker ' s attitude was hardened by the sense of
betrayal engendered by the lack of resistance of
the denxcrats to the crippling concessions and
reparations danded by the allies. Zarathustra,
Hesse suggests, would have reproached him, 'Is it
our mission to keep up this loud lamentation. . .7'.
2.	 This is the fragment On Music and Words. See
Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 106.
3	 See Federhofer, 1985, p. 290.
4. Ibid., p. 290-1.
5. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1987, p. 15, ff..
6 Federhofer, 1985, p. 7: 'On the day of his death I
cannot suppress the seatiingly paradoxical
observation how much happier L. 's life would have
been, with his desire for recognition, if instead
of encountering teachers like Jadassohn and
Graedner, he had had me as his guide to [the world
of] art! But how can one ask nature, which has
fixed the order of the generations as it has, to
turn them backwards?' ('2ni Tage seines Todes kann
ich die scheinbar paradoxe Benerkung nicht
unterdriicken, L. ware weit glickiicher in Leben
gewesen, wenn er bei seiner Neigung zur
Erkenntnis, statt auf Lehrer wie 1Jadas[s]ohn,
Graedner zu stossen, mich zurn ihrer in der Kunst
gehabt htte! ?ber wie soil man der Natur, die di
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- Reihe der Generationen so. . . festgesetzt hat, darin
gerade eine retrograde Richtung vorschreiben
wollen.')
7. See Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, pp. 60-63. This
conclusion is inescapable in this instance. His
refusal to allow himself to hear Beethoven' s
massage can only be the consequence of an
otional block. Nothing in his theory depends on
the denial of the 'alidi of the modes,
whatever that maans. To acknowledge the historical
role of modality would not even carunit him to
pluralism. His antipathy has iore to do with th
ecclesiastical character of modal music and the
clerical influence on Viennese institutions than
with musical or historical logic. It leads to the
curious impression among the tedious point-scoring
over theoretical details in Counterpoint of
somaone hunting for treasure with the aid of
conflicting maps on an island which he thinks is
not the one to which they, or sane of then,
refer.
s Bruckner' s student it was this kind of
counterpoint Schenker had learned, and it was the
Viennese tradition he wished to reform. His desire
to detach it fran its source in the theoretical
tradition associated with polyphonic vocal music
distorts his otherwise insightful historical
enquiries. Instead of providing the motivation he
believes any valid rule must be able to
demonstrate, he makes the rules refer back to
music justified on the basis of the rules. Where
he sees a mismatch, he either modifies the rule or
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denounces the music.
Wriat he really needed to do was to pursue the role
of the contrapuntal heritage in classical music,
which is what he does in Free Ccmposition and in
the best parts of Counterpoint, but he was caught
up in the nature of his project which involved the
writing of a text-book on counterpoint. Moreover
he needed to go through the critical process his
counterpoint books embody. But these are
essentially private meditations, preparatory to
the main task. If his project had been differently
conceived, that is what they might have remained.
As it was, the polemical habit encouraged the
prejudice against which even the rrost minute
attention to the musical and historical evidence
was powerless.
8	 Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1990, p. 141.
9. See Federhofer, 1982. The 'scholarly' attitude
which contrasts so sharply with Nietzsche's can be
seen in Adler' s remark in the foreword to his
essay on Mahler that 'any discussion of...
personal relations was excluded on the ground that
my intention was to view the picture on a higher
plane'. (See 'Mahier and Guido Adler' by Edward R.
Reilly in Musical Quarterly, July, 1972.) This
'higher plane' was the 'scientific' study of music
history.
10. See Canetti, 1987.
11. See Johnston, 1972, p. 204. This is unfair to
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Kraus. Canetti speaks not only of Kraus' s 'wrath,
his scorn, his bitterness, hi loathing', 'his
rturderous courage in pursuing the powerful', his
'arrogance', but also 'his worship in regard to
love and women', 'his compassion and tenderness'
and 'his ever active veneration for his gods,
which included such diverse beings as Shakespeare,
Claudius, Goethe, Nestroy, Off enbach'. reover,
these negative 'affects', as Canetti describes
them, make Kraus 'the opposite of the. . . huge
majority of writers, who butter people up in order
to be loved and lauded by them'. In this, at
least, Schenker resembles him! See Canetti, 1987,
p. 32.
12.	 Canetti, 1987, p. 35.
13.	 Ibid., p. 37.
14. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 97: 'The
cultural power of our academies has never been
lower than at the present; the 'journalist', the
paper-slave of the day, has emerged victorious
over the academic in all cultural spheres...'.
This is, of course, part of Nietzsche's wider
critique of the reduction of art to a kind of
spectator sport, ultimately the Euripidean
reduction of tragedy to mere theatre.
15.	 See Federhofer, 1985, p. 302: 'Unk1(ge Menschen,
denen die bigkeit mangein, aus bestinri±en
UrStchen ihre Wirkungen zu deduzieren, halten sich
missverstnd1icher eise die Unfbigkeit zugite,
sobald sie jemand[em] gegenberstehen, der diese
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Fáhigkeit besitzt. Flugs verwandelt der Unfhige
semen Mangel in eine angebliche Lebensrobustheit,
die er selbst zu preisen, nicht mide wird und der
er in herabsetzender Weise die vorausschauender
Kraft des Anderen nur als etwas Krankhaftendes,
als eine fltçfindlichkeit, gegeriberste11t. Darin
spiegeit sich übrigens wie in einem Microcosmos
das Bud jener Praktiken, mit denen die alizeit
Robusten die angeblichen empfindiichen Genies
bedenken.'
16. Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 17.
17. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 313, ff..
18. Several of the leading members of what became
known as the Second Viennese School, for example,
who fell into this category, were fanatical
followers of Kraus.
19. See, for example, Belier, 1989. It is in part to
this exclusion that Belier attributes the Jewish
contribution - which he considers crucial - to the
rise of Viennese MDdernism. In music, however,
this idea seems doubtful. The Second Viennese
School had various kinds of institutional
corinect.ions, sate of which were arguably nore
accessible to the Jews arrong them than to the
non-Jews, and in so far as they were accessible
to the latter it was often by way of the
former. The connections with Mahier, with Busoni,
and with Adler are cases in point. It is not
easy to separate Viennese cultural life into a
Christian (Catholic) institutionalised philistine
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conservatism on the one hand and a radical
dernism which was the property of a group
of Jewish outsiders on the other. 1\o of the
three leading lights of the Second Viennese
School, after all, were not Jewish, and the only
academic musical institution whose ethos could
be considered in any way Catholic was the
Conservatory, which was an off-shoot of a society
whose founder was Fanny von Arnstein. The
attitudes of Jews were anything but stereotypical,
as we cans fran the conservatism of Schenker,
a Jew and hostile to dernism, fran the hardly
less conservative attitude of the Jewish
dernist, Schoenberg, and, among many other
things, fran the fact that the prime target of
Karl Kraus' s rage against the abuse of language
ws a press which Beller grants was datiinated by
Jews. The idea of musical &dernism as a Jewish
rrovsnent is sustainable only if the definition is
extended to include Viennese musicology and
Schenkerian theory. If there did exist a sharp
dividing line between Jews and others, formal
institutions do not seem to define it with any
clarity. The exclusions which operated against
Jews were, as Schenker pointed out, legal and
political, rather than institutional in this
broader sense.
20. See, e.g., McCagg, 1989.
21. We can see this network in action throughout
Schenker' s career. He could hardly have survived
without it, from his access as a student to
the newspaper magnate Harden onwards. Schenker
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perhaps put too much faith in its pewers at
a time when they were diminishing. Institutions
founded earlier in the century with the aid
of Jewish wealth, such as the Gesellschaft der
Musikfreunde in Wien, had been anything but
underground or alternative, in the sense, for
instance, of the private performing society set
up by Schoenberg a century later. The earlier
institutions were parallel to and often successful
rivals of, existing cultural institutions to
which, at the same time, Jews were making a vital
contribution. Indeed, the Jewish contribution to
the developiient of 'enlightened' culture and to
its institutionalisation was hardly less than its
contribution to the Modernism which challenged the
ethos of institutional culture. By Scheriker' s time
such overt participation was no longer so welcome,
because of bourgeois rather than aristocratic
resistance. As 1'tCagg points out, many assimilated
families, rather than encouraging upward nobility
arrong newer irtinigrants as earlier waves had done,
were becaning wary of being seen to favour fellow
Jews, or of being associated with than at all.
22. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 44: 'Die Not, in die ich
hineingeboren whrde, die mich stets begleitet hat
und mir bis heute treu geblieben ist, zwang rnich,
mit alien erdenklichen Cpfern urn den Lebens-
unterhalt zu sorgen und zu bangen. Diesen nun
gerade durch meine neue Lebre verdienen zu wollen,
war em tragisches Unterfangen: Elner Menschheit,
die dieser Lehre nicht braucht, richtiger, nicht
gebrauchen kann (in Schule, Betrieb usw.), die
Lebesgroschen abringen zu wollen, war Wahnsinn,
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und ich musste Opfer bringen, urn die Schuler zu
finden und zu halten. • ('The need into which I was
born and which has kept faith with me to this day,
compelled me, in spite of every imaginable
sacrifice, to worry about and fear for my
livelihood. To attempt to provide for this
directly through my new theory would have been a
tragic undertaking: to try to extract an incane
from people who have no use for my theory, indeed
cannot make use of it (in schools, in catinerce,
etc.,), madness, so I had to make sacrifices in
order to find pupils and keep them.')
23.	 Thid., p. 21: '...ich selbst war mir aber kiar
dass ich keinen ister erreiche, geschweige
ibertreffe....' ('... it was, however, clear to me
that I could never match, much less surpass, any
of the masters....')
24.	 See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975, p. 89.
25.	 See Forte, 1959.
26 See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, pp. xxii-xiii. It
is depressing that Schenker felt the need, at this
stage, to justify his monumental project as a
substitute for the art to which he had felt he
could not aspire, and to propose, in bitter,
alnst dog-in-the-manger terms, its use for the
same dismal purpose for young musicians. It is
still more dispiriting that these S sentiments,
whose pusillanimity is belied by the substance of
the book, have been seized upon as a pretext for
reducing his theory to a 'system' acceptable to
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the academies whose ethos he spent his life
resisting. These thoughts, once again, have
nothing to do with the philosophy of music and
everything to do with Schenker's situation, as the
quotation in n. 22 makes clear.
27. The crucial text is, of course, the essay on David
Strauss in the Untimely Meditations. See
Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1990.
28. n accessible German version appears in the
Insel Taschenbuch series. (See Nietzsche, 1987.)
The standard English version has been Nietzsche,
tr. Kaufmann, 1967. A new English version has
recently appeared. (See ,tr. Whiteside,
1993.)
29. See, e.g., Silk and Stern, 1981.
30. 'Why should it not also hold true in the
intellectual area that through an intuitive
perception of eternally creative nature we may
becane srthy of participating spiritually in its
creative processes?' Goethe on 'Judgement through
Intuitive Perception'. See Goethe, tr. Miller,
1988, p. 31. Many other passages in Goethe's
scientific writings could be cited in which this
view of science as either actually or ideally a
synthetic as well as an analytic activity is
expressed. A perceptive discussion of their
relevance to Schenker' s thought is to be found in
'Music and MDrphology: Goethe' s influence on
Schenker' s Thought', by William Pastille, in
Siegel, 1990. The influence of Goethe's scientific
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writings on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is
everywhere apparent. Schopenhaier energetically
defends him in his struggle against the
Newtonians. Helrnholtz also read him with a kind
of uneasy awe. (See 2mrine, 1987, p. 45, ff..) His
tonal concept evokes the aphorism in which Goethe
describes nature as 'simple in essence and
manifold in appearance', as do Schopenhauer's
musical and Nietzsche's tragic theories, and,
obviously, Schenker' s theory.
31.	 See Nietzsche, 1987, p. 192, ff..
32. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 14: 'We
shall have gained much for the science of
aesthetics when we have succeeded in perceiving
directly, and not only through logical reasoning,
that art derives its continuous aevelopuent ¶.rcxtt
the duality of the po11ine and the Dionysiac;
just as the reproduction of the species depends on
the duality of the sexes. . . the Greeks.. . revealed
the profound mysteries of their artistic doctrines
to the discerning mind, not in concepts but in the
vividly clear forms of their deities...'.
33.	 See Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1990, p. 171.
34.	 See Nietzsche, 1987, p. 193. 'Es war nicht weniger
als em wissenschaftflcher Selbstrrord.'
35.	 See Federhofer, 1985, p. 303: 'All das ist auch
van Chor der griechichen Tragc5die zu verstehen und
auch van stirrrnführungs Principien der alteren
Music. . . . Dass wir heute CIióre nicht mehr
- 383 -
gebrauchen und in der Musik mit Stufen arbeiten,
hebt die Warheit der antiken Chor und Stirrmfihrung
nicht auf.' From a diary entry of 1912.
36. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 5: 'As the image
of our life motion music. . .may.. . express different
meanings... '. This passage is not quite pure
Schopenhauer, since there remains a trace of
Hans lick, but it patently derives, like much more
on these pages, fran that source.
37. These controversies are examined at length in
Silk and Stern, 1981.
38. An idea appearing in Schenker's earliest
theoretical writings. See 'The Spirit of Musical
Technique' in Schenker, tr. Pastille, 1988.
39. The first thapter of Harmony is full of related
ideas, sane obviously Nietzschean, such as the
remarks about Greek music on p. 3. (Canpare
Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 81.) Whether
this indicates an insightful reading of The Birth
of Thagedy however, is doubtful. The plethora of
ideas in Schenker' s early writings is symptanatic
of the intellectual ethos of fin de siècle Vienna
in which fashionable ideas from literature,
philosophy, popular science and technology were
freely associated.
40. see Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 27 for the
clearest parallel: 'I reccmrend that everyone take
the trouble to feel his way fran the foreground to
the middleground and background.. .so he will
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arrive at shorter and shorter versions, and
finally the shortest, the fundanental structure.'
The presentation in Free Canposition is, of
course, as in The Birth of Thagedy itself, in the
opposite direction, logically enough, since
Schenker, like Nietzsche, sees his theory as a
theory of synthesis not a theory of analysis.
nalysis is no rrre than the process of
'level[ling] down, stone by stone' or in this
case, tone by tone, by whose means the synthetic
process is discovered. Schenker recnends his
readers to test independently his claim that by
using the familiar concepts of ornamentation and
diminution to peel away levels of elaboration,
they will find simpler and simpler patterns, still
coherent, still recognisably musical, and see for
themselves the feasibility of his basic argument
about the nature of musical structure. However
naively they do this, they are likely to be as a
result more receptive, more sympathetic to his
vastly more sophisticated detailed procedure,
developed over a long period of time, and
more patient with the difficulties attending
the verbal formulations of the theoretical
generalisations arising fran it.
Felix Saltzer demurred at Schenker' s suggestion
that any musically educated person can do this.
But if this were not the case his theory would
depend on a circularity: it could only be tested
in relation to the work conceived in terms of the
theory. Schenker always maintained that his theory
was simpler than other theories. The canplexity of
the details of the theory do not nullify the
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simplicity of the approach in its essentials. The
advice given to readers by the editors of the
English version of his last book invites them to
follow Schenker through the maze of his particular
detailed concepts and jargon without first gaining
an insight into these simple essentials. This is
less obviously unacceptable than the editorial
practice of excising whole passages fran the
works, but it suggests a lingering reluctance to
trust Scheriker with the reader and the reader with
Schenker.
41. See Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, p. 6: 'We should
get accustomed to seeing tones as creatures'. In
a philosophical void this is bound to seem
a very strange idea, but in the preceding
paragraph Scheriker can be seen struggling
with the Schopenhauerian notion of music as
parallel objectification of the will, apparently
as yet without benefit of a clear understanding
of the analogy. He sees, for example, the
general 'concept' - Schopenhauer's 'idea' -
following rather than preceding the individual
who objectifies it, and his notion of a
'procreative urge' owes nore to biological
theories in which the gene is nore important
than the individual carrier rather than to
Schoperihauer' s notion of the egoism of the
individual.
42. A confusion between 'continuous becoming', which
is a positive concept, and 'continuous present',
which is a negative one, creeps into the
translation of Free Composition. On p. 3 Schenker
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refers to the Schopenhauerian concept of a
'continuous present without connction, unwinding
chaotically in empty animal fashion', Y em ewige
Gegenwart, ohne Zusaimienhang, in blankem Tierwesen
chaotisch abrollend') although he relates this to
the foreground in a way which, like Schopenbauer' s
remarks on Beethoven, fails to make clear that it
refers not to the actual foreground of the music,
which in both theories must be the perfection of
the coherence in which it is grounded, but to the
confused perception of the uninitiated listener.
On p. 18, Oster uses airrost the same expression,
'continual present', to aenote the role of the
fundamental structure as guardian angel,
guaranteeing the coherence of the foreground. It
is not necessary, however, to translate
Gleichzeitigkeit (contemporaneity) in this way.
'Continuous presence' (could this be what Oster
meant?) would have been a little closer to
Schenker' s meaning but would still have had the
disadvantage of risking the invocation of the
negative concept employed earlier to denote
incoherence. Schenker' s own attempt to explain his
concept - which is, after all, perfectly simple -
is already unnecessarily canplicated. The
'contemporaneity' of the Ursatz and the
transformations, i.e., the non-temporal nature of
their relationship, should present no difficulty
to a reader who has grasped the analogy between
(large-scale) transformation and (small-scale)
ornamentation. Having presented this idea clearly
Schenker then mystifies it, first by saying -
bewilderingly - that the structural relationships
cannot be presented graphically, then by
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introducing a quite inappropriate analogy. The
notion of the meeting of past, present and future
in a point of time is about the worst possible
idea to raise just where he wishes to ernphasise
the a-temporal character of the relationships
between structural levels.
The alleged spatial-temporal confusion found by
satie comentators in Schenker' s structural model
is undoubtedly partly attributable to Schenker' s
inability to leave well alone, and to the
compounding of the resulting confusion in
translation. There are, of course, no such
confusions in the concepts themselves, only
sometimes in their expression.
43. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 83.
44. Ibid., p. 35. The paragraph beginning, 'Throughout
this discussion I have relied...' is Nietzsche's
Schopenhauerian 'resolution' of the 'problem'
contained in Schopenhauer' s explanation of lyric.
To readers who have not previously read
Schopenhauer, just how very Schopenhauerian this
solution is becanes clear only on pp. 77-78. This
must be the excuse for those readers who rejoice
in finding, along with the ungracious and - to put
it kindly - forgetful Nietzsche of Ecce Hano, that
the The Birth of Tragedy 'is only in a few
formulas infected with the cadaverous perfume of
Schoperthauer'.
45. For a discussion of Goethe's notion in relation to
Schenker see Pastille, 1985 p. 81 ff..
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46. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, P. 22.
47. Ibid., p. 29.
48. Ibid., p. 31.
49. Ibid., p. 77. See also n. 44.
50. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, p.
220. See n. 42, Chapter 5 of the present study.
51. Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, p. 216.
so ist die Musik. . .von der erscheinenden Welt
ganz unabhangig...'.
52. Ibid.,	 p.	 223.	 '.. .daher taugt dieselbe
Katiposition fur viele Strophen'.
53. Ibid., p. 198.
54. See Schoperihauer, tr. Payne, 1958, V. II, P. 450.
Nietzsche relates this passage to the passage in
V. I, p. 263.
55. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III p.
219.
56. See n. 51.
57. See Nietzsche's quotation on p. 16 of Nietzsche,
tr. Whiteside, 1993.
58. Ibid., p. 34.
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59. As we can see fran p. 81 (ibid.).
60. Ibid., p. 43.
61. See ibid., p. 76-7, for Nietzsche's dismissal of
Hanslick: '... a false aesthetic, hand in hand with
a misdirected and degenerate art, has grown used
to demanding, on the basis of the concept of
beauty that prevails in the world of the visual
arts, that music should provide an effect similar
to that of works in the visual arts - the arousal
of pleasure in beautiful forms'. Of course,
Nietzsche has in his sights much rrore than Van
Muiskalisch Sch&ien: art-history as a model for
musicology, the reduction of aesthetics to a
question of beauty, the confining of musical
significance to the Leibnizean 'surface' and the
denial of musical rreaning, the whole
Socratic-critical, journalistic-academic ethos of
nineteenth century music aesthetics.
62. See Schenker, tr Oster, 1985, p.5. 'As an image of
our life-motion...'. In the light of this passage,
and many others, so plainly indebted to
Schopenhauer, Schenker' S objection to
'mataphysics' in the next section (in a passage
which appears only in an appendix in the English
version), is as strange as its equation with
'objectivity'. A possible explanation lies in the
religious tone of the passage, and of several
earlier ones. It is as if Schenker is saying that
Schopenhauer' s explanation is right except in one
respect: the Will is not original and unmotivated,
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nor is it a negative force. There is a loving God
guiding it towards the coherence which is its
goal. Kassler, again uniquely, is aware of this
problem, but her solution seems to conjure away
the difference rather than to confront it. Like
many things in Schenker's last work, this is one
of the problems that remains unresolved, a piece
of unfinished business. That there is a genuine
problem is clear. On the one hand, Schenker is
enarroured of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics, but,
on the other, he believes in God. He is also very
conscious that life is a struggle in which the
godly do not always tri.ntiph.
A simpler explanation for what could be merely a
nraient of confusion might lie in the conditions of
extreme mental and physical stress under which
the book was canposed, conditions described so
painfully in one of the last diary entries. (See
Federhofer, 1985 p. 44.) A simpler one still is
that he was behaving in the manner of the
Nietzsche of Ecce Hctno, but this seems the least
likely.
63.	 Ibid., p. 93. 'The word alone was the generator of
tone successions...'.
64. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, ,
221-2. '...die aligemeinen Formen aller niiglichen
Objekte der Erfahrung...'
65. Ibid., p. 223. '....und darf nich mit bewusster
Absichtlichkeit durch Begriffe vermittelte
Nachahmung sein..'
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66.	 Ibid., p. 218-9.
67. See Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, P. 14.
68. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1987, Book I, Chapter
2, part 1.
69. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 110-111.
Here, however, Kaufmann' s version has been
retained. In spite of his declared lack of
sympathy with this part of the work, his
translation of this passage conveys Nietzsche's
exalted, poetic utterance better than the new
version.
70.	 Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, p. 4.
71	 Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 37, ff..
72. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 93.
73. Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 46.
74. Thid., p. 55.
75. Thid., p. 69.
76. Thid., p. 71.
77. Thid., p. 75.
78.	 The layman who sets himself up as critic (Schenker
uses the same word as Nietzsche, der Laie,
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although this, yet again, is concealed by
translation) is the butt of Schenker's scorn, for
example, in the Introduction' to Counterpoint.
The tracing of this phenomenon to the Italian
Renaissance, the setting up in opposition to it of
the German Reformation, and the treatment of the
Lutheran chorale (exempt from the objections to
Christianity in general) as the bearer of the
Dionysian seriousness, the spirit of truth and
nature which flowers in sudden miraculous
Apolline splendour in classical music - hints and
elements of which can be found in German aesthetic
literature from Winckelmann onwards - are brought
together in this particular constellation only by
Nietzsche and Schenker. The inference is clear.
79. Again, canpare the 'Introduction' to Counterpoint
with the passage beginning, 'Even under the most
favourable conditions...', and the paragraph which
follows it beginning with the reference to Kant
and Schopenhauer. Schenker would have been
surprised by the claim of the editor of the latest
English version of The Birth of Thagedy that 'Few
of its readers can give much of an account of its
detailed contents'. He describes three ways in
which it should not be read, the last of which is
'the least misleading way of mistreating BT'. But
why 'mistreat' BT? Why not read it as an essay in
aesthetics, the imaginative meditation on the role
of art in life that it manifestly is? (Yet again
Schopenhauer is held responsible for Nietzsche' s
alleged shortcomings and is accused of
'vagueness', which is not a criticism that can
fairly be levelled against the original version of
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the metaphysics of music, whatever the merits of
the rest of his work.)
80. Schenker' s concurrence with Nietzsche' s judgement
of the significance of Luther stands in striking
contrast to his implacable hostility to the church
rxdes and his fixed determination to reduce
counterpeint to a way of learning about tonal
relationships. The two things are undoubtedly
related. Even Palestrina' s music is regarded,
still, in Free Composition, as embryonic. (See p.
128.)
A perceived affinity between the Judaic ethos and
Lutheran Protestantism has been remarked on by
Stephen Belier. See Belier, 1989, p. 153. Although
Schenker did not convert, he certainly flirted
with Christianity in his twenties, and all the
indications are that if he had done so it would
have been, as in Schoenberg's case, and in the
cases of the others referred to by Beller, to
sane Protestant form of Christianity rather than
to Austrian-Roman-Catholicism, which was felt to
be hostile to German culture. Only in speaking of
Bruckner's piety, which he said reminded him of
his father' s, did Schenker show anything but
hostilty to the Catholic church.
81.	 See Liddeli Hart, 1970, p. 435.
82.	 See, 'To a Cabinet Minister', Hesse, 1985, p.21.
83.	 See Liddell Hart, 1970, p. 436.
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84. Ernst Haekel published in 1899 a book entitled Die
Weltratsel, (literally, the 'world-riddle', the
solution to which was, of course, Darwins's theory
of natural selection). It sold 100,000 copies in
a year, and as many again in an English edition.
(See Chadwick, 1990, p. 176, ff..) Chadwick's
account of German science in the nineteenth
century omits any mention of Helmholtz, or,
perhaps less surprisingly, of Goethe, although he
refers to Haeckel 's book on morphology. Similarly
symptomatic is his remark that Haeckel 'descended
fran science into. . .metaphysics'. This remark is
the more curious since it is followed by a
quotation from Haekel, in which an early instance
of the expression 'We now know' appears: 'We now
know that the soul [is] a sum of plasma movements
in the ganglion-cells'. This must be the kind of
metaphysics at which those 'philosophers' who
think they have disposed of 'the first of all the
sciences' arrive in spite of themselves.
A number of influences on late nineteenth-century
German intellectual attitudes appear here, but in
a highly arbitrary fashion, with no sense of a
centre, a core of shared assumptions against which
such aberrant manifestations as Die Weltratsel
worked. If one looked here for such a core, it
would have to be Hegel, with a glance over the
shoulder at Kant, a dash of Feuerbach, a little
Lamarck. . . and so on. The cultural world of
Schenker seen in this kind of perspective can only
be bewildering.
85. The best known instance is Otto Weininger whose
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fame is generally attributed to the manner, as
much as to the fact, of his suicide. The êclat
with which Weininger's book appeared, however,
could not entirely account for its reception.
86. The most famous sufferer from this dilema was
surely Siegmund Freud in his association with
Wilhelm Fliess. The criminal idiocy of Fliess's
activities are startling enough in themselves.
That they could be taken so seriously suggests
a very peculiar set of intellectual-social
conditions. The reception of Fliess and Weininger
was a very strange phenomenon in a supposedly
scientific age, indicative of much more than
passing indiscretions on the part of an otherwise
solid scientist and a public teorarily caught up
in an affecting drama. It suggests a profound
insecurity about what was real and what was not,
an insecurity not only related to the general
de-stabilisation of culture represented by
political upheavals, the reduction of imperial
pageantry to a kind of real-life operetta, the
substitution of sentimentality for deference, but
also to such things as the de-mythologising of
religion, the systematic assault on the
philosophical tradition and the alienation from
the concerns of the state of so large a part of
its intellectual leadership.
87. See Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 86.
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